Methane, a potent greenhouse gas, is responsible for about 30% of the global temperature increase observed since the industrial revolution.
China accounts for more than 10% of annual global human methane emissions, in large part due to unintended releases – known as “fugitive” emissions – from its energy sector.
In a recently published study, we take a closer look at China’s coal-mine methane (CMM) emissions, which account for roughly 40% of the nation’s total methane emissions.
Leveraging newly collected, mine-specific data, we develop granular estimates of CMM emissions in China since 2000.
These estimates reveal that China’s coal production is shifting towards provinces with lower-emission mines.
In addition, there has been a significant increase in the capturing of methane from coal mines for energy use.
Together, these developments have helped to limit the rise of CMM emissions, despite an overall increase in coal production since 2016.
Mine data
To estimate CMM emissions at a granular level, we needed to understand how emissions vary from one mine to the next across China.
To do this, we made use of existing safety regulations in China. As methane is a highly flammable gas, the Chinese government enforces mandatory methane gas level identification in coal mines and implements safety regulations accordingly.
Coal mines are categorised based on their “methane emission factors”, the volume of methane emitted per tonne of coal produced.
At one end are low-gas mines, with an emissions factor of less than 10 cubic metres (m3) of methane emitted per tonne of coal. At the other are high-gas mines, at more than 10m3 of methane emitted per tonne. Beyond this are “outburst” mines, which are those that have experienced coal seam or gas outburst incidents.
To get a clearer sense of how much low-gas, high-gas and outburst mines emit in practice, we built a model of the relationship between gas levels and emission factors, using a 2011 database of all Chinese coal mines.
This database includes information on methane gas levels, mine-specific emission factors, coalbed depth, mine ownership and production capacity. We further validated this relationship with newly collected coal mine data from 2023, published by Chinese local governments.
The results show that the distribution of emission factors, as shown in the figure below, varies significantly with gas level.
The top row in the figure below shows the emissions factors for a range of mines in 2011 classed as low-gas (top left, green), high-gas (top centre, pink) or outburst (top right, red). The dashed vertical lines show the central estimate for each type, ranging from 4.1m3 per tonne for low-gas mines through to 19.9m3/tonne for high-gas and 28.4m3/tonne for outburst mines.
The bottom row shows the same metrics based on the more recent 2023 data.
The strong correlation shown in the data above suggests that gas level is a crucial indicator of how much methane a coal mine emits.
In contrast, our analysis reveals no significant correlation between how much a coal mine emits and either coal mine depth or ownership.
Comparing the distributions for the same gas levels between 2011 and 2023 also shows that the link between gas levels and methane emissions remains fairly constant over time.
Therefore, the gas level of a mine can reliably serve as a proxy for its methane emissions per tonne of production, when direct measurements are unavailable.
Provincial shift
To estimate CMM emissions for each province in China, we assumed that the percentage of coal produced by mines of each gas level remains roughly constant as in 2011.
For instance, if 20% of Guizhou’s coal production in 2011 came from low-gas mines, we maintained this percentage for subsequent years.
We then calculated CMM emissions by multiplying provincial-level production-weighted emission factors by total coal production.
The line chart below illustrates our estimated CMM emissions since 2000.
The raw estimates, depicted by the lower grey dashed line, show a rapid increase in CMM emissions from approximately 5m tonnes in 2000 to nearly 21m tonnes in 2013.
This was followed by a decrease to 15m tonnes in 2016 and a subsequent rebound to 24m tonnes in 2023.
The decline between 2013 and 2016 aligns with a period of reduced coal production in China.
On the chart, the upper grey line represents CMM emissions when abandoned coal mines are included.
These mines, which continue to release methane long after operations cease, were responsible for 4.8m tonnes of methane emissions in 2020, contributing approximately 25% to the total CMM emissions.
Meanwhile, the blue line shows CMM emissions when the capture and use of methane in energy supply is taken into consideration.
National methane utilisation increased from 1.2m tonnes in 2008 to 3.7m tonnes in 2020, resulting in a reduction of total emissions by 5% and 17%, respectively.
It is noteworthy that CMM emissions did not immediately rebound after 2016, despite a reported increase in coal production by China’s National Bureau of Statistics.
This delay can likely be attributed to shifts in production locations to lower-emissions provinces, the closure of high-emissions mines and the adoption of technologies for capturing and using methane that effectively mitigate emissions.
The figure below compares CMM emissions across provinces in 2012 and 2021, two years with nearly identical total coal production levels.
