Nearly 15 years after journalist David Owen and I tangled — and then united — over Jevons Paradox, the New York Times today published a guest essay on that subject by a Murdoch-employed London journalist. David and I went deeper and did better, as you’ll see in a moment.
Jevons Paradox denotes the tendency of economies to increase, not decrease, their use of something as they learn how to use that thing more efficiently. Its 19th-century archetype, observed by Britisher William Stanley Jevons, was that “as steam engines became ever more efficient, Britain’s appetite for coal [to power them] increased rather than decreased,” as Sky News editor Ed Conway put it today, in The Paradox Holding Back the Clean Energy Revolution. Why? Because the “rebound” in use of steam as its manufacture grew cheaper more than offset the direct contraction in use from the increased efficiency.
Illustration by Joost Swarte for “The Efficiency Dilemma,” in the New Yorker magazine’s Dec. 20, 2010 print edition (Dec. 12 on line).
Where does David Owen come in? In October 2009 he published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal claiming that congestion pricing could never cure traffic congestion, on account of the bounceback in car traffic due to lesser congestion. (Funnily enough, the Journal never runs opinion pieces maintaining that induced demand prevents highway expansions from “solving” road congestion.) My subsequent rebuttal in Streetsblog, Paradox, Schmaradox, Congestion Pricing Works, changed David’s mind. The disincentive of the congestion toll, he told me, could probably stave off enough of the rebound in driving to allow congestion pricing to fulfill its promise of curbing gridlock.
A year later, when David revisited Jevons Paradox in a full-blown New Yorker magazine narrative, The Efficiency Dilemma, he made sure to point to “capping emissions or putting a price on carbon or increasing energy taxes” as potential ways out. I was thrilled. and I published a post in Grist riffing on “The Efficiency Dilemma.” I’ve pasted it below. I hope to comment on Conway’s NY Times essay in a future post soon.
If efficiency hasn’t cut energy use, then what?
By Charles Komanoff, reprinted from Grist, Dec. 16, 2010.
One of the most penetrating critiques of energy-efficiency dogma you’ll ever read is in this week’s New Yorker (yes, the New Yorker). “The efficiency dilemma,” by David Owen, has this provocative subtitle: “If our machines use less energy, will we just use them more?” Owen’s answer is a resounding, iconoclastic, and probably correct Yes.
Owen’s thesis is that as a society becomes more energy efficient, it becomes downright inefficient not to use more. The pursuit of efficiency is smart for individuals and businesses but a dead end for energy and climate policy.
This idea isn’t wholly original. It’s known as the Jevons paradox, and it has a 150-year history of provoking bursts of discussion before being repressed from social consciousness. What Owen adds to the thread is considerable, however: a fine narrative arc; the conceptual feat of elevating the paradox from the micro level, where it is rebuttable, to the macro, where it is more robust; a compelling case study; and the courage to take on energy-efficiency guru Amory Lovins. Best of all, Owen offers a way out: raising fuel prices via energy taxes.
Thirty-five years ago, when the energy industry first ridiculed efficiency as a return ticket to the Dark Ages, it was met with a torrent of smart ripostes like the Ford Foundation’s landmark “A Time to Choose” report — a well-thumbed copy of which adorns my bookshelf. Since then, the cause of energy efficiency has rung up one triumph after another: refrigerators have tripled in thermodynamic efficiency, energy-guzzling incandescent bulbs have been booted out of commercial buildings, and developers of trophy properties compete to rack up LEED points denoting low-energy design and operation.
Yet it’s difficult to see that these achievements have had any effect on slowing the growth in energy use. U.S. electricity consumption in 2008 was double that of 1975, and overall energy consumption was up by 38 percent. True, during this time U.S. population grew by 40 percent, but we also outsourced much of our manufacturing to Asia. In any case, efficiency, the assertedly immense resource that lay untapped in U.S. basements, garages, and offices, was supposed to slash per capita energy use, not just keep it from rising. Why hasn’t it? And what does that say for energy and climate policy?
