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Clean energy generated a record-high 44% of China’s electricity in May 2024, pushing coal’s share down to a record low of 53%, despite continued growth in demand.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and other data that only became available last week, reveals the true scale of the drop in coal’s share of the mix.

Coal lost seven percentage points compared with May 2023, when it accounted for 60% of generation in China.

Other key insights revealed by the analysis include:

  • Monthly National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data on generation by technology is now severely limited for wind and solar. For example, it excludes “distributed” rooftop solar and smaller centralised solar plants, capturing only about half of solar generation.
  • This mismatch becomes clear when comparing the NBS total for monthly electricity generation of 718 terawatt hours (TWh) with reported monthly electricity demand of 775TWh, according to the National Energy Administration (NEA). In reality, electricity generation must be higher than demand due to losses at power plants and on the grid.
  • Media reports have speculated that the record renewable capacity additions would have run into grid constraints in May, but the new data shows this is not the case.
  • China’s electricity demand in May 2024 grew by 49TWh (7.2%) from a year earlier.
  • At the same time, generation from clean energy sources grew by a record 78TWh, including a record rise from solar of 41TWh (78%), a recovery from earlier drought-driven lows for hydro of 34TWh (39%) and a modest rise for wind of 4TWh (5%).
  • With clean energy expanding by more than the rise in electricity demand, fossil fuel output was forced into retreat, seeing the largest monthly drop since the Covid 19 pandemic. Gas generation fell by 4TWh (16%) and that from coal by 16TWh (4%).
  • Falling generation from fossil fuels point to a 3.6% drop in CO2 emissions from the power sector, which accounts for around two-fifths of China’s total greenhouse gas emissions and has been the dominant source of emissions growth in recent years.

The new findings show a continuation of recent trends, which helped send China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels and cement into reverse in March 2024.

If current rapid wind and solar deployment continues, then China’s CO2 output is likely to continue falling, making 2023 the peak year for the country’s emissions.

Monthly mismatch

Every month, the NBS publishes data on China’s electricity generation by technology. The figures for May 2024 came out nearly a month ago, in mid-June, and were widely reported.

However, this data is increasingly limited because it excludes, among other things, “distributed” solar sites, such as those on the roofs of homes and businesses. Analysis for this article shows this misses out about half of the electricity generated by solar overall.

The fact that the NBS data on power generation is incomplete is obvious when looking at consumption numbers: the NEA reported electricity consumption in May was 775TWh, while the NBS reported generation at only 718TWh. In reality, generation must be significantly larger than consumption because of losses at power plants and in transmission.

The seemingly small amount of power generation from solar and wind reported by the NBS has caused confusion and has led to claims that the performance of wind and solar in China is poor.

The performance of wind and solar generation is tracked by “utilisation” data collected by China Electricity Council (CEC), showing actual output relative to the maximum potential. These figures are normally included in monthly statistics released by the NEA.

The NEA omitted this data from its May release, which led to speculation from Bloomberg and Reuters that the reason would be poor numbers for wind and solar. This proved to be largely untrue when the data became available directly from the CEC, with solar power utilisation increasing significantly and wind power utilisation falling, but within normal year-to-year variation.

Another dataset, tracking the fraction of solar and wind power wasted due to grid inflexibility, showed small increases of 0.8 percentage-points for solar and 1.7 points for wind. This is problematic for plant operators, but well short of a spike that would notably affect the utilisation numbers – they typically vary by more than 5% from year to year.

There is now enough data to work around the limitations in the NBS power generation data and give a complete picture of China’s power generation mix in May.

The first thing to note is that the NBS numbers are normalised to a 30-day month, which accounts for a fraction of the mismatch. The rest of this article uses normalised 30-day numbers.

Instead of using the NBS numbers, it is possible to estimate generation from solar and wind based on reported capacity and utilisation. Combining these estimates with reported generation for other technologies yields total generation of 783TWh and year-on-year growth of 8%.

Reported electricity consumption of 750TWh – when normalised to a 30-day month – is consistent with estimated generation of 783TWh, with the 4.2% difference being due to transmission losses.

Monthly data on transmission losses is not available, but the average for 2023 was 4.5%, matching closely with the difference between reported consumption and estimated generation.