Overall, changes in methane emissions closely mirrored shifts in where the coal was being mined. There is a clear geographic trend: production and emissions surged in northern and north-western regions such as Xinjiang, Shaanxi and especially Shanxi.
In fact, Shanxi alone emitted nearly 8m tonnes of coal-mine methane in 2021, making up roughly half of China’s total CMM emissions.
Meanwhile, both production and emissions dropped in south-western provinces, including Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan.
The figure shows that China’s coal production has switched from regions in the south-west where emissions per unit of coal production are relatively high, to lower-emission areas in the north and north-west. At the same time, total production levels have stayed similar, at just over 4bn tonnes in both 2012 and 2021.
Tackling methane
China has signalled its intention to address methane emissions, with key tasks for the next five years outlined in a national methane action plan published in 2023.
The broad trends of CMM emissions observed in this study will likely continue in China.
Small-scale coal mines – those producing less than 300,000 tonnes of coal per year – are at risk of closing or being consolidated, while increased production from large-scale, lower-emission mines in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia will likely lead to an overall reduction in national production-weighted emission factors.
(This reduction in the rate of emissions per unit of coal production does not guarantee a reduction in methane emissions overall, as several analyses show this also depends on the total coal output. Even following closures, methane may still leak from abandoned mines.)
However, this regional shift in coal production – and, thus, methane emissions – could also help to address public health concerns from pollution associated with the gas.
The Chinese government has also introduced significant changes in policy on the capturing and use of methane gas. The Ministry of Ecology and Environment recently revised coal-mine methane standardsto mandate the capture and use of methane with concentrations above 8%, down from a previous 30%.
In addition, the government has a programme providing financial incentives for capturing methane and reducing CMM emissions.
Together, these measures could help China achieve its short- and medium-run methane capture and use goals set by the methane action plan.
The post Guest post: How changes to coal mining have affected China’s methane emissions appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How changes to coal mining have affected China’s methane emissions
Climate Change
Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate
When the land no longer answers the stars the way it once did, Indigenous peoples are among the first to notice — and the first to ask why.
A Sky Full of Knowledge
Look up on a clear night on Turtle Island and you’re seeing a sky that has guided human life for thousands of years. Across Indigenous nations in Canada, detailed systems of celestial knowledge developed not as abstract science but as living, practical guides —telling people when to plant, when to harvest, when herds would move, and when ice would come. This astronomical knowledge was woven into language, ceremony, and everyday life, passed down through generations with remarkable precision.
The Mi’kmaq and the Celestial Bear
Among the Mi’kmaq of Atlantic Canada, star stories are ecological calendars, precise and functional. The story of Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters connects the annual movement of what Western astronomy calls Ursa Major to the seasonal cycle of hunting and harvest: the bear rises in spring, is hunted through summer, and falls to earth in autumn. This knowledge was brought to broader public attention in 2009 during the International Year of Astronomy, when Mi’kmaq Elders Lillian Marshall of Potlotek First Nation and Murdena Marshall of Eskasoni First Nation shared the story through an animated film produced at Cape Breton University narrated in English, French, and Mi’kmaq.¹ The story encodes specific observations about when and where to hunt, and which species to expect at which time of year. It is science in narrative form.
The Anishinaabe and the Seasonal Star Map
Among the Anishinaabe peoples of the Great Lakes and northern Ontario, celestial knowledge forms part of a comprehensive seasonal understanding. Knowledge keepers like Michael Wassegijig Price of Wikwemikong First Nation have described how Anishinaabe constellations quite different from those of Western astronomy connect the movement of the heavens to naming ceremonies, seasonal gatherings, and land practices.² The Royal Astronomical Society of Canada now offers planispheres featuring Indigenous constellations from Cree, Ojibwe, and Dakota sky traditions, recognizing their value as both cultural heritage and ecological knowledge systems.³
When the Stars and the Land Fall Out of Rhythm
Here’s the challenge that climate change has introduced: the stars still move on their ancient, reliable schedule. But the land no longer always responds as expected. Migratory birds that once arrived when certain constellations appeared are now showing up earlier or later. Ice that once formed in predictable windows is forming weeks late, or not at all. Berry harvests, fish runs, animal migrations, all once timed by celestial cues accumulated over millennia are shifting. Indigenous knowledge holders across Canada describe this as a kind of dissonance: the sky remains faithful, but the land has changed.⁴
Long-Baseline Ecological Records
Far from being historical curiosity, Indigenous celestial knowledge systems are now being recognized by researchers as long-baseline ecological calendars —records of how nature behaved over centuries, encoded in story and ceremony. When an Elder observes that a particular star rising no longer predicts the arrival of certain geese, that observation represents a departure from a pattern that may have held true for hundreds of years. The Climate Atlas of Canada integrates Indigenous knowledge observations alongside western climate data, recognizing that both contribute meaningfully to understanding ecological change.⁵
Keeping the Knowledge Alive
Language revitalization and land-based education programs are helping ensure this knowledge reaches the future. From youth astronomy nights on-reserve to the integration of Indigenous sky stories in school curricula, there is growing recognition that these knowledge systems belong to what comes next, not only what came before. As Canada grapples with accelerating ecological change, the quiet precision of thousands of years of skyward observation offers something no satellite can fully replicate: a continuous record of the relationship between the cosmos and a living land.
