Connect with us

Published

on

The UK government’s spending on climate aid reached its highest-ever level last year, with more than £1.8bn channelled into projects aimed at cutting emissions and boosting resilience in developing countries.

The new data, released to Carbon Brief via freedom-of-information (FOI) requests, reveals how “international climate finance” (ICF) was dispersed in the financial year 2023-24. This builds on larger Carbon Brief analysis tracking ICF spending back to 2011.

UK aid money was, for example, used last year to reconstruct low-carbon power supplies in Ukraine, support flood victims in Pakistan and help Ethiopians facing drought. There were also large contributions to international programmes, such as the Green Climate Fund.

However, despite the record sum, Carbon Brief has identified at least £199m – or 11% – of this money as the result of the government loosening its definition of “climate finance”. This allows the UK to meet its climate-aid targets without providing as much new money.

Carbon Brief understands that this figure is likely an underestimate, because the “provisional” figures provided do not include some of the reclassified humanitarian aid identified in internal documents revealed by a previous FOI request.

Climate finance will be the critical issue at the COP29 UN climate negotiations in Baku, Azerbaijan, later this year. Rich nations are under pressure to increase their overseas climate spending despite many, including the UK, drastically cutting their aid budgets.

Yet, with a general election on the horizon, neither the Conservatives nor their Labour opposition have expressed interest in returning the UK’s aid spending to its previous levels, for the time being.

New record

In 2019 the UK government, led by then-prime minister Boris Johnson, committed to spending £11.6bn on ICF between the financial years of 2021-22 and 2025-26. 

This money is the UK’s contribution towards a broader Paris Agreement commitment by developed countries to provide financial support for climate action in developing countries.

Current prime minister Rishi Sunak has reaffirmed this pledge, stating that it is the “right thing to do”. Yet the target has come under considerable strain during his leadership.

In his role as chancellor in Johnson’s government, Sunak announced major cuts to the foreign aid budget – breaching a legal obligation. The government has spent much of the remaining budget on housing refugees, making it even harder to scale up climate spending.

Towards the end of 2023, the government announced that it was broadening its definition of “climate finance”. This allows the UK to stay on track for its pledges without providing as much new money. (See: Accounting changes.) 

However, the trajectory the government mapped out to reach £11.6bn still requires annual spending to more than double within five years. 

According to the annual figures provided to Carbon Brief, ICF spending reached at least £1.82bn in 2023-24 – an increase of £192m since the previous year. As the chart below shows, this suggests that the UK’s ICF spending will still have to increase significantly over the next two years to stay on track for the £11.6bn goal.

UK climate aid spending still needs to increase rapidly to reach the government's £11.6bn target
UK’s annual international climate finance (ICF) spending, £m, by financial year for the period 2011-12 to 2025-26. The blue bars are recorded spending and the red bars indicate an example trajectory beyond 2023-24 that would achieve the government target of spending £11.6bn across the period 2021-22 to 2025-26. Source: UK government data and projections, with 2023-24 figure provided by FOI request. Chart by Carbon Brief.

These figures are based on FOI responses from the three major departments responsible for the UK’s overseas climate-related development projects: the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO); the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ). The FCDO is by far the largest contributor, with responsibility for 79% of the ICF spending.

In fact, the total ICF spend in 2023-24 is likely to be at least a little higher than the £1.82bn suggested by the FOI data. According to the government, these numbers are “provisional” and “subject to year-end accounting and audit adjustments”.

This could explain why many of the humanitarian aid projects that were recently reclassified as ICF – as per a previous FOI request by Carbon Brief – do not appear in the data. If these projects are included, they could add tens of millions to the total.

Moreover, Carbon Brief has not been able to obtain data on a handful of “research and innovation” projects that support scientific research in developing countries, which have recently been transferred from DESNZ to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology (DSIT). 

Last year, these projects contributed £7.77m in ICF – amounting to around 0.4% of that year’s total. (Carbon Brief has asked DSIT and FCDO about these projects, but had not received a response at the time of publication.)

