India’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from its power sector fell by 1% year-on-year in the first half of 2025 and by 0.2% over the past 12 months, only the second drop in almost half a century.
As a result, India’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement grew at their slowest rate in the first half of the year since 2001 – excluding Covid – according to new analysis for Carbon Brief.
The analysis is the first of a regular new series covering India’s CO2 emissions, based on monthly data for fuel use, industrial production and power output, compiled from numerous official sources.
(See the regular series on China’s CO2 emissions, which began in 2019.)
Other key findings on India for the first six months of 2025 include:
- The growth in clean-energy capacity reached a record 25.1 gigawatts (GW), up 69% year-on-year from what had, itself, been a record figure.
- This new clean-energy capacity is expected to generate nearly 50 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity per year, nearly sufficient to meet the average increase in demand overall.
- Slower economic expansion meant there was zero growth in demand for oil products, a marked fall from annual rates of 6% in 2023 and 4% in 2024.
- Government infrastructure spending helped accelerate CO2 emissions growth from steel and cement production, by 7% and 10%, respectively.
The analysis also shows that emissions from India’s power sector could peak before 2030, if clean-energy capacity and electricity demand grow as expected.
The future of CO2 emissions in India is a key indicator for the world, with the country – the world’s most populous – having contributed nearly two-fifths of the rise in global energy-sector emissions growth since 2019.
India’s surging emissions slow down
In 2024, India was responsible for 8% of global energy-sector CO2 emissions, despite being home to 18% of the world’s population, as its per-capita output is far below the world average.
However, emissions have been growing rapidly, as shown in the figure below.
The country contributed 31% of global energy-sector emissions growth in the decade to 2024, rising to 37% in the past five years, due to a surge in the three-year period from 2021-23.
More than half of India’s CO2 output comes from coal used for electricity and heat generation, making this sector the most important by far for the country’s emissions.
The second-largest sector is fossil fuel use in industry, which accounts for another quarter of the total, while oil use for transport makes up a further eighth of India’s emissions.
India’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement grew by 8% per year from 2019 to 2023, quickly rebounding from a 7% drop in 2020 due to Covid.
Before the Covid pandemic, emissions growth had averaged 4% per year from 2010 to 2019, but emissions in 2023 and 2024 rose above the pre-pandemic trendline.
This was despite a slower average GDP growth rate from 2019 to 2024 than in the preceding decade, indicating that the economy became more energy- and carbon-intensive. (For example, growth in steel and cement outpaced the overall rate of economic growth.)
A turnaround came in the second half of 2024, when emissions only increased by 2% year-on-year, slowing down to 1% in the first half of 2025, as seen in the figure below.

The largest contributor to the slowdown was the power sector, which was responsible for 60% of the drop in emissions growth rates, when comparing the first half of 2025 with the years 2021-23.
Oil demand growth slowed sharply as well, contributing 20% of the slowdown. The only sectors to keep growing their emissions in the first half of 2025 were steel and cement production.
Another 20% of the slowdown was due to a reduction in coal and gas use outside the power, steel and cement sectors. This comprises construction, industries such as paper, fertilisers, chemicals, brick kilns and textiles, as well as residential and commercial cooking, heating and hot water.
This is all shown in the figure below, which compares year-on-year changes in emissions during the second half of 2024 and the first half of 2025, with the average for 2021-23.

Power sector emissions fell by 1% in the first half of 2025, after growing 10% per year during 2021-23 and adding more than 50m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) to India’s total every six months.
Oil product use saw zero growth in the first half of 2025, after rising 6% per year in 2021-23.
In contrast, emissions from coal burning for cement and steel production rose by 10% and 7%, respectively, while coal use outside of these sectors fell 2%.
Gas consumption fell 7% year-on-year, with reductions across the power and industrial sectors as well as other users. This was a sharp reversal of the 5% average annual growth in 2021-23.
Power-sector emissions pause
The most striking shift in India’s sectoral emissions trends has come in the power sector, where coal consumption and CO2 emissions fell 0.2% in the 12 months to June and 1% in the first half of 2025, marking just the second drop in half a century, as shown in the figure below.
The reduction in coal use comes after more than a decade of break-neck growth, starting in the early 2010s and only interrupted by Covid in 2020. It also comes even as the country plans large amounts of new coal-fired generating capacity.

