Connect with us

Published

on

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Carbon target locked into final five-year plan

FEW CHANGES: The final version of China’s 15th five-year plan, published on 13 March, placed renewable energy “centre stage” in China’s energy supply, reported economic news outlet Jiemian. There were few changes related to energy and climate issues from the draft published at the beginning of the “two sessions” meeting in Beijing earlier this month. The final version was updated to include a reference to China’s new ecological and environmental code (see spotlight below) and a call to “actively promote” use of geothermal energy, found analysis by Carbon Brief. Policymakers also passed a new law on drafting “long-term national development plans”, such as five-year plans, specifying that research on “environmental constraints” must be factored into future documents, said business news outlet Caixin.

CLIMATE ‘BOON’: China’s five-year plans stand in contrast to other countries’ “short-term political-cycle promises”, said an editorial by state-run newspaper China Daily, with the climate targets in the plan providing a “boon to the entire world” and “influenc[ing] whether global emissions targets are achievable”. An editorial in the state-supporting Global Times argued that the plan shows that China is a “stable” geopolitical force, with its “active participation in global climate governance” showing China is “trustworthy”. [See Carbon Brief‘s coverage for further comment.]

NEA COMMENT: National Energy Administration head Wang Hongzhi published an article in political theory newspaper Study Times on the same day as the plan’s final version was released. He stated that the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030) is “not only the decisive phase for achieving the carbon peak target, but also a critical period for building a new energy system”. He added that China must “fully leverage” market-based pricing reforms to “promote the safe, reliable and orderly replacement of fossil fuels” and “safeguard” energy security.

China endorsed nuclear target

TRIPLING NUCLEAR: China signed up to an international pledge to “triple global nuclear energy capacity between 2020 and 2050”, reported Climate Home News. Chinese vice-premier Zhang Guoqing stated that China viewed the pledge as useful both for climate change and energy security, it added. Industry news outlet China Electric Power News quoted China Atomic Energy Authority director Shan Zhongde saying China is open to nuclear cooperation with other countries on “technological innovation, safety governance [and] industrial collaboration”.

MISSED TARGETS: State-run newspaper China Daily said in an editorial responding to the pledge that nuclear power “must be part” of China’s energy transition, as “[solar and wind] alone will not suffice”. However, Bloomberg reported that China has missed several recent domestic nuclear targets, meeting neither its goal for 58 gigawatts (GW) of capacity by 2020 nor its 70GW by 2025 target. [China’s nuclear capacity totalled 62GW at the end of 2025.] It cited Francois Morin, China director for the World Nuclear Association, saying the country would also likely miss the target set in its latest five-year plan to develop 110GW of capacity by 2030.

Middle East turmoil ‘vindicates’ China’s energy approach

STOCKPILE SUPPORT: China has “ordered an immediate ban” on exports of petrol, diesel, aviation fuel and other refined fuel products in March to “pre-empt ‌a potential domestic fuel shortage” caused by the US-Israel war on Iran, according to Reuters. The country had been stockpiling crude oil ahead of the war, Reuters also reported, with data showing the country had a surplus of “1.2m barrels per day” in the first two months of 2026. China may be “close to tapping” this stockpile, said Bloomberg, which is estimated at 1.4bn barrels in total.

CLEAN-ENERGY CUSHION: The war and the subsequent spike in oil prices have highlighted the “national security benefits of clean power” for China, said Politico, with renewable additions “cushioning” it from gas market volatility. Crude stockpiles and renewable energy mean China is “less sensitive to a prolonged closure” of the Strait of Hormuz, reported CNBC. Kate Logan, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s China climate hub, told Inside Climate News that the war “vindicates” China’s clean-energy push, although she added that coal will likely act as a provider of flexibility in the power sector – a role occupied by gas in other countries – and be used as a fuel and chemical feedstock. Meanwhile, the war may make relative “reliance” on Chinese clean-energy technologies “appear less like a strategic liability and more like a manageable trade-off” for other countries, argued Columbia University’s Jason Bordoff and Erica Downs in Foreign Policy.

SWITCHING SNAG: However, oil does play an “irreplaceable” role in China’s economy despite electrification, particularly as a feedstock, the Stimson Center’s China programme director Yun Sun wrote in War on the Rocks. The impact of the war on prices and availability of oil will fall hardest on industries such as “chemicals, ammonia and methanol[, as well as] advanced materials”, wrote Michal Meidan, head of China energy research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, in a briefing. She added that it may also affect light industries that switched to using gas to “comply with air-quality and carbon-intensity targets”. Columnist David Fickling noted in Bloomberg that lessons from Iran are layered on top of a gas heating “crisis” seen in northern China last winter, which exposed the mistake of “treating gas as a cheap option”.