Accounting changes

The government has described the £11.6bn goal as “dedicated ring-fenced funding that is distinguishable from non-climate [aid]”. This aligns with the widely held notion that climate finance should be “new and additional”, namely, on top of existing aid programmes.

Nevertheless, in October 2023, the government made three major changes to its ICF accounting in order to inflate its overseas climate spending figures.

The biggest change was including a cut of “core” UK contributions to development banks, such as the World Bank. It also increased the share of British International Investment (BII) input – through which the UK invests in overseas businesses – that counts as ICF.

The third change was labelling 30% of all humanitarian aid provided to the most climate-vulnerable nations as ICF. This applies even if a project has no explicit link to climate action.

In addition, civil servants were tasked with “scrubbing” existing aid projects for any other money that could be counted as ICF, in order to increase the numbers further.

FOI documents released to Carbon Brief earlier this year revealed the details of £1.7bn in funds that the government planned to reclassify as ICF between 2021-22 and 2025-26.

The new data for 2023-24 confirms some of these details. Carbon Brief has identified at least £199m, including funds confirmed separately from the FOI request, which can be attributed to these changes in that year. These figures are “provisional” and may not account for all the changes that have taken place.

Part of the UK's increase in climate aid spending is due to its looser accounting
Annual UK ICF spending, £m, by financial year for the period 2011-12 to 2023-24. The blue area indicates ICF spending under the original accounting methodology. The red area indicates approximately how much of the total ICF since 2021 has resulted from accounting changes. Source: UK government data, with 2023-24 total figure and figures for accounting changes provided by FOI request. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The FOI data includes £153.5m that was provided to the BII “programme of support” for companies in Africa, south Asia, the Indo-Pacific region and the Caribbean. Based on a comparison with previously obtained documents, this suggests the UK counted an additional £69.5m of BII investment as ICF in 2023-24, compared to its pre-revision plans for the year.

Carbon Brief could only identify three purely humanitarian projects, contributing a relatively small £4.5m of ICF in 2023-24. This is far less than the £74m identified in government planning documents, previously released to Carbon Brief.

A notable omission from the FOI data is any new funding for multilateral development banks (MDBs), which is expected to make up the biggest chunk of the recently reassigned ICF. 

However, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) confirmed to Carbon Brief that, in fact, some MDB funding was included in the UK’s ICF totals last year. Specifically, £48m of contributions to the 16th “replenishment” of the African Development Fund – part of the African Development Bank – has been classed as ICF.

ICAI has also previously confirmed that, according to an internal government document, £77m was “scrubbed” from existing funds and added to the 2023-24 total. (Carbon Brief was not able to identify which projects these came from, based on the FOI response.)

The government has previously argued that their changes to ICF accounting are in line with the methodologies used by other wealthy countries. In response, development experts have said that the UK should be upholding high standards, rather than lowering them to align with others.

At COP29 in November, rich countries will be under pressure to increase the amount of climate finance they provide to developing countries, in particular via a mechanism known as the “new collective quantified goal”. There will also be discussions at the summit in Azerbaijan of establishing tighter guidelines for what counts as climate finance.

With the UK general election taking place next month and Sunak’s Conservative government likely to lose power, the current polling suggests that the opposition Labour party will be leading the country during the key climate finance discussions at COP29.  

Labour has not committed to restoring the UK’s foreign aid budget to its former level, in the short term, and neither has it explicitly committed to maintaining the £11.6bn target.

Major recipients

For the first time in the history of the UK’s ICF programme, the government directly contributed climate aid to Ukraine in 2023-24, as part of a wider package to support the war-torn nation.

The UK committed £12.9m of bilateral climate funds towards the Ukraine Resilience and Energy Security Programme – part of a wider £62m package of grants out to the end of 2025 to ensure the “continued operation of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure”.

The first stages of the project focused on immediate repairs and maintenance of the country’s gas and electricity system, including the provision of fossil-fuel generators.

