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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Carbon target locked into final five-year plan

FEW CHANGES: The final version of China’s 15th five-year plan, published on 13 March, placed renewable energy “centre stage” in China’s energy supply, reported economic news outlet Jiemian. There were few changes related to energy and climate issues from the draft published at the beginning of the “two sessions” meeting in Beijing earlier this month. The final version was updated to include a reference to China’s new ecological and environmental code (see spotlight below) and a call to “actively promote” use of geothermal energy, found analysis by Carbon Brief. Policymakers also passed a new law on drafting “long-term national development plans”, such as five-year plans, specifying that research on “environmental constraints” must be factored into future documents, said business news outlet Caixin.

CLIMATE ‘BOON’: China’s five-year plans stand in contrast to other countries’ “short-term political-cycle promises”, said an editorial by state-run newspaper China Daily, with the climate targets in the plan providing a “boon to the entire world” and “influenc[ing] whether global emissions targets are achievable”. An editorial in the state-supporting Global Times argued that the plan shows that China is a “stable” geopolitical force, with its “active participation in global climate governance” showing China is “trustworthy”. [See Carbon Brief‘s coverage for further comment.]

NEA COMMENT: National Energy Administration head Wang Hongzhi published an article in political theory newspaper Study Times on the same day as the plan’s final version was released. He stated that the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030) is “not only the decisive phase for achieving the carbon peak target, but also a critical period for building a new energy system”. He added that China must “fully leverage” market-based pricing reforms to “promote the safe, reliable and orderly replacement of fossil fuels” and “safeguard” energy security.

China endorsed nuclear target

TRIPLING NUCLEAR: China signed up to an international pledge to “triple global nuclear energy capacity between 2020 and 2050”, reported Climate Home News. Chinese vice-premier Zhang Guoqing stated that China viewed the pledge as useful both for climate change and energy security, it added. Industry news outlet China Electric Power News quoted China Atomic Energy Authority director Shan Zhongde saying China is open to nuclear cooperation with other countries on “technological innovation, safety governance [and] industrial collaboration”.

MISSED TARGETS: State-run newspaper China Daily said in an editorial responding to the pledge that nuclear power “must be part” of China’s energy transition, as “[solar and wind] alone will not suffice”. However, Bloomberg reported that China has missed several recent domestic nuclear targets, meeting neither its goal for 58 gigawatts (GW) of capacity by 2020 nor its 70GW by 2025 target. [China’s nuclear capacity totalled 62GW at the end of 2025.] It cited Francois Morin, China director for the World Nuclear Association, saying the country would also likely miss the target set in its latest five-year plan to develop 110GW of capacity by 2030.

Middle East turmoil ‘vindicates’ China’s energy approach

STOCKPILE SUPPORT: China has “ordered an immediate ban” on exports of petrol, diesel, aviation fuel and other refined fuel products in March to “pre-empt ‌a potential domestic fuel shortage” caused by the US-Israel war on Iran, according to Reuters. The country had been stockpiling crude oil ahead of the war, Reuters also reported, with data showing the country had a surplus of “1.2m barrels per day” in the first two months of 2026. China may be “close to tapping” this stockpile, said Bloomberg, which is estimated at 1.4bn barrels in total.

CLEAN-ENERGY CUSHION: The war and the subsequent spike in oil prices have highlighted the “national security benefits of clean power” for China, said Politico, with renewable additions “cushioning” it from gas market volatility. Crude stockpiles and renewable energy mean China is “less sensitive to a prolonged closure” of the Strait of Hormuz, reported CNBC. Kate Logan, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s China climate hub, told Inside Climate News that the war “vindicates” China’s clean-energy push, although she added that coal will likely act as a provider of flexibility in the power sector – a role occupied by gas in other countries – and be used as a fuel and chemical feedstock. Meanwhile, the war may make relative “reliance” on Chinese clean-energy technologies “appear less like a strategic liability and more like a manageable trade-off” for other countries, argued Columbia University’s Jason Bordoff and Erica Downs in Foreign Policy.

SWITCHING SNAG: However, oil does play an “irreplaceable” role in China’s economy despite electrification, particularly as a feedstock, the Stimson Center’s China programme director Yun Sun wrote in War on the Rocks. The impact of the war on prices and availability of oil will fall hardest on industries such as “chemicals, ammonia and methanol[, as well as] advanced materials”, wrote Michal Meidan, head of China energy research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, in a briefing. She added that it may also affect light industries that switched to using gas to “comply with air-quality and carbon-intensity targets”. Columnist David Fickling noted in Bloomberg that lessons from Iran are layered on top of a gas heating “crisis” seen in northern China last winter, which exposed the mistake of “treating gas as a cheap option”.