More China news

  • HYDROGEN PILOT: China launched a pilot programme aiming to bring the price of hydrogen “below 25 yuan ($3.6) per kilogram by 2030”, reported Bloomberg.
  • HFC QUOTA: The Ministry for Ecology and Environment issued a notice on “further strengthening” regulations on ozone-depleting substances and hydrofluorocarbons, a group of potent greenhouse gases, said Xinhua.
  • MARINE ECONOMY: President Xi Jinping wrote in the theory journal Qiushi that China must promote an “orderly” construction of offshore wind, exploration for oil and gas and development of “marine energy”.
  • WIND DOMINANCE: Chinese companies now occupy the “top six spots” for global wind turbine manufacturing, according to Jiemian.

Captured

Changes in provincial coal mine methane emissions in China between 2012 and 2021, million tonnes.

Coal production in China is shifting away from regions in the south-west of the country, where mining is associated with high methane emissions, towards lower-gas mines in the north and north-west, new research found. This, one report author wrote in Carbon Brief, is helping to “limit” the rise of China’s coal-mine methane emissions. 

Spotlight 

Experts: What does China’s new environmental code mean for climate change?

At the close of the two sessions (see above) China passed the final version of the ecological and environmental code, only the second code on any topic passed by China’s legislature since the Chinese Communist party (CCP) came to power.

The code includes a chapter on the “green and low-carbon transition”, which the government-supported Sino-German Cooperation on Climate Change said would introduce “foundational principles to guide future legislation and practices in areas such as carbon peaking and neutrality, green transition and climate adaptation”.

Carbon Brief has asked leading experts what impact the code will have on China’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Their comments have been edited for length and clarity.

Dimitri de Boer, director for China, Client Earth, and Boya Jiang, nature and climate lawyer for China, Client Earth

Think of the code as a guarantee for China’s long-term decarbonisation.

As only the second statutory code adopted in China, it provides a high-level legal foundation for the country’s climate governance as it strives towards carbon neutrality by 2060. It requires control over both the total volume and the intensity of carbon emissions, plus establishes a legal basis for key instruments, such as the national carbon market. It also mandates the government to actively participate and to play a leading role in global climate governance.

The code marks a shift from policy-led climate action to a more systematic, law-based approach, which is supported by a strong enforcement infrastructure of specialised environmental courts and public interest prosecutors. It sends a clear signal that environmental governance will remain a national priority, providing greater predictability for China’s low-carbon transition. Next steps may include revising energy-related laws, drafting further implementing regulations, and developing a dedicated climate change law.

Tianbao Qin, director, Wuhan University Research Institute of Environmental Law

China’s new ecological and environmental code marks a pivotal step in institutionalising its climate commitments. By formally enshrining the “dual-carbon” goals – peaking emissions by 2030 and achieving neutrality by 2060 – into statutory law, the code moves beyond short-term policy experiments to create a stable, long-term legal foundation.

For international observers, the most significant aspect is the establishment of legally-binding mechanisms. The codification of carbon-intensity controls, total emission caps, and a national carbon trading system provides the regulatory certainty that businesses and investors require. This legal framework ensures that emissions reductions are not just aspirational, but are backed by enforceable compliance mechanisms.

Furthermore, by integrating climate goals into broader environmental governance, China is aligning its domestic legal system with global norms, demonstrating that economic modernisation and ecological responsibility can advance in tandem under a rules-based approach.

Gu Gong, associate professor with tenure, Peking University

The ecological and environmental code has established a systematic legal framework for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The code for the first time [provides a legal basis for] the “dual-carbon” goals, clarifies the control system for the total amount and intensity of carbon emissions, and improves the rules for carbon footprint management, the national carbon-emission trading market and carbon-emission statistics and accounting.

At the same time, separate carbon-reduction pathways – such as the green and low-carbon transformation of energy, energy conservation and carbon reduction in key industries, and clean production – have been coordinated, and the carbon-reduction responsibilities of multiple entities [such as local governments and enterprises] have been clearly defined.

Overall, the code promotes the normalisation and standardisation of greenhouse gas governance, provides a clear legal basis for the “dual carbon” goals, and makes greenhouse gas reduction work more regulated and rule-based.