However, the project is also focusing on “pivot[ing] towards rehabilitating infrastructure in a green and energy efficient manner”. This includes money to support renewables, green hydrogen and insulation for homes.

The only country that received more direct, country-to-country ICF funds from the UK last year than Ukraine was Ethiopia. It received £36.8m in bilateral funds, meaning it retains its long-running position as the biggest single-country recipient of UK climate finance.

The east African nation has also been facing significant instability over the past year, as conflict continues following war in the northern Tigray region. Meanwhile, swathes of the country have been struggling with climate change-driven drought.

As the map below shows, much of the remaining bilateral ICF last year went to former colonies in Africa and south Asia, with which the UK continues to foster close relationships. Of the top 10 recipients, seven are members of the Commonwealth association of nations.

For the first time, Ukraine was a major recipient of UK climate finance in 2023-24
Total bilateral ICF spending, £m, in 2023-24. The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Carbon Brief concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Source: UK government data obtained by FOI request.

Other notable single-country ICF beneficiaries include Pakistan, which received £10m – including £3.3m to help build climate resilience for communities struck by devastating, climate change-driven floods

Kenya was also a key recipient, with £10.5m to support climate-resilient cities and provide cash transfers to people in drought-affected areas.

Most of the UK’s biggest contributions were to well-established multilateral climate funds and schemes, including a £411m contribution to the first replenishment of the Green Climate Fund. This alone was roughly a quarter of all the climate finance provided last year.

Other major contributions to international efforts in 2023/2024 included a £134.4m injection into the eighth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and £44.1m for the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Resilience and Sustainability Trust. The latter is a recently established vehicle for lending to help developing countries prepare for crises.

Developing countries say they need trillions of dollars in annual support to achieve their climate targets under the Paris Agreement, with a preference for grant-based finance. Some wealthy countries have argued that such levels of funding are only possible if a wider selection of countries contribute and there is more emphasis on private-sector funding.

All of these issues will come to a head at COP29 in November, where countries will decide how best to mobilise climate finance in the coming years.

The post Analysis: UK climate aid reaches record £1.8bn in 2023 after loosening rules appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: UK climate aid reaches record £1.8bn in 2023 after loosening rules

Continue Reading

Climate Change

From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority

Published

on

Gill Einhorn is head of the Forest Future Alliance and Natalie Çilem is community lead of the Global Wildfire Leadership Network.

Wildfires have devastated communities across the world this summer, claiming lives, displacing thousands of people and leaving billions in economic damage in their wake. In Europe alone, wildfires have already caused an estimated €19 billion in losses this year.

They are an economic, financial and public health challenge that is growing faster than many governments and markets are prepared for – and exposing the real costs of poor land management.

A system built for recovery, not resilience

Far more money is currently spent responding to the disastrous effects of wildfires than preventing them in the first place. The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that more than half of wildfire-related spending goes towards response, while planning receives only around 0.2 percent. This problem is not limited to wildfires; over 95 percent of disaster aid between 2005 and 2017 was allocated to response, and less than 4 percent was directed towards prevention or preparedness.

Forests are critical, but without investment in how land is managed and protected, their value is neither stable nor guaranteed. Protecting forests requires investing not only in conservation, but in the conditions that keep forests standing.

    Each dollar invested in wildfire-resistant construction could save around $210 in avoided future economic losses, according to a report by the World Economic Forum and Forest Future Alliance. Despite this evidence that prevention can significantly reduce future costs, wildfire resilience remains chronically underfunded.

    This spending discrepancy is creating significant challenges for insurers, asset owners and financial institutions. Global insured losses from natural catastrophes reached $107 billion in 2025, with wildfires, floods and storms accounting for 92 percent of claims.

    In this context, insurers are reassessing where and how they are willing to underwrite risk. Around 56 percent of global wildfire losses between 2000 and 2023 were uninsured. In some high-risk areas, insurers are scaling back coverage altogether, leaving homeowners, businesses and governments to shoulder a growing share of the costs – making it increasingly difficult to break even.