Record results

Putting the various figures together shows that, far from the modest 29% year-on-year increase in the incomplete NBS data, there was a record 78% rise in solar generation in May 2024.

Installed solar capacity increased by 52% to 691 gigawatts (GW) and capacity utilisation improved from 16% to 19%. This delivered the largest increase in China’s electricity generation for any technology, with solar generation rising 41TWh from 53TWh in May 2023 to 94TWh in May 2024.

The second-largest increase was from hydropower, where capacity only increased 1%, but utilisation jumped from 31% to 41%, as the sector recovers from the record drought seen in 2022-23. This led to a 39% or 34TWh increase in power generation, which hit 115TWh.

Wind power saw a strong increase in capacity of 21%. Utilisation fell, however, likely due to month-to-month variations in wind conditions. As a result, power generation grew by a relatively modest 5%, or 4TWh, reaching 83TWh. Nuclear and biomass-fired power generation also saw small increases in capacity, but the utilisation of nuclear plants fell from 87% to 85%.

In total, clean power generation grew 78TWh, as shown in the figure below. This was more than enough to exceed the 49TWh increase in demand.

As a result, gas-fired generation plummeted by 16%, despite a 9% increase in capacity, driving a steep 24% drop in utilisation. Coal-fired generation capacity increased by 3% while power generation from coal fell 3.7%, resulting in average plant utilisation falling by 7%. Falling demand could temper investment in new coal capacity, which has run hot in the past two years.

The changes in coal and gas-fired generation, combined with a slight degradation in the thermal efficiency of coal-fired power plants, imply a 3.6% drop in CO2 emissions from the power sector.

Year-on-year change in China’s monthly electricity generation by source, terawatt hours, 2016-2024.
Year-on-year change in China’s monthly electricity generation by source, terawatt hours, 2016-2024. Source: Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, calculated from capacity and utilisation reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal; total generation from thermal power and generation from other sources taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases. Chart by Carbon Brief.

After these changes in output, China’s power generation mix shifted significantly away from fossil fuels in May 2024. The share of coal-fired generation fell to 53%, down from 60% at the same time last year and the lowest share on record, as shown in the figure below.

Meanwhile, solar rose to 12%, up from 7% a year earlier and the highest on record. The remainder was made up of wind (11%), hydropower (15%), nuclear (5%), gas (3%) and biomass (2%).

Share of China’s electricity generation, %, 2016-2024.
Share of China’s electricity generation, %, 2016-2024. Source: Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, calculated from capacity and utilisation reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal; total generation from thermal power and generation from other sources taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The overall non-fossil energy share was a record 44% and there was also a new record-high share for variable renewable – solar and wind – which reached 23%.

Solar and wind are gaining share in China’s power mix very rapidly, despite rising demand, as shown in the figure above. In May 2016, they accounted for just 7% of the total.

Meanwhile, strong clean-energy capacity growth continued in May 2024, with 19GW of solar being added, 3GW of wind and 1.2GW of nuclear.

In the first five months of 2024, China has added some 79GW of solar and 20GW of wind. These additions are up 29% and 21% respectively from last year’s numbers, which were already record-breaking, as shown in the figure below.

Looking at solar specifically, monthly additions in May 2024 were higher than the previous month of April and also increased year-on-year compared with May 2023.

Newly added solar and wind power capacity from the beginning of each year, GW, cumulative at the end of each month.
Newly added solar and wind power capacity from the beginning of each year, GW, cumulative at the end of each month. Source: National Energy Administration monthly releases.

The rapid growth in power generation from solar shows that the solar capacity boom is delivering new electricity supplies at a scale sufficient to cover much of China’s demand growth.

This reinforces the view that China’s CO2 emissions are in a period of structural decline.

If clean energy additions are kept at the level reached in 2023 and early 2024, then CO2 output is likely to keep falling, which would confirm 2023 as the peak year for the country’s emissions.

With China due to announce new climate targets by early next year, the government’s level of ambition for clean energy growth remains an open question.

About the data

Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation – the proportion of maximum possible output – using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power, hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases. Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied.

CO2 emissions from power generation were calculated by applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018, as well as the monthly average coal power plant heat rate reported by National Energy Administration, and by assuming average thermal efficiency of 50% for gas-fired power plants.