Watch, read, listen

‘OPENCLAW AI’: BJX News analysed how much power is being used by the AI agent tool OpenClaw, which it says the “entire internet” in China has been using, in a trend referred to as “raising lobsters”.

‘INTENSE UPHEAVAL’: The Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed whether China’s solar overcapacity would “erode China’s leadership in solar”, or further entrench it.

STORM IN A TEAPOT: Bloomberg’s Odd Lots programme spoke with Columbia University’s Erica Downs about how tensions in the Middle East are affecting China’s “teapot” oil refiners.

FOLLOW THE MONEY: A new report by Climate Energy Finance tracked $120bn in Chinese investment in critical minerals needed for the energy transition since 2023.


55-60%

The share of total vehicle sales that new-energy vehicles (NEVs) will hold in 2026, according to estimates by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. The research institute also noted that plug-in hybrid electric vehicles lost share to battery electric vehicles in 2025.


New science 

  • Implementing China’s net-zero climate policies by 2050 “reduces global CO2 emissions to 13bn tonnes (Gt), compared with 23Gt without such policies” and could “partially offset insufficient ambition elsewhere” | Nature Communications
  • China has more than 3,000 petrochemical plants, which together produced 0.8Gt of CO2 in 2021 | Science Advances
  • Analysis into the power shortages that “plagued” China over 2020-22 highlights “the rigidity of existing institutional arrangements”, such as capped electricity prices, in adapting to a decarbonising energy system | Energy Policy

Recently published on WeChat

China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

The post China Briefing 19 March 2026: China joins nuclear pledge | Energy approach ‘vindicated’ | New ecological code appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 19 March 2026: China joins nuclear pledge | Energy approach ‘vindicated’ | New ecological code

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Drought Turns Southeastern US Into ‘Tinderbox’ as Wildfires Rage

Published

on

Weather extremes fuel wildfires that have burned through tens of thousands of acres across Georgia, Florida and other states.

Drought and fire are a dangerous duo. The Southeastern United States is witnessing this firsthand as several major blazes burn tens of thousands of acres across the parched region, destroying homes and prompting evacuations in some areas. Florida and Georgia have been particularly hard hit, and strong winds and unusually low humidity have made it difficult to combat the flames.

Drought Turns Southeastern US Into ‘Tinderbox’ as Wildfires Rage

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate

Published

on

When the land no longer answers the stars the way it once did, Indigenous peoples are among the first to notice — and the first to ask why.

A Sky Full of Knowledge

Look up on a clear night on Turtle Island and you’re seeing a sky that has guided human life for thousands of years. Across Indigenous nations in Canada, detailed systems of celestial knowledge developed not as abstract science but as living, practical guides —telling people when to plant, when to harvest, when herds would move, and when ice would come. This astronomical knowledge was woven into language, ceremony, and everyday life, passed down through generations with remarkable precision.

The Mi’kmaq and the Celestial Bear

Among the Mi’kmaq of Atlantic Canada, star stories are ecological calendars, precise and functional. The story of Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters connects the annual movement of what Western astronomy calls Ursa Major to the seasonal cycle of hunting and harvest: the bear rises in spring, is hunted through summer, and falls to earth in autumn. This knowledge was brought to broader public attention in 2009 during the International Year of Astronomy, when Mi’kmaq Elders Lillian Marshall of Potlotek First Nation and Murdena Marshall of Eskasoni First Nation shared the story through an animated film produced at Cape Breton University narrated in English, French, and Mi’kmaq.¹ The story encodes specific observations about when and where to hunt, and which species to expect at which time of year. It is science in narrative form.

The Anishinaabe and the Seasonal Star Map

Among the Anishinaabe peoples of the Great Lakes and northern Ontario, celestial knowledge forms part of a comprehensive seasonal understanding. Knowledge keepers like Michael Wassegijig Price of Wikwemikong First Nation have described how Anishinaabe constellations  quite different from those of Western astronomy connect the movement of the heavens to naming ceremonies, seasonal gatherings, and land practices.² The Royal Astronomical Society of Canada now offers planispheres featuring Indigenous constellations from Cree, Ojibwe, and Dakota sky traditions, recognizing their value as both cultural heritage and ecological knowledge systems.³