    Proven solutions are already paying off

    In many regions, wildfires are driven not by natural causes but by the deliberate clearing of land for agriculture. Degraded landscapes are becoming drier, more flammable and increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic loss, creating a vicious cycle of deforestation, economic damage and rising emissions.

    The answer is not simply stronger firefighting capacity. Governments, investors and businesses must work together to shift capital upstream into prevention, resilience and long-term landscape stewardship of healthy forests. That means planting appropriately, investing in heat-resistant species, exploring approaches that minimise fire footprints through active management, and exploring the AI and technology solutions that are burgeoning.

    A burnt olive tree in an area affected by a wildfire in Ano Sichaina near Patras, Greece, August 14, 2025. REUTERS/Louiza Vradi

    A burnt olive tree in an area affected by a wildfire in Ano Sichaina near Patras, Greece, August 14, 2025. REUTERS/Louiza Vradi

    Solutions to this already exist and are proven to have an impact. Following devastating wildfires year-on-year, Portugal shifted its approach to wildfire management, increasing prevention spending within its national rural fire management system from around 20 percent in 2017 to approximately 60 percent in 2022. While many countries remain locked in a reactive cycle of disaster response, public policy can shift investment upstream and make resilience a priority before fires occur.

    Indigenous communities have long used proactive land stewardship to reduce wildfire risk while supporting healthy and productive landscapes. For example, the Cheslatta Carrier Nation in British Columbia traditionally managed fuels through cultural fire practices but now implements mechanised fuel removal methods under commercial agreements. By combining Indigenous stewardship with sustainable forest management, Cheslatta is generating community benefits while also boosting wildfire prevention.

    Resilience can also be strengthened through finance and technology. FireSat, a partnership led by Earth Fire Alliance with Google.org, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and Muon, is a satellite constellation designed for rapid wildfire detection. Scanning every 20 minutes, it can detect fires 400 times smaller than current systems and track them through smoke and darkness in almost real time. In California alone, FireSat could prevent up to 350,000 acres from burning each year. It has recently received significant new investments allowing it to expand towards a constellation of more than 50 satellites that will monitor every point on Earth every 20 minutes or less.

    In Brazil’s Pantanal, the Embrace the Forest initiative uses AI-powered detection towers across 2.5 million hectares to support earlier intervention and faster response. During the severe 2024 fire season, the initiative contributed to a 40 percent reduction in burned area compared to 2020.

    A drone view shows burnt cars following a wildfire in Dymi, near Patras, Greece August 14, 2025. REUTERS/Louiza Vradi

    A drone view shows burnt cars following a wildfire in Dymi, near Patras, Greece August 14, 2025. REUTERS/Louiza Vradi

    These examples illustrate what is possible when resilience is treated as an investment priority rather than a recovery cost. But we must ensure funding for these measures is scaled before disaster strikes. Initiatives like the Global Wildfire Leadership Network (GWLN) are key, bringing together corporate decision-makers, investors, insurers, governments and Indigenous leaders to direct investment towards prevention and align finance, technology and stewardship to protect nature, safeguard communities and strengthen future economic stability. With a goal of doing more together than the sum of our parts, the network focuses on Forest Future Alliance GWLN Solutions Labs – where partners sign up with the intent to collaborate.

    Rewarding prevention

    Financial incentives must be created that reward prevention. This can be done by scaling public-private partnerships, supporting long-term landscape stewardship, investing in community capacity including Indigenous wisdom and technology. Ultimately, our terrestrial natural reserves are critical infrastructure that support resilient economies and thriving communities.

    One in three people are dependent on forest services, goods and economic opportunities for survival, so it’s in all our interests to protect what we have. Forests support cooling, water and food security – and are a very cost-effective way of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, where done appropriately.

    UN chief warns climate crisis “in overdrive” as El Niño threatens to fuel the fire

    No sector can solve this challenge alone. The benefits of wildfire resilience are shared across communities, governments, insurers, investors, utilities and businesses. A single intervention can protect homes and livelihoods, reduce insurance claims, secure water supplies and lower future public costs. Because the benefits are shared, the solutions must be too. Coalitions of actors can take proven approaches further than any one individual or organisation could alone.

