The future of fossil fuels – and whether to agree to phase them “down” or “out” – is shaping up to be a key battle at the COP28 climate talks in Dubai.
While some parties and groups would like to see a deal on phasing out all fossil fuels, others only want to restrict “unabated” coal, oil and gas. Some are opposed to both options.
Meanwhile, alternative formulations are emerging, tying renewable expansion to fossil fuel “substitution”, adding additional verbs such as “accelerating”, adverbs such as “rapidly” or adding timescales such as “this decade”.
The fight over using the phrase “unabated” fossil fuels, implicitly accompanied by its opposite – “abated” – raises the question of exactly what these terms mean.
“Unabated” refers to the burning of fossil fuels where resulting carbon dioxide (CO2) or other greenhouse gas emissions are released directly into the atmosphere, adding to global warming.
Conversely, “abated” refers to the burning of coal, oil and gas combined with the capture and permanent storage of some proportion of the resulting greenhouse gases. This proportion is a key detail as there is no agreed definition of what “abated” means.
In addition to the fight over “unabated”, evidence from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and others can be used to inform fossil-fuel discussions at COP28. Key conclusions from their work include:
- The ongoing use of fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS) features in almost all 1.5C pathways, but only to a very limited extent.
- Today, CCS barely exists and relying on a major scale-up is considered “risky”. If CCS is limited to plausible levels, then fossil fuel use would have to fall even faster.
- While there is disagreement over the difference between “phase down” and “phase out”, the production and use of fossil fuels drops dramatically in all 1.5C pathways.
This Q&A explains the term “unabated fossil fuels”, the science behind fossil-fuel phaseout and the positions of different countries on what should be agreed in relation to fossil fuels at COP28.
- What are ‘abated’ and ‘unabated’ fossil fuels?
- Do fossil fuels have to be phased out to stay below 1.5C?
- What has been agreed on fossil fuel reduction so far?
- Who wants what on fossil fuels at COP28?
What are ‘abated’ and ‘unabated’ fossil fuels?
The Glasgow climate pact, agreed at the COP26 climate talks in 2021, was the first COP decision to mention any fossil fuel – specifically coal – and this reference was tied to the word “unabated”.
However, this word was not defined and there remains a level of uncertainty around what the associated term “abated” actually means in practice. For example, could a coal-fired power plant capture 10% of the CO2 it produces and still argue its emissions were abated?
Disagreement over fossil fuels and “unabated” sprung up again at the COP27 climate talks in 2022 and has continued ever since. (See: What has been agreed on fossil fuel reduction so far?)
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Dr Alaa Al Khourdajie, a research fellow at Imperial College London, says these disagreements highlighted the need to be “transparent and crystal clear about what abated fossil fuels means”. Al Khourdajie says:
“In the absence of such a clear set of criteria, any capture rate – for example, 50-60% – of carbon emissions could be casually considered abated. This cannot be left ambiguous. Looking at the findings of the technical assessment of the first ‘global stocktake’ discussions, the term unabated is used very heavily in the findings.
“But there is a lack of clarity about what counts as unabated and what counts as abated, largely due to the absence of such agreed definitions in the underlying literature at the time of those negotiations.”
The word “unabated” appeared, once again, in the IPCC’s sixth assessment Working Group III report on how to tackle climate change. The report concluded:
“In all scenarios [limiting warming in 2100 to below 1.5C], fossil fuel use is greatly reduced and unabated coal use is completely phased out by 2050.”
(IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea repeated these lines to COP28 delegates, at a 4 December event.)
Moreover, for the first time, the 2022 IPCC report also included a definition of unabated and abated fossil fuels. This definition was added, by Al Khourdajie and other IPCC authors, as a footnote to the summary for policymakers (SPM), after the word “unabated” was added to the summary.
Dr Chris Bataille, adjunct research fellow at the Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy and one of the other IPCC authors involved in the footnote tells Carbon Brief:
“At the SPM approval session, a group of parties was very insistent on adding the word ‘unabated’ in front of any language on fossil fuels – and that immediately created a need for a definition. A bunch of us [IPCC authors] were concerned to make sure it was defined and so we had to jump in at the last minute to pull something together.”
The IPCC footnote explains that, in order to count as “abated”, at least 90% of fossil-fuel emissions from power plants should be captured and 50-80% of methane from energy supply. It says:
“In this context, ‘unabated fossil fuels’ refers to fossil fuels produced and used without interventions that substantially reduce the amount of GHG emitted throughout the life cycle; for example, capturing 90% or more CO2 from power plants, or 50-80% of fugitive methane emissions from energy supply.”
However, this definition, as drafted, was still somewhat unclear, Bataille tells Carbon Brief. He says the final comma combined with the word “or” implied that this was an alternative to the 90% capture at power plants, whereas the intention had been for both requirements to apply.
In order to clear up this confusion, Al Khourdajie and Bataille published a paper setting out their requirements, in detail, for fossil fuel use to be considered “abated”.