In the first half of 2025, total power generation increased by 9 terawatt hours (TWh) year-on-year, but fossil power generation fell by 29TWh, as output from solar grew 17TWh, from wind 9TWh, from hydropower by 9TWh and from nuclear by 3TWh.
Analysis of government data shows that 65% of the fall in fossil-fuel generation can be attributed to lower electricity demand growth, 20% to faster growth in non-hydro clean power and the remaining 15% to higher output at existing hydropower plants.
Slower growth in electricity usage was largely due to relatively mild temperatures and high rainfall, in contrast to the heatwaves of 2024. A slowdown in industrial sectors in the second quarter of the year also contributed.
In addition, increased rainfall drove the jump in hydropower generation. India received 42% above-normal rainfall from March to May 2025. (In early 2024, India’s hydro output had fallen steeply as a result of “erratic rainfall”.)
Lower temperatures and this abundant rainfall reduced the need for air conditioning, which is responsible for around 10% of the country’s total power demand. In the same period in 2024, demand surged due to record heatwaves and higher temperatures across the country.
The growth in clean-power generation was buoyed by the addition of a record 25.1GW of non-fossil capacity in the first half of 2025. This was a 69% increase compared with the previous period in 2024, which had also set a record.
Solar continues to dominate new installations, with 14.3GW of capacity added in the first half of the year coming from large scale solar projects and 3.2GW from solar rooftops.
Solar is also adding the majority of new clean-power output. Taking into account the average capacity factor of each technology, solar power delivered 62% of the additional annual generation, hydropower 16%, wind 13% and nuclear power 8%.
The new clean-energy capacity added in the first half of 2025 will generate record amounts of clean power. As shown in the figure below, the 50TWh per year from this new clean capacity is approaching the average growth of total power generation.
(When clean-energy growth exceeds total demand growth, generation from fossil fuels declines.)

India is expected to add another 16-17GW of solar and wind in the second half of 2025. Beyond this year, strong continued clean-energy growth is expected, towards India’s target for 500GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030 (see below).
Slowing oil demand growth
The first half of 2025 also saw a significant slowdown in India’s oil demand growth. After rising by 6% a year in the three years to 2023, it slowed to 4% in 2024 and zero in the first half of 2025.
The slowdown in oil consumption overall was predominantly due to slower growth in demand for diesel and “other oil products”, which includes bitumen.
In the first quarter of 2025, diesel demand actually fell, due to a decline in industrial activity, limited weather-related mobility and – reportedly – higher uptake of vehicles that run on compressed natural gas (CNG), as well as electricity (EVs).
Diesel demand growth increased in March to May, but again declined in June because of early and unusually severe monsoon rains in India, leading to a slowdown in industrial and mining activities, disrupted supply-chains and transport of raw material, goods and services.
The severe rains also slowed down road construction activity, which in turn curtailed demand for transportation, construction equipment and bitumen.
Weaker diesel demand growth in 2024 had reflected slower growth in economic activity, as growth rates in the industrial and agricultural sectors contracted compared to previous years.
Another important trend is that EVs are also cutting into diesel demand in the commercial vehicles segment, although this is not yet a significant factor in the overall picture.
EV adoption is particularly notable in major metropolitan cities and other rapidly emerging urban centres and in the logistics sector, where they are being preferred for short haul rides over diesel vans or light commercial vehicles.
EVs accounted for only 7.6% of total vehicle sales in the financial year 2024-25, up 22.5% year-on-year, but still far from the target of 30% by 2030.
However, any significant drop in diesel demand will be a function of adoption of EV for long-haul trucks, which account for 32% of the total CO2 emissions from the transport sector. Only 280 electric trucks were sold in 2024, reported NITI Aayog.
Trucks remain the largest diesel consumers. Moreover, truck sales grew 9.2% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2025, driven in part by India’s target of 75% farm mechanisation by 2047. This sales growth may outweigh the reduction in diesel demand due to EVs. Subsidies for electric tractors have seen some pilots, but demand is yet to take off.
Apart from diesel, petrol demand growth continued in the first half of 2025 at the same rate as in earlier years. Modest year-on-year growth of 1.3% in passenger vehicle sales could temper future increases in petrol demand, however. This is a sharp decline from 7.5% and 10% growth rates in sales in the same period in 2024 and 2023.
Furthermore, EVs are proving to be cheaper to run than petrol for two- and three-wheelers, which may reduce the sale of petrol vehicles in cities that show policy support for EV adoption.