    As wildfires continue to burn at an unprecedented scale, the opportunity now is to roll out solutions, shift investment upstream and build a future where resilience, rather than recovery, becomes the foundation of thriving economies.

    The post From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority appeared first on Climate Home News.

    From firefighting to future-proofing: Preventing wildfires must be the priority

    Continue Reading

    Climate Change

    Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C

    Published

    on

    Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas and the second-largest contributor to global warming after carbon dioxide (CO2).

    Methane traps heat in the atmosphere more efficiently than CO2, but has a significantly shorter lifespan, fading after just a few decades.

    Therefore, reducing emissions of methane – a gas primarily produced by agriculture, fossil fuels and waste management – is a powerful option for limiting global warming in the near-term.

    Yet climate strategies and models often only focus on CO2, or combine all greenhouse gases into one metric known as “CO2 equivalent”.

    The latter approach makes reducing methane emissions dependent on modelling choices and assumptions about the “equivalence” of methane and CO2.

    It hides the opportunities and challenges linked to methane’s high warming and short lifetime.

    In a new study, published in Communications Earth & Environment, we offer a different perspective that “decouples” CO2 and methane reduction and takes global warming limits as a starting point for determining the required level of methane cuts.

    We show that, even under the most ambitious existing national net-zero targets, an absence of methane reduction leads to peak warming that exceeds 1.85C above pre-industrial levels.

    The study highlights that, to limit peak warming to well-below 2C, net-zero CO2 targets must be complemented by stringent methane emissions cuts.

    CO2 equivalent

    How much methane corresponds to one tonne of CO2?

    The question is as difficult to answer as: ‘how much spaghetti equals a chicken?’ You could compare the two meals according to their calories, protein content or cost. Each metric can be convenient, but is only valid for that specific comparison – no amount of spaghetti is the same as a chicken.

    The same is true for the conversion of emissions of methane and other gases to CO2-equivalent emissions. It can be convenient, as it allows different gases to be compared or combined into a single number. This is why the metric is used in climate targets or evaluating the effectiveness of different mitigation options.

    But, because methane and CO2 have different atmospheric lifetimes and warming properties, any conversion is only valid for a chosen time horizon and a chosen baseline.

    Depending on the assumptions baked into calculations, methane mitigation can either appear as an immediate priority or framed as almost unnecessary.

    There are a number of metrics that scientists use to convert greenhouse gases – whether methane, hydrofluorocarbons or nitrous oxide – into CO2-equivalent emissions:

    • “GWP20” measures how much heat a greenhouse gas traps in the atmosphere over a 20-year period, relative to CO2. It emphasises urgent methane mitigation but has been criticised for its implicit discounting of future damages.
    • “GWP100” looks at a 100-year timeline. It gives more weight to long-term warming and is used in “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) used by scientists, national emission reporting to the UN and by the GHG Protocol used by companies.
    • GWP*” considers the rate of emissions, rather than warming over a fixed time horizon. Under GWP*, very limited methane reductions bring CO2-equivalent emissions to zero, meaning remaining methane emissions can be designated as causing “no additional warming”. (This interpretation remains controversial as it assumes the continuation of historical levels of warming.)

    IAMs are the tools used to generate future emissions scenarios. Because they combine CO2 and methane emissions, the impact of methane emission cuts alone is difficult to isolate in existing emission scenarios.

    IAM-generated scenarios also assume mitigation decisions driven by costs. Combinations of CO2 and methane emission pathways that are not purely cost-effective are, therefore, not represented, even though climate policy is messy and emission pathways are rarely cost-effective in the real world.

    Only a few countries – including Japan, Mexico and South Korea – specify methane mitigation targets.

    A different approach

    In our study, we separate CO2 and methane emissions and treat them as independent.