When the Stars and the Land Fall Out of Rhythm

Here’s the challenge that climate change has introduced: the stars still move on their ancient, reliable schedule. But the land no longer always responds as expected. Migratory birds that once arrived when certain constellations appeared are now showing up earlier or later. Ice that once formed in predictable windows is forming weeks late, or not at all. Berry harvests, fish runs, animal migrations, all once timed by celestial cues accumulated over millennia are shifting. Indigenous knowledge holders across Canada describe this as a kind of dissonance: the sky remains faithful, but the land has changed.⁴

Long-Baseline Ecological Records

Far from being historical curiosity, Indigenous celestial knowledge systems are now being recognized by researchers as long-baseline ecological calendars —records of how nature behaved over centuries, encoded in story and ceremony. When an Elder observes that a particular star rising no longer predicts the arrival of certain geese, that observation represents a departure from a pattern that may have held true for hundreds of years. The Climate Atlas of Canada integrates Indigenous knowledge observations alongside western climate data, recognizing that both contribute meaningfully to understanding ecological change.⁵

Keeping the Knowledge Alive

Language revitalization and land-based education programs are helping ensure this knowledge reaches the future. From youth astronomy nights on-reserve to the integration of Indigenous sky stories in school curricula, there is growing recognition that these knowledge systems belong to what comes next, not only what came before. As Canada grapples with accelerating ecological change, the quiet precision of thousands of years of skyward observation offers something no satellite can fully replicate: a continuous record of the relationship between the cosmos and a living land.

Blog by Rye Karonhiowanen Barberstock

Image Credit: Dustin Bowdige, Unsplash

References 

[1] Marshall, L., Marshall, M., Harris, P., & Bartlett, C. (2010). Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters: A Mi’kmaw Night Sky Story. Cape Breton University Press. See also: Integrative Science, CBU. (2009). Background on the Making of the Muin Video for IYA2009. http://www.integrativescience.ca/uploads/activities/BACKGROUND-making-video-Muin-Seven-Bird-Hunters-IYA-binder.pdf

[2] Price, M.W. (Various). Anishinaabe celestial knowledge. Wikwemikong First Nation. Referenced in: Royal Astronomical Society of Canada Indigenous Astronomy resources.

[3] Royal Astronomical Society of Canada. (2020). Indigenous Skies planisphere series. RASC. https://www.rasc.ca/indigenous-skies

[4] Neilson, H. (2022, December 11). The night sky over Mi’kmaki: A Q&A with astronomer Hilding Neilson. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/hilding-neilson-indigenizing-astronomy-1.6679072

[5] Climate Atlas of Canada. (2024). Prairie Climate Centre, University of Winnipeg. https://climateatlas.ca/

The post Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate appeared first on Indigenous Climate Hub.

https://indigenousclimatehub.ca/2026/04/night-skies-and-shifting-stars-how-indigenous-celestial-knowledge-tracks-a-changing-climate/

Continue Reading

Climate Change

World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis

Published

on

A much-discussed “return to coal” by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year.

The new analysis by thinktank Ember, shared exclusively with Carbon Brief, is a “worst-case” scenario and the reality could be even lower.

Separate data shows that, to date, there has been no “return to coal” in 2026.

While some countries, such as Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, have responded to disrupted gas supplies with plans to increase their coal use, the new analysis shows that these actions will likely result in a “small rise” at most.

In fact, the decline of coal power in some countries and the potential for global electricity demand growth to slow down could mean coal generation continues falling this year.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that “the big story isn’t about a coal comeback” and any increase in coal use is “merely masking a longer-term structural decline”.

Instead, they say clean-energy projects are emerging as more appealing investments during the fossil-fuel driven energy crisis.

‘Return to coal’

The conflict following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran has disrupted global gas supplies, particularly after Iran blocked the strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.

A fifth of the world’s liquified natural gas (LNG) is normally shipped through this region, mainly supplying Asian countries. The blockage in this supply route means there is now less gas available and the remaining supplies are more expensive.

(Note that while the strait usually carries a fifth of LNG trade, this amounts to a much smaller share of global gas supplies overall, with most gas being moved via pipelines.)

With gas supplies constrained and prices remaining well above pre-conflict levels, at least eight countries in Asia and Europe have announced plans to increase their coal-fired electricity generation, or to review or delay plans to phase out coal power.

These nations include Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Germany and Italy. Many of these nations are major users of coal power.

Such announcements have triggered a wave of reporting by global media outlets and analysts about a “return to coal”. Some have lamented a trend that is “incompatible with climate imperatives”, while others have even framed this as a positive development that illustrates coal’s return “from the dead”.

This mirrors a trend seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which many commentators said would lead to a surge in European coal use, due to disrupted gas supplies from Russia. 