Blog by Rye Karonhiowanen Barberstock
Image Credit: Dustin Bowdige, Unsplash
References
[1] Marshall, L., Marshall, M., Harris, P., & Bartlett, C. (2010). Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters: A Mi’kmaw Night Sky Story. Cape Breton University Press. See also: Integrative Science, CBU. (2009). Background on the Making of the Muin Video for IYA2009. http://www.integrativescience.ca/uploads/activities/BACKGROUND-making-video-Muin-Seven-Bird-Hunters-IYA-binder.pdf
[2] Price, M.W. (Various). Anishinaabe celestial knowledge. Wikwemikong First Nation. Referenced in: Royal Astronomical Society of Canada Indigenous Astronomy resources.
[3] Royal Astronomical Society of Canada. (2020). Indigenous Skies planisphere series. RASC. https://www.rasc.ca/indigenous-skies
[4] Neilson, H. (2022, December 11). The night sky over Mi’kmaki: A Q&A with astronomer Hilding Neilson. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/hilding-neilson-indigenizing-astronomy-1.6679072
[5] Climate Atlas of Canada. (2024). Prairie Climate Centre, University of Winnipeg. https://climateatlas.ca/
The post Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate appeared first on Indigenous Climate Hub.
https://indigenousclimatehub.ca/2026/04/night-skies-and-shifting-stars-how-indigenous-celestial-knowledge-tracks-a-changing-climate/
A much-discussed “return to coal” by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year.
The new analysis by thinktank Ember, shared exclusively with Carbon Brief, is a “worst-case” scenario and the reality could be even lower.
Separate data shows that, to date, there has been no “return to coal” in 2026.
While some countries, such as Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, have responded to disrupted gas supplies with plans to increase their coal use, the new analysis shows that these actions will likely result in a “small rise” at most.
In fact, the decline of coal power in some countries and the potential for global electricity demand growth to slow down could mean coal generation continues falling this year.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that “the big story isn’t about a coal comeback” and any increase in coal use is “merely masking a longer-term structural decline”.
Instead, they say clean-energy projects are emerging as more appealing investments during the fossil-fuel driven energy crisis.
‘Return to coal’
The conflict following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran has disrupted global gas supplies, particularly after Iran blocked the strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.
A fifth of the world’s liquified natural gas (LNG) is normally shipped through this region, mainly supplying Asian countries. The blockage in this supply route means there is now less gas available and the remaining supplies are more expensive.
(Note that while the strait usually carries a fifth of LNG trade, this amounts to a much smaller share of global gas supplies overall, with most gas being moved via pipelines.)
With gas supplies constrained and prices remaining well above pre-conflict levels, at least eight countries in Asia and Europe have announced plans to increase their coal-fired electricity generation, or to review or delay plans to phase out coal power.
These nations include Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Germany and Italy. Many of these nations are major users of coal power.
Such announcements have triggered a wave of reporting by global media outlets and analysts about a “return to coal”. Some have lamented a trend that is “incompatible with climate imperatives”, while others have even framed this as a positive development that illustrates coal’s return “from the dead”.
This mirrors a trend seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which many commentators said would lead to a surge in European coal use, due to disrupted gas supplies from Russia.
In fact, despite a spike in 2022, EU coal use has returned to its “terminal decline” and reached a historic low in 2025.
Gas to coal
So far, the evidence suggests that there has been no return to coal in 2026.
Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, in March, coal power generation remained flat globally and a fall in gas-fired generation was “offset by large increases in solar and wind power, rather than coal”.