The post Analysis: China’s clean energy pushes coal to record-low 53% share of power in May 2024 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Guest post: Why 2024’s global temperatures were unprecedented, but not surprising

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Human-caused greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2024 continued to drive global warming to record levels.

This is the stark picture that emerges in the third edition of the “Indicators of Global Climate Change” (IGCC) report, published in Earth System Science Data.

IGCC tracks changes in the climate system between Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) science reports.

In doing so, the IGCC fills the gap between the IPCC’s sixth assessment (AR6) in 2021 and the seventh assessment, expected in 2028.

Following IPCC methods, this year’s assessment brings together a team of over 60 international scientists, including former IPCC authors and curators of vital global datasets.

As in previous years, it is accompanied by a user-friendly data dashboard focusing on the main policy-relevant climate indicators, including GHG emissions, human-caused warming, the rate of temperature change and the remaining global carbon budget.

Below, we explain this year’s findings, highlighting the role that humans are playing in some of the fundamental changes the global climate has seen in recent years.

Infographic: Key indicators of global climate change 2024: What's changed since AR6?
Headline results from an analysis of key climate indicators in 2024, compared to the IPCC AR6 climate science report. Source: Forster et al. (2025)

(For previous IGCC reports, see Carbon Brief’s detailed coverage in 2023 and 2024.)

An ‘unexceptional’ record high

Last year likely saw global average surface temperatures hit at least 1.5C above pre-industrial levels. This aligns with other major assessments of the Earth’s climate.

Our best estimate is a rise of 1.52C (with a range of 1.39-1.65C), of which human activity contributed around 1.36C. The rest is the result of natural variability in the climate system, which also plays a role in shaping global temperatures from one year to the next.

Our estimate of 1.52C differs slightly from the 1.55C given by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) state of the global climate 2024 report, published earlier this year. This is because they make slightly different selections on which of the available global land and ocean temperature datasets to include. (The warming estimate has varied by similar amounts in past years and future work will aim to harmonise the approaches.)

The height of 2024’s temperatures, while unprecedented in at least the last 2,000 years, is not surprising. Given the high level of human-induced warming, we might currently expect to see annual temperatures above 1.5C on average one year in six.

However, with 2024 following an El Niño year, waters in the North Atlantic were warmer than average. These conditions raise this likelihood to an expectation that 1.5C is surpassed every other year.

From now on, we should regard 2024’s observed temperatures as unexceptional. Temperature records will continue to be broken as human-caused temperature rise also increases.

Longer-term temperature change

Despite observed global temperatures likely rising by more than 1.5C in 2024, this does not equate to a breach of the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal, which refers to long-term temperature change caused by human activity.

IGCC also looks at how temperatures are changing over the most recent decade, in line with IPCC assessments.

Over 2015-24, global average temperatures were 1.24C higher than pre-industrial levels. Of this, 1.22C was caused by human activity. So, essentially, all the global warming seen over the past decade was caused by humans.

Observed global average temperatures over 2015-24 were also 0.31C warmer than the previous decade (2005-14). This is unsurprising given the high rates of human-caused warming over the same period, reaching a best estimate of 0.27C per decade.

This rate of warming is large and unprecedented. Over land, where people live, temperatures are rising even faster than the global average, leading to record extreme temperatures.

But every fraction of a degree matters, increasing climate impacts and loss and damage that is already affecting billions of people.

Driven by emissions

Undoubtedly, these changes are being caused by GHG emissions remaining at an all-time high.

Over the last decade, human activities have released, on average, the equivalent of around 53bn tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere each year. (The figure of 53bn tonnes expresses the total warming effect of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide, using CO2 as a reference point.)

Emissions have shown no sign of the peak by 2025 and rapid decline to net-zero required to limit global warming to 1.5C with no or limitedovershoot”.

Most of these emissions were from fossil fuels and industry. There are signs that energy use and emissions are rising due to air conditioning use during summer heatwaves. Last year also saw high levels of emissions from tropical deforestation due to forest fires, partly related to dry conditions caused by El Niño.

Notably, emissions from international aviation – the sector with the steepest drop in emissions during the Covid-19 pandemic – returned to pre-pandemic levels.