Al Khourdajie tells Carbon Brief:
“We clearly say that the term should be reserved for where the ongoing carbon emissions from using fossil fuels are reduced 90-95% or more; upstream fugitive methane emissions are less than 0.5%, and approaching 0.2%, of equivalent natural gas production; and captured emissions are stored permanently.”
Al Khourdajie notes that the vague definition of “abated” fossil fuel gives a “false, if not dangerous, sense of security” that could lead to inadequate policy measures and investment decisions.
Yet there are some “legitimate uses” of the term, Katrine Petersen, senior policy advisor in thinktank E3G’s fossil fuel transition team, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“It’s important to note that there are legitimate uses of ‘abatement’ requirements as a route to emissions reductions, too. The use of the term ‘unabated’ in respect to CO2 reduction historically stems from how some governments (such as the UK and Canada) used forms of emissions performance standards to rule out the construction of new coal power plants without CCS, and then to require existing coal power plants to either retrofit CCS to reduce emissions, or instead retire, by certain dates – a regulatory approach that, ultimately, led to no new coal plants being built and clear phase-out dates set, given the high costs and difficulty of CCS.
“This has been an effective use of abatement standards by policymakers and regulators to force action from the coal power industry. But it required clear definitions and regulation rather than just vague language.”
Even so, there are clear risks to the inclusion of the term “unabated”, says Dr Natalie Jones, policy adviser at thinktank the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).
She tells Carbon Brief that these risks are particularly acute in the setting of the UN climate talks:
“If the word ‘unabated’ is in the final COP28 text, it will be a distraction from the fossil fuel cuts needed this decade to stay below 1.5C. It muddies the water and could mean parties spend the next five years debating definitions.”
Do fossil fuels have to be phased out to stay below 1.5C?
Fossil fuels are the biggest contributors to current global warming, making up the lion’s share of the cumulative historical emissions that have warmed the Earth by more than 1.2C.
Moreover, existing fossil-fuel infrastructure, if used in line with historical averages, would be sufficient to breach the carbon budget for 1.5C, according to the IPCC. It says:
“Projected cumulative future CO2 emissions over the lifetime of existing and currently planned fossil-fuel infrastructure without additional abatement exceed the total cumulative net CO2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to 1.5C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot.”
Furthermore, continuing to build new fossil-fuel infrastructure would “lock-in” further emissions, the IPCC says with high confidence.
Similarly, the IEA has said there is no space for the development of new, unabated coal-fired power stations or “long-lead time” oil and gas developments, if warming is to stay below 1.5C.
These findings are backed by a “large consensus”, across all published studies, that developing new oil and gas reserves is “incompatible” with staying below 1.5C.
At the aggregate level, the IEA’s 1.5C pathway sees dramatic reductions in unabated fossil fuel use, with only a very small role for abated fossil fuels. This is illustrated in the figure below, which shows that unabated fossil fuel use falls 88% by 2050 and abated fossil fuels remain minimal.
This is just one pathway to staying below 1.5C. The IPCC looks at a wider range of pathways and confirms that reaching net-zero CO2 emissions to stop global warming would entail “substantial” cuts in fossil fuel use, with only “minimal” unabated use remaining and some CCS. It says:
“Net-zero CO2 energy systems entail: a substantial reduction in overall fossil fuel use, minimal use of unabated fossil fuels, and use of CCS in the remaining fossil fuel system.”
The IPCC looked at a range of different ways to keep warming below 1.5C and used “illustrative mitigation pathways” (IMPs) to show how these approaches are similar – and how they differ.
The second row in the figure below shows four IMPs that limit warming in 2100 to 1.5C, from left to right IMP-Neg, IMP-Ren, IMP-LD and IMP-SP. These refer to pathways relying heavily on negative emissions (IMP-Neg), renewable energy (IMP-Ren), low energy demand (IMP-LD) or “shifting development pathways” (IMP-SP).
Note that only the final three IMPs stay below 1.5C with no- or limited “overshoot”, whereas IMP-Neg sees 1.5C temporarily breached.
Fossil fuel use (red) does not reach zero by 2050 in any of these pathways. As such, it is technically correct to say that fossil fuels can still be used in 2050, in pathways respecting 1.5C.
Nevertheless, as with the IEA’s 1.5C pathway, fossil fuel use overall drops very dramatically in all cases. For COP28, the question is how to describe this dramatic reduction in fossil fuel use, which is clearly needed to stay below 1.5C.
There is disagreement over whether a “phase out” refers to a trajectory that reaches zero or whether it simply refers to a very substantial reduction.
Some prefer the term “phase down” for this reason, whereas others feel this implies a weaker reduction than a “phase out”. In addition, “phase down” could mean only a very small cut.
Furthermore, neither of these phrases cover defined periods of time, unless time bounds such as “this decade” or “well before 2050” are explicitly added.
Regardless of the terminology, the amount of fossil fuels still in the system by 2050 is very small, even when including abated fossil fuels as in the figure below. Furthermore, fossil fuel use reaches zero – or close to zero – in the second half of the century in no- or low-overshoot pathways.
