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Governments have decided against adopting a new structure for the next Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment cycle, committing instead to the traditional set of three “working group” reports and just one “special” report.

At a three-day meeting in Istanbul last week, delegates debated several different approaches for the work programme of the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle.

These included a more radical option to replace its huge assessment report with a series of shorter special reports on specific topics.

Nonetheless, delegates decided in favour of the usual assessment report and instead focused on the possibility of its three working group reports being delivered by the end of 2028.

This would allow the reports to inform the UN’s second global stocktake, which will gauge progress towards the Paris Agreement goals.

However, despite most governments agreeing on the accelerated timetable, a few countries “strenuously objected”, blocking a final decision on timelines, which will be revisited at an IPCC meeting in the summer.

One person present at the meeting tells Carbon Brief that “most of the resistance about the 2028 timeline came from Saudi Arabia, China and India”.

IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea described the gathering of more than 375 delegates from 120 governments – which overran into a fourth day – as the “one of the most intense meetings” he had ever experienced. 

The seventh assessment cycle will also include a special report on climate change and cities as well as a methodology report on short-lived climate forcers – decisions that governments had previously already agreed.

The deliberations saw the addition of a second methodology report on carbon dioxide removal technologies, carbon capture utilisation and storage, plus a revision to the IPCC’s 1994 technical guidelines on impacts and adaptation. An overall “synthesis” report for AR7 will follow in 2029.

Reacting to the decisions, one scientist tells Carbon Brief that she is “not thrilled” by the decision to produce “a whole set of working group reports again”, given they will “not say that much new”.

And another says that “waiting until 2028 for the three reports and 2029 for the synthesis is too late to have an impact on decision-making. The world will be significantly different by then”.

In this article, Carbon Brief unpacks the following questions:

What was the purpose of the meeting?

The synthesis report, published in March 2023, marked the final product of the IPCC’s sixth assessment report (AR6) cycle.

Just weeks after its publication, the secretary of the IPCC invited member countries to submit nominations for the IPCC bureau for the AR7 cycle. Over the following months, 100 nominations were submitted for 34 positions – including IPCC chair, vice chairs and co-chairs and working group vice chairs.

Four candidates were nominated for the position of IPCC chair – Dr Debra Roberts from South Africa, Dr Thelma Krug from Brazil, Prof Jean-Pascal Van Ypersele from Belgium and Prof Jim Skea from the UK. These were the first elections in the history of the IPCC with women running for the position of chair.

The new IPCC chair and leadership team were elected at a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, in July last year, via a secret ballot.

Prof Jim Skea was elected as chair, as the IPCC announced:

“With nearly 40 years of climate science experience and expertise, Jim Skea will lead the IPCC through its seventh assessment cycle. Skea was elected by 90 votes to 69 in a run-off with Thelma Krug.” 

To select the rest of the bureau, the IPCC mandates that at least one IPCC vice chair and one co-chair from each working group should be from a developing country. 

Dr Ladislaus Chang’a from Tanzania, Prof Ramón Pichs-Madruga from Cuba and Prof Diana Ürge-Vorsatz from Hungary were elected to the positions of IPCC vice chair.

IPCC documentation adds that “consideration should also be given to promoting gender balance”. Women make up 40% of the IPCC bureau for AR7 (pdf).

The meeting in Turkey was the first full meeting for the new leadership team. Its purpose was to make a series of decisions for AR7, such as discussing the IPCC budget over 2023-26 and reviewing lessons learned from AR6.

Skea also presented his “vision for the seventh assessment cycle”, in which he highlighted three key themes – policy relevance, inclusivity and interdisciplinarity. 

For example, on interdisciplinarity, Skea said that he is “keen to explore ways of enhancing collaboration” with the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), given the “intertwined nature of the climate, biodiversity and pollution challenges”. 

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What decisions were delegates making?

Among all the decisions that government delegates debated last week, the one that dominated discussions was which option to choose for AR7’s “programme of work”.

This programme sets out the overall approach that the IPCC takes through the assessment cycle, including the number and types of reports that the body produces.

Traditionally, the centrepiece of an IPCC cycle is an “assessment report” that comprises three working group reports and an overall “synthesis” report. The IPCC’s three working groups are:

  • Working Group I (WG1): The physical science basis
  • Working Group II (WG2): Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability
  • Working Group III (WG3): Mitigation of climate change

For AR6, these reports were published in August 2021, February 2022 and April 2022, respectively. They were each around 2,000-3,000 pages in length.

The synthesis report then “integrates” the main findings of the three working group reports. It also takes into account any “special reports” that the IPCC has published during the assessment cycle. 

These are shorter reports on specific topics, written by authors from across the three working groups. In AR6, for example, the IPCC published three special reports – each around 600-900 pages long:

Finally, an assessment cycle typically also includes “methodology” reports, which “provide practical guidelines for the preparation of greenhouse gas inventories” and “technical papers”, which are “prepared on topics for which an objective international scientific/technical perspective is essential”.

Ahead of the meeting in Turkey, an “informal group on the programme of work” had been established to prepare a paper setting out the options for the AR7 programme of work, taking into account the lessons learned from AR6 and the views of IPCC member countries. (Of the IPCC’s 195 members, 66 sent in submissions – roughly split 60-40 between developing and developed countries.)

One of the challenges faced during AR6 was the “very high workload” as a result of “the unprecedented number of reports, the rapidly increasing literature, and a significant increase of review comments on the final government draft [of the reports]”, the paper says.

