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Uranium Prices Take a Dip at $85 Per Pound

Uranium prices have experienced a decline to $89 per pound, marking the 6th consecutive week of decreases since reaching a 16-year high of $106 in early February. This drop comes as market participants continue to evaluate the evolving dynamics following the recent surge in prices. 

Uranium’s Rollercoaster: From Heights to Pullbacks

Uranium, a dense metal found in most rocks, primarily serves as fuel in nuclear power plants. The standard contract unit for uranium is 250 pounds of U3O8 and is traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Key uranium-producing countries include Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia.

Following a strong bullish trend that propelled uranium prices to levels unseen since the Fukushima disaster in 2011, the metal has encountered a 22% pullback over the past six weeks. 

Uranium spot price by Numerco
Chart from Numerco

The elevated U3O8 prices have led utilities to abstain from spot market purchases, instead relying on previously established long-term contracts. Moreover, speculative physical uranium holders have capitalized on the recent rally to secure profits. 

Additionally, the anticipation of a sustained increase in demand, signaled by major economies, has prompted mines to resume uranium projects in US mountain states, further contributing to the moderation of prices.

Despite the decrease in futures trading prices to $88.50 per pound in New York, current prices still surpass last year’s average. This resilience in the market reflects ongoing bullish sentiment towards uranium. 

Uranium price Trading Economics
Source: Trading Economics

The uranium prices reported by Trading Economics are based on over-the-counter (OTC) and contract-for-difference (CFD) financial instruments. 

Despite this correction, analysts and experts remain optimistic about the long-term prospects of nuclear fuel. Industry insiders suggest that the market has likely established a new baseline, supported by robust demand forecasts and supply constraints.

Jonathan Hinze, president of the nuclear industry research firm UxC, expressed confidence in uranium’s fundamentals, stating, “We have reached a bottom”. 

He emphasized the enduring demand for uranium and noted that supply has yet to catch up with this demand.

Recent global annual production of uranium has ranged from 55,000 – 65,000 tons of uranium metal, roughly matching fuel demand, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. As per the Nuclear Energy Agency, an estimated 60,000 tons of uranium are required annually to fuel the world’s 436 operating nuclear reactors.

Uranium Market Resilience and Geopolitical Complexities

In recent developments, Kazatomprom, the world’s leading uranium producer responsible for 40% of U3O8 supply, refrained from announcing further production downgrades in its latest earnings report. However, the company continues to caution about limited sulphuric acid supplies, which could pose additional challenges in meeting its guidance.

Projections from major producers like Cameco indicate impending supply deficits in the uranium market. The International Energy Agency forecasts a demand of 200 million pounds by 2040, while Kazatomprom predicts a global shortfall of 21 million pounds by 2030, rising to 147 million pounds by 2040.

According to the World Nuclear Associations data as shown in the chart below, demand would continuously increase by 2040 while supply would be limited. This leaves a huge gap between the metal’s supply and demand requirements worldwide by that period.

uranium supply and demand projections 2040
Chart from IRIS France website

Geopolitical factors add complexity to the supply outlook. For instance, the U.S. is considering a bill to ban imports of enriched Russian uranium, which is currently under review in the Senate.

Given the increasingly uncertain future of nuclear fuel, countries worldwide are moving to secure their power generation supply. 

Sweden’s Climate Minister Romina Pourmokhtari has announced plans to lift the uranium mining ban as early as May. This is a good development for the EU market, as Sweden holds 80% of the EU’s uranium deposits.

Meanwhile, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) has urged the state government to reconsider the uranium ban. According to The West Australian, the CCI’s analysis suggests that uranium mining could generate over $650 million in exports and create 9,000 jobs.

Despite holding around one-third of global uranium resources, BHP’s Olympic Dam remains Australia’s sole active nuclear fuel producer.

As uranium prices experience a notable decline, the market witnesses a shift from recent highs, prompting a reassessment of supply-demand dynamics and geopolitical factors. Despite the pullback, optimism persists in the industry, fueled by projections of impending supply deficits and increasing global interest in nuclear power as a climate change solution. 

The post Uranium Prices Take a Dip at $89 Per Pound appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

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Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

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Carbon Footprint

Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions

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Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?

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