Only in the IMP-Neg pathway (leftmost chart in the figure above), where emissions overshoot 1.5C before returning below that level by 2100, is there a larger role for fossil fuels by mid-century.
Here, the ongoing use of fossil fuels is mainly combined with CCS, shown by the grey wedge on the top of the stack in the figure below. (Unabated fossil fuels are shown in dark yellow.)
Notably, in the pathways that stay below 1.5C with no- or minimal overshoot, the use of fossil fuels combined with CCS is almost non-existent. Where CCS is used, it is combined instead with the use of bioenergy (BECCS) or the direct air capture of CO2 from the atmosphere (DACCS).
In addition to noting the minimal role of CCS in 1.5C pathways, it is worth adding that, to date, the technology has failed to scale up to significant levels.
According to the IEA, there are now more than 40 commercial capture facilities in operation globally, with a total annual “capture capacity” of more than 45m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2).
This capacity can be compared with annual global CO2 emissions that are nearly 1,000 times larger, at an estimated 37bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2023. Put another way, CCS facilities currently capture one tenth of one percent of global CO2 emissions.
The IEA says that momentum behind the technology has been growing since the start of 2018, with more than 50 new capture facilities announced since January 2022.
These could be operating by 2030 and capturing around 125MtCO2 per year. However, only around 20 projects under development have taken a final investment decision, the IEA notes.
Even with this growth in momentum, the pipeline of current projects amounts to only around a third of the level needed under the IEA’s 1.5C pathway in 2030.
For this reason – as well as conflicts with other sustainable development priorities – relying on the significant scaling up of CCS technology would be a “risky” way to respect the 1.5C limit.
(In addition, a new study from the University of Oxford released during COP28, finds that a high-CCS pathway to 1.5C would come with a cumulative $30tn in additional costs by 2050, compared with a low-CCS alternative that relies on faster reductions in fossil fuel use.)
Looking at each of the fossil fuels in turn, in pathways assessed by the IPCC as staying below 1.5C with no- or low-overshoot, there are significant declines in coal use across the board.
In the 1.5C pathway in the middle of the range considered by the IPCC (the median pathway), coal, oil and gas decline by 95%, 60% and 45% by 2050, respectively, compared with 2019 levels.
These median figures hide a wider range for oil and gas. On the other hand, the range gets significantly smaller – and steeper – if pathways are constrained to maximum plausible levels of CCS. In this case, oil and gas see declines of 70% and 84% by 2050, respectively.
Moreover, some countries argue the focus on coal is inequitable, given it tends to be used more heavily in developing countries.
If the pace of coal reductions is eased in these places, then the use of oil and gas – which are more significant in developed countries – would need to fall more steeply.
What has been agreed on fossil fuel reduction so far?
As already noted, COP26 saw the first COP decision that explicitly called out the need to tackle fossil fuels, with agreement on a “phase down of unabated coal”.
The text in the final agreement at COP26 calls upon parties to:
“Accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition.”
This language was hard-won, with earlier text at the summit having called for efforts to “accelerate the phasing out of coal”. This short wording was ultimately tempered with additional language and, in the final moments of the summit, the phrase “phase out” was changed to “phase down”.
At COP27, parties took up the fight over fossil-fuel language once again, with India calling for agreement to phase down all fossil fuels, with a group of 80 countries calling for a phase out.
Catherine Abreu, executive director of NGO Destination Zero, told Carbon Brief at the time:
“Parties asked for it pretty consistently. More and more parties [joined the call] with every consultation. Their ask for all fossil fuels to be included in the text was ignored every time…The presidency chose not to put those phrases into the drafts.”
Despite countries’ efforts, the Egyptian presidency refused to include fossil-fuel language in any of the draft negotiating texts throughout the two-week summit, leaving many parties disappointed.
Instead, the meeting simply restated the language that had been agreed in Glasgow at COP26 – with even this reiteration having been in doubt at times.
The conversation over cutting fossil fuel use has continued throughout 2023.
In April, the G7 group of major economies held its meeting on climate, energy and environment in Sapporo, Japan. It agreed text using slightly stronger language than that of previous COPs.
For example, the group emphasised their commitment to “accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels so as to achieve net-zero in energy systems by 2050 at the latest”.
The G7 leader’s communiqué reaffirmed a commitment from the previous year’s meeting to achieve a “fully or predominantly decarbonised power sector by 2035”.
This includes taking “concrete and timely steps” towards the goal to “phase-out domestic unabated coal power generation”. It also recognised the need to end the construction of new unabated coal-fired power plants, while working with other nations to support them to do the same.
The G7 agreement added that the member nations ended new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021, as well as public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector in 2022, except in limited circumstances.
In September, the larger G20 bloc agreed to back global efforts to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030, but failed to find agreed language on fossil fuels.
Following tense negotiations, the group of the world’s largest economies finally secured an agreement at a meeting held in New Delhi, India. The main negotiator Amitabh Kant dubbed the agreement the “most ambitious document on climate action” at a press conference.
