At COP28 in Dubai, Carbon Brief’s Anika Patel spoke with Prof Zou Ji, CEO and president of the Energy Foundation China, to discuss China’s approach to its energy transition.
This wide-ranging interview covers China’s stance on fossil fuels, issues-based alliances and energy efficiency pledges at COP28, pathways to the country growing its renewable power generation and what China has learned from Germany’s energy transition. It is transcribed in full below, following a summary of key quotes.
Energy Foundation China is a professional grantmaking organisation dedicated to China’s sustainable energy development. Prof Zou has years of experience in economics, energy, environment, climate change, and policymaking, having previously served as a deputy director general of China’s National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation, under the government’s national development and reform commission (NDRC).
He was also a key member of the Chinese climate negotiation team leading up to the Paris Agreement, and has been a lead author for several assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
- On why China did not join the pledge to triple renewables and double efficiency: “[Before COP28] we have not seen [it laid out] very clearly which year should be the base year [from which tripling renewables should be calculated]. Should it be 2020? Should it be 2022? This might seem to be technical but, [in] the past two years, global development of renewables, especially in China, [have been significantly boosted, and so]…the difference in targets might be very significant.”
- On signing pledges at COP: “If you look at the whole history of the COP…I do not [remember] China joining any alliances. I have never seen that…As a party, China [is only concerned with] official procedures, waiting for a legal framework of the UNFCCC or the Paris Agreement.”
- On China’s commitment to decarbonisation: “If you look back at history, there have been very few cases that show China [first making] and then [giving up] a commitment. This is not the political culture in China.”
- On China’s electricity consumption: “For low-income level groups, although their income has not grown very much, their consumption preferences and mindsets – especially for younger generations of consumers – mean they are more willing to use electricity [than previous generations].”
- On comparisons of China to the EU and US: “There is a structural [difference] compared to the [energy mix] in Europe and the US. The majority of energy use [in China] has been for industrial production, rather than for residential [use]…In China, the average power consumption per capita is around 6,000 kilowatt-hours (kWh), compared to 8,000kWh in Europe and over 12,000kWh in the US.”
- On energy efficiency: “Physically, I think China has become better and better [in terms of] its efficiency, but, economically, this cannot produce as high a value-add as Europe and the US in monetary terms.”
- On fossil fuel phaseout: “I would like to see…[China] very quickly enlarging its renewable capacity. Only if [there is] adequate capacity and generation of renewables can this lead to a real phasing out or phasing down of fossil fuels.”
- On ensuring more renewables uptake: “We have raised the share of renewable power generation from seven, eight, nine per cent to today’s 16%. This is progress, but it is not quick enough or large enough. We want to push the grid companies…to do more and do it faster.”
- On the power of distributed renewables: “We should also consider…creat[ing] another, totally new power system. This would be a sort of nexus of a centralised and decentralised grid system…If [the central grid] is having difficulties [increasing renewable generation], and if these are very challenging to overcome, then let’s [shift] to a lot of microgrids.”
- On distributed renewables growth: “Today, the share of distributed [renewables] is still lower than centralised renewables. But the incremental [distributed] renewables growth has become higher than growth of centralised renewables in the past year or two, and I would assume this will remain a trend in the future.”
- On substituting fossil fuels with renewables: “Relying only on solar and the wind [means] you need not rely on imported oil or gas. And so, gradually, you will de-link your energy use from coal [and] from fossil fuels.”
- On the need for CCUS: “In some sectors, like, for example, iron and steel, cement, chemicals and petrochemicals, we do need carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS), because it is very difficult to phase out coal or carbon dioxide [completely].”
- On CCUS in the power sector: “I have mixed feelings about CCUS for the power sector. I have an ideal vision that we can reach real zero emissions in these sectors through a more developed grid system, with more connectivity across provinces or regions and the use of AI technology.”
Carbon Brief: Could you give an overview of what your expectations are for COP28?
Zou Ji: It might be a little early to make a judgement [on] what outcomes this COP can reach, but we do know what the key issues here are…[The] global stocktake (GST) is the core issue for this COP as it is the first time it has taken place since the Paris Agreement …But for the GST there are different levels [at which we need] to understand [the process and]…its outcome. Number one, [in terms of] the scope of GST, what should we take stock [of]? Many colleagues, especially colleagues from Europe and maybe also from the US – I mean industrialised countries – would like to concentrate more on mitigation…We still have a significant gap…[to fill] to achieve the 1.5C target. The gap [is] there, and we need to enhance our ambition to close the gap. So this is a major concern…in the GST.
But meanwhile, we see some other parties, [such as] the so-called [like-minded] developing country [LMDC] group… the Alliance of Small Island States and Least Developed Countries group, [which are] mainly located in Africa. [These groups] are very keen to [address] the gap in financial support for capacity building and technology transfer, in short, means of implementation.