It notes the need for IPCC reports to be “shorter and more concise, focused on new science and [able to] provide policy relevant information”.

The paper adds that “many member countries recommended ensuring adequate input from the IPCC is available for the second global stocktake to be concluded in 2028, either as a contribution from the assessment reports, topical [special reports], or as a specific dedicated product”.

The global stocktake is a five-yearly temperature check that is a vital part of the Paris Agreement. It is meant to help countries collectively assess where they are, where they want to go and how to get there in terms of climate action and to identify gaps to course correct.

In the text of the first global stocktake, agreed at COP28 in Dubai last year, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), invited the IPCC to “consider how best to align its work with the second and subsequent global stocktakes” and also “to provide relevant and timely information for the next global stocktake”.

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What was agreed for the AR7 ‘programme of work’?

The informal group set out three options for AR7’s programme of work:

  • A “light” option with the usual assessment report and then just one special report and methodology report. This would see a “reduced workload compared to the AR6” and a shorter timeline.
  • A “classical” option with the usual assessment report and up to two special reports and two methodology reports.
  • A “special report gallery” option that replaces the assessment report with a larger collection of special reports (a working assumption of four).

The paper notes that “nearly all” member countries wanted AR7 to include the three working groups reports and synthesis, and the “vast majority” were also in favour of more than one special report and methodology report. (There were 13 countries that wanted to stick with one special report and methodology report.)

Previous assessment cycles suggest that a single working group report takes four years to produce from start to finish, the paper notes, while a special or methodology report can take three or three-and-a-half years. Although working group reports within an assessment cycle are produced in parallel, a complete set – including a synthesis report – ”is not considered possible in less than about four and a half years”, the paper says.

The table below, from the paper, presents the feasibility of when the reports could be published under each of the three options – from “not feasible” (grey) to “risk of delay” (yellow) and “feasible” (green).

Option Report 2027 H1 2027 H2 2028 H1 2028 H2 2029 H1 2029 H2 2030 H1
Light Special 1
Light Methodology 1
Light Assessment
Light Synthesis
Classical Special 1
Classical Methodology 1
Classical Special 2
Classical Methodology 2
Classical Assessment
Classical Synthesis
SR gallery Special 1
SR gallery Methodology 1
SR gallery Methodology 2
SR gallery Special 2
SR gallery Special 3
SR gallery Special 4
SR gallery Synthesis

Feasibility of release of the products listed in the AR7 structure options at indicated periods in time, based on past practice, from “not feasible” (grey) to “risk of delay” (yellow) and “feasible” (green). Source: IPCC (2024)

The paper analysed the three options against a series of criteria that include the time allowed for “engagement of underrepresented communities”. The findings, shown in the “scorecard” below, classify how achievable each criterion is for the three options – yes (green), no (red) or partly (yellow).

Criterion Light Classical SR gallery
Allows strong integration across working groups
Somewhat constrained
Yes
Yes
Input available to second global stocktake
Special report 1 only
Special reports 1 & 2
Special reports 1 & 2
Time window allows significant new literature
Somewhat constrained
Yes
Yes
Time window long enough to allow engagement of underrepresented communities
No
Yes
Yes
Level of undue stress to authors and IPCC Technical Support Unit
Medium
Low
Low
Number of topics to be covered
Somewhat constrained
Large
Somewhat constrained
Comprehensive literature assessment
Somewhat constrained
Yes
Highly constrained
Time distance to the third global stocktake
Long
Medium
Medium

Scorecard for the three programme options assessed against a series of criteria. Shading refers to whether that criterion is achievable – yes (green), no (red) or partly (yellow). Source: IPCC (2024)

Despite being a “fairly straightforward exercise in agenda setting”, the discussions over these options at the IPCC meeting in Turkey “evolved into fraught deliberations that ran overnight on Friday and well into Saturday morning”, the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) reports. 

It adds that the discussions “came down to the wire as delegates laboured in plenary and huddles to secure consensus on the programme of work”.

The final decision falls between the “light” and “classical” options – comprising a full assessment report with synthesis, as well as one special report and two methodology reports. In addition, AR7 will also include a revision of the IPCC’s technical guidelines on impacts and adaptation, published way back in 1994. (See following sections for more details.)

Skea tells Carbon Brief that the “big issue in the mind of most governments when they went into the meeting” was for “the IPCC to produce something that’s useful for the global stocktake by the end of 2028”. (Even though this process actually starts “in late 2026 through 2027”, he notes.)

There were “kind of two ways of going about” this, explains Skea:

“One was to have a second special report, which was prepared in time for the global stocktake with the working group reports coming after that – and, obviously, not being ready in time. The second option was to dispense with the second special report and produce the three working group reports on quite a fast timetable.”

Therefore, says Skea, “what we’ve ended up with is much more like what was labelled ‘light’, because the key point of ‘light’ is that there were no extra products before the second global stocktake”. (The agreed second methodology report “could take place later” in the assessment cycle, Skea notes.)

However, while there was agreement on the selection of reports, the “accelerated” timeline for working group reports was not agreed as “some countries didn’t necessarily want that”, he adds.