Yet the language with regards to fossil fuels remained in line with what was agreed at COP26 in Glasgow and COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh.
Reiterating the COP wording, the final G20 agreement called for a transition towards low-emission energy systems, including “accelerating efforts towards phasedown of unabated coal power”.
Moreover, neither the G7 nor the G20 included a definition of “unabated” and “abated” fossil fuels.
Finally, in mid-November, the US and China – sometimes referred to as the G2 – released their joint “Sunnylands statement” on climate change, which also backed a tripling of renewable energy, but contained only oblique references to cutting the use of fossil fuels.
Rather than talking of phasing fossil fuels down or out, the English-language version says the two countries will ramp up renewables “so as to…substitut[e]” for fossil fuels. It says they:
“[I]ntend to sufficiently accelerate renewable energy deployment in their respective economies through 2030 from 2020 levels so as to accelerate the substitution for coal, oil and gas generation [in the power sector], and thereby anticipate post-peaking meaningful absolute power sector emissions reduction, in this critical decade of the 2020s.”
The statement also commits the pair to at least five “large-scale” CCS cooperation projects for industry and energy, in each country by 2030.
BBC News quoted Bernice Lee, distinguished fellow at Chatham House, as saying that it had likely “proven to be too difficult to find the form of language that works for both” on fossil fuels.
Who wants what on fossil fuels at COP28?
In the run-up to COP28, key divisions remained on the approach to phasing out or down unabated or abated fossil fuels.
The High Ambition Coalition (HAC) is one of the only blocs to actively support the phasing out of all fossil fuels, both abated and unabated. In a September statement the bloc said:
“Abatement technologies have a role to play in reducing emissions, but that role in the decarbonisation of energy systems is minimal. We cannot use it to green-light fossil fuel expansion.”
It then made a direct call to phase-out fossil fuel production and use within its submission to the global stocktake at the end of October. This submission said:
“Fossil fuels are at the root of this crisis. We must work together to develop a comprehensive global clean energy access approach to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels.”
With the exception of Colombia, none of the HAC members are fossil-fuel producers of note.
After “fractious” internal negotiations over its position, the EU called for a phase-out of “unabated” fossil fuels – and an energy system “predominantly free of fossil fuels well ahead of 2050”.
Crucially, the bloc’s agreed position also “underlines” limitations on the use of CCS. It says that “emission abatement technologies which do not significantly harm the environment, exist at limited scale and are to be used to reduce emissions mainly from hard to abate sectors”.
Furthermore, it adds that “removal technologies [such as BECCS and DACCS] are to contribute to global negative emissions…[and] should not be used to delay climate action in sectors where feasible, effective and cost-efficient mitigation alternatives are available”.
Speaking in July, then-EU climate chief Frans Timmermans listed the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels as a key goal for the bloc, together with tripling renewables rollout by 2030 and doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvements.
Timmermans also highlighted the limitation on CCS, saying:
“It is important to have a precise understanding of the role of ‘abated fossils’ in a net-zero economy. These need to be residual and only in hard-to-abate sectors. And the sector carries the burden of proof in demonstrating this is achievable and proposing credible investment strategies in carbon-abating technologies”.
The stances of other key countries and groups can be seen on Carbon Brief’s Who Wants What grid.
The US is also supporting the phase-out of “unabated” fossil fuels. A statement released by the White House earlier this year argued that the US needs to “accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels”.
US climate envoy John Kerry backed the use of “abated” fossil fuels, but challenged the oil industry to prove the efficacy of CCS in an interview with the Associated Press earlier this year. He said:
“If you’re able to abate the emissions, capture it. But we don’t have that at-scale yet. And we can’t sit here and just pretend we’re going to automatically have something we don’t have today. Because we might not. It might not work.”
Meanwhile, China’s climate envoy Xie Zhenhua said the phase-out of fossil fuels is “not realistic”, during a speech in Beijing in September.
According to a translation from the Center for China and Globalization, Xie said “completely eliminating fossil energy is not realistic”.
Going into COP28, sources told Reuters that India would continue to resist those pushing for a deadline on the phasedown of fossil fuels. Instead, it would favour shifting focus to reducing overall carbon emissions through “abatement and mitigation technologies”, the newswire said.
COP28 host nation the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – a major and expanding fossil fuel producer – has shifted its stance on fossil fuels as 2023 has progressed.
In May, a speech given by COP28 president Sultan Al Jaber said: “We must be laser-focused on phasing out fossil fuel emissions, while phasing up viable, affordable zero-carbon alternatives.”
This was widely interpreted as support for CCS and, with its focus on “fossil fuel emissions”, a deflection from phasing out fossil fuels themselves – a sentiment that drew widespread criticism.
Subsequently, Al Jaber started describing the “phasedown” of fossil fuels as “inevitable” and “essential”, following an interview with the Guardian.