    Instead of choosing a conversion method, we suggest that states and organisations set a limit on peak global warming first, then, based on their existing net-zero targets, determine the minimum compatible methane reduction target.

    Companies and countries around the world have set net-zero targets focused on CO2, as well as those that include all greenhouse gases. As a result, our research looks at the necessary methane reductions for both types of goal. We consider scenarios where companies or countries deliver linear – in other words, steady – emissions reductions to reach net-zero.

    Using a simple climate model, we systematically combined methane and CO2 (or greenhouse gas) mitigation pathways starting in 2025 and calculated peak warming.

    The figure below shows how peak warming depends on both the year of reaching net-zero CO2 and the level of methane cuts.

    Peak global warming relative to 1850-1900 reached until 2100 (50% likelihood), for combinations of the year of global net-zero CO2 emissions (x-axis) and the change in global methane (CH4) emissions between 2020 and that year (y-axis), assuming linear trajectories. Black lines are contours of equal peak warming. The three bars on the right show independent estimates of where CH4 emissions could or would land on the same vertical scale: CH4 mitigation available at no net cost (IEA, red), the 2030 mitigation potential (Global methane status report, orange), and the current legislation scenario for 2050 (Global methane status report, purple). Adapted from Weber et al. (2026).

    The blue arrows in the figure show that to limit warming to 1.7C under a 2050 net-zero CO2 scenario, methane emissions would need to fall by at least 69% by 2050, relative to 2020.

    Our research also finds that, if an organisation or country’s 2050 net zero-target covers all greenhouse gases, its methane emissions would need to fall by 63% instead.

    However, under current policies, methane emissions are expected to increase by around 20% by 2050, relative to 2020. We find that this pathway would result in peak warming above 2C by 2050 – even if global CO2 emissions were to reach net-zero by that date (see purple bar on the right-hand side of the figure above).

    The figure also shows how, if methane emissions remained at 2020 levels and net-zero CO2 was delivered by 2040 or later, warming would exceed 1.85C. This level of warming is above what has been argued as consistent with the Paris Agreement’s “well-below” 2C limit.

    Conversely, cutting methane emissions by around one-third – in line with the Global Methane Pledge target for 2030 – could reduce peak warming by 0.15C, of which 0.05C could be delivered by interventions that come at no net cost. These are shown by the orange and red bars, respectively, on the figure above.

    The table below highlights the minimum compatible methane cuts for three different peak warming levels and net-zero CO2 or greenhouse-gas emission targets.

    Peak warming Year of net-zero CO2 emissions Year of net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions
    2050 2060 2100 2050 2060 2100
    1.7C -69% -63%
    1.8C -32% -56% -11% -47%
    2C +8% -8% -83% >50% +33% -78%

    Minimum methane emission reductions between 2020 and the year of net-zero emissions, consistent with peak warming of 1.7C, 1.8C, and 2.0C at 50% likelihood, assuming linear emission trajectories. For some net-zero targets and peak warming levels, there are no compatible methane mitigation targets (indicated by “–”).

    Remaining carbon budget

    The global carbon budget refers to the amount of cumulative CO2 emissions allowable while still meeting a particular global warming threshold.

    The 2021 climate science report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a 2023 Nature study estimated that, by 2025, the remaining carbon budget for holding warming to 2C would be around 1,000-1,150bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2).

    We find that these estimates are founded on the assumption of methane reductions of 27-35% by 2050, relative to a 2020 baseline. (A 2024 Communications Earth & Environment study reached similar conclusions.)

    Under the GWP* metric, where methane emissions are only cut to maintain “no additional warming”, the remaining carbon budget would be constrained. The best estimate of a 2C budget shrinks by around 30% to approximately 750GtCO2.

    Finally, if methane emissions are not cut at all in the future, our findings suggest that the remaining carbon budget for 1.7C of global warming has, in effect, already been exhausted.

    Our analysis shows how peak warming depends on both CO2 and methane reduction – and how methane-specific targets can help refine existing net-zero targets.