Prof Sonia Seneviratne, a climate scientist from ETH Zurich who is a WG1 vice-chair for AR7, notes that “it was very difficult to reach a final decision because a majority of countries wanted to have all assessment reports completed at the latest in 2028”. She tells Carbon Brief:

“Delivery of the IPCC [assessment] report in 2028 would be critical for the IPCC to fulfil its mandate of being ‘policy relevant’. [Nonetheless,] the final decision keeps the door open for the three assessment reports to be released by 2028 – that is, in time for the global stocktake – provided that the schedule is carefully developed.”

Prof Friederike Otto, senior lecturer in climate science at Imperial College London’s Grantham Institute and IPCC AR6 author, says she is “not thrilled” by the decision to produce “a whole set of working group reports again”, which “will require a huge amount of work for many scientists”. 

The final reports for WG1 and WG3 will especially “not say that much new”, she tells Carbon Brief, costing the “best scientists…a lot of time they cannot use to actually advance the pressing questions”.

Dr Valérie Masson-Delmotte, a senior researcher at the Laboratoire des Science du Climat et de l’environnement in France and IPCC WG1 co-chair during AR6, says that the “positive” of not adding further special reports “is that there will be more time for expert meetings or workshops in particular on topics possibly stimulating the integration across working groups”.

However, she tells Carbon Brief:

“The less positive outcome is a lack of innovation for the AR7, which I see as a transition cycle, and where I think it is critical to prepare a different approach for the AR8 in order to keep IPCC policy relevant and motivating for scientists.”

This timeline (see section below) means that, even with only one special report, the AR7 cycle “might be much more challenging” than AR6, says Prof Joeri Rogelj, professor of climate science and policy at Imperial College London and IPCC AR6 author. He tells Carbon Brief that “this looks like a daunting cycle”, adding:

“Given the sequence of working group reports and the time needed to finalise, review and approve reports, this puts enormous time pressure on WG1 and WG2.”

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How many special reports will AR7 have?

The decision to limit the production of new special reports is in line with the reported preferences of IPCC chair Jim Skea, who previously promised that he would strongly resist pressure to produce more reports, saying they dragged on the IPCC’s core work and resources.

“I’ll say something very strongly – over my dead body will we see lots and lots of special reports,” Skea said shortly after he was elected.

At its 43rd session in April 2016, the IPCC decided to include a special report on climate change and cities in the AR7 cycle. A “cities and climate change science conference” was held in Edmonton, Canada, in March 2018 to “inspire the next frontier of research focused on the science of cities and climate change”.

The comments submitted by member countries suggest that “nearly all countries supported the idea of additional products in the seventh assessment cycle, such as special reports, technical papers or methodology reports”, the IPCC says. It adds that countries suggested a total of 28 different topics, with special reports on tipping points, adaptation, and loss and damage receiving the most support.

However, some countries had expressed concern that the three special reports included in AR6 involved a “substantial amount of work”. Some suggested that only two special reports should be produced in AR7 – including the report on cities – to “avoid overburdening the authors”. 

At last week’s meeting in Istanbul, delegates decided to stick with just the already agreed special report on climate change and cities.

Despite the focus on tipping points before the meeting, the view that emerged during discussions in Turkey was that “if there were to be a second special report…it has to have a sufficiently comprehensive character that it would be useful for the second global stocktake”, Skea explains to Carbon Brief.

Several governments mentioned that a second special report “should provide guidance or evidence on climate action”, says Skea, “which a tipping points report would not” because it would be focusing on “yet another reason for acting urgently, whereas a lot of governments were looking for guidance on how to take urgent action”.

Similarly, while there was “a big push for adaptation from some governments as the subject of the second special report” at the meeting, says Skea, “a lot of the arguments were ‘well, that’s WG2’s job anyway to produce an impacts, adaptation and vulnerability report’ – hence, it would be a duplicative effort”.

Overall, the deliberations in Turkey “went much more towards the accelerated working group reports rather than the second special report option”, Skea says.

However, this logic has not been universally welcomed. Prof Lisa Schipper – a professor of development geography at the University of Bonn and AR6 coordinating lead author – tells Carbon Brief that “the fact that none of the additional special reports was agreed is not good”. 

She notes that special reports can “take a lot of time and energy away” from the IPCC’s Technical Support Units and authors. However, she adds:

“A series of special reports instead of a series of working group reports before 2029 would have allowed for this science to be more regularly assessed, and for countries to have continuous input for decision-making. When the assessment is put off to 2029, this also means that governments’ attention is delayed until then.”

Dr Céline Guivarch is a professor at Ecole des Ponts ParisTech and was a lead author on AR6. She tells Carbon Brief that the decision on special reports “was probably to be expected”. However, she adds: 

“It is a very concerning sign because special reports are important to give faster assessments and to cover topics in more integrated ways than the WG1, WG2 and WG3 ‘siloes’.”

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What other reports will AR7 include?

As well as working group reports and special reports, there are a range of other products that the IPCC can produce.

At the 49th session in May 2019, it was decided that the IPCC Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (TFI) should produce a methodology report on short-lived climate forcers. Short-lived climate forcers, such as methane and black carbon, are gases and particulates that cause global warming, but typically only stay in the atmosphere for less than two decades.

Ahead of last week’s meeting in Turkey, around half of IPCC member countries had indicated that they want an “additional product” from the TFI. By far the most sought-after product was on carbon dioxide removal and carbon capture and storage. The meeting saw the addition of a second methodology report on “carbon dioxide removal technologies, carbon capture utilisation and storage”.