A pre-summit note issued by the UAE in October calls for a world “working towards an energy system free of unabated fossil fuels by mid-century, with coal being a priority”.
The early draft texts at COP28 shows countries are considering calling for an “orderly and just” phase out of fossil fuels, but whether “unabated” will be included still remains unclear.
As of 5 December, there are three options officially on the table. These are
- “An orderly and just phase out of fossil fuels”;
- “Accelerating efforts towards phasing out unabated fossil fuels and to rapidly reducing their use so as to achieve net-zero CO2 in energy systems by or around mid-century”;
- The third option would be not to mention a fossil fuel phase out (or down) at all.
For many countries, COP28 will not be seen as a success if it fails to agree to language on phasing out all fossil fuels. Whether this is possible – and whether such language will end up being qualified with “unabated” – or some other form of words – remains to be seen.
Strong definitions of abatement could send an important signal at COP28, says Petersen, but could also have real-world implications in driving emissions reductions.
International definitions of abatement could be translated into regulatory standards at national level, she adds, helping countries to reach Paris-aligned emissions reduction levels.
Al Khourdajie says:
“Both [abated and unabated] are certainly used more prominently in international negotiations than ever before. The hope is for the outcomes of the upcoming COP28 to bring clarity to both terms.”
However, he adds that international negotiations should be discussing deeper decarbonisation in developed countries and efforts to support climate action in developing nations, including financial and technological transfer as well as funds for loss and damage. He adds:
“This is the space that discussions in international negotiations should occupy, rather than nuances around abated and unabated fossil fuels, important as they are.”
The post Q&A: Why defining the ‘phaseout’ of ‘unabated’ fossil fuels is so important at COP28 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: Why defining the ‘phaseout’ of ‘unabated’ fossil fuels is so important at COP28
Climate Change
The UN climate process was built for negotiation – now it must support implementation
By Paul Watkinson, Stefan Ruchti-Crowley, Anju Sharma, Ovais Sarmad and Benito Müller.
In the corridors of the World Conference Centre in Bonn, where the June Climate Meetings (SB64) will conclude on Thursday, the need for change is palpable.
Delegates are grappling once again with overcrowded agendas, growing demands on limited negotiating time, external geopolitical pressures that reverberate internally to test the limits of a consensus-based process, and concerns over its future financial sustainability.
Bonn Bulletin: Finance row threatens to scupper work on adaptation goal
There is growing frustration with a process that consumes vast amounts of time to produce outcomes that are often too incremental to match the accelerating reality of the climate crisis.
The climate regime has delivered. But it is in danger of not delivering enough.
More effective multilateralism
There is no denying the successes of the UN climate process. Over three decades, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement established a universal framework for climate action, created transparency and accountability mechanisms, and sent powerful signals to governments, businesses and investors.
Thanks in large part to this framework, the world is no longer on a trajectory of more than 4°C of warming, clean technology costs have fallen dramatically, and participation in the global climate effort remains nearly universal.
Yet, global temperatures continue to break records. Climate impacts are intensifying across every region. The world remains far off track to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. As warming approaches – and may exceed – 1.5°C, every additional fraction of a degree brings greater losses of lives, livelihoods and ecosystems, with the greatest burdens falling on the most vulnerable countries and communities.
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We remain convinced that the answer to the climate crisis is not less multilateralism, but more effective multilateralism.
The hard truth is that the UNFCCC remains largely organised around the logic of treaty-making, while the central challenge of climate action has shifted to implementation. A process designed to negotiate agreements and deliver decision text as the outcome is now required to support implementation on the ground—and it is struggling.
There is a structural mismatch between what the climate process was designed to do, and what it needs to do now.
Consultations on reforms
Discussions on the urgency of reform are widespread and no longer confined to the margins. Formally, the Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings (AIM) process is exploring ways of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the process.
The UNFCCC Executive Secretary has also convened a High-Level Informal Consultative Roundtable for strategic reflection on how to strengthen the complementarity between the intergovernmental process and action in the real economy.
Defending multilateralism today requires adapting it.
The good news is that meaningful reform does not require reopening treaties, renegotiating the Paris Agreement, or indeed even resolving long-standing differences on the Rules of Procedure to change the consensus rule. Stefan Ruchti-Crowley and Paul Watkinson’s recent paper for ecbi (European Capacity Building Initiative), Quo Vadis COP? Reforming UNFCCC Sessions to Improve Negotiations and Support Implementation, outlines a practical toolbox of four reforms that can be pursued within the existing institutional framework.
First, the process must improve its agendas.
The formal process is burdened by crowded agendas and overlapping workstreams. Consolidating agenda items under broader thematic pillars (such as mitigation, adaptation, finance and transparency); developing good practices for agenda adoption; removing legacy “ghost” items; and concluding outstanding business on the Kyoto Protocol will create more space for substantive discussions and implementation.
Second, the process must organise its work more strategically.
