The first major update of CTC’s carbon-tax model since 2021 is now in the books, calibrated to 2023 emissions and the putative emissions-reducing provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act. One result stands out: Without federal legislation mandating a robust national carbon tax, the U.S. won’t come close to achieving the hoped-for 50% decline in carbon emissions (from 2005 levels) in the reasonably foreseeable future.
A $20/$15 carbon tax could halve carbon emissions by 2035
A national carbon tax starting next year at $20/ton and rising annually by $15/ton will cut U.S. CO2 emissions in half from 2005 levels in 2035. To halve emissions by 2030 requires $25/ton for both the starting price and the annual rises.
A national carbon price that took effect in 2025 at $20 per (short) ton and rose by $15 per ton each year would, by 2035, halve U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion: from 6,120 million metric tons (“tonnes”) in 2005, the standard baseline year, to an estimated 3,068 million tonnes in 2035, according to CTC’s model (Excel spreadsheet, 2 MB). That computes to a 50% reduction (rounded from 49.9%).
But without a national carbon price, our model projects U.S. emissions in 2035 of 4,606 million tonnes. That would be just 25% below 2005 emissions, putting the country only halfway to the 50%-reduction goal in 2035. And even that piddling progress entails pushing back the customary 2030 target for halving U.S. emissions to 2035, a 5-year delay.
To be fair, the “halving by 2030” goal is generally construed to encompass not just carbon dioxide but also methane, which is regarded as lower-hanging greenhouse-gas fruit on account of its relative concentration in more easily regulatable oil and gas extraction and transport. This January methane began to be subjected to emissions pricing, through a provision of the Inflation Reduction Act mandating that emissions above a certain threshold be taxed at a rate of $900 per tonne.
But even assuming an optimistic three-fourths reduction in methane and other non-carbon GHG’s, CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-burning would have to fall by 44% from 2005 to achieve an overall 50% reduction in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Without a national carbon price, the projected CO2 reduction from 2005 is just 17% in 2030 and, as noted, only 25% in 2035, according to CTC’s model.
Halving carbon emissions by 2030 requires a more heroic carbon tax, one starting at $25/ton in 2025 and rising annually by that amount
We also ran the CTC model to determine the carbon price level and trajectory required to halve U.S. 2005 carbon emissions by 2030 rather than 2035. Talk about a tall order! Here’s what the requisite carbon tax would look like:
- The carbon tax would take effect in 2025 (same as in the 2035 scenario).
- The initial price would be $25 per ton of CO2 rather than $20.
- The annual price rise would be the same $25/ton, rather than just $15/ton in the 2035 scenario. That means reaching triple digits in the tax’s fourth year.
- And — this is a bit technical — we’re relaxed the model assumption of the maximum annual tax rise to which the U.S. economy can fully react, from $20/ton previously to $25/ton.
It goes without saying that the present-day American political system isn’t equipped to enact and implement such an “heroic” (an adjective we prefer to “draconian”) carbon tax.
The still-lonely radical center
Prominent voices calling for carbon taxes beyond token amounts (e.g., $10 or $20 per ton with little or no increases) are precious few, not just in absolute terms but relative to the pre-2010 period in which climate concern was widespread and neither the left nor the right had been consumed by their respective demonizations: carbon pricing (on the left) or climate concern of any sort (on the right).
Indeed, here at Carbon Tax Center, we’ve traded in our web pages that previously celebrated carbon tax supporters for pages like Carbon Pricing and Environmental Justice, Progressives and Carbon Pricing, and Conservatives, all of them grouped under a heading of “Politics.” Each is essentially a litany of grievances and rejections of carbon pricing and/or climate action, period.
This attractive chart, though not germane to carbon taxing, is included here to illustrate the wealth of data and perspective available in CTC’s newly updated carbon tax model. Be sure to download it (Excel file) using the link near the start of this post.
This isn’t polarization, it’s a simultaneous disavowal by both ends of the political spectrum of the lone plausible transformational climate-preserving policy measure. (Rather than “ends” I should say “sides” of the spectrum, given that anti-pricing has spilled over from the confines of the respective extremes and now appears to occupy most of the two sides.)
Omens
Consider these two minor but telling signposts from the past week.
One was a NY Times “Sunday Review” guest essay last weekend, I’m a Young Conservative, and I Want My Party to Lead the Fight Against Climate Change, by one Benji Backer, founder-director of the American Conservation Coalition.
Alas, the essay was cut from the same generic cloth as other conservative calls to climate action. Here’s an excerpt:
We cannot address climate change or solve any other environmental issue without the buy-in and leadership of conservative America. And there are clear opportunities for climate action that conservatives can champion without sacrificing core values, from sustainable agriculture to nuclear energy and the onshoring of clean energy production.
Ho-hum. But, most strikingly, zero mention of carbon pricing — not even a nod to the revenue-neutral type such as fee-and-dividend that circumvents right-wing canards about government overreach by “dividending” the carbon revenues to households, thus correcting the market failure driving carbon emissions without “growing the government.”
So much for the right wing. On the left, I had the frustrating experience of meeting a director of an iconic American environmental organization at a public event and bonding with him over our shared dismay at the organization’s post-2016 submission to anti-carbon-pricing rhetoric . . . only to be ghosted when I tried to arrange a meet-up to possibly grow our newfound patch of common ground.
So much for dialogue in service of effective climate policy.
Can’t we bring U.S. emissions down sharply without carbon pricing?
Alas, no. Actual U.S. emission progress perennially falls short of even modest hopes. Almost from the moment the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act — which CTC supported from the git-go — was enacted into law, it has bumped up against a reality calamity of red tape, transmission bottlenecks, NIMBY and other permitting resistance that have demonstrably slowed the march of cleaner energy; not to mention new hellspawns of energy demand like AI processing, cyber-currency computing and ever-larger SUV’s and pickup trucks driven ever more miles, all of which threaten to pile on new carbon emissions almost as fast as incumbent emissions are removed.
As we’ve argued in post after post — just scroll through our monthly archives — these and other decarbonization derailments would be alleviated, if not averted entirely, by the robust carbon taxes we scoped above.
Our updated carbon-tax model shows that U.S. carbon emissions fell by 2.3% from 2022 to 2023. If there weren’t a climate emergency, that might qualify as a decent win. But in our real, overheating world, that rate doesn’t come close to the 4.1% compound annual decline needed to halve 2005 emissions by 2035, much less the 6.9% annual emissions shrinkage required to meet the same goal in 2030.
The insufficiency of even the best-intentioned policies and programs to meet necessary carbon targets without robust carbon taxing can’t be hidden indefinitely. The carbon tax reckoning awaits.
Carbon Footprint
Want a simpler way to buy carbon credits? Discover our carbon marketplace
Most businesses that decide to act on their net-zero targets reach the same point of friction. Buying carbon credits has meant tracking down brokers, sitting through sales calls, and requesting a quote just to learn a price, sometimes with limited proof of what you are buying.
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Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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