In addition to the methodology reports, AR7 will also include a revision of the IPCC’s technical guidelines on impacts and adaptation, published in 1994, as well as adaptation indicators, metrics and guidelines. This will be “developed in conjunction with the WG2 report and published as a separate product”.

Dr Chandni Singh, senior researcher at the School of Environment and Sustainability at the Indian Institute for Human Settlements and IPCC AR6 author, says this is “very welcome”. She tells Carbon Brief:

“There is a bewildering range of frameworks being suggested and applied to track and monitor adaptation progress, and the policy salience is pressing, with discussions for the global goal on adaptation ongoing.”

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What is the timeline for producing these reports?

The delegates also used the meeting to begin discussing the timeline for the upcoming AR7 cycle. In a press release, Skea stressed the importance of “getting policy-relevant, timely and actionable scientific information as soon as possible and providing input to the 2028 second global stocktake”.

However, a full timeline for the AR7 cycle was not agreed at the meeting in Turkey. The dates for the working group reports will be developed by the IPCC bureau and presented at the next meeting in late July or early August for a decision. 

The ENB reports that while most countries “broadly agreed on the need to ensure that a balanced set of scientific inputs, covering both mitigation and adaptation, would be available in time for the second global stocktake in 2028, a few countries strenuously objected”. It adds:

“Until late on the final day of the session, governments’ positions were converging towards having the three working group assessment reports completed by 2028, or at least ‘striving’ to have them completed. Still, the small number of delegates who opposed this timeline held fast.”

One person present at the meeting tells Carbon Brief that “most of the resistance about the 2028 timeline came from Saudi Arabia, China and India”. This “seems politically motivated given the political position of these countries regarding climate mitigation”, they add.

Delegates did agree on a timeline for some of the reports, the ENB notes:

  • The special report on climate change and cities will be published in “early 2027”.
  • The methodology report on short-lived climate forcers will be published “by 2027”.
  • The TFI will hold an expert meeting on carbon dioxide removal technologies, carbon capture utilisation and storage, and provide a methodology report on these “by the end of 2027”.

(Some of the IPCC documents published ahead of the meeting report that author selections for the special report on cities are already underway. More than 1,200 experts were nominated and the IPCC bureau is currently working to pare down the list to around 100 people. The list is expected to be finalised by the end of January, when the chosen experts will be invited to an initial scoping meeting, which will be held in April in Riga, Latvia.)

In addition, the IPCC says that the synthesis report – the final product of the AR7 cycle – will be “released by late 2029”.

If governments do agree that all working group reports are ready in time for the second global stocktake, the timeline for the WG1 report, in particular, will be “very time constrained”, says Rogelj, as it would need to “conclude around late 2027”. He explains:

“Otherwise, there will be insufficient time available for the two other working group reports to go through final review and approval in time for the global stocktake. For the research and climate modelling community, this also means a literature cut-off earlier in 2027 leaving very little time for new coupled climate model runs.”

However, Prof Roberto Sánchez-Rodríguez, a professor in the department of urban and environmental studies at the College of the Northern Border in Mexico and IPCC vice chair for WG2 during AR6, says that even this timetable “fails to recognise the severity of the climate crisis and the pace of change in socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions in the world”. He tells Carbon Brief:

“Waiting until 2028 for the three reports and 2029 for the synthesis is too late to have an impact on decision-making. The world will be significantly different by then.”

Schipper says that getting the reports out before 2030 is important, as 2030 is a “mental tipping point for many”. She adds:

“The IPCC special report on 1.5C said that we needed to be well on our way with action to stay below 1.5 by 2030 – and, clearly, we are not.”

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Experts: Why carbon removal needs a ‘major scale up’ to return warming to 1.5C

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Last week, more than 260 researchers convened in Milan to discuss the opportunities, challenges and risks involved in scaling “carbon dioxide removal” (CDR) to help curb climate change.

The conference – held on the campus of the Politecnico di Milano – is the fourth in a series, with previous editions held in Oxford, UK in 2024, and Gothenburg, Sweden in 2018 and 2022.

A broad range of academics – from forests, oceans and soils experts through to social and political scientists – discussed the co-benefits and trade-offs involved in drawing down CO2 from the atmosphere at scale, as well as the ways policy could drive CDR deployment.

Dr Soheil Shayegh, director of the industrial and planetary carbon cycle programme at the Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC), told Carbon Brief the idea behind the conference was to “bring scientists together to convey a message to policymakers about where the technology stands”.

He continued: “We should be very clear that there still are huge uncertainties about the effectiveness of lots of this CDR technology – are they marketable or not? But what is clear for us is the need for CDR.”

Dr Morgan Edwards, the lead author of the recently published “state of CDR report”, told delegates that meeting the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C goal by the end of this century would require CDR to “scale up rapidly” from 2.2bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2 per year) today to 8.8GtCO2 by 2050.

She added: “We need to see an upscaling in ambition over the next few years to get on a track consistent with these long-term scenarios.”

Below, Carbon Brief summarises the key talking points at the conference.

Overshoot

The removal of carbon from the atmosphere is seen as crucial to compensate for the emissions from human activities that are difficult to decarbonise – for instance, those generated in aviation and agriculture.

This, scientists have emphasised, must come in addition to steep emissions cuts.

CDR has another role, which is as a mechanism to return average global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, in the likely event that the Paris Agreement’s temperature target is exceeded.

The Milan conference comes after 2024 was the first single year to breach the 1.5C target and as scientists have projected that the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C target – typically interpreted in terms of a 20-year average – could be exceeded by the end of this decade.