However, as some governments only announced their coal plans towards the end of March, these figures may not capture their impact.
To get a sense of what that impact could be, Ember assessed the impact of coal policy changes and market responses across 16 countries, plus the 27 member states of the EU, which together accounted for 95% of total coal power generation in 2025.
For each country, the analysis considers a maximum “worst-case” scenario for switching from gas to coal power in the face of high gas prices.
It also considers the potential for any out-of-service coal power plants to return and for there to be delays in previously expected closures as a result of the response to the energy crisis.
Ember concludes that these factors could increase coal use by 175 terawatt hours (TWh), or 1.8%, in 2026 compared to 2025.
(This increase is measured relative to what would have happened without the energy crisis and does not account for wider trends in electricity generation from coal, which could see demand decline overall. Last year, coal power dropped by 63TWh, or 0.6%.)
Roughly three-quarters of the global effect in the Ember analysis is from potential gas-to-coal switching in China and the EU.
Other notable increases could come from switching in India and Indonesia and – to a lesser extent – from coal-policy shifts in South Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
However, widely reported policy changes by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines are estimated to have very little, if any, impact on coal-power generation in 2026. The table below briefly summarises the potential for and reasoning behind the estimated increases in coal generation in each country in 2026.
Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, stresses that the 1.8% figure is an upper estimate, telling Carbon Brief:
“This would only happen if gas prices remained very high for the rest of the year and if there were sufficient coal stocks at power plants. The real risk of higher coal burn in 2026 comes not from coal units returning…but rather from pockets of gas-to-coal switching by existing power plants, primarily in China and the EU.”
Moreover, Jones says there is a real chance that global coal power could continue falling over the course of this year, partly driven by the energy crisis. He explains:
“If the energy crisis starts to dent electricity demand growth, coal generation – as well as gas generation – might actually be lower than before the crisis.”
‘Structural decline’
Energy experts tell Carbon Brief that Ember’s analysis aligns with their own assessments of the state of coal power.
Coal already had lower operation costs than gas before the energy crisis. This means that coal power plants were already being run at high levels in coal-dependent Asian economies that also use imported LNG to generate electricity. As such, they have limited potential to cut their need for LNG by further increasing coal generation.
Christine Shearer, who manages the global coal plant tracker at Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief that, in the EU, there is a shrinking pool of countries where gas-to-coal switching is possible:
“In Europe, coal fleets are smaller, older and increasingly uneconomic, while wind, solar and storage are becoming more competitive and widespread.”
In the context of the energy crisis, Italy has announced plans to delay its coal phaseout from 2025 to 2038. This plan, dismissed by the ECCO thinktank as “ineffective and costly”, would have minimal impact given coal only provides around 1% of the country’s power.
Notably, experts say that there is no evidence of the kind of structural “return to coal” that would spark concerns about countries’ climate goals. There have been no new coal plants announced in recent weeks.
Suzie Marshall, a policy advisor working on the “coal-to-clean transition” at E3G, tells Carbon Brief:
“We’re seeing possible delayed retirements and higher utilisation [of existing coal plants], as understandable emergency measures to keep the lights on, but not investment in new coal projects…Any short-term increase in coal consumption that we may see in response to this ongoing energy crisis is merely masking a longer-term structural decline.”
With cost-competitive solar, wind and batteries given a boost over fossil fuels by the energy crisis, there have been numerous announcements about new renewable energy projects since the start of war, including from India, Japan and Indonesia.
Shearer says that, rather than a “sustained coal comeback” in 2026, the Iran war “strengthens the case for renewables”. She says:
“If anything, a second gas shock in less than five years strengthens the case for renewables as the more secure long-term path.”
Jones says that Ember expects “little change in overall fossil generation, but with a small rise in coal and a fall in gas” in 2026. He adds:
“This would maximise gas-to-coal switching globally outside of the US, leaving no possibility for further switching in future years. Therefore, the big story isn’t about a coal comeback. It’s about how the relative economics of renewables, compared to fossil fuels, have been given a superboost by the crisis.”
The post World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.
World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis
Small towns around Corpus Christi worry where they’ll fall on the pecking order if the region’s water runs out.
At least six small cities and towns in the Coastal Bend region of Texas issued disaster declarations in the last two weeks, begging not to be forgotten amid a spiraling water crisis.
Disaster Declarations Ripple Through South Texas Amid Water Crisis
From the Independent: “Trump Administration to Pay Two More Companies to Walk Away from U.S. Offshore Wind Leases”
Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate
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