More China news

  • HYDROGEN PILOT: China launched a pilot programme aiming to bring the price of hydrogen “below 25 yuan ($3.6) per kilogram by 2030”, reported Bloomberg.
  • HFC QUOTA: The Ministry for Ecology and Environment issued a notice on “further strengthening” regulations on ozone-depleting substances and hydrofluorocarbons, a group of potent greenhouse gases, said Xinhua.
  • MARINE ECONOMY: President Xi Jinping wrote in the theory journal Qiushi that China must promote an “orderly” construction of offshore wind, exploration for oil and gas and development of “marine energy”.
  • WIND DOMINANCE: Chinese companies now occupy the “top six spots” for global wind turbine manufacturing, according to Jiemian.

Captured

Changes in provincial coal mine methane emissions in China between 2012 and 2021, million tonnes.

Coal production in China is shifting away from regions in the south-west of the country, where mining is associated with high methane emissions, towards lower-gas mines in the north and north-west, new research found. This, one report author wrote in Carbon Brief, is helping to “limit” the rise of China’s coal-mine methane emissions. 

Spotlight 

Experts: What does China’s new environmental code mean for climate change?

At the close of the two sessions (see above) China passed the final version of the ecological and environmental code, only the second code on any topic passed by China’s legislature since the Chinese Communist party (CCP) came to power.

The code includes a chapter on the “green and low-carbon transition”, which the government-supported Sino-German Cooperation on Climate Change said would introduce “foundational principles to guide future legislation and practices in areas such as carbon peaking and neutrality, green transition and climate adaptation”.

Carbon Brief has asked leading experts what impact the code will have on China’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Their comments have been edited for length and clarity.

Dimitri de Boer, director for China, Client Earth, and Boya Jiang, nature and climate lawyer for China, Client Earth

Think of the code as a guarantee for China’s long-term decarbonisation.

As only the second statutory code adopted in China, it provides a high-level legal foundation for the country’s climate governance as it strives towards carbon neutrality by 2060. It requires control over both the total volume and the intensity of carbon emissions, plus establishes a legal basis for key instruments, such as the national carbon market. It also mandates the government to actively participate and to play a leading role in global climate governance.

The code marks a shift from policy-led climate action to a more systematic, law-based approach, which is supported by a strong enforcement infrastructure of specialised environmental courts and public interest prosecutors. It sends a clear signal that environmental governance will remain a national priority, providing greater predictability for China’s low-carbon transition. Next steps may include revising energy-related laws, drafting further implementing regulations, and developing a dedicated climate change law.

Tianbao Qin, director, Wuhan University Research Institute of Environmental Law

China’s new ecological and environmental code marks a pivotal step in institutionalising its climate commitments. By formally enshrining the “dual-carbon” goals – peaking emissions by 2030 and achieving neutrality by 2060 – into statutory law, the code moves beyond short-term policy experiments to create a stable, long-term legal foundation.

For international observers, the most significant aspect is the establishment of legally-binding mechanisms. The codification of carbon-intensity controls, total emission caps, and a national carbon trading system provides the regulatory certainty that businesses and investors require. This legal framework ensures that emissions reductions are not just aspirational, but are backed by enforceable compliance mechanisms.

Furthermore, by integrating climate goals into broader environmental governance, China is aligning its domestic legal system with global norms, demonstrating that economic modernisation and ecological responsibility can advance in tandem under a rules-based approach.

Gu Gong, associate professor with tenure, Peking University

The ecological and environmental code has established a systematic legal framework for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The code for the first time [provides a legal basis for] the “dual-carbon” goals, clarifies the control system for the total amount and intensity of carbon emissions, and improves the rules for carbon footprint management, the national carbon-emission trading market and carbon-emission statistics and accounting.

At the same time, separate carbon-reduction pathways – such as the green and low-carbon transformation of energy, energy conservation and carbon reduction in key industries, and clean production – have been coordinated, and the carbon-reduction responsibilities of multiple entities [such as local governments and enterprises] have been clearly defined.

Overall, the code promotes the normalisation and standardisation of greenhouse gas governance, provides a clear legal basis for the “dual carbon” goals, and makes greenhouse gas reduction work more regulated and rule-based.