The climate process currently attempts to address nearly every issue at every session. A more strategic approach would use thematic multi-year programmes of work; better align review cycles and timelines; improve coherence across the many bodies and processes that have accumulated over time, often to the extent that even insiders have lost oversight; and also make better use of inter-sessional and pre-sessional meetings.
Third, the process must focus more deliberately on implementation.
Critically, not every challenge requires a negotiated outcome. Negotiations should focus on issues that genuinely require collective decision-making. Other discussions should prioritise learning, cooperation and practical problem-solving.
Existing formats such as Talanoa Dialogues, roundtables and other facilitative approaches should be expanded. Likewise, the Enhanced Transparency Framework should become a stronger mechanism for mutual learning and accountability rather than a largely procedural reporting and “box-ticking” exercise.
Fourth, the process must make structural changes and broaden participation.
National delegations should include a broader range of practitioners and policymakers, including a Head of Implementation. The process should strengthen engagement with sectoral ministers, investors, technology providers, scientists, local authorities and non-Party stakeholders.
Stronger links are necessary between science policy and implementation, and with international institutions that shape the enabling conditions for climate action, particularly finance and development. Platforms to address systemic barriers along with AI-enabled learning by doing will equally support strengthened action.
Delivering commitments with limited resources
The case for reform is becoming even stronger as financial pressures intensify.
Improving efficiency is not simply desirable; it has become unavoidable. The UNFCCC faces growing budgetary constraints arising from delayed contributions, uncertainty surrounding major donors, and broader reductions across the UN system.
A process that is better organised, more implementation-focused and less encumbered by procedural overload will be far better equipped to navigate a future of tighter resources.
Leadership will be crucial.
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COP presidencies have an important role to play, as do the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies. The UNFCCC Executive Secretary and Secretariat must take a bold approach to work in coordination with the COP Bureau to implement urgent changes.
Careful diplomacy will, of course, be essential. Parties must be reassured that reform is intended to strengthen the effectiveness of the regime, not weaken its governance. The objective is not to replace mandates, but to ensure that mandates can be fulfilled more effectively. It is to ensure that negotiation is used where negotiation is needed, while other forms of cooperation are used where they can deliver better results.
The UNFCCC remains the cornerstone of international climate cooperation. No other forum combines its legitimacy, universality and legal authority. But the multilateral climate process must evolve from a system primarily designed to negotiate commitments into one that is equally capable of supporting their delivery.
The post The UN climate process was built for negotiation – now it must support implementation appeared first on Climate Home News.
The UN climate process was built for negotiation – now it must support implementation
On quiet streets across the Californian city of Monterey Park, green-and-white “YES on Measure NDC” signs stood on front-yard lawns as volunteers walked door-to-door, drumming up support among residents to vote in favor of a ban on new data centers in their area.
They clarified the ballot wording in English, Spanish and Chinese, while distributing multilingual flyers warning about the rise in electricity demand, industrial infrastructure and environmental impacts associated with AI-related data center development.
Less than a month later, on June 2, Monterey Park voters overwhelmingly approved the ban in the San Gabriel Valley east of Los Angeles, with 86.4% voting in favor and 13.6% opposed, according to county election results.
Social opposition to data centers is on the rise, especially in the US, as artificial intelligence (AI) and the technology hubs needed to support it stoke competition for electricity, water and land in communities where they are based. Industry advocates say data centers bring economic benefits and do not always result in higher power prices for households.
The result in Monterey Park made it the first city in the United States to enact a citywide prohibition on data centers through a voter-approved ballot measure.
“This week our city has been celebrating the landslide results from Measure NDC,” Monterey Park Mayor Elizabeth Yang said in a phone interview.
On social media, Yang described the city’s response as the result of sustained resident organizing and civic engagement. “We want to fulfill our duty of listening to residents,” Yang told Climate Home News.
A community campaign takes shape
The vote came after months of public testimony, neighborhood outreach and organizing surrounding a proposed data center project on Saturn Street in Monterey Park. Here, developers planned to replace an existing commercial office building with a nearly 50-megawatt data center intended to serve growing demand for AI computing.
Supporters of Measure NDC (Measure No Data Centers) argued that keeping this, and other such centers, out of their community would help protect air quality, drinking water resources, public health and local infrastructure.
According to CoStar News, a real estate information platform, the backers of the Saturn Street project – Digico Infrastructure REIT and HMC Capital’s StratCap – had already withdrawn their planning application on April 3 amid growing local opposition and regulatory uncertainty, including the city’s decision to place a data center ban before voters.
Subsequently, on April 20, the Monterey Park City Council adopted an ordinance prohibiting all data centers within the city limits.
Explainer: Will AI data centres make or break the energy transition?
Company representatives later said they would explore future “productive land uses … supported by the broader community”. Potential alternatives discussed publicly have included housing, although no formal proposal has been submitted.
Reuters reported in May that DigiCo Infrastructure, an Australian company, was exploring “monetisation options” for its two Los Angeles sites after rowing back on the Monterey Park proposal. DigiCo is also selling its Chicago data center for $750 million to pay down debt and fund the development of another site in Sydney.