Prof Sabine Fuss, head of research department at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) told Carbon Brief the likely breach of the 1.5C limit means the CDR research agenda was getting “even bigger” as the world would need to contend with “even larger scales” of CDR. She added:

“Some of the things that we were worrying about already in a net-zero context are getting even more pertinent. Also, [we need to think about] what will happen under climate change. A lot of [CDR approaches] may not be super resilient if we’re facing higher temperatures and more disturbances. Think about forests.”

Prof Massimo Tavoni, scientific director of the RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, described the prospect of returning temperatures to 1.5C with CDR as the “biggest Earth restoration project ever”.

Speaking in the plenary, Tavoni said the concepts of “overshoot” and “CDR” were “closely connected, but not the same thing”.

Broadly speaking, there have been three “phases” of overshoot research, Tavoni said:

  • 1995 to 2005: a period where overshoot was not “seriously considered”, he argued. It was during this period that researchers first explored scenarios that would “now be classified as overshoot pathways” and “set out CO2 removal as a mechanism” for stabilising the climate, he said.
  • 2005 to 2015: the age when “overshoot was discovered”, according to Tavoni. At this time, he said, “[climate] ambition was rising and emissions were also rising, which led to the incorporation of CDR in the models”.
  • 2015 to the present day: an “age of reckoning” where overshoot has become “formally entangled” in the scenarios created by the climate community due to the “absolute need for overshoot and CDR to achieve [temperature] targets in the face of growing CO2 concentration”.

Tavoni noted that all of the new emissions scenarios set out ahead of the seventh phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP7) – unveiled in April – exceeded the 1.5C limit.

(CMIP is a global initiative that coordinates the work of dozens of climate modelling centres around the world, recommending a common set of model experiments that can collectively shed light on the climate and how it could change.)

Half of the CMIP7 scenarios, Tavoni said, first “overshoot” the 1.5C goal and then “return back”.

The indicative global temperature rise under these seven scenarios is shown in the chart on the right below.

(For more on CMIP7 and the emissions scenarios, see Carbon Brief’s recent guest post).

The greenhouse gas emissions for each of the CMIP7 climate scenarios (left) and the associated estimated average temperature change from 1850-1900 (right) using the FaIR emulator. Source: Adapted from Van Vuuren et al. (2026)
The greenhouse gas emissions for each of the CMIP7 climate scenarios (left) and the associated estimated average temperature change from 1850-1900 (right) using the FaIR emulator. Source: Adapted from Van Vuuren et al. (2026)

Tavoni noted that there was no “significant relation” across the scenario database between the cumulative CDR levels a scenario assumes and the level of temperature overshoot it would likely cause.

This, he said, is because “many other factors” contribute to CDR uptake, including the policy environment, progress on emissions reduction in different countries and decisions about what types of emissions might constitute “hard-to-abate” or “residual”. He added:

“You can have scenarios with no ‘negative emissions’, but still a lot of CDR for compensating residual emissions.”

A number of sessions at the conference looked at Earth-system response to overshoot pathways with large-scale CDR.

For example, CMCC’s Dr Momme Butenschön presented research looking at how the oceans would respond to “global net-negative emissions” – a hypothetical situation where more carbon is being removed from the atmosphere than is being added through emissions.

He explained that model runs to 2100 show that a decline in global surface temperature would fail to reduce temperatures in the upper layer of the ocean for at least 30-40 years. Ocean temperatures would “stay flat” during this period due to the ocean’s inertia, he said.

The response to negative emissions further down in the ocean would be even slower, he explained to Carbon Brief:

“If you go to the mesopelagic zone – the twilight zone 200-1,000 metres beneath the surface – the ocean will continue to warm and then, after some years, it will flatten out again. [Its temperature] will not go down.

“And, if you go to the deeper ocean, everything – acidification, deoxygenation, warming – they all continue on their path. So the deep ocean doesn’t even realise you are doing negative emissions.”

The researchers behind the project – named RESCUE – have asked for an extension to run the models up to 2300 so they can better understand what the “long-term reaction” of the ocean to negative emissions technologies would be.

Forests

Speaking in a plenary session, Dr Edwards – assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin and lead author of the 2026 state of CDR report – explained that the “vast majority of CDR that is happening today is so-called ‘conventional’ CDR – so, primarily removal of CO2 from forests”.

Edwards was summarising some of the findings of the latest “state of CDR” report, which says that, at present, 99.9% of existing CDR is “conventional”, land-based techniques such as tree-planting.

The world’s forests currently remove 2.2GtCO2 per year, equivalent to around 5% of gross global CO2 emissions, according to the report. It also notes that “high ambition climate scenarios” will require all forms of CDR to reach a median value of 3.9GtCO2 by 2035 and 8.8GtCO2 by 2050.

Edwards said that conventional CDR methods “tend to be well established and have relatively high readiness levels”. Typically, they also have lower costs – “in some cases less than $10 per tonne of CO2” – than “novel” methods.

Experts pointed out repeatedly throughout the conference that CDR methods would need to be diversified for CDR to achieve levels required to meet climate goals, given land-use constraints and concerns around the permanence of carbon stored in forests.

CMCC’s Shayegh said the world would need a “portfolio” of solutions, given the “big trade-offs” involved in different CDR approaches. He explained:

“For forests, for example, to get the scale you need, you have to have lots of managed land for CDR, which means interfering with agriculture. So you will compete with food and biofuel – and it’s not a very easy or efficient way of creating jobs.”