Steel and cement emissions continue to grow
As already noted, steel and cement were the only major sectors of India’s economy to see an increase in emissions growth in the first half of 2025.
While they were only responsible for around 12% of India’s total CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement in 2024, they have been growing quickly, averaging 6% a year for the past five years.
The growth in emissions accelerated in the first half of 2025, as cement output rose 10% and steel output 7%, far in excess of the growth in economic output overall.
Steel and cement growth accelerated further in July. A key demand driver is government infrastructure spending, which tripled from 2019 to 2024.
In the second quarter of 2025, the government’s capital expenditure increased 52% year-on-year. albeit from a low base during last year’s elections. This signals strong growth in infrastructure.
The government is targeting domestic steel manufacturing capacity of 300m tonnes (Mt) per year by 2030, from 200Mt currently, under the National Steel Policy 2017, supported by financial incentives for firms that meet production targets for high quality steel.
The government also imposed tariffs on steel imports in April and stricter quality standards for imports in June, in order to boost domestic production.
Government policies such as Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna – a “housing for all” initiative under which 30m houses are to be built by FY30 – is further expected to lift demand for steel and cement.
The automotive sector in India is expected to grow at a fast pace, with sales expected to reach 7.5m units for passenger vehicle and commercial vehicle segments from 5.1m units in 2023, in addition to rapid growth in electric vehicles. This can be expected to be another key driver for growth of the steel sector, as 900 kg of steel is used per vehicle.
Without stringent energy efficiency measures and the adoption of cleaner fuel, the expected growth in steel and cement production could drive significant emissions growth from the sector.
Power-sector emissions could peak before 2030
Looking beyond this year, the analysis shows that CO2 from India’s power sector could peak before 2030, having previously been the main driver of emissions growth.
To date, India’s clean-energy additions have been lagging behind the growth in total electricity demand, meaning fossil-fuel demand and emissions from the sector have continued to rise.
However, this dynamic looks likely to change. In 2021, India set a target of having 500GW of non-fossil power generation capacity in place by 2030. Progress was slow at first, so meeting the target implies a substantial acceleration in clean-energy additions.
The country has been laying the groundwork for such an acceleration.
There was 234GW of renewable capacity in the pipeline as of April 2025, according to the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. This includes 169GW already awarded contracts, of which 145GW is under construction, and an additional 65GW put out to tender. There is also 5.2GW of new nuclear capacity under construction.
If all of this is commissioned by 2030, then total non-fossil capacity would increase to 482GW, from 243GW at the end of June 2025, leaving a gap of just 18GW to be filled with new projects.
When the non-fossil capacity target was set in 2021, CREA assessed that the target would suffice to peak demand for coal in power generation before 2030. This assessment remains valid and is reinforced by the latest Central Electricity Authority (CEA) projection for the country’s “optimal power mix” in 2030, shown in the figure below.

In the CEA’s projection, the share of non-fossil power generation rises to 44% in the 2029-30 fiscal year, up from 25% in 2024-25. From 2025 to 2030, power demand growth, averaging 6% per year, is entirely covered from clean sources.
To accomplish this, the growth in non-fossil power generation would need to accelerate over time, meaning that towards the end of the decade, the growth in clean power supply would clearly outstrip demand growth overall – and so power generation from fossil fuels would fall.
While coal-power generation is expected to flatline, large amounts of new coal-power capacity is still being planned, because of the expected growth in peak electricity demand.
The post-Covid increase in electricity demand has given rise to a wave of new coal power plant proposals. Recent plans from the government target an increase in coal-power capacity by another 80-100GW by 2030-32, with 35GW already under construction as of July 2025.
The rationale for this is the increase in peak electricity loads, associated in particular with worsening heatwaves and growing use of air conditioning. The increase might yet prove unneeded.
Analysis by CREA shows that solar and wind are making an increasing contribution to meeting peak loads. This contribution will increase with the roll-out of solar power with integrated battery storage, the cost of which fell by 50-60% from 2023 to 2025.
The latest auction held in India saw solar power with battery storage bidding at prices, per unit of electricity generation, that were lower than the cost of new coal power.
This creates the opportunity to accelerate the decarbonisation of India’s power sector, by reducing the need for thermal power capacity.
The clean-energy buildout has made it possible for India to peak its power-sector emissions within the next few years, if contracted projects are built, clean-energy growth is maintained or accelerated beyond 2030 and demand growth remains within the government’s projections.