Watch, read, listen

‘OPENCLAW AI’: BJX News analysed how much power is being used by the AI agent tool OpenClaw, which it says the “entire internet” in China has been using, in a trend referred to as “raising lobsters”.

‘INTENSE UPHEAVAL’: The Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed whether China’s solar overcapacity would “erode China’s leadership in solar”, or further entrench it.

STORM IN A TEAPOT: Bloomberg’s Odd Lots programme spoke with Columbia University’s Erica Downs about how tensions in the Middle East are affecting China’s “teapot” oil refiners.

FOLLOW THE MONEY: A new report by Climate Energy Finance tracked $120bn in Chinese investment in critical minerals needed for the energy transition since 2023.


55-60%

The share of total vehicle sales that new-energy vehicles (NEVs) will hold in 2026, according to estimates by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. The research institute also noted that plug-in hybrid electric vehicles lost share to battery electric vehicles in 2025.


New science 

  • Implementing China’s net-zero climate policies by 2050 “reduces global CO2 emissions to 13bn tonnes (Gt), compared with 23Gt without such policies” and could “partially offset insufficient ambition elsewhere” | Nature Communications
  • China has more than 3,000 petrochemical plants, which together produced 0.8Gt of CO2 in 2021 | Science Advances
  • Analysis into the power shortages that “plagued” China over 2020-22 highlights “the rigidity of existing institutional arrangements”, such as capped electricity prices, in adapting to a decarbonising energy system | Energy Policy

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China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org 

The post China Briefing 19 March 2026: China joins nuclear pledge | Energy approach ‘vindicated’ | New ecological code appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 19 March 2026: China joins nuclear pledge | Energy approach ‘vindicated’ | New ecological code

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Alabama Coal Ash Lawsuit Can Continue, Appeals Court Rules

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The lawsuit challenges Alabama Power’s plans to leave more than 21 million tons of coal ash in an unlined pond at the head of the Mobile-Tensaw Delta, an area sometimes called “America’s Amazon” for its rich biodiversity.

A yearslong court battle over the 21.7 million tons of coal ash sitting in one of Alabama’s most ecologically sensitive areas will continue after an appeals court ruling handed down Monday.

Alabama Coal Ash Lawsuit Can Continue, Appeals Court Rules

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Factcheck: Trump’s false claims about the IPCC and ‘RCP8.5’ climate scenario

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Among a flurry of posts on social media last weekend, US president Donald Trump declared “good riddance” to a specific emissions scenario used in global climate projections.

The “RCP8.5” scenario, which envisages a future of very high carbon emissions, was “wrong, wrong, wrong”, the president wrote in block capitals.

This was “just admitted” by the UN’s “top climate committee”, he falsely claimed, referring to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

The post was quickly picked up by right-leaning media, amplifying Trump’s misrepresentation of emissions scenarios and the role of the IPCC.

His claim follows the publication of a new set of emissions scenarios that will feed into the next IPCC reports.

While the new scenarios no longer include such high emissions as in RCP8.5, they also show it is “not possible” to limit global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels without significant “overshoot”, one of the authors tells Carbon Brief.

Moreover, projections suggest that the world is still on course for between 2.5C and 3C of warming, another author says.

This level of warming was previously described as “catastrophic” by the UN.

In this factcheck, Carbon Brief looks at Trump’s comments, the debate around RCP8.5 and the “good” and “bad” news within the latest scenarios.

What did Trump say?

In the late evening of Saturday 16 May, Trump posted the following message on his Truth Social social-media platform:

“Dumocrats” is a derogatory nickname for Democrat politicians, debuted by the president in a televised Fox News interview on Thursday 14 May, according to the Independent.

By “top climate committee”, the president was presumably referring to the IPCC, the UN body responsible for assessing science about human-caused climate change.

However, the IPCC does not develop, control or own climate scenarios. Moreover, it has not published anything stating that any climate scenario is “wrong”. (For more, see: How is the IPCC involved?)

Nevertheless, right-leaning media outlets have reported on Trump’s comments, in many instances repeating his false assertion that the RCP8.5 climate scenario had been developed by the IPCC.

The New York Post misleadingly claimed that the IPCC “had quietly adjusted” its framework of emission scenarios. The Daily Caller, a pro-Trump conspiratorial US outlet, adds its own falsehoods stating that “IPCC researchers revised their modelling approach last month, swapping the extreme pathway for seven alternative scenarios”. The climate-sceptic Australian claimed that scientists had “quietly scrapped the apocalyptic forecasts that have terrified policymakers and the public”.