In a research session, Dr Clemens Schwingshackl from LMU Munich noted that CDR from afforestation and reforestation compensated for about 6% of human fossil-fuel emissions between 2014-23.

However, he said that there was “large uncertainty” in calculations of forest-based CDR. Current bookkeeping models and national greenhouse gas inventories – two key methods for estimating levels of forest-based CDR – have uncertainty rates of 20% and 30%, respectively.

“Missing processes” in bookkeeping models include the impact of disturbances on forests, such as fire, as well as information about the effectiveness of afforestation and reforestation projects, he said.

Dr Giacomo Grassi, scientific officer at the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, noted the differences in the ways “conventional” CDR levels are calculated by countries, the “state of CDR” report and by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

CDR, he said, “excludes” CO2 uptake that is not directly caused by human activities. However, separating direct human effects on land from indirect human-caused effects – such as the impacts of climate change – cannot be achieved through observations alone and instead relies on models and model assumptions. He explained:

“Because national greenhouse gas inventories typically rely on observations, they include a broader [human-caused] land carbon sink than what is counted as CDR. As a result, conventional land-based CDR cannot be fully tracked in these inventories.”

Grassi illustrated the different approaches to defining CDR by showing the graphic below.

Infographic showing the different definitions of anthropogenic CO2 removals
Credit: Grassi et al. (2023)

Barbara Saget from the Paris School of Economics presented the findings of an exercise where researchers used a “dynamic social planner model” to understand the optimum timing and scaling of nature-based and technological CDR and the extent to which net-zero targets can rely on nature-based CDR.

The research showed that nature-based CDR was needed in the medium-term to offset hard-to-abate emissions and limit reliance on more expensive solutions.

However, the model results showed that, as forests grow, an increasing share of captured CO2 is used to compensate for carbon produced during forest disturbances, rather than human-caused greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, in the EU, the issue of tight land availability restricts the expansion of forest-based removals. She explained:

“This theoretical model shows that forests are not reliable in the long-run to offset the hard-to-abate emissions, first because of the release of emissions – this reversal risk – but also because of land constraints. So, we need to rely on technological CDR to compensate for these remaining emissions.”

Other forms of CDR

Other research sessions focused on the challenges, uncertainties and opportunities in scaling in other CDR techniques, sometimes referred to as “novel”, “engineered” or “technological” CDR.

In the opening plenary, Edwards noted that, despite making up less than 0.1% of current levels CDR, “novel” solutions were “growing rapidly”.

She added that “the major scale up of novel CDR that we might need to meet climate goals will likely require substantial cost reductions for these technologies”.

Ashwin Murphy, negative emissions fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, explained the various international agreements governing “marine CDR” – a category that includes ocean alkalinity enhancement and direct ocean capture. He said:

“As much promise as marine CDR holds, it also holds the potential for harm, environmental, social and otherwise. The laws that apply to CDR as a whole are unclear, because there are older laws that have been taken out and forced into the CDR framework and that means that they often don’t fit right.

“When a CDR project takes place and for whatever reason there’s an issue – whether it’s environmental harm or otherwise – liability questions are complicated, and there’s not often a clear answer as to what happens next.”

Oumaima Rhalem of Utrecht University described research which looked at the potential of biochar as a CDR technology. She said the findings show that biochar’s potential to tackle climate change depended on a region’s agricultural soils and biomass resources.

In the longer-run, however, she noted that carbon pricing would influence the geography of biochar deployment and would eventually shift biochar from an “agricultural technology” to a “carbon-removal technology”.

Dr Christian Rischer from the Kiel Institute presented findings of a literature review on the CDR potential of blue-carbon ecosystems, such as mangroves, salt marshes, sea grasses and macroalgae.

He said that “low ranges of estimates” suggest these ecosystems currently sequester around 270m tonnes of carbon per year and have a “mitigation potential” of up to 448m tonnes of carbon per year 2050.

Meanwhile, Dr Leon Stephan, a scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research presented the results of a review of the scientific and “grey” literature – which includes reports, white papers and other evaluations – on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of CDR up to 2023.

He noted an “exponential growth” in the MRV literature, with two-thirds of the 184 publications assessed focused on “conventional” CDR approaches, such as afforestation and deforestation. On the other hand, he said, marine CDR, DACCS and bioenergy and carbon capture and storage (BECCS) were “rarely studied” in the MRV literature. The analysis also showed that terminology and definitions were used inconsistently, he said.

The literature focused largely on the quantification of MRV, followed by monitoring and removal quality, he added, noting that there was “very little” on governance of solutions.

The researchers also conducted an analysis of 60 CDR certification methodologies used to issue credits for 11 CDR methods in the voluntary and compliance carbon markets.

IPCC CDR methodology report

The conference comes as the IPCC gears up to publish a methodology report on CDR technologies in 2027.

The report will be produced by the Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, the group responsible for the internationally-agreed methodologies used for countries’ calculation of greenhouse gas emissions and removals.

The European Commission’s Grassi noted the report aims “to provide a consistent methodology that allows countries to report greenhouse gas emissions removal under the UNFCCC [UN Framework Convention on Climate Change]”.

Dr Oliver Geden, senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and Working Group III vice-chair for the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle, tells Carbon Brief the report will bring together experts on CDR methods, as well as specialists on compiling inventories.