    Crucially, we show that complementing net-zero CO2 targets with stringent methane cuts is necessary to limit peak warming to well-below 2C.

    Weber, K. et al. (2026) Limiting warming by CO2 and methane mitigation in an expanded scenario space, Communications Earth & Environment, doi:10.1038/s43247-026-03832-1

    The post Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C appeared first on Carbon Brief.

    Guest post: Why tough methane cuts are crucial for keeping warming ‘well-below’ 2C

    Continue Reading

    Climate Change

    Pacific Islands Forum leaders, Albanese must not lose focus on Pacific priorities of climate and ocean

    Published

    on

    KOROR, PALAU, Monday 31 August 2026 — As Pacific leaders gather for the 55th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in Palau from today, Greenpeace Australia Pacific is urging Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to stand with Pacific family by keeping Pacific needs at the heart of negotiations, backing longstanding Pacific leadership, supporting Pacific energy sovereignty and ocean custodianship, and holding the line on 1.5°C.

    Against the backdrop of tense geopolitical turmoil, increasingly frequent and lethal extreme weather disasters, the threat of deep sea mining and an energy crisis driven by fossil fuel dependence, the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting (PIFLM) is a critical moment for Pacific nations to unite with Pacific needs central to regional dialogue.

    The climate crisis, security, the opportunities of renewable energy in the Pacific, ocean protection, and the shifting political landscape will be the focus of the Forum’s discussions.

    Speaking from Palau, Shiva Gounden, Head of Pacific at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said:
    “The Pacific Islands Forum is the most important multilateral forum in our region, unifying the Pacific under increasingly turbulent global circumstances. We are urging Forum members, including Australia, to not lose focus of Pacific priorities of climate and oceans amid noise and external pressures at this year’s meeting.

    “It is very clear that the greatest security threat to our region is climate change and the only way we can address that is through a just transition away from fossil fuels. Regional cooperation is an antidote to climate chaos and geopolitical tension – together, our region can be guided by Pacific nations’ legacy of leadership from the frontlines of the climate crisis, as we build a more peaceful and secure world.

    “This year’s Forum will set the stage as we build momentum toward COP31 and a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific. Australia must back Pacific energy sovereignty as a solution to the compounding threats facing our region, including soaring costs of living and increasingly lethal extreme weather disasters, and resist the militarisation of our oceans, deep sea mining, and power politics.

    “We must not lose sight of what is needed. The regional adoption of Pacific-led solutions, a Pacific pre-COP with focus on advancing the just transition away from fossil fuels and community-targeted finance for strong and resilient futures beyond fossil fuels must be the foundations of this year’s Forum discussion. What we need now is stronger political will.”

    Also in Palau, Dr Simon Bradshaw, COP31 Lead and climate expert at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said:
    “Prime Minister Albanese faces a major test of Australia’s climate credibility and Pacific partnership this week. We cannot be a friend to the Pacific and continue to expand fossil fuel production. The best way for Australia to remain the Pacific’s security partner of choice is to act faster on the Pacific’s number one security concern — climate change.

    “The Albanese Government has approved at least five new coal and gas projects since the last Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting, and 36 since being elected, every one of which increases the threats to life, security and sovereignty facing Pacific communities.

    “Nowhere in the world are the dangers of fossil fuels or the benefits of renewable energy clearer than in the Pacific, which faces the double blow of climate disasters and expensive fuel imports.

    “Australia, as incoming President of Negotiations for COP31, has a responsibility to follow the Pacific’s lead, embrace the vision of a resilient Fossil Fuel Free Pacific, and do everything possible to keep 1.5°C alive. Doing so would establish Australia as a highly effective middle power, a force for good in troubled times, and a true ally and partner to the Pacific.”

    —ENDS—

    Greenpeace Australia Pacific has delegates from the Pacific and Australia at the PIFLM in Palau available for interview

    Pacific Islands Forum leaders, Albanese must not lose focus on Pacific priorities of climate and ocean

    Continue Reading

    Trending

    Copyright © 2022 BreakingClimateChange.com