A short form of the Jevons paradox, and a good entry point for discussing it, is the “rebound effect” — the tendency to employ more of something when efficiency has effectively cut its cost. The rebound effect is a staple of transportation analysis, in two separate forms. One is the rebound in gallons of gas consumed when fuel-efficiency standards have reduced the fuel cost to drive a mile. The other is the rebound from the reduction in car trips after imposition of a road toll, now that the drop in traffic has made it possible to cover the same ground in less time.
Rebound effect one turns out to be small. As UC-Irvine economics professor Ken Small has shown, no more than 20 percent of the gasoline savings from improved engine efficiency have been lost to the tendency to drive more miles — and much less in the short term. Rebound effect two is more significant and becoming more so, as time increasingly trumps money in the decision-making of drivers, at least better-off ones.
Rebound effects, then, vary in magnitude from one sector to another. They can be tricky to analyze, as Owen unwittingly demonstrated in an ill-considered 2009 Wall Street Journal op-ed criticizing congestion pricing, “How traffic jams help the environment.” He wrote:
If reducing [congestion via a toll] merely makes life easier for those who drive, then the improved traffic flow can actually increase the environmental damage done by cars, by raising overall traffic volume, encouraging sprawl and long car commutes.
Not so, as I wrote in “Paradox, schmaradox. Congestion pricing works”:
When the reduction in traffic is caused by a congestion charge, life is not just easier for those who continue driving but more costly as well. Yes, there’s a seesaw between price effects and time effects, but setting the congestion price at the right point will rebalance the system toward less driving, without harming the city’s economy.
Rebound effects from more fuel-efficient vehicles, as depicted in “Energy sufficiency and rebound effects,” a 2018 concept paper by Steve Sorrell, Univ. of Sussex, and Birgitta Gabersleben & Angela Druckman, Univ. of Surrey, UK.
More importantly, as Owen points out in his New Yorker piece, a narrow “bottom up” view — one that considers people’s decision-making in isolated realms of activity one-by-one — tends to miss broader rebound effects. On the face of it, doubling the efficiency of clothes washers and dryers shouldn’t cause the amount of laundering to rise more than slightly. But consider: 30 years ago, an urban family of four would have used the washer-dryer in the basement or at the laundromat, forcing it to “conserve” drying to save not just quarters but time traipsing back and forth. Since then, however, efficiency gains have enabled manufacturers to make washer-dryers in apartment sizes. We own one, and find ourselves using it for “spot” situations — emergencies that aren’t really emergencies, small loads for the item we “need” for tomorrow — that add more than a little to our total usage. And who’s to say that the advent of cheap and rapid laundering hasn’t contributed to the long-term rise in fashion-consumption, with all it implies for increased energy use through more manufacturing, freight hauling, retailing, and advertising?
Owen offers his own big example. Interestingly, it’s not computers or other electronic devices. It’s cooling. In an entertaining and all-too-brief romp through a half-century of changing mores, he traces the evolution of refrigeration and its “fraternal twin,” air conditioning, from rare, seldom-used luxuries then, to ubiquitous, always-on devices today:
My parents’ [first fridge] had a tiny, uninsulated freezer compartment, which seldom contained much more than a few aluminum ice trays and a burrow-like mantle of frost … The recently remodeled kitchen of a friend of mine contains an enormous side-by-side refrigerator, an enormous side-by-side freezer, and a drawer-like under-counter mini-fridge for beverages. And the trend has not been confined to households. As the ability to efficiently and inexpensively chill things has grown, so have opportunities to buy chilled things — a potent positive-feedback loop. Gas stations now often have almost as much refrigerated shelf space as the grocery stores of my early childhood; even mediocre hotel rooms usually come with their own small fridge (which, typically, either is empty or — if it’s a minibar — contains mainly things that don’t need to be kept cold), in addition to an icemaker and a refrigerated vending machine down the hall.
Air conditioning has a similar arc, ending with Owen’s observation that “access to cooled air is self-reinforcing: to someone who works in an air-conditioned office, an un-air-conditioned house quickly becomes intolerable, and vice versa.”