This would be a major turning point, as the power sector has been responsible for half of India’s recent emissions growth. In order to peak its emissions overall, however, India would still need to take further action to address CO2 from industry and transport.
With the end-of-September 2025 deadline nearing, India has yet to publish its international climate pledge (nationally determined contribution, NDC) for 2035 under the Paris Agreement, meaning its future emissions path, in the decades up to its 2070 net-zero goal, remains particularly uncertain.
The country is expected to easily surpass the headline climate target from its previous NDC, of cutting the emissions intensity of its economy to 45% below 2005 levels by 2030. As such, this goal is “unlikely to drive real world emission reductions”, according to Climate Action Tracker.
In July of this year, it met a 2030 target for 50% of installed power generating capacity to be from non-fossil sources, five years early.
About the data
This analysis is based on official monthly data for fuel consumption, industrial production and power generation from different ministries and government institutes.
Coal consumption in thermal power plants is taken from the monthly reports downloaded from the National Power Portal of the Ministry of Power. The data is compiled for the period January 2019 until June 2025. Power generation and capacity by technology and fuel on a monthly basis are sourced from the NITI data portal.
Coal use at steel and cement plants, as well as process emissions from cement production, are estimated using production indices from the Index of Eight Core Industries released monthly by the Office of Economic Adviser, assuming that changes in emissions follow production volumes.
These production indices were used to scale coal use by the sectors in 2022. To form a basis for using the indices, monthly coal consumption data for 2022 was constructed for the sectors using the annual total coal consumption reported in IEA World Energy Balances and monthly production data in a paper by Robbie Andrew, on monthly CO2 emission accounting for India.
Annual cement process emissions up to 2024 were also taken from Robbie Andrew’s work and scaled using the production indices. This approach better approximated changes in energy use and emissions reported in the IEA World Energy Balances, than did the amounts of coal reported to have been dispatched to the sectors, showing that production volumes are the dominant driver of short-term changes in emissions.
For other sectors, including aluminium, auto, chemical and petrochemical, paper and plywood, pharmaceutical, graphite electrode, sugar, textile, mining, traders and others, coal consumption is estimated based on data on despatch of domestic and imported coal to end users from statistical reports and monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal, as consumption data is not available.
The difference between consumption and dispatch is stock changes, which are estimated by assuming that the changes in coal inventories at end user facilities mirror those at coal mines, with end user inventories excluding power, steel and cement assumed to be 70% of those at coal mines, based on comparisons between our data and the IEA World Energy Balances.
Stock changes at mines are estimated as the difference between production at and despatch from coal mines, as reported by the Ministry of Coal.
In the case of the second quarter of the year 2025, data on domestic coal has been taken from the monthly reports by the Ministry of Coal. The regular data releases on coal imports have not taken place for the second quarter of 2025, for unknown reasons, so data was taken from commercial data providers Coal Hub and mjunction services ltd.
Product-wise petroleum product consumption data, as well as gas use by sector, was downloaded from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell of the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas.
As the fuel dispatch and consumption data is reported as physical volumes, calorific values are taken from IEA’s World Energy Balance and CO2 emission factors from 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories.
Calorific values are assigned separately to different fuel types, including domestic and imported coal, anthracite and coke, as well as petrol, diesel and several other oil products.
The post Analysis: India’s power-sector CO2 falls for only second time in half a century appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: India’s power-sector CO2 falls for only second time in half a century
Climate Change
UN raises COP30 allowance to help with Belém accommodation crisis
The UN has increased a subsidy for diplomats from most developing nations to attend COP30, after complaints about the high costs of attending the climate summit in Brazil’s Amazon region – but limited resources mean fewer people can now receive the payment unless more money is raised.
With more than half of all countries yet to secure accommodation in the city of Belém due to soaring costs, UN climate chief Simon Stiell said on Wednesday that the daily subsistence allowance (DSA) had been raised from $144 to $197 per day.
The payment usually helps cover lodging and meals for two delegates each from 144 eligible developing countries, with small island states and least developed countries receiving support for an additional representative.
But Climate Home News understands that the money currently available in a special funding mechanism supported by donations is not enough to guarantee the higher allowance to the usual number of beneficiaries.
The trust fund for participation in the UN climate process had received $2.1 million in voluntary contributions by the end of August – with the vast majority of funding provided by Denmark. That amount falls far short of the nearly $8 million the UN climate body had budgeted for the fund in 2025.