And there has been, since [COP26 in] Glasgow, I think, a very specific financial issue: the loss and damage fund. Together with some general financial issues like developed countries mobilis[ing] $100bn each year by 2023, this will continue to be a concern. But…we also have other issues, more specific issues like the tripling of renewables and doubling efficiency and… [procedure-related] issues like transparency. [There are] a lot of issues!
Before COP we have seen…official statements from Europe, from the US and also from China – especially the joint Sunnylands statement – [which is] relevant to China-US cooperation in COP28 and…can [give us] some very initial expectations on the outcome.
[Taking the GST as an example], I would assume there will be a political decision by all the parties [to say] they recognise the significant gap for achieving well-below 2C, [following] the Paris Agreement language. But [there is an] even larger gap for 1.5C. This should be one [thing] we could expect [to see appear in the final text], but certainly I think there must be some tough negotiations on the scope of the GST: especially [on if we] should include…issues [such as] adaptation, financial support to developing countries, technology transfer, capacity building, etc…The negotiations will be very tough, but it is a long debate.
[Another issue to watch is the] tripling renewables and doubling efficiency [pledge]. I would say [that the issue has received]…endorsement from the G20 and the Sunnylands statement. But in those two statements…we have not seen [it laid out] very clearly which year should be the base year. Should it be 2020? Should it be 2022? This might seem to be technical but, [in] the past two years, global development of renewables, especially in China, [have been significantly boosted]… So [depending on which year is picked as the base year,] the difference in targets might be very significant.
And then it is packaged together with [a more defined] target…[to] not only [focus on the] tripling [of renewables] but also [to focus on] the total amount of the capacity of renewables…11,000GW [gigawatts] has been proposed. If this is the case, [meaning that] the base year is 2020…then, [from some negotiators’ perspectives] this might be a different understanding of the definition of the target from the one [proposed] before the COP. And then, this may lead to some parties hesitat[ing] to make an official commitment on that. I know you might be very interested in China’s position on that issue.
CB: You read my mind.
ZJ: I would try to understand it in this way. If you look at the whole history of the COP…I do not [remember] China joining any alliances [Prof Zou here means issue-based alliances or pledges]. I have never seen that. That means that[,]…as a party, China only focuses on official procedures, waiting for a legal framework of the UNFCCC or the Paris Agreement. And if you look at different initiatives, [such as the] climate ambition alliance, [global] renewables alliance, etc – for the moment, they have not readied a legal framework. So now…[the pledges are] informal, without official or legal commitments. So, I cannot find evidence [of China joining informal alliances in this way].
Certainly I do not have any assessments whether China should…or should not [join the pledge to triple renewable energy and double energy efficiency]. But this is the history…of China’s engagement in UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement [and] the Kyoto Protocol…If China makes [such] a commitment, this would be somewhat surprising [from a historical perspective].
[Secondly,] maybe this reflects the difference of political systems and…policymaking in different political regimes or cities, especially between China and Europe and the United States. As you know, in Europe and the US you have election[-based] regimes or systems – every four or five years you will elect a different parliament, a different cabinet, a different president or a different prime minister, etc. Their term might be short or it might be long, depending on the results of the election. That means that there is no guarantee for one party or for one policymaker to stay in power for a long time. It might be two terms, it might be three terms. But in China, the political assumption is [that] the communist party will be in power forever. [No-one would assume that] next year, or next term, we will have another party leading the country.
My observation is [that] Chinese policymakers are very cautious [about] making commitments, not only because of concerns around the challenges and difficulty of achieving this commitment. They would say: “If I make the commitment, this should be something I must [achieve].” [This is] because they make the decision or commitment for a single party. No matter [which] generation of leader [made the commitment], the commitment comes from the same party…So that partially [explains] why China seems to be very careful to make even a long-term commitment.
Just to take a very immediate example, the US made a commitment on the Kyoto Protocol during the Clinton administration, but only [on behalf of] the White House. When [power] turned to the Bush administration in the early 2000s, the Bush administration said [they] will not submit that proposal to congress, because [they] knew it would not be approved…And then [eventually] the US gave up [trying] to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
This is the first case, and unfortunately, we see another case in the Trump administration. The Obama administration…signed the Paris Agreement. But…[then] Trump became president and Trump said the US will withdraw from the Paris Agreement. And this [type of turbulence] is something, in fact, I take for granted, given [my] understanding of the US political system. But this is not the case in China.