In fact, despite a spike in 2022, EU coal use has returned to its “terminal decline” and reached a historic low in 2025.

Gas to coal

So far, the evidence suggests that there has been no return to coal in 2026.

Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, in March, coal power generation remained flat globally and a fall in gas-fired generation was “offset by large increases in solar and wind power, rather than coal”.

However, as some governments only announced their coal plans towards the end of March, these figures may not capture their impact.

To get a sense of what that impact could be, Ember assessed the impact of coal policy changes and market responses across 16 countries, plus the 27 member states of the EU, which together accounted for 95% of total coal power generation in 2025.

For each country, the analysis considers a maximum “worst-case” scenario for switching from gas to coal power in the face of high gas prices.

It also considers the potential for any out-of-service coal power plants to return and for there to be delays in previously expected closures as a result of the response to the energy crisis.

Ember concludes that these factors could increase coal use by 175 terawatt hours (TWh), or 1.8%, in 2026 compared to 2025.

(This increase is measured relative to what would have happened without the energy crisis and does not account for wider trends in electricity generation from coal, which could see demand decline overall. Last year, coal power dropped by 63TWh, or 0.6%.)

Roughly three-quarters of the global effect in the Ember analysis is from potential gas-to-coal switching in China and the EU.

Other notable increases could come from switching in India and Indonesia and – to a lesser extent – from coal-policy shifts in South Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

However, widely reported policy changes by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines are estimated to have very little, if any, impact on coal-power generation in 2026. The table below briefly summarises the potential for and reasoning behind the estimated increases in coal generation in each country in 2026.

Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, stresses that the 1.8% figure is an upper estimate, telling Carbon Brief:

“This would only happen if gas prices remained very high for the rest of the year and if there were sufficient coal stocks at power plants. The real risk of higher coal burn in 2026 comes not from coal units returning…but rather from pockets of gas-to-coal switching by existing power plants, primarily in China and the EU.”

Moreover, Jones says there is a real chance that global coal power could continue falling over the course of this year, partly driven by the energy crisis. He explains:

“If the energy crisis starts to dent electricity demand growth, coal generation – as well as gas generation – might actually be lower than before the crisis.”

‘Structural decline’

Energy experts tell Carbon Brief that Ember’s analysis aligns with their own assessments of the state of coal power.

Coal already had lower operation costs than gas before the energy crisis. This means that coal power plants were already being run at high levels in coal-dependent Asian economies that also use imported LNG to generate electricity. As such, they have limited potential to cut their need for LNG by further increasing coal generation.

Christine Shearer, who manages the global coal plant tracker at Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief that, in the EU, there is a shrinking pool of countries where gas-to-coal switching is possible:

“In Europe, coal fleets are smaller, older and increasingly uneconomic, while wind, solar and storage are becoming more competitive and widespread.”

In the context of the energy crisis, Italy has announced plans to delay its coal phaseout from 2025 to 2038. This plan, dismissed by the ECCO thinktank as “ineffective and costly”, would have minimal impact given coal only provides around 1% of the country’s power. 

Notably, experts say that there is no evidence of the kind of structural “return to coal” that would spark concerns about countries’ climate goals. There have been no new coal plants announced in recent weeks.

Suzie Marshall, a policy advisor working on the “coal-to-clean transition” at E3G, tells Carbon Brief:

“We’re seeing possible delayed retirements and higher utilisation [of existing coal plants], as understandable emergency measures to keep the lights on, but not investment in new coal projects…Any short-term increase in coal consumption that we may see in response to this ongoing energy crisis is merely masking a longer-term structural decline.”

With cost-competitive solar, wind and batteries given a boost over fossil fuels by the energy crisis, there have been numerous announcements about new renewable energy projects since the start of war, including from India, Japan and Indonesia

Shearer says that, rather than a “sustained coal comeback” in 2026, the Iran war “strengthens the case for renewables”. She says:

“If anything, a second gas shock in less than five years strengthens the case for renewables as the more secure long-term path.”

Jones says that Ember expects “little change in overall fossil generation, but with a small rise in coal and a fall in gas” in 2026. He adds:

“This would maximise gas-to-coal switching globally outside of the US, leaving no possibility for further switching in future years. Therefore, the big story isn’t about a coal comeback. It’s about how the relative economics of renewables, compared to fossil fuels, have been given a superboost by the crisis.”

The post World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.

World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis

Continue Reading

Trending

Copyright © 2022 BreakingClimateChange.com