With Fox News also covering Trump’s comments, along with an earlier article by the Times, much of the reporting around RCP8.5 in recent days has been driven by media controlled by the climate-sceptic mogul Rupert Murdoch.

It is not the first time the Trump administration has attacked RCP8.5. In an executive order issued in May 2025 – entitled, “Restoring gold-standard science” – the White House included the climate scenario in a list of examples of how the previous government had “used or promoted scientific information in a highly misleading manner”.

Excerpt from White House executive order, saying: "Similarly, agencies have used Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenario 8.5 to assess the potential effects of climate change in a “higher” warming scenario. RCP 8.5 is a worst-case scenario based on highly unlikely assumptions like end-of-century coal use exceeding estimates of recoverable coal reserves. Scientists have warned that presenting RCP 8.5 as a likely outcome is misleading."
Excerpt from White House executive order, issued in May 2025.

Federal agencies, it claimed, had been using RCP8.5 to “assess the potential effects of climate change in a higher warming scenario”, despite scientists warning that “presenting RCP8.5 as a likely outcome is misleading”.

The executive order came after Project 2025 – a policy wishlist for Trump’s second term published in 2023 by the Heritage Foundation, an influential rightwing, climate-sceptic thinktank in the US – criticised the climate scenario.

The manifesto said a “day-one” priority for the new government should be to “eliminate” the US Environmental Protection Agency’s “use of unauthorised regulatory inputs”, such as “unrealistic climate scenarios, including those based on RCP8.5”.

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What is RCP8.5?

Scientists use emissions scenarios to explore potential future climates, based on how global energy and land use could change in the decades to come.

These scenarios are not predictions or forecasts of what will happen in the future. Therefore, Trump’s declaration that projections under RCP8.5 were “wrong, wrong, wrong” misrepresents the purpose of emissions scenarios.

Different modelling groups have produced thousands of different scenarios over the years. RCP8.5 was developed by scientists back in the early 2010s as one of a set of four consistent “representative concentration pathways”, or RCPs, for climate modellers to use.

As their name suggests, the RCPs were representative of the vast array of scenarios in the scientific literature.

Their corresponding numbers – 2.6, 4.5, 6.0 and 8.5 – do not describe temperature rise (as some mistakenly assume), but the level of “radiative forcing” that each pathway reaches by 2100. This forcing level is a measure of the change in the Earth’s “energy balance” (in watts per square metre) caused by human-caused greenhouse gas emissions.

As the highest forcing of the set, RCP8.5 was a scenario of very high emissions and extensive global warming.

When it was originally published in 2011, RCP8.5 was intended to reflect the high end – roughly the 90th percentile – of the baseline scenarios available in the scientific literature at the time.

A “baseline” scenario is one that assumes no climate mitigation, explains Dr Chris Smith, senior research scholar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria. He tells Carbon Brief:

“RCP8.5 was developed as a no-climate-policy scenario, often called ‘reference’ or ‘baseline’ scenarios. These are used to benchmark the actions of climate policy.”

Under RCP8.5, the IPCC’s fifth assessment report (AR5) in 2013 projected a best estimate of 4.3C of temperature rise by 2081-2100, compared to the pre-industrial period, with a “likely” range of 3.2C to 5.4C.

The RCPs were succeeded in 2017 by the “shared socioeconomic pathways”, or SSPs. The SSPs included a set of five socioeconomic “narratives”, which described factors such as population change, economic growth and the rate of technological development.

The SSPs were then used in the IPCC’s sixth assessment (AR6) cycle, which ran over 2015-23. The upper end of the AR6 temperature projections was provided by the successor to RCP8.5, known as SSP5-8.5, which indicated warming of 4.4C by 2081-2100, with a “very likely” range of 3.3C to 5.7C.

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Why is RCP8.5 so hotly debated?

Prof Detlef van Vuuren from Utrecht University, a leading figure in the development of emissions scenarios for many years, tells Carbon Brief that RCP8.5 is a “low-probability, high-risk scenario and it was always meant like that”.

The scenario assumed a world without climate policy and was designed to explore the consequences of high levels of greenhouse gases and global warming. It was not, van Vueren says, a “best-guess scenario” of what the future held in store.

However, in some research papers, RCP8.5 was characterised as “business as usual”, suggesting that it was the likely outcome if society did not pursue climate action.

This was “incorrect”, says van Vuuren, noting that RCP8.5 “is not a likely outcome”. He adds: “It’s never been a likely outcome.”