Thirdly, it might be a matter of political culture. For the Chinese, normally, [as I said]…if they make a commitment, the commitment…is something they must [achieve]. Normally they will not…just make the commitment to ‘talk [big]’ and then, after several years, give up or ‘forget’ [about it]. Normally, China will remember [its] commitments and will achieve [them], [on the] basis of trust. So, China puts very high [importance] on achieving these commitments, [which] leads to some difficulties for the Chinese government to make commitments. If you look back at history, there have been very few cases that show China [first making] and then [giving up] a commitment. This is not the political culture in China. But this is my understanding, not a standardised or official interpretation!
CB: I was having a conversation with another academic earlier today, and they offered an additional explanation – that recent economic troubles might be an added factor increasing caution towards committing to targets in China. Would you agree with that?
ZJ: It’s not easy to simply answer yes or no, agree or disagree. But I would say yes. The uncertainty of growth in the past years, especially since the pandemic, seems to [have made] things a little bit…complicated, especially in terms of carbon intensity.
In past years, the [economic] growth rate has become lower and lower – even lower than expectations. But carbon emissions continue to increase. Several years ago, the common understanding was that if the growth rate stays at a very high level, the economy will grow over time, and then emissions will grow over time. But this time, we saw that growth was very slow, but emissions continued to grow. But I would like to try to look at this in more detail, to identify the driving force behind [this]. Why have we had a lower growth rate in the past year, but carbon emissions, coal use and also energy use have continued to grow?
[In this case], we had better look at energy use per capita, and especially electricity use per capita. Although the growth rate is very low, the base amount of power use per capita was also very low in the past. For low-income level groups, although their income has not grown very much, their consumption preferences and mindsets, especially for younger generations of consumers, mean they are more willing to use electricity…Just look at the energy use performance of low-income groups in rural areas.
In urban areas, blue collar [workers] have better living conditions – they have air conditioners, better heating [and can access better options for] travel. Although their income level continues to be very low, their consumption behaviour has changed over time…Everybody [now] has a mobile phone and connection to the internet…They saw [examples of how to live a better life] from people in the middle income [band]. They saw this from advertisements, from movies, from TV programmes, etc…Compared to their fathers’ generation, [who had a] similar income level, their pursuit of a higher quality of life [could be a reason why] today [they] have a higher level of energy consumption. This is one interpretation [of the data], but it can be proven by many pieces of evidence.
Another [interpretation] is if you look at China’s mix of energy use, in terms of total amount and in terms of per capita, there is a structural [difference] compared to the [energy mix] in Europe and the US. The majority of energy use [in China] has been for industrial production, rather than for residential [use]. And given what I just mentioned, [in terms of] the change of consumption behaviour…[The effects are] marginal [if] they increase their consumption of energy. In China, the average power consumption per capita is around 6,000 kilowatt-hours (kWh), compared to 8,000kWh in Europe and over 12,000kWh in the US.
CB: Does that have an implication for why China talks about energy intensity, whereas Europe and the US talk about energy efficiency?
ZJ: Yes. In China, the general indicator is energy intensity per unit of GDP. But when you talk about energy efficiency, what is the indicator? You have physical indicators, for example, energy use per tonne of iron, steel, ammonia or cement. This is one way to measure efficiency. Another way is just to [calculate it] per unit of GDP, which shows the major sources of money in your economy. Physically, I think China has become better and better [in terms of] its efficiency, but economically this cannot produce as high a value-add as Europe and the US in monetary terms. So that changes things, especially given two [factors]. One is the lower and lower GDP growth rate, which makes carbon intensity higher. Another is the chang[ing] foreign exchange situation in recent years. The raising of interest rates by the US Federal Reserve makes US dollars more expensive, increasing foreign exchange rates which then enlarges the monetary GDP gap, making Chinese GDP [in dollar terms] fall and carbon intensity rise.
So, there are several variables [affecting this decision], but we should also not ignore the real improvements to efficiency [in China], measured by physical indicators. I saw slightly slower progress in efficiency improvements, but maybe those are the matter of measurement.
CB: That’s always the fun fine print. Going back to the scope of the GST at COP28, how would you interpret China’s position on the ideal language around fossil fuels?
ZJ: I retired from the delegation eight years ago, so [I can’t say for sure] about the ideal language! But, maybe we can revisit the language from the Sunnylands statement. There is a specific paragraph talking about recognising the global tripling of renewables and the doubling of efficiency…[which is] then followed by several phrases mentioning that China and the US should accelerate the deployment of renewables…to substitute fossil fuels, including coal, oil and gas. So, if I were in the delegation, I should look at fossil fuels as a whole. Certainly, we should accelerate the process to phase down or phase out fossil fuels.
I mean, in China, it is mainly the matter of coal. But in Europe and the US, it is mainly the matter of oil and gas. According to an International Energy Agency (IEA) report, in the past decade, the whole world moved very slowly to phase out coal, oil and gas. In China, the majority issue is coal, but in Europe we saw some positive but very small changes when you look at the share of fossil fuels – [particularly] oil and gas. Same in the US.