If Owen has a summation, it’s this:
All such increases in energy-consuming activity [driven by increased efficiency] can be considered manifestations of the Jevons paradox. Teasing out the precise contribution of a particular efficiency improvement isn’t just difficult, however; it may be impossible, because the endlessly ramifying network of interconnections is too complex to yield readily to empirical, mathematics-based analysis. [Emphasis mine.]
Defenders of efficiency will call “endlessly ramifying network” a cop-out. I’d say the burden is on them to prove otherwise. Based on the aggregate energy data mentioned earlier, efficiency advocates have been winning the micro battles but losing the macro war. Through engineering brilliance and concerted political and regulatory advocacy, we have increased energy-efficiency in the small while the society around us has grown monstrously energy-inefficient and cancelled out those gains. Two steps forward, two steps back.
I wrote something roughly similar five years ago in a broadside against my old colleague, Amory Lovins:
[T]hough Amory has been evangelizing “the soft path” for thirty years, his handful of glittering successes have only evoked limited emulation. Why? Because after the price shocks of the 1970s, energy became, and is still, too darn cheap. It’s a law of nature, I’d say, or at least of Economics 101: inexpensive anything will never be conserved. So long as energy is cheap, Amory’s magnificent exceptions will remain just that. Thousands of highly-focused advocacy groups will break their hearts trying to fix the thousands of ingrained practices that add up to energy over-consumption, from tax-deductible mortgages and always-on electronics to anti-solar zoning codes and un-bikeable streets. And all the while, new ways to use energy will arise, overwhelming whatever hard-won reductions these Sisyphean efforts achieve.
I wrote that a day or two after inviting Lovins to endorse putting carbon or other fuel taxes front-and-center in energy advocacy. He declined, insisting that “technical efficiency” could be increased many-fold without taxing energy to raise its price. Of course it has, can, and will. But is technical efficiency enough? Owen asks us to consider whether a strategy centered on technical and regulatory measures to boost energy efficiency may be inherently unsuited for the herculean task of keeping coal and other fossil fuels safely locked in the ground.
I said earlier that Owen offers an escape from the Jevons paradox, and he does: “capping emissions or putting a price on carbon or increasing energy taxes.” It’s hardly a clarion call, and it’s not the straight carbon taxers’ line. But it’s a lifeline.
The veteran English economist Len Brookes told Owen:
When we talk about increasing energy efficiency, what we’re really talking about is increasing the productivity of energy. And, if you increase the productivity of anything, you have the effect of reducing its implicit price, because you get more return for the same money — which means the demand goes up.
The antidote to the Jevon paradox, then, is energy taxes. We can thank Owen not only for raising a critical, central question about energy efficiency, with potential ramifications for energy and climate policy, but for giving us a brief — an eloquent and powerful one — for a carbon tax.
Author’s present-day (Feb. 22, 2024) note: I overdid it somewhat in belittling energy efficiency’s impacts on U.S. energy use in that 2010 Grist post. Indeed, in posts here in 2016 and again in 2020 I quantified and enthused over improved EE’s role in stabilizing electricity demand and slashing that sector’s carbon emissions.
Carbon Footprint
The real cost of 1 tonne of CO2: Translating carbon into hectares
Every business carbon footprint report ends with a number, the amount of carbon emissions produced by the business, less the amount of carbon reduced and offset, given in tonnes of CO₂. Many of the people who sign off on that number, including those who paid for it, cannot picture what it represents on the ground. A tonne is a unit of mass. CO₂ is invisible. The link between the amount offset in the report and a real piece of restored forest somewhere in the world is almost never indicated.
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Carbon Footprint
Finding Nature Based Solutions in Your Supply Chain
Carbon Footprint
How Climate Change Is Raising the Cost of Living
Americans are paying more for insurance, electricity, taxes, and home repairs every year. What many people may not realize is that climate change is already one of the drivers behind those rising costs.
For many households, climate change is no longer just an environmental issue. It is becoming a cost-of-living issue. While climate impacts like melting glaciers and shrinking polar ice can feel distant from everyday life, the financial effects are already showing up in monthly budgets across the country.