The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, alongside the other major GHGs of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), is continuing to build up to record levels. Their concentrations have increased by 3.1, 3.4 and 1.7%, respectively, since the 2019 values reported in the last IPCC assessment.

At the same time, aerosol emissions, which have a cooling effect, are continuing to fall as a result of important efforts to tackle air pollution. This is currently adding to the rate of GHG warming.

Notably, cutting CH4 emissions, which are also short-lived in the atmosphere, could offset this rise. But, again, there is no real sign of a fall – despite major initiatives such as the Global Methane Pledge.

The effect of all human drivers of climate change on the Earth’s energy balance is measured as “radiative forcing”. Our estimate of this radiative forcing in 2024 is 2.97 Watts per square metre (W/m2), 9% above the value recorded in 2019 that was quoted in the last IPCC assessment.

This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates the percentage change in an array of climate indicators since the data update given in the last IPCC climate science report.

Bar chart: Key Indicators of Global Climate Change: Percentage change since IPCC Sixth Assessment Report
Percentage changes in key climate indicators in 2024, compared to the IPCC AR6 climate science report. The remaining carbon budget given on the right is the only indicator to show a reduction and is the change since IPCC AR6, presented as a shrinking box. Source: Forster et al. (2025)

Continued emissions and rising temperatures are meanwhile rapidly eating into the remaining carbon budget, the total amount of CO2 that can be emitted if global warming is to be kept below 1.5C.

Our central estimate of the remaining carbon budget from the start of 2025 is 130bn tonnes of CO2.

This has fallen by almost three-quarters since the start of 2020. It would be exhausted in a little more than three years of global emissions, at current levels.

However, given the uncertainties involved in calculating the remaining carbon budget, the actual value could lie between 30 and 320bn tonnes, meaning that it could also be exhausted sooner – or later than expected.

Beyond global temperatures

Our assessment also shows how surplus heat is accumulating in the Earth’s system at an accelerating rate, becoming increasingly out of balance and driving changes around the world.

The data and their changes are displayed on a dedicated Climate Change Tracker platform, shown below.

Webpage screenshot: Indicators of Global Climate Change 2024
Snapshot of Climate Change Tracker

The radiative forcing of 2.97 W/m2 adds heat to the climate system. As the world warms in response, much of this excess heat radiates to space, until a new balance is restored. The residual level of heating is termed the Earth’s “energy imbalance” and is an indication of how far out of balance the climate system is and the warming still to come.

This residual rate of heat entering the Earth system has now approximately doubled from levels seen in the 1970s and 1980s, to around 1W/m2 on average during the period 2012-24.

Although the ocean is storing an estimated 91% of this excess heat, mitigating some of the warming we would otherwise see at the Earth’s surface, it brings other impacts, including sea level rise and marine heatwaves.

Global average sea level rise, from both the melting of ice sheets and thermal expansion due to deep ocean warming, is included in the IGCC assessment for the first time.

We find that it has increased by around 26mm over the last six years (2019-24), more than double the long-term rate. This is the indicator that shows the clearest evidence of an acceleration.

Sea level rise is making storm surges more damaging and causing more coastal erosion, having the greatest impact on low-lying coastal areas. The 2019 IPCC special report on the oceans and cryosphere estimated that more than one billion people would be living in such low-lying coastal zones by 2050.

Multiple indicators

Overall, our indicators provide multiple lines of evidence all pointing in the same direction to provide a clear and consistent – but unsurprising and worsening – picture of the climate system.

It is also now inevitable that global temperatures will reach 1.5C of long-term warming in the next few years unless society takes drastic, transformative action – both in cutting GHG emissions and stopping deforestation.

Every year of delay brings reaching 1.5C – or even higher temperatures – closer.

This year, countries are unveiling new “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), the national climate commitments aimed at collectively reducing GHG emissions and tackling climate change in line with the Paris Agreement.

While the plans put forward so far represent a step in the right direction, they still fall far short of what is needed to significantly reduce, let alone stop, the rate of warming.

At the same time, evidence-based decision-making relies on international expertise, collaboration and global datasets.

Our annual update relies on data from NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and input from many of their highly respected scientists. It is this type of collaboration that allows scientists to generate well-calibrated global datasets that can be used to produce trusted data on changes in the Earth system.