Brazil wants UN to fork out more money
Brazil’s COP30 presidency, which had been pushing for a top-up of the daily allowance rate, welcomed the decision, calling it “a step forward” in helping developing nations attend November’s climate talks.
But its statement added that was still not enough because the amount remains below the rate applied in other Brazilian cities and does not “fully cover local costs”. The COP30 hosts urged the UN climate body (UNFCCC) to consider giving extra money to delegates from developing nations through an “emergency supplement”.
A UNFCCC spokesperson declined to comment on the feasibility of this request.
In recent years, the UN climate body has been struggling for funding as contributions from governments and other donors fail to match the ever-growing list of activities countries have asked it to carry out.
In its budget proposal for the next two years, the UNFCCC Secretariat said that insufficient funding and unpredictable contributions to the trust fund for participation can cause cancellations of important events and limit options for inclusive participation.
Most inclusive COP ever?
Brazil has vowed that COP30 will go down in history as the “most inclusive” climate summit ever. But that promise risks breaking under the weight of an accommodation crisis in the remote Amazonian city where hotels are charging up to 15 times their regular rates during the conference period.
To help the situation, the COP30 presidency has made a set number of rooms available to poorer countries at a fixed price range.
Brazil insists it will host COP30 in Belém, despite accommodation worries
So far, 79 countries have confirmed their accommodation in Belém, while another 70 are still negotiating their lodging options, the COP30 presidency told members of the COP bureau – a committee that advises on COP matters – on Wednesday.
Valter Correia, Brazil’s special secretary for COP30, said the hosts have maintained “active dialogues” with delegations and “have shown flexibility in addressing their concerns”, for example by supporting them in negotiations with hotels and rental providers.
But speaking to Climate Home, Richard Muyungi, chair of the African Group of Negotiators who is also a member of the COP bureau, said he was still not satisfied with the cost, available types of rooms and the number allocated to delegations.
“Still the problem is there – it hasn’t been solved as we had expected,” he said, adding that he had hoped for more support for African countries from Brazil. “I complained and I will keep complaining.”
The few rooms still available on the official accommodation platform cost $420 a night – more than double the daily allowance provided by the UN.
Speaking on Wednesday ahead of the bureau meeting, Ilana Seid, chair of the AOSIS group of small island states, said the cost of the rooms offered by the presidency needs to match the daily allowance rate.
“There are still quite a few things that need to be ironed out, and we are working with Brazil,” she added.
The post UN raises COP30 allowance to help with Belém accommodation crisis appeared first on Climate Home News.
UN raises COP30 allowance to help with Belém accommodation crisis
Climate Change
Can COP30 turn adaptation talks into real-world investments?
The COP30 climate summit in Belém will put adaptation to a warming world front and centre, with the aim of moving negotiations from technical debate to deciding how to measure adaptation progress and accelerating action on the ground, according to Alice Amorim, Brazil’s COP30 programme director.
At the mid-year UN talks in Bonn, countries reached a compromise on work to select a set of 100 indicators this year for the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), which is part of the Paris Agreement.
But a key sticking point has been how to track funding for vulnerable communities to become more resilient to climate shifts – which affect everything from agriculture to water and infrastructure – in a way that can help ensure that developed countries are providing adequate support to developing nations.
IEA says some oil and gas projects must shut early to meet 1.5C limit
A meeting of technical experts in late August narrowed down the list of GGA indicators to 113, but was unable to agree on how to monitor finance for adaptation, according to a summary released this week.
With the negotiations set to continue at COP30, Amorim told this month’s Africa Climate Summit in Addis Ababa that she hopes countries will finally agree on the indicators in Belém, adding that the Brazil conference – being described as an “implementation COP” – must go further to shape a system that can quickly turn those decisions into real-world results.
“This is a moment where we don’t need to wait anymore for all parties to agree on what needs to happen to make adaptation finance flow to Africa, to Latin America, to the small island states and so on. It’s about acting upon it, it’s about moving from commitments to practice,” Amorim said.
She added that there should be no more delay in investing in adaptation and resilience-building because resources are needed urgently to build climate-safe infrastructure and implement national adaptation plans.
COP30 will not launch “shiny new initiatives”, she added, but will bring existing solutions “to understand what is already happening on the ground that needs to be leveraged and what are the gaps that financial sector players and policy makers need to address”.


An existing goal to double adaptation finance to around $40 billion a year by 2025 – agreed at COP26 – expires this year, and experts say it has helped drive more money into adaptation.