He said the methodology report differed from previous climate inventory reports, given that many of the solutions it would be drawing up guidelines for do not yet exist at scale:

“If you look into the guidelines of established processes, like emissions from gasoline use…you don’t have to measure the emissions, you just have statistics about the activity and then you have an emissions factor. It’s an established process.

“The problem with the methodology report is that it is very unusual that you try to regulate things that are not really there yet…So, it can be problematic to come up with ‘standard removal factors’.”

Nevertheless, he said the report was a “start” and signalled that policymakers had started to take CDR beyond forestry seriously.

He added that it will “need to be reworked constantly because experience with what these methods deliver, and under which circumstances, may change”.

Policy

A significant tranche of the conference was focused on how policy could drive uptake of carbon removal solutions.

Speaking in a plenary, Geden presented a table from the “state of CDR” report, which sets out three types of policy that can drive uptake of CDR.

Table outlining the typology for CDR policy assessment that lists policy categories, policy objectives, and examples.
Credit: State of CDR (2026).

Geden said that, at present, there was a “lack of robust demand signals” for CDR. This includes measures such as binding targets, government procurement initiatives and tax incentives for buyers.

The state of CDR report notes that the 140 countries around the world that have announced net-zero targets – including virtually all of the world’s major emitters have “implicitly included a role for CDR in their climate plans”.

However, this does not always translate into measures specifically designed to scale up CDR. Only the EU has adopted a binding, quantified removals target into law – namely, the goal to reach 310m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) of annual net removals in the land sector by 2030.

In general, conventional CDR is the main focus of policy, according to the state of CDR report, with various governments focusing on tree planting to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere.

Speaking in a plenary at the conference, Fabien Ramos, carbon removal lead at the European Commission, detailed the way the bloc was incorporating carbon removals into its policy, both through its headline carbon targets and via the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS).

Ramos said that “carbon removal would have a significant role in the ETS in the future”, noting that the EU will need “lots of carbon removal after 2030” to achieve its 2050 net-zero goal.

Geden told Carbon Brief that net-negative emissions would be the “next frontier for European countries to commit to” if overshoot scenarios were to be successfully realised:

“If you talk about exceeding 1.5C and returning, and you need net-negative [emissions] globally. You don’t get to net-negative globally if nobody even plans to go net-negative individually…Currently, only Denmark has a net-negative target right now. Others will have to follow.”

Lucia Dora Simonelli, from US-based non-profit Carbon Removal Standards Initiative, said it would be important to establish how to “weave” the carbon removal process into existing policies. She said:

“This is not about creating a new CDR policy. This is not about creating climate policy. It’s about truly leveraging existing policy infrastructure.”

PIK’s Fuss similarly told Carbon Brief that one of her key takeaways from the conference was the need to “expand the carbon lens and see what other opportunities we have to mainstream CDR into other policy agendas – so, looking at benefits, for instance, in terms of health or adaptation”.

Dr Steve Smith from the University of Oxford’s Smith School of Enterprise & Environment told Carbon Brief:

“If CDR is to scale to gigatonne levels – as indicated by nearly all global pathways to the Paris Agreement goals – then governments will likely need to introduce markets to create demand for CDR or obligations for it to happen.

“CDR is a public good – like our current waste management systems for sewage – and it’s highly unlikely to happen at that scale through voluntary action alone.”

Societal buy-in

A number of delegates pointed to the need to build societal demand and acceptance for CDR technologies.

Dr Livia Fritz from the University of Geneva presented results of a survey of more than 10,000 people in six countries, focused on three CDR approaches: DACCS, BECCS and enhanced rock weathering. Each respondent was assigned one technology and asked to weigh in on five imagined scenarios of how the solutions would be implemented.

The exercise found that support for CDR hinges on taking “procedural and distributive” fairness “seriously” and opening up planning processes to public and expert scrutiny, she said. It also found that benefit-sharing, as well as not-for-profit arrangements “consistently increase” public support for CDR across all countries and technologies.

Speaking in a plenary, Dr Holly Buck from the University of Buffalo discussed the cultural shift required to enable overshoot scenarios. She explained that a national survey exploring US public opinion about decarbonisation and climate policies – including CDR – had revealed that many members of the US public see the concept of a return to 1.5C from above as “fantastical and implausible”. She said:

“Its not just about social support or acceptance or licence. This sort of industry really requires an active demand or desire for it. It’s not enough to just tolerate [CDR]. It’s not going to work unless there’s a wish that’s felt.”

The post Experts: Why carbon removal needs a ‘major scale up’ to return warming to 1.5C appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Experts: Why carbon removal needs a ‘major scale up’ to return warming to 1.5C

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How Shining a Light on Ships Could Help Solve Illegal Fishing

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Sixteen countries have adopted the Mombasa Declaration to combat illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. The biggest weapon in their arsenal: transparency.

Mamadou Sarr remembers when an artisanal fisherman in Dakar only had to helm his wooden pirogue a single kilometer offshore to find a rich bounty of sardines and cuttlefish. For generations, Senegal’s near shore was the staging ground for a noble trade passed down from father to son.

How Shining a Light on Ships Could Help Solve Illegal Fishing

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Mombasa ocean summit drives progress on marine protection, but threats persist

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Governments at the annual oceans summit reaffirmed commitments to protect key marine ecosystems including the high seas and coral reefs, but observers said funding barriers and polluting projects are hampering progress on putting them into practice.