DigiCo and HMC Capital did not respond to requests for comment for this article.
Potential local benefits of data centers
Industry lobby groups argue that data centers can provide economic benefits to host communities. According to the US-based Data Center Coalition, which represents major operators and developers, data centers generate tax revenue, support construction and technical jobs, and provide infrastructure needed for cloud computing, scientific research and AI development.
The industry has also challenged claims that data centers necessarily raise electricity costs for households. A recent report by energy consulting firm Energy + Environmental Economics (E3), commissioned by the coalition, found no historical evidence that data centers had driven up residential electricity rates under existing utility pricing structures. It argued that factors including inflation, grid modernization costs, natural gas price volatility and investments in wildfire resilience have played a bigger role in rising electricity bills.
According to E3, large users can, under certain regulatory frameworks, reduce prices for other customers by contributing more revenue to utilities than they cost to serve. In a previous analysis of Amazon data centers, the consultancy found that payments from the facilities exceeded the incremental costs incurred by utilities. The report also noted that regulators across the US have increasingly adopted specialized pricing structures as data center demand has expanded.
Hefty carbon, water and land footprints
The concerns raised in Monterey Park mirror debates over the environmental and infrastructure demands of AI being heard in many countries around the world, from Europe to North America and Asia.
This month, a UN report estimated that the data centers required for AI globally could consume 945 terawatt-hours of electricity annually by 2030 – roughly twice France’s 2025 power consumption.
This, it calculated, would have a carbon footprint needing some 6.7 billion trees grown over 10 years to offset, a water footprint equal to the annual domestic needs of 1.3 billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa, and a land footprint of more than 14,500 square kilometers, roughly twice the Jakarta metropolitan area.
In a 2026 report, Key Questions on Energy and AI, the International Energy Agency (IEA) found that electricity consumption from AI-focused data centers grew by approximately 50% in 2025 alone.
It warned that “social acceptability is also a growing issue, as communities push back against data center projects”, citing concerns about environmental sustainability, electricity affordability, infrastructure strain and democratic participation in land-use decisions.
Global data center electricity consumption by sensitivity case, 2020-2035
AI-focused facilities consume substantially more electricity than traditional data centers and often require extensive supporting infrastructure, including cooling systems, industrial electrical equipment, backup generators running on diesel and large-scale energy storage systems.
The IEA also noted that operators are increasingly exploring onsite natural gas generation and battery infrastructure to maintain electrical reliability as AI workloads intensify.
Local concern over industrial infrastructure
Samuel Brown Vazquez, an East San Gabriel Valley community organizer, said doubts about the proposed data center in Monterey Park were informed by broader debates over industrial development in the area.
Brown cited community opposition to proposals that could bring battery energy storage facilities – and potentially data centers – to the former Puente Hills Mall site in the City of Industry, where residents have raised concerns about pollution, fire risks, and the impacts of new industrial infrastructure on nearby residential neighborhoods and schools.
Many viewed the campaign as part of a larger conversation about how communities should respond to the rapid expansion of AI-related infrastructure across Southern California.
Power-hungry AI data centres seen driving demand for fossil fuels
According to nonprofit Data Center Watch, around $64 billion-worth of data center projects nationwide were delayed or blocked between May 2024 and March 2025 amid increasing local opposition.
Mayor Yang wants Monterey Park’s experience to encourage other communities to take a more active role in decisions about AI-related infrastructure. “We’re hoping other cities can follow similarly in banning data centers with proposed ballot measures,” she said, adding that whether such efforts succeed elsewhere will depend in part on how local officials respond to residents’ concerns.
The new UN report this month called on governments and companies to address AI’s environmental impacts proactively to ensure that the technology develops sustainably and its benefits are shared fairly.
Kaveh Madani, director of the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, who led the investigation team for the report, said AI “is a technological transformation that is improving the lives of billions of people around the world”. But, he added, it must be used “responsibly”.
“We have a narrow window to ensure that the backbone of the technological revolution of our era develops within planetary limits, and that the communities who provide the critical minerals for advancing AI and the ones that host its infrastructure and e-waste are also among those who benefit from it,” he said.
This story was developed, reported and produced under the Covering Climate Now (CCNow) Climate Journalism Student Mentorship, which connects USC student journalists with professional newsrooms in CCNow’s global network. Participants receive training, editorial mentorship, and the opportunity to report and publish original climate stories with partner outlets while being paid professional freelance rates.
The post The vote that stopped a data center: US communities query resource-hungry AI appeared first on Climate Home News.
The vote that stopped a data center: US communities query resource-hungry AI
Wealthy nations in the G7 have agreed to work more closely together to secure the minerals they need for the energy transition, AI and defence, and to diversify supply chains away from China, calling for more cooperation with “like-minded partners”.
But the agreement adopted at this week’s G7 leaders’ summit in France is vague on what co-operation with resource-rich developing countries could look like, with critics warning against creating a consumer club of powerful nations that excludes others from shaping standards and building green supply chains.