The Least Developed Countries group has called for a new goal of tripling finance from 2022 levels by 2030 to close to $100 billion a year. But even that would not close the gap which the UN estimates to be $160 billion-$340 billion a year by 2030.
Addis summit gets behind adaptation
Brazil’s Amorim told the Africa climate summit in Ethiopia last week that the need for adaptation “is clear and tangible” on the continent. What is missing, however, are the conditions to drive it in a much wider and faster way, she added.
Adapting to climate change by shoring up defences against negative impacts such as extreme heat, floods and food insecurity remains a priority for African countries. Leaders at the summit made it clear in their final declaration – yet to be published – that the continent needs scaled-up, grant-based and concessional finance for adaptation, whose delivery should avoid loading countries with more debt.
Since 2017, most adaptation finance flows to the continent have come as loans, with little private sector investment, raising fears over rising debt burdens on the continent. While Africa needs about $70 billion annually for adaptation, it received only $14.8 billion in 2023, according to an analysis by the Global Center on Adaptation (GCA) and Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) released during the summit.
The analysis showed that since most adaptation finance comes from international public sources such as donor governments and multilateral development banks, cuts in bilateral aid mean capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa are projected to decline in 2025.
“Public health emergency”: Report shows fossil fuel impacts on every stage of life
Reacting to the report’s findings, Macky Sall, former president of Senegal and chair of the GCA, said the aid cuts from major donor countries would be “unprecedented – and unacceptable – precisely when resilience spending must rise”.
To enable African countries to build resilient infrastructure without piling on unsustainable debt, Sall called on developed-country partners “to reverse planned reductions, ring-fence adaptation within aid budgets, and expand guarantees and local-currency facilities”.
Tadeous Chifamba, permanent secretary of environment, climate and wildlife in Zimbabwe, said COP30 should focus attention on increasing adaptation finance flows to Africa, drive a restructuring of the global financial architecture and ensure developed countries, which are responsible for historical emissions, play their part in mobilising funds for adaptation.
“It has become a moral obligation on their part to ensure that there is fairness, justice and that they assume responsibility just as we are doing as the first-line defenders,” Chifamba told an event on the sidelines of the Addis summit.

Mobilising African money too
While African leaders need developed countries to help deliver finance for adaptation, they made it clear at the summit that the continent is not asking for charity, but is championing local solutions and will also mobilise resources from African financial institutions to respond to climate shocks.
At the summit, the second phase of the Africa-led Adaptation Acceleration Program (AAAP)- a joint initiative of the African Development Bank and the GCA – was launched with a goal to mobilise $50 billion by 2030 to climate-proof Africa and build resilience in different sectors including agriculture, infrastructure, food systems and urban areas, as well as creating jobs.
This is a boost to the program’s initial target of $25 billion and will be achieved through a convergence of private-sector leadership, innovation and resilient economic growth, according to the GCA.
COP observers invited to reveal who is bank-rolling their participation at climate talks
Bernadette Arakwiye, Rwanda’s environment minister, told the summit that Africa needs to shift from a position of deficit to opportunity, and start leveraging its assets by unlocking domestic capital. “Africa’s financial institutions hold trillions in assets and yet only a fraction is flowing to climate resilience – we need to change this,” she added.
Investing for resilient growth
Unlocking private finance would scale up adaptation investments to equip countries to quickly respond to climate shocks, Arakwiye emphasised, adding that private capital can move the continent away from small and fragmented initiatives to large-scale bankable projects.
The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap for boosting climate finance to $1.3 trillion a year by 2035, to be presented at COP30, will go some way in showing how more funds can be raised for adaptation, including through multilateral development banks, private investment and country platforms for investment, Melanie Robinson, global climate director at the World Resources Institute (WRI), told journalists this week.
Comment: How COP30 could deliver an ambitious outcome on global finance flows
Citing WRI’s research, she noted that every dollar invested in adaptation can generate more than ten times its value in economic, social and environmental benefits.
In addition to finance, policy and regulatory changes such as insurance systems, land zoning and business incentives are also needed to support adaptation on the ground, she said.
“COP30 will be an opportunity to focus more on adaptation and resilience – and this is about investing, not just to save lives, although that’s very important, but actually to drive resilient growth and enable communities and businesses to thrive in a changing climate,” she added.
The post Can COP30 turn adaptation talks into real-world investments? appeared first on Climate Home News.
Can COP30 turn adaptation talks into real-world investments?