Over time, RCP8.5 became hotly debated in academic circles, with some scientists arguing that such high emissions were becoming increasingly unlikely and others claiming that RCP8.5 was still consistent with historical cumulative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.

Carbon Brief unpacked the arguments in this debate in a detailed explainer in 2019.

The charts below, originally included in a 2012 Nature commentary and then updated each year by the authors, shows how projected CO2 emissions under RCP8.5 (red line) compares with the other RCPs (bold coloured lines) and observations (black line).

The left-hand chart shows total CO2 emissions, including land-use change, while the right-hand chart shows CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels and producing cement – the dominant drivers of 21st century emissions.

Global total CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and land use
Global total CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and land use (left) and global fossil CO2 emissions (left) for historical observations (black lines) and the four RCP (coloured bold lines) for 1980-2050. Originally produced as part of Peters et al. (2012) and since updated by Glen Peters and Robbie Andrew.

While emission trends up to the early 2010s approximately tracked RCP8.5, a flattening of emissions growth in the years since has meant they have not kept pace with the sustained rises that were assumed in the scenario.

Over the past decade, global emissions have more closely tracked RCP4.5, one of the two “medium stabilisation scenarios” of the original four RCPs.

The debate around RCP8.5 has not just focused on current emissions, but also on the scenarios underlying assumptions for the future.

When it was published in 2011, the world had just seen unprecedented growth in global CO2 emissions, which had increased by 30% over the previous decade. Global coal use had increased by nearly 50% over the same period. Cleaner alternatives remained expensive in most countries and the idea of continued rapid growth in coal use seemed realistic.

Critics of RCP8.5 point to its assumptions for a dramatic expansion of coal use in the future, as well as high growth in global population.

For example, in a 2017 paper, two scientists argued that the “return to coal” envisaged in RCP8.5 would require an unprecedented five-fold increase in global coal use by the end of the century. Such an outcome was “exceptionally unlikely”, the authors wrote.

However, others have argued that while high-emissions scenarios are becoming increasingly unlikely, they still have an important role to play. For example, they highlight risks that only emerge under higher levels of warming.

In addition, research has shown that feedbacks in the climate system – where warming triggers the release of more CO2 and methane, which warms the planet further – could mean that human-caused emissions lead to a higher radiative forcing and have a greater climate impact than initially assumed.

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How has RCP8.5 been replaced?

As the IPCC heads into its seventh assessment cycle (AR7), scientists have been developing the emissions scenarios and climate model projections that will – eventually – feed into its reports.

For the emissions scenarios, that process – known as ScenarioMIP – started back in 2023 at a meeting in Reading, UK. This involved scientists representing “different climate research communities”, explains van Vuuren.

This “brainstorming” session devised the outlines for the new scenarios, he says. After more meetings, these were subsequently developed into a proposal that was – after review – translated into a journal paper. After review from scientists and the public, the final paper was published in April.

The paper sets out seven all-new emissions scenarios, replacing the SSPs (and its predecessors, the RCPs). For simplicity, the new scenarios are named according to their levels of greenhouse gas emissions.

The figures below show the emissions (left) and the estimated global temperature changes (right) under the proposed scenarios, from the “low-to-negative” emissions scenario (turquoise) up to a “high-emissions” scenario (brown).

The greenhouse gas emissions for each of the CMIP7 climate scenarios (left) and the associated estimated average temperature change over 2000-2150 from a 1850-1900 baseline (right) using the FaIR emulator. Source: Adapted from Van Vuuren et al. (2026)
The greenhouse gas emissions for each of the CMIP7 climate scenarios (left) and the associated estimated average temperature change over 2000-2150 from a 1850-1900 baseline (right) using the FaIR emulator. Source: Adapted from Van Vuuren et al. (2026)

(It should be noted that, while the ScenarioMIP paper has been published, there remains an embargo on using the scenario data produced by integrated assessment models – often referred to as IAMs – to publish academic papers, analysis or even social media posts until 1 September this year. Carbon Brief will publish a detailed explainer on the new scenarios once the embargo lifts.)

When compared to the SSPs that came before, the range in future emissions in the new scenarios “will be smaller”, the authors say in the paper:

“On the high-end of the range, the…high emission levels (quantified by SSP5-8.5) have become implausible, based on trends in the costs of renewables, the emergence of climate policy and recent emission trends…At the low end, many…emission trajectories have become inconsistent with observed trends during the 2020-30 period.”