Today, a larger share of household income is consumed by fixed costs such as housing, insurance, utilities, and healthcare. (3) Climate change and climate inaction are adding pressure to many of those expenses through higher disaster recovery costs, rising energy demand, infrastructure repairs, and increased insurance risk.
The goal of this article is to help connect climate change to the everyday financial realities people already experience. Regardless of where someone stands on climate policy, it is important to recognize that climate change is already increasing costs for households, businesses, and taxpayers across the United States.
More conservative estimates indicate that the average household has experienced an increase of about $400 per year from observed climate change, while less conservative estimates suggest an increase of $900.(1) Those in more disaster-prone regions of the country face disproportionate costs, with some households experiencing climate-related costs averaging $1,300 per year.(1) Another study found that climate adaptation costs driven by climate change have already consumed over 3% of personal income in the U.S. since 2015.(9) By the end of the century, housing units could spend an additional $5,600 on adaptation costs.(1)
Whether we realize it or not, Americans are already paying for climate change through higher insurance premiums, energy costs, taxes, and infrastructure repairs. These growing expenses are often referred to as climate adaptation costs.
Without meaningful climate action, these costs are expected to continue rising. Choosing not to invest in climate action is also choosing to spend more on climate adaptation.
Here are a few ways climate change is already increasing the cost of living:
- Higher insurance costs from more frequent and severe storms
- Higher energy use during longer and hotter summers
- Higher electricity rates tied to storm recovery and grid upgrades
- Higher government spending and taxpayer-funded disaster recovery costs
The real debate is not whether climate change costs money. Americans are already paying for it. The question is where we want those costs to go. Should we invest more in climate action to help reduce future climate adaptation costs, or continue paying growing recovery and adaptation expenses in everyday life?
How Climate Change Is Increasing Insurance Costs
There is one industry that closely tracks the financial impact of natural disasters: insurance. Insurance companies are focused on assessing risk, estimating damages, and collecting enough revenue to cover losses and remain financially stable.
Comparing the 20-year periods 1980–1999 and 2000–2019, climate-related disasters increased 83% globally from 3,656 events to 6,681 events. The average time between billion-dollar disasters dropped from 82 days during the 1980s to 16 days during the last 10 years, and in 2025 the average time between disasters fell to just 10 days. (6)
According to the reinsurance firm Munich Re, total economic losses from natural disasters in 2024 exceeded $320 billion globally, nearly 40% higher than the decade-long annual average. Average annual inflation-adjusted costs more than quadrupled from $22.6 billion per year in the 1980s to $102 billion per year in the 2010s. Costs increased further to an average of $153.2 billion annually during 2020–2024, representing another 50% increase over the 2010s. (6)
In the United States, billion-dollar weather and climate disasters have also increased significantly. The average number of billion-dollar disasters per year has grown from roughly three annually during the 1980s to 19 annually over the last decade. In 2023 and 2024, the U.S. recorded 28 and 27 billion-dollar disasters respectively, both setting new records. (6)
The growing impact of climate change is one reason insurance costs continue to rise. “There are two things that drive insurance loss costs, which is the frequency of events and how much they cost,” said Robert Passmore, assistant vice president of personal lines at the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America. “So, as these events become more frequent, that’s definitely going to have an impact.” (8)
After adjusting for inflation, insurance costs have steadily increased over time. From 2000 to 2020, insurance costs consistently grew faster than the Consumer Price Index due to rising rebuilding costs and weather-related losses.(3) Between 2020 and 2023 alone, the average home insurance premium increased from $75 to $360 due to climate change impacts, with disaster-prone regions experiencing especially steep increases.(1) Since 2015, homeowners in some regions affected by more extreme weather have seen home insurance costs increased by nearly 57%.(1) Some insurers have also limited or stopped offering coverage in high-risk areas.(7)
For many families, rising insurance costs are no longer occasional financial burdens. They are becoming recurring monthly expenses tied directly to growing climate risk.