Climate Change
Guest post: Is climate change making UK droughts worse?
The year 2025 has seen exceptionally dry conditions in many parts of the UK.
At the time of writing, a large area of England is officially “in drought” and hosepipe bans are in force for more than 8m households.
This follows severe drought episodes in the summers of 2022 and 2018 – which raises the question of whether these events are part of a pattern towards a drier future.
However, the intervening periods between these drought events have been associated with major floods.
There is good reason to assume this “hydrological volatility” could be linked to climate change.
Writing for Carbon Brief in 2020, we explored how climate change might be impacting UK river flooding.
Here, we revisit this theme – but ask whether global warming is driving a long-term trend towards increasing drought severity in the UK.
To do so, we draw from the findings of a 2023 Environment Agency report, a chapter of which we authored and has now been accepted for publication in a peer-reviewed journal.
Key findings include:
- Future projections indicate hydrological droughts will become more severe in the UK, especially over the months of April to September, due to hotter, drier summers.
- However, observations from the past 50 years – and longer where records allow – do not provide evidence of worsening drought.
- This apparent conflict is largely because natural climate variability can obscure underlying trends driven by climate change.
- An increasingly variable climate in the UK means planners still need to prepare for more severe droughts, as well as more floods.
The 2025 hydrological drought
Droughts are complex events that vary in duration, time of year, location and severity.
They are often categorised into different types. For example, a meteorological drought is defined by a lack of rainfall – whereas agricultural drought is a period when there is not enough water for crops to grow.
Here, we are focusing on hydrological drought, which is when a lack of rainfall results in less water in streams, lakes, rivers and reservoirs.
In particular, we look at deficits in river flow. It is through dwindling river flows that droughts have some of their greatest impacts on society and the environment.
Over March-July of this year, flows for many UK rivers were at their lowest level on record. Hosepipe bans have been introduced by water companies, while the Environment Agency has imposed restrictions on extracting water from rivers and warned of widespread environmental impacts, such as fish die-offs and algal blooms in rivers, streams and lakes.
The map below shows how a significant number of rivers in the UK this spring saw exceptionally low flows (marked by a dark red circle) or notably low flows (marked by an orange circle) compared to the 1991-2020 average. This includes many rivers in northern parts of Great Britain – which is typically wetter the south-east.
The graphs on the right, meanwhile, show how flows in the River Derwent and the River Wye (black line) in 2025 have been at equivalent levels, or lower, than in major past droughts (red, green and orange lines). This includes the record-breaking drought of 1976 (orange line), often used as a benchmark.

How is climate change going to affect droughts in the UK?
Globally, climate change causes an intensification of the hydrological cycle. This means that both wet and dry extremes – floods and droughts – are likely to become more frequent and severe.
One way of understanding the impact of climate change on hydrological drought is to use rainfall and temperature projections from climate models to drive hydrological models that simulate how the flow of water through river catchments could change in the future.
There are numerous studies that provide such projections of UK drought. (A summary of these can be found in the chapter on modelling in the 2023 Environment Agency report, linked above.)
Across these studies, river flow models generally show that, in the future, the UK should expect lower summer river flows, increasing drought severity and decreasing minimum flows – in other words, the lowest flows in each year will get lower.
The graphs below show projections of changing low flows for a selection of UK rivers from the 1980s to the 2080s over consecutive 30-year moving averages (1983-2012, 1984-2013 and so on, through to 2050-79).
These projections are based on the “enhanced future flows and groundwater” (Eflag) dataset, which provides simulated river flows for 200 catchments around the UK, using four river flow models. These are driven by the “regional” projections from the Met Office’s UK Climate Projections 2018 (UKCP18), a 12-member climate model “ensemble” which uses the very-high-emission RCP8.5 scenario.
(For more on why this regional data is only available under this pathway, read Carbon Brief’s in-depth Q&A on UKCP18.)
The multiple lines on each plot – which indicate different projections for low flows – show the uncertainties arising from the different climate model runs and river flow models used.
The charts reveal that, across all rivers and different future trajectories, the trend points in the same direction – towards diminishing minimum flows. This suggests a drier future across the UK, most notably in the summer.

Past trends in drought
Given these projections, we would expect to see a similar trend of decreasing minimum flows emerging in observational data over the last few decades.
However, our research concludes that there is little compelling evidence for any evidence of a widespread worsening of UK droughts over the last half century – yet.
