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PRINCETON

For a quarter of a century, Princeton University partnered with one of the world’s biggest oil and gas giants, BP. The alliance poured money into the University’s Carbon Mitigation Initiative (CMI), one of its most prominent climate research programs. On the surface, the deal brought prestige and resources. In reality, critics argue that it delayed the urgent work of phasing out fossil fuels.

Now, the partnership is ending, as reported by The Daily Princetonian. When the current contract expires in 2025, BP will no longer fund CMI. Both sides insist it’s a mutual decision, but the move comes after years of growing criticism, student protests, and investigations that raised serious questions about how fossil fuel companies use academia to protect their business model.

A Deal That Shaped Climate Research

The report further explained: when Princeton struck its deal with BP back in 2000, it was framed as a groundbreaking collaboration. BP’s funding supported research into carbon capture, storage, alternative fuels, and other mitigation strategies.

CMI quickly became one of the University’s flagship institutes, producing influential studies like the Net Zero America report, which mapped possible pathways for the U.S. to achieve net zero by 2050.

Of the five modeled scenarios, four kept fossil fuels in play through mid-century, relying heavily on carbon capture to offset emissions. Critics later pointed out that this conclusion closely mirrored BP’s corporate strategy: continue pumping oil and gas while showcasing carbon capture as a lifeline.

At the time, renewable energy was less developed and more expensive than today. But as wind, solar, geothermal, and battery technologies advanced rapidly, the wisdom of pouring billions into carbon capture began to look like a stalling tactic.

Prestige for BP, Problems for Princeton

For BP, the partnership was a communications jackpot. Having Princeton’s name attached to its climate efforts gave the company a veneer of credibility, even as it expanded drilling and exploration. Internal communications later revealed how BP staff highlighted Princeton’s research to bolster its case for carbon capture and hydrogen in U.S. policy circles.

For Princeton, the financial support was significant, but the cost was reputational. As the climate crisis worsened, the University found itself increasingly criticized for giving BP legitimacy. By 2022, Princeton announced it would divest from fossil fuels, yet the BP relationship remained—an uncomfortable contradiction for a campus under growing activist pressure.

Net Zero: Whose Roadmap?

The partnership’s most contested legacy is the Net Zero America report. Funded by BP and Exxon, the study leaned heavily on carbon capture and fossil fuels. Just five months later, the International Energy Agency (IEA) issued its own net-zero roadmap, independent of fossil fuel influence.

The IEA’s message was blunt: no new investments in fossil fuel projects could be made if the world hoped to stay within 1.5°C of warming. The sharp contrast between Princeton’s BP-backed report and the IEA’s independent findings laid bare the risks of corporate-funded science.

Investigations Pull Back the Curtain

The true extent of BP’s influence came into sharper focus in 2024. A congressional investigation concluded that BP leveraged its Princeton ties to promote policies that aligned with its long-term strategy rather than committing to large-scale renewable investments.

The investigation found that BP not only shaped the narrative around carbon capture but also used the partnership to influence how energy and emissions policies were discussed in Washington. For student groups like Sunrise Princeton and Divest Princeton, this confirmed what they had warned for years: the partnership was less about science and more about extending the fossil fuel era.

Is Fossil Fuel Money Too Toxic for Academia?

Princeton is hardly alone. We discovered that a 2023 report by Data for Progress and Fossil Free Research revealed that fossil fuel companies funneled more than $675 million into 27 U.S. universities between 2010 and 2020. The University of California, Berkeley topped the list with $154 million, followed by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ($108 million) and George Mason University ($64 million).

The debate over whether universities should accept fossil fuel funding is complex. Supporters argue that oil and gas companies bring valuable expertise, particularly in areas like carbon storage, green hydrogen, or sustainable aviation fuel. They say tapping into that knowledge can accelerate decarbonization.

Critics counter that these partnerships are inherently compromised. Any research tied to fossil fuel dollars risks being skewed toward preserving oil and gas interests. The history of tobacco industry funding of medical research is often cited as a warning: money from industries whose business models depend on harmful practices should not dictate academic inquiry.

What’s clear is that fossil fuel money buys more than just lab equipment—it buys influence, legitimacy, and access to future policymakers. That’s a trade-off many now say is too high a price to pay.

FOSSIL fuel
Source: Data for Progress

From Princeton to Harvard: BP’s Quiet Academic Powerplay

BP’s influence extended beyond Princeton. Documents show the company paid between $2.1 million and $2.6 million to CMI between 2012 and 2017. It also funded programs at Harvard and Tufts, contributing hundreds of thousands annually to policy-focused research. Harvard’s Kennedy School and Tufts’s Fletcher School, both heavily tied to government policymaking, received funds earmarked for climate policy labs.

The report noted that these partnerships gave BP access not just to research, but also to future policymakers—a revolving door that helped the company shape long-term political outcomes.

Princeton’s Climate Work Seeks New Lifelines

The end of BP’s sponsorship comes as Princeton faces broader challenges in securing climate research funding. In mid-2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce cut $4 million earmarked for University climate programs, claiming they no longer aligned with federal priorities.

Professor Stephen Pacala, CMI’s director, acknowledged that the termination of BP’s support will reduce funding for some projects and end the annual BP-Princeton conference, but he emphasized that the work will continue with other backers. Professor Jonathan Levine, a lead investigator, echoed that sentiment, noting that the research pillars will remain intact but under new funding models.

Student Demands for Real Leadership

With BP now stepping back, Princeton students and climate activists see an opening for change. Divest Princeton has called on the University to:

  • Cut all ties with fossil fuel companies.

  • Offer pension plans free of fossil fuel exposure.

  • Introduce an undergraduate climate crisis course requirement.

  • Make campus operations a model of sustainability, from dining halls to reunions.

  • Acknowledge and address harms inflicted on frontline communities impacted by fossil fuels.

To them, Princeton has lagged on sustainability, and its long partnership with BP represents decades of lost opportunity. Instead of backing bold renewable solutions already proven at scale—solar, wind, geothermal, and battery storage—Princeton, they argue, gave BP the cover it needed to keep selling fossil fuels.

A Chance for Princeton to Reset

The end of Princeton’s BP partnership represents more than just the expiration of a contract. It’s a moment of reckoning for the University, and a chance to redefine its role in the global energy transition.

Princeton could choose to double down on independent, transparent climate research that focuses on accelerating renewable deployment, scaling storage, and building resilient, low-carbon systems. It could use its prestige not to give cover to fossil fuel interests, but to lead the charge toward a sustainable future.

Whether Princeton seizes this opportunity or clings to the legacy of a 25-year deal that many see as a costly mistake. Nonetheless, it will send a powerful signal about the role of higher education in solving the climate crisis.

The post How Princeton’s Break with BP Exposed the Hidden Influence of Fossil Fuel Money on Universities appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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