How Rising Temperatures Increase Household Energy Costs

The financial impacts of climate change extend beyond insurance. Rising temperatures are also changing how much energy Americans use and how utilities plan for future electricity demand.
Between 1950 and 2010, per capita electricity use increased 10-fold, though usage has flattened or slightly declined since 2012 due to more efficient appliances and LED lighting. (3) A significant share of increased energy demand comes from cooling needs associated with higher temperatures.
Over the last 20 years, the United States has experienced increasing Cooling Degree Days (CDD) and decreasing Heating Degree Days (HDD). Nearly all counties have become warmer over the past three decades, with some areas experiencing several hundred additional cooling degree days, equivalent to roughly one additional degree of warmth on most days. (1) This trend reflects a warming climate where air conditioning demand is increasing while heating demand generally declines. (4)
As temperatures continue rising, households are expected to spend more on cooling than they save on heating. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that by 2050, national Heating Degree Days will be 11% lower while Cooling Degree Days will be 28% higher than 2021 levels. Cooling demand is projected to rise 2.5 times faster than heating demand declines. (5)
These projections come from energy and infrastructure experts planning for future electricity demand and grid capacity needs. Utilities and grid operators are already preparing for higher peak summer electricity loads caused by rising temperatures. (5)
Longer and hotter summers also affect how homes and buildings are designed. Buildings constructed for past climate conditions may require upgrades such as larger air conditioning systems, stronger insulation, and improved ventilation to remain comfortable and energy efficient in the future. (10)
For many households, this means higher monthly utility bills and potentially higher long-term home improvement costs as temperatures continue to rise.
How Climate Change Affects Electricity Rates
On an inflation-adjusted basis, average U.S. residential electricity rates are slightly lower today than they were 50 years ago. (2) However, climate-related damage to utility infrastructure is creating new upward pressure on electricity costs.
Electric utilities rely heavily on above-ground poles, wires, transformers, and substations that can be damaged by hurricanes, storms, floods, and wildfires. Repairing and upgrading this infrastructure often requires substantial investment.
As a result, utilities are increasing electricity rates in response to wildfire and hurricane events to fund infrastructure repairs and future mitigation efforts. (1) The average cumulative increase in per-household electricity expenditures due to climate-related price changes is approximately $30. (1)
While this increase may appear modest today, utility costs are expected to rise further as climate-related infrastructure damage becomes more frequent and severe.
How Climate Disasters Increase Government Spending and Taxes
Extreme weather events also damage public infrastructure, including roads, schools, bridges, airports, water systems, and emergency services infrastructure. Recovery and rebuilding costs are often funded through taxpayer dollars at the federal, state, and local levels.
The average annual government cost tied to climate-related disaster recovery is estimated at nearly $142 per household. (1) States that frequently experience hurricanes, wildfires, tornadoes, or flooding can face even higher public recovery costs.
These expenses affect taxpayers whether they personally experience a disaster or not. Climate-related recovery spending can increase pressure on public budgets, emergency management systems, and infrastructure funding nationwide.
Reducing Climate Costs Through Climate Action
While this article focuses on the growing financial costs associated with climate change, the issue is not only about money for many people. It is also about recognizing our environmental impact and taking responsibility for reducing it in order to help preserve a healthy planet for future generations.
While individuals alone cannot solve climate change, collective action can help reduce future climate adaptation costs over time.
For those interested in taking action, there are three important steps:
- Estimate your carbon footprint to better understand the emissions connected to your lifestyle and activities.
- Create a plan to gradually reduce emissions through energy efficiency, cleaner technologies, and more sustainable choices.
- Address remaining emissions by supporting verified carbon reduction projects through carbon credits.
Carbon credits are one of the most cost-effective tools available for climate action because they help fund projects that generate verified emission reductions at scale. Supporting global emission reduction efforts can help reduce the long-term impacts and costs associated with climate change.
Visit Terrapass to learn more about carbon footprints, carbon credits, and climate action solutions.
The post How Climate Change Is Raising the Cost of Living appeared first on Terrapass.
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