The maps below show how river flows have changed since 1965 across the UK for very low (Q95), medium-low (Q70) and median (Q50) flows.
For much of the north and west of the UK, the lowest flows in each year have, in fact, increased since 1965 (blue triangles). In the south and east of the country, there are decreases (inverted red triangles), but it is a mixed picture. Overall, the number of statistically significant trends is modest.

But, while these river flow records span more than 50 years, this is still a relatively short timeframe.
As a result, we also explored much longer records, including “reconstructed” river flows, which stretch back to 1890. Here, too, we find there is no consistent trend towards worsening drought over these long periods.
In fact, our research shows how trends in the last 50 years are often unrepresentative of longer-term changes. Some of the apparent decreasing trends from the maps above disappear when a longer view is taken.
Mismatch between past trends and future projections
There is a clear contradiction between future projections and past trends. We do not yet see much evidence of the drier future that climate models project.
However, this apparent contradiction is unsurprising once uncertainties inherent in both future projections and historical observations are considered.
Future projections are highly uncertain and span a wide range of possibilities – as shown by the multiple lines in the Eflag graphs above.
Caution is needed in interpreting trends in observations, too. While 50 years seems a reasonably long period, trends can be influenced by variability associated with natural atmospheric and oceanic circulation patterns.
The trends towards increasing river flows in the north and west are consistent with changes in the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) – the atmospheric pressure system that influences the UK’s weather on year-to-year and decade-to-decade timescales.
There is a growing list of drivers of drought variability, including the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and the role of the influx of freshwater into the North Atlantic due to the melting of the Greenland ice sheet.
In a recent paper, we highlighted that long-term trends in low river flows for many UK catchments may not be detectable for decades due to being obscured by natural climate variability.
This is shown by the plot below, which illustrates how projected trends of very low river flows over the 21st century (red line) contrasts with the estimated range of historical river flow variability (dashed lines). (The grey shading shows the range of different climate models.)
It shows that for some catchments – for example, the Lambourn River in south-east England – significant trends do not emerge until the 2050s.

Part of the mismatch between historical observations and climate projections for UK summer is due to a run of wet summers from the late 2000s onwards. This climate variability has ‘masked’ an underlying trend that could eventually emerge and bring a more worrisome consistency with the projections of climate models.
That this masking has often entailed living with an excess of water, in the form of widespread, damaging flooding, only highlights the challenges water managers face.
A drier and wetter future
Further research is required into how different types of hydrological drought will evolve.
We are confident we will see more droughts in April-September, typically associated with heatwaves, as in 2025, 2022 and 2018. This is because warming temperatures – which, unlike rainfall trends, are certain – will exacerbate droughts.
The increased likelihood of hot, dry summers also means more rapid-onset “flash droughts”, which have impacts on soil moisture as well as river flows.
As such, the droughts of recent years should be interpreted as a warning that hotter temperatures will worsen drought impacts.
However, we are much less confident that we will see more long, multi-annual droughts driven by dry winters that fail to replenish reservoirs and aquifers, such as those seen in 1988-93, 2005-06 and 2010-12. This is because climate models generally predict wetter winters for the UK. (These multi-annual droughts have, historically, posed some of the greatest challenges to water management.)
Nevertheless, climate variability means that even if winters get wetter, there will always be runs of dry years. This is a cause for concern, as the greatest problems occur when wet winters combine with dry summers. (It was the dry winter of 1975-76 which made the 1976 drought so severe).
Our finding that it is difficult to confirm whether droughts are, overall, becoming more severe offers little comfort to water managers preparing for the future.
Our research offers a number of recommendations for water planners trying to navigate this complexity. This includes using large climate model “ensembles” to test the resilience of water supply systems to different types of droughts. Although model projections are uncertain, they provide a way to assess the UK’s vulnerability to a range of future outcomes.
Furthermore, the hydrological volatility of the recent past indicates the importance of preparing for both a drier and wetter future in the UK.
The UK is known for its variable weather, but it will have a future climate that is even more variable and extreme.
The post Guest post: Is climate change making UK droughts worse? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Spanish-language misinformation on renewable energy spreads online, report shows
-
Climate Change Videos2 years ago
The toxic gas flares fuelling Nigeria’s climate change – BBC News
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change1 year ago
嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Carbon Footprint1 year ago
US SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Climate Change1 month ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Why airlines are perfect targets for anti-greenwashing legal action
-
Renewable Energy2 months ago
US Grid Strain, Possible Allete Sale