“The G7 communiqué reaffirms our suspicion that, for the G7, it is all about resource security, not just energy transition,” Claude Kabemba, executive director of Southern Africa Resource Watch, told Climate Home News.
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In a joint communique, the leaders of some of the world’s largest economies said they would step up coordination within the group and with partner countries to establish mineral processing and industrial capacity, support local value addition, promote innovation, develop standards, improve mineral traceability and share information on stockpiling systems.
They agreed to create a joint crisis-prevention mechanism with the support of the International Energy Agency to monitor mineral supply and demand disruptions, as well as establish harmonised platforms to provide information about the origin of minerals, starting with lithium and nickel.
The statement was endorsed by France, the UK, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the US and the European Union at the end of the three-day summit in Evian, on the French shores of Lake Geneva. Australia, which isn’t a G7 member, also supported the declaration.
Breaking dependency on China
Western governments have been scrambling to secure the minerals they need to produce clean energy technologies such as batteries, electric vehicles and wind turbines, as well as hardware for artificial intelligence and military equipment while breaking their dependence on China.
China controls most supply chains for the strategic minerals they need, dominating the processing of 19 out of 20 critical minerals. The only exception is nickel, where Indonesia leads on supply and processing. Last year, Beijing spooked governments in Europe and the US when it imposed restrictions on rare earths exports, signalling its willingness to use its industrial clout to achieve its geopolitical objectives.
“We are all faced with risks of over-dependence and therefore vulnerability in our value chains,” French President Emmanuel Macron told a press conference, citing the “risks of divisions” among the group on how to respond to China’s control over strategic resources. “We have decided to move forward together,” he said.
Leaders agreed to aggregate demand to support the development of minerals projects and set targets for reducing dependencies on any single country outside the G7 by the end of the year.
A US proposal to regulate mineral prices and a French push to establish a permanent secretariat to track G7 initiatives on minerals failed to reach consensus among the group, according to Reuters.
Who has a seat at the table?
The declaration recognises the need for “mutually beneficial partnerships” and “plurilateral trade agreements” between G7 countries and “like-minded” and “trusted” partners to build diversified supply chains. Other parts of the text refer to “developing countries” and “emerging economies”.
A separate G7 statement on “mutually beneficial international partnerships” mentions the need for international cooperation along the whole of mineral supply chains.
“Who is going to be part of this conversation is unclear,” said Sébastien Treyer, executive director of France think-tank IDDRI, citing the ambiguity of the language and calling for developing countries to be part of the conversation.
Trade agreements that support green industrialisation can be “an entry point” for investment into value-addition projects in developing countries, said Treyer, but “how this is going to be operationalised is the key question”.
Moving beyond a ‘consumer club’
Resource-rich developing countries, particularly in Africa, have called for investment to build their industrial capacity to turn raw materials into high-value components for clean energy technologies such as batteries, capturing more domestic value and creating jobs.
But Kabemba, whose organisation is based in South Africa, said the declaration says “nothing about transferring industrial capacity to previously exploited regions such Africa”.
“Africa needs to react with its own coalition of the willing to put Africa’s interests first, otherwise, Africa risks being locked into a role as a raw material supplier in a new economic order it is not helping to build,” he said.
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Patrick Schröder, a resource governance expert at Chatham House, agreed that the G7 remains overwhelmingly focused on securing minerals supplies and reducing its dependence on China. “The benefits for developing country producers are only marginal in the G7 discussions,” he said.
Brazil, which is rich in rare earths, graphite and copper, was invited to attend the G7 meeting but did not endorse the minerals declaration – highlighting the need for future minerals framework to be more inclusive and responsive to producer-country concerns, said Schröder.
For Luc Tezenas, head of policy and advocacy at the Resource Justice Network, “the answer to rising geopolitical fragmentation cannot be to shrink multilateralism into a smaller club of ‘like-minded’ consumer economies”.
Instead, a non-binding minerals framework put forward by South Africa during its presidency of the G20 last year “shows more promise as a pathway forward because it attempts to link supply resilience with regional value chains and economic justice,” he said. The UK, which is presiding over the G20 next year, has the opportunity to build a more inclusive way forward, he added.
Circularity: another way to capture value
G7 nations also described the circular economy and the substitution of minerals in designing technologies as “key” to meet growing demand and secure sufficient supplies.
This, they said, includes increasing recycling capacity by setting targets, combatting the illegal transfer of used products and components, and promoting the recovery of minerals from secondary sources such as mining waste.
“We also recognise the opportunity for emerging market and developing economies to benefit from capturing added value through the recycling and secondary processing of their mining waste, as well as from circular economy innovations,” they said.
Schröder, of Chatham House, said the challenge now lies in demonstrating that intentions can be turned into creating a circular economy for minerals through investments, business support and a favourable policy environment.
The post Warning against ‘consumer club’ as G7 forms critical minerals alliance appeared first on Climate Home News.
Warning against ‘consumer club’ as G7 forms critical minerals alliance
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