At the Our Ocean Conference in Kenya’s coastal city of Mombasa this week, some 3,000 delegates – including government officials, scientists, business representatives and activists – gathered to discuss ocean protection and push for marine issues to move from the margins to the centre of global climate diplomacy. 

Campaigners said the overall picture was positive. Oceans are gaining more visibility in international climate discussions: from blue carbon ecosystems such as mangroves, to coastal adaptation, marine biodiversity, ocean finance and the High Seas Treaty. 

In this year’s preliminary conference report, the secretariat listed 320 existing ocean commitments worth $6.4 billion, with about $1.1 billion destined to address the climate crisis. Many of these pledges were already announced before the conference.

But as momentum builds ahead of the COP31 climate summit in Türkiye, John Kerry, former US climate envoy and founder of the Our Ocean Conference, warned that the conversations and commitments on ocean protection will mean little if implementation continues to lag behind action. 

    “The ocean can no longer be an afterthought in climate policy,” Kerry told delegates at the opening ceremony of the conference. “Now it must become central to our climate solutions.”

    “The challenge before us is not a lack of knowledge. We know exactly what has happened,” he said. “The challenge is whether political will can finally catch up with the science.”

    He added that the meeting taking place on the shores of the Indian Ocean should be remembered as the moment the process moved “from commitments to implementation”.

    The ocean has quietly shielded humanity from the worst impacts of climate change for decades, absorbing around 90% of the excess heat generated by global warming while sustaining the livelihoods of billions of people.

    From pledges to progress

    Oceans have been largely absent from international climate negotiations, often treated as a conservation issue rather than a core component of climate action. 

    Yet scientists say the ocean absorbs around a quarter of humanity’s annual carbon emissions and plays a critical role in regulating global temperatures.

    Research suggests that ocean-based solutions – from restoring mangroves and seagrass meadows to decarbonising shipping and expanding marine protected areas – could deliver up to 35% of the emissions reductions needed to keep global warming within 1.5 degrees Celsius by mid-century.

    That growing recognition has fuelled calls for oceans to play a larger role in climate policy and negotiations. Against that backdrop, the Our Ocean Conference – launched in 2014 to mobilise governments, business, philanthropies and activists – has emerged as a platform for advancing action to keep the planet’s seas healthy. 

    According to the conference secretariat, the process has generated more than 2,900 commitments worth nearly $170 billion in the 10 years since its launch. The gathering in Mombasa was the 11th conference and the first to take place in Africa.

    This week, Canada and Jamaica were confirmed as the hosts of the next two Our Ocean conferences in 2027 and 2029. There is none planned for 2028, as the UN Ocean Conference will be co-hosted by South Korea and Chile that year, the secretariat said.  

    Science ‘under attack’ from fossil fuel interests at UN climate talks

    In Mombasa, governments reaffirmed more than 300 commitments linked to the creation of new marine protected areas, reducing marine pollution, and developing sustainable fisheries, among others.

    Most of the finance mobilised went to “blue economy” initiatives, including the European Union’s Ocean Eye initiative, which will mobilise €50 million ($57 million) to offset a Trump administration decision to scale back the US Ocean Observatories Initiative and weaken scientific marine data.

    “More important than the new pledges is the actual delivery of commitments,” Cynthia Barzuna, who heads the conference secretariat at the World Resources Institute, told Climate Home News. “That is what makes a difference for marine ecosystems and coastal communities.”

    Last year, the secretariat published its first comprehensive assessment of implementation, finding that nearly 80% of commitments made through the conference were either completed or progressing towards completion.

    A side event on the EU's Ocean Eye initiative at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya. (Photo: Kenya State Department for Blue Economy and Fisheries)
    A side event on the EU’s Ocean Eye initiative at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya. (Photo: Kenya State Department for Blue Economy and Fisheries)

    Barriers remain

    Yet while oceans are climbing the political agenda, significant barriers remain to turning ambition into meaningful action.

    The secretariat’s assessment found that successful projects involved local communities, strengthened local expertise, and secured long-term financing. Many organisations, however, reported difficulties accessing sustained funding, particularly in developing countries. 

    African initiatives, for example, tend to rely on short-term project grants, creating what Barzuna described as a “patchwork of impacts on the ground” rather than the systemic change needed to protect marine ecosystems and coastal livelihoods. 

    Campaigners say a broader challenge lies in ensuring that growing recognition of the ocean’s importance is reflected in wider climate and economic policies.

    While countries have pledged to expand marine protected areas, restore coastal ecosystems and strengthen ocean governance, many continue to pursue activities that place additional pressure on marine environments, including offshore fossil fuel development.

    “This year’s Our Ocean Conference comes at a critical moment where the incoming presidencies for COP31 – both Türkiye and Australia – have a strong interest increasing the prominence of the ocean in the COP,” Shamini Selvaratnam, director of International Climate and Clean Energy at the Ocean Conservancy, told Climate Home News.

    “But we cannot talk about ocean health and then continue to explore offshore oil and gas – those two things are incompatible. It’s like asking the dolphin to swim on the land.”

    For supporters of the ocean agenda, the question is no longer whether oceans matter to climate action. The challenge now is ensuring that governments match rising political ambition with funding, implementation and accountability. 

    “The ocean has actually been acting as Earth’s life support system – and it has been protecting us,” Kerry told delegates. “The question before us is whether we are willing to protect the ocean in return.” 

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