In other words, the combination of technological progress and action on climate change that, to date, remains insufficient, means that scenarios of very high or very low emissions are now not considered plausible.

Another way of looking at it is that the “range of potential futures has narrowed”, explains Smith, one of the authors on the paper.

If you “draw a fan or plume of potential future emissions that start in 2025”, it lies entirely within the spread of scenarios from a decade ago, he says:

“So you’ve ruled out futures at the high end. You’ve also ruled out futures at the low end – so it’s now not possible to limit warming to 1.5C, at least in the short term or the medium term.

This is a mix of “good” and “bad” news, Smith adds.

“In the latest set of scenarios, the lowest [scenario sees] peaking at about 1.7C, so we’ve also lost that low end, but the good news is we’ve lost the high end…Back in 2010, RCP8.5 wasn’t an implausible future, we’ve now made it an implausible future, because we’ve actually bent the curve [on emissions] enough to eliminate that possibility.”

The new “high” scenario projects warming in 2100 of closer to 3.2C (with a range of 2.5C to 4.3C).

To be clear, this “high” scenario would still come with catastrophic climate impacts, even if the level of warming would remain slightly below what was set out in RCP8.5.

Van Vuuren adds that the world is “now on a trajectory to 2.5-3C of warming”. As a result, “we don’t have any scenario anymore that can reach 1.5C with limited overshoot – we will have a significant overshoot”.

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How is the IPCC involved?

Contrary to Trump’s claims, the common set of future emissions scenarios used by climate scientists are not developed by the IPCC, the UN climate-science body that produces landmark reports about climate change.

Instead, the development process described above is driven by a group of Earth system modelling experts convened by the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP).

CMIP – an initiative of another UN body, the World Climate Research Programme – coordinates the work of dozens of climate modelling centres around the world.

Working in six-to-eight year cycles, CMIP asks modelling centres around the world to run a common set of climate-model experiments – simulations that use the same inputs and conditions – that allows for results to be collected together and more easily compared.

For experiments that explore how the climate might change in the future, modelling centres are instructed to run simulations against a fixed set of future climate scenarios, each with different levels of concentrations of greenhouse gases, aerosols and other drivers of climate change.

These future emissions scenarios are revisited each time CMIP embarks on a new “phase” of climate-modelling coordination, to reflect advances in scientific understanding and the pace of real-world climate action.

The group tasked with producing the design of future scenarios, as well as the “input files” for climate models, is the “scenario model intercomparison project”, or ScenarioMIP.

CMIP aligns its work with the schedule of the IPCC, coordinating a new set of model runs for each IPCC assessment cycle.

For example, the IPCC’s AR5 in 2013 featured climate models from the fifth phase of CMIP (CMIP5), whereas AR6 in 2021 used climate models from CMIP’s sixth phase (CMIP6).

AR7 will feature models from CMIP’s ongoing seventh phase (CMIP7). The first results from CMIP7 model runs are expected later this year.

The IPCC is consulted during the CMIP process, van Vuuren tells Carbon Brief, but their input is “no different from any other review comment” that the ScenarioMIP team received.

Thus, while the IPCC relies on model runs coordinated by CMIP in its landmark reports, it does not play a role in designing future emissions scenarios, nor in deciding when they should be retired.

Dr Robert Vautard, co-chair of IPCC AR7 Working Group I, tells Carbon Brief that the IPCC does not “do or coordinate research”. Its role, he says, is to “synthesise existing knowledge” and produce “regular” reviews of climate-science literature.

He adds that ScenarioMIP is just one set of scenarios the climate-science body assesses in its reports:

“IPCC assesses all scenarios, or sets of scenarios, that the scientific community produces. IPCC does not produce scenarios. CMIP7 will be [one] set of scenarios assessed by IPCC [for AR7] – but there will be many others.”

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The post Factcheck: Trump’s false claims about the IPCC and ‘RCP8.5’ climate scenario appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Factcheck: Trump’s false claims about the IPCC and ‘RCP8.5’ climate scenario

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Corpus Christi Leaders Believe Data Center Plans May Be Behind Delays to Emergency Water Supply

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Authorities in Sinton won’t confirm or deny Corpus Christi’s suggestion that the small town is hoarding its precious groundwater for data centers. Across Texas, a booming buildout of server farms is adding strain to water resources that are already stretched to their limit.

This story was produced in partnership by Inside Climate News and the Texas Newsroom, the state’s network of public radio stations.

Corpus Christi Leaders Believe Data Center Plans May Be Behind Delays to Emergency Water Supply

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