It would not be possible to maintain the consistent long-term datasets employed in our study if their work is interrupted.

At a time when the planet is changing at the fastest rate since records began, we are at risk of failing to track key indicators – such as greenhouse gas concentrations or deep ocean temperatures – and losing core expertise that is vital for understanding the data.

The post Guest post: Why 2024’s global temperatures were unprecedented, but not surprising appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon

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The perception of how the land surface releases carbon dioxide (CO2) typically conjures up images of large-scale deforestation or farmers churning up the soil.

However, there is an intriguing – and underappreciated – role played by the world’s rivers.

Right now, plants and soils absorb about one-third of the CO2 released by human activity, similar to how much the oceans take up.

Over thousands to millions of years, some of this land-fixed carbon can end up being buried in sediments, where it eventually forms rocks.

The waters that feed rivers flow through plants, soils and rocks in landscapes, picking up and releasing carbon as they go.

This process is generally considered to be a sideways “leakage” of the carbon that is being taken up by recent plant growth.

However, the age of this carbon – how long it resided in plants and soils before it made it into rivers and then to the atmosphere – has remained a mystery.

If the carbon being released by rivers is young, then it can be considered a component of relatively quick carbon cycling.

However, if the carbon is old, then it is coming from landscape carbon stores that we thought were stable – and, therefore, represents a way these old carbon stores can be destabilised.

In our new study, published in Nature, we show that almost 60% of the carbon being released to the atmosphere by rivers is from these older sources.

In total, this means the world’s rivers emit more than 7bn tonnes of CO2 to the atmosphere each year – more than the annual fossil-fuel emissions from North America.

This means that there is a significant leak of carbon from old stores that we thought were safely locked away.

Previous work has shown that local land-use change, such as deforestation and climate-driven permafrost thaw, will directly release old carbon into rivers. Whether this is happening at the global scale remains a significant unknown for now.

Who are you calling old?

How do you tell how old carbon is? We employ the same technique that is used to determine the age of an archaeological relic or to verify the age of a vintage wine – that is, radiocarbon dating.

Radiocarbon is the radioactive isotope of carbon, which decays at a known rate. This enables us to determine the age of carbon-based materials dating back to a maximum age of about 60,000 years old.

We know that some of the carbon that rivers release is very young, a product of recent CO2 uptake by plants.

We also know that rivers can receive carbon from much older sources, such as the decomposition of deep soils by microbes and soil organisms or the weathering and erosion of ancient carbon in rocks.

Soil decomposition can release carbon ranging from a few years to tens of thousands of years. An example of very old soil carbon release is from thawing permafrost.

Rock weathering and erosion releases carbon that is millions of years old. This is sometimes referred to as “radiocarbon-dead” because it is so old all the radiocarbon has decayed.

Rivers are emitting old carbon

In our new study, we compile new and existing radiocarbon dates of the CO2 emissions from around 700 stretches of river around the world.

We find that almost 60% of the carbon being released to the atmosphere by rivers is from older sources (hundreds to thousands of years old, or older), such as old soil and ancient rock carbon.

In the figure below, we suggest how different processes taking place within a landscape can release carbon of different ages into rivers, driving its direct emission to the atmosphere.

Diagram representing the processes that drive young (decadal) and old (millennial and petrogenic) CO2 emissions from rivers. Values are given as petagrams of carbon, equivalent to billions of tonnes. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)

So, while rivers are leaking some modern carbon from plants and soils as part of the landscape processes that remove CO2 from the atmosphere, rivers are also leaking carbon from much older landscape carbon stores.

One major implication of this finding is that modern plants and soils are leaking less carbon back to the atmosphere than previously thought, making them more important for mitigating human-caused climate change.

We find that the proportion of old carbon contributing to river emissions varies across different ecosystems and the underlying geology of the landscapes they drain.

In the figure below, we show that landscapes underlain by sedimentary rocks, which are the most likely to contain substantial ancient (or “petrogenic”) carbon, also had the oldest river emissions. We also show that the type of ecosystem (biome) was also important, although the patterns were less clear.

