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Nickel Prices Fall to a 4-Year Low, What Causes The Plunge

Demand for battery-grade nickel is projected to grow significantly by the end of the decade due to rising electric vehicle (EV) adoption. However, the nickel market faced more volatility and uncertainty in November 2024, according to S&P Commodity Insights data. It is largely due to macroeconomic and political developments following Donald Trump’s U.S. presidential election victory. 

Trump’s Victory Fuels Nickel Market Volatility

Nickel is vital for producing stainless steel and alloys used in equipment, transport, buildings, and power generation. Major nickel producers include Indonesia, the Philippines, Russia, and Australia, with Indonesia having the highest nickel reserves while Australia has the most active mining projects. 

Global nickel reserves and active mining projects
Source: S&P Global

Nickel futures are traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME), reflecting its global industrial importance. The LME three-month nickel price dropped to a four-year low of $15,540 per metric ton on November 15. 

nickel prices drop 4-year low LME

Concerns over Trump’s potential economic policies, particularly their implications for China, the industrial metals’ top consumer, have fueled investor caution. A stronger U.S. dollar and increased LME nickel inventories further worsen the downward pressure on prices as shown above. This highlights a risk-off sentiment across metals markets.

  • Nickel prices initially saw an uptick after Trump’s election win, rising from $16,007 per metric ton on November 4 to $16,587 per metric ton on November 7. 

This temporary boost mirrored gains in U.S. equity markets. However, optimism quickly faded as the trade-weighted U.S. dollar index climbed to a one-year high, fueled by market expectations that Trump’s policies—such as higher tariffs on Chinese imports—could revive U.S. inflation. 

The prospect of prolonged high interest rates from the Federal Reserve further strengthened the dollar. This makes nickel and other commodities more expensive for non-dollar investors.

Investor sentiment in the nickel market took another hit following China’s unveiling of a 10 trillion yuan fiscal stimulus package on November 8. The measures failed to meet market expectations for more aggressive economic support. This disappointment, coupled with rising nickel inventories and a nearly 4x increase in net short positions on LME nickel, accelerated the price decline. 

By mid-November, the LME three-month nickel price had plunged to levels not seen since November 2020, underscoring the market’s vulnerability to both economic and geopolitical developments. 

nickel futures prices Trading Economics

In late November, nickel rebounded to $16,040 per tonne amid Indonesia’s tighter mining policies. Approved quotas could drop 27% by 2026, while license fees for low-grade ore may be reduced.

According to the Indonesian mining minister, nickel ore imports surged 50-fold, as officials prioritized domestic reserves and warned of dwindling stocks to stabilize prices.

IRA Under Threat: What Trump’s Plans Mean for Nickel and EVs

The implications of Trump’s election for the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) add another layer of uncertainty to the global nickel market. 

Signed into law by President Joe Biden in 2022, the IRA has been a key driver of clean energy initiatives. This includes a $7,500 consumer tax credit for electric vehicles

However, Trump’s transition team is reportedly considering repealing this tax credit as part of broader tax reform efforts. Such a move could slow the adoption of EVs in the U.S. This could undermine a major driver of global primary nickel demand over the next five years.

Additionally, Trump’s administration may tighten the IRA’s foreign entity of concern (FEOC) guidelines, which currently disqualify companies with significant Chinese ownership from benefiting from the EV tax credit. For instance, Indonesia—a leading producer of nickel—has been working to reduce China’s influence to qualify for IRA incentives. 

In a recent deal between PT Vale Indonesia and China’s GEM Co., GEM’s stake in a $1.42 billion nickel plant was capped at 25% to comply with the guidelines. However, stricter FEOC rules could make it even harder for such projects to qualify for U.S. tax incentives. This can potentially limit Indonesia’s ability to expand its nickel exports to the U.S.

China remains a dominant player in Indonesia’s nickel sector. Between January and September 2024, Indonesia exported 129,860 metric tons of nickel sulfate exclusively to China. 

Indonesia nickel export to China

If Indonesia faces challenges in accessing U.S. markets due to stricter IRA policies, its reliance on China is likely to deepen. This dynamic could reshape global nickel supply chains, with potential long-term implications for battery manufacturing and EV production.

Short-Term Pain, Long-Term Gain? Nickel’s Future Outlook

Beyond U.S. policy developments, other global factors are contributing to nickel market uncertainty. Escalations in the Russia-Ukraine war have dampened investor confidence, while concerns about slowing economic growth in China continue to weigh on demand projections. 

The interplay of these factors has led to reduced risk appetite among investors, as evidenced by the sharp rise in short positions on LME nickel.

Despite these challenges, S&P Global’s fundamental outlook for primary nickel supply and demand remains broadly unchanged from previous forecasts. However, the near-term trading environment is expected to remain difficult. 

Amid all these challenging market conditions, an emerging player is targeting U.S. nickel independence. Alaska Energy Metals Corporation (AEMC) is leading efforts to support the U.S. energy transition through its flagship Nikolai project in Alaska. The site holds a significant resource of nickel, copper, cobalt, and platinum group metals essential for renewable energy and electric vehicles.

The Canadian nickel junior’s dual focus on sustainability and critical mineral supply underscores its commitment to reducing U.S. reliance on imports.

With the nickel prices already at a multi-year low, the market’s recovery will depend on clearer policy signals and stronger demand drivers, particularly from the EV and clean energy sectors. 


Disclosure: Owners, members, directors, and employees of carboncredits.com have/may have stock or option positions in any of the companies mentioned: AEMC.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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