Radiocarbon content (age) of river carbon emissions in different ecosystems (“Biome”) and in landscapes underlain by different geology (“Lithology”). The lower the amount of radiocarbon (F14Catm), the older the age. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)
Radiocarbon content (age) of river carbon emissions in different ecosystems (“Biome”) and in landscapes underlain by different geology (“Lithology”). The lower the amount of radiocarbon (F14Catm), the older the age. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)

What is obvious is that at least some old carbon was common across most of the rivers we observed, regardless of size and location.

We provide evidence that there is a geological control on river emissions. And the variability in the ecosystem also indicates important controlling factors, such as soil characteristics, vegetation type and climate – especially rainfall patterns and temperature which are known to impact the rate of carbon release from soils and rock weathering.

Are old carbon stores stable?

Long-term carbon storage in soils and rocks is an important process regulating global climate.

For example, the UK’s peatlands are important for regulating climate because they can store carbon for thousands of years. That is why restoring peatlands is such a great climate solution.

Rivers emit more than 7bn tonnes of CO2 to the atmosphere each year – that’s equivalent to about 10-20% of the global emissions from fossil fuel burning annually.

If 60% of river carbon emissions are coming from old carbon stores, then this constitutes a significant leak of carbon from old stores we thought were safely locked away.

Another major implication of our study is that these old carbon stores can be mobilised and routed directly to the atmosphere by rivers, which would exacerbate climate change if these stores are further destabilised.

As can be seen in the figure below, we found that river carbon emissions appeared to be getting older since measurements first began in the 1990s (lower F14Catm means older radiocarbon ages).

We found that river carbon emissions appeared to be getting older since measurements first began in the 1990s.

While there are several caveats to interpreting this trend, it is a warning sign that human activities, especially climate change, could intensify the release of carbon to the atmosphere via rivers.

Given the strong link between soil carbon and river emissions, if this trend is a sign of human activity disturbing the global carbon cycle, it is likely due to landscape disturbance mobilising soil carbon.

The age of carbon emissions from rivers appears to be getting older since measurements began in the early 1990s. Icons show dissolved inorganic carbon (grey dots), CO2 (orange squares) and methane (grey crosses). The dashed horizontal line indicates F14Catm = 1.0, for which F14C content is in equilibrium with atmospheric levels in the year of sample collection. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)
The age of carbon emissions from rivers appears to be getting older since measurements began in the early 1990s. Icons show dissolved inorganic carbon (grey dots), CO2 (orange squares) and methane (grey crosses). The dashed horizontal line indicates F14Catm = 1.0, for which F14C content is in equilibrium with atmospheric levels in the year of sample collection. Credit: Dean et al. (2025)

Using rivers to monitor global soil carbon storage

Rivers collect waters from across the landscapes they flow through and therefore provide a tool to track processes happening out of sight.

A drop of water landing in a landscape travels through soils and rock before reaching the river, and its chemistry, including its radiocarbon age, reflects the processes occurring within the landscape.

Monitoring the age of carbon in rivers can therefore tell you a lot about whether their landscapes are storing or releasing carbon.

This has been shown to help identify carbon loss in degraded tropical peatlands, thawing Arctic permafrost and due to deforestation.

River radiocarbon is sensitive to environmental change and could therefore be a powerful monitoring tool for detecting the onset of climate tipping points or the success of landscape restoration projects, for example.

While we present data spread out across the world, there are quite a few gaps for important regions, notably where glacier change is happening and others where droughts and flood frequencies are changing.

These include areas with low amounts of data in Greenland, the African continent, the Arctic and Boreal zones, the Middle East, eastern Europe, western Russia, Central Asia, Australasia and South America outside of the Amazon.

All these regions have the potential to store carbon in the long-term and we do not yet know if these carbon stores are stable or not under present and future climate change.

River radiocarbon offers a powerful method to keep tabs on the health of global ecosystems both now and into the future.

The post Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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A National Quest for Uranium Comes to Remote Western Alaska, Raising Fears in a Nearby Village

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Demand for low-carbon nuclear energy could boost uranium prospects on Alaska’s Seward Peninsula. But residents of the small village of Elim fear a mine would pollute the river they depend on.

This story was published in partnership with Northern Journal and is the second in a two-story series.

A National Quest for Uranium Comes to Remote Western Alaska, Raising Fears in a Nearby Village

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