So, what about the pace of phasing out or phasing down coal, oil or gas? Different countries have different agendas here. So maybe fossil fuels should be covered for every country. [But] I would like to see…[China] very quickly enlarging its renewable capacity. Only if [there is] adequate capacity and generation of renewables can this lead to a real phasing out or phasing down of fossil fuels. In this sense, I think these are the same story for all the countries, for Europe, for the US and also for China.
CB: We published analysis recently saying that fossil fuels in China might enter a structural decline next year because of China’s renewable build out. However, as we all know, there are challenges facing the grid, I think not only with intermittency but also with developing market mechanisms. How optimistic are you that China will be able to overcome these constraints in the power grid and make renewable energy more widely consumed?
ZJ: This is a very good question. There are several ways to figure out the transmission issue to support broader and deeper use of renewables. Number one, as you know, we have a very unbalanced geographical distribution of renewables. Northern and north-western China has very rich renewable resources, especially solar and wind power. But the most dense centres of energy use are located in the eastern and southern part of China. This requires that we generate renewable power and then transmit [it] from northern and western China to eastern, southern and south-eastern China. This will require a very long-distance transmission grid, [covering] two-, three- or even four thousand kilometres. [That comes at] a very high expense, [creating a] high cost for transmission.
Normally, we have a very rough estimate that [transmission will cost] around 0.1 yuan per kilowatt-hour for every thousand kilometres. So how do we overcome [these higher costs]? One way is to optimise the distribution and allocation of remote renewable resources. For example, [we could] transmit [power] from the closest places, [such as transmitting power from] Inner Mongolia province…to the eastern part [of China]. This is one way. China now has [developed] an ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission system, which enables long-distance transmission, and we rely on that technology. We have had some engineering pilots [for UHV transmission in place] already, from Qinghai province to Henan province…[and] from Baihetan in Sichuan province to Jiangsu province. There are several [other] transmission grids under construction.
Another bottleneck is the capacity of the grid to absorb renewables. To my knowledge, in the past few years, we have made some progress, but this has been very limited. We have raised the share of renewable power generation from seven, eight, nine percent to today’s 16%. This is progress, but it is not quick enough or large enough. We want to push the grid companies – State Grid and Southern Grid – to do more and do it faster.
What we want to push [can be] compared to a benchmark [set by the] German grid. As you may know, Germany’s grid is one of the most advanced grids in the world, in terms of featuring a higher share of renewable generation – it can have up to 40% or even 50% of generated power come from solar and wind power. But what I’m thinking about now is if China can catch up and fill the gap between its grid and the German grid.
I’ve heard a lot of different opinions from power experts, [which] I will not go into detail here – it is too technical! But one long-term consideration to overcome…is the higher and higher marginal cost of raising the share of renewables in the German grid. This means [progress] to further enlarge the share of renewables in their grid has become slower. If this is the case for Germany today, this might also be the case for China tomorrow. That means that there might be some physical limitations [to having a higher share of renewables] in the current power system and the grid system.
But certainly the first step for China should be to close the gap between its current performance and Germany’s performance. Beyond that, a 40-50% [renewables] share is not enough for carbon neutrality or for [meeting the target of] 1.5C. We want to have more. What is the way out? We should also consider… creat[ing] another, totally new power system. This would be a sort of nexus of centralised and decentralised grid systems…If [the central grid] is having difficulties [increasing renewable generation], and if these are very challenging to overcome, then let’s [shift] to a lot of microgrids, together with a distribution grid, which would act as a lower level of the grid.
[To do this] you need to figure out a lot of technological issues, including [the use of] transformers and changing the [grid] system. To allow [for] more and more distributed renewables, it should not be necessary [for them] to be connected to the centralised grid system. [Instead, microgrids] should just have to connect with each other, with [households] having their own rooftop solar [panels] which are connected with each other using AI technology, etc. And if they do that, then most of [China’s] electricity [will be] generated by distributed renewables. That way, we [can] rely on the centralised grid less and less.
This might be one way to figure out today’s bottleneck, and Energy Foundation China is exploring a pilot [to trial this]. The solution is mainly applicable to rural areas…households… and also SMEs outside the central mega-cities…This might serve as the power source [that will cover] the increase in our power demand in the future. We can stop [the go-to solution being to rely on] coal or other fossil fuels, and instead from the very beginning [demand would be met through] renewables. So that is something I’m thinking about.
CB: That’s a really interesting possibility. I’m a bit of a pessimist, so an immediate question that comes to mind is that we have seen how important energy security and stability is to the general political system in China. If we have this decentralised system, would that cause nervousness among some government stakeholders?
ZJ: I would say that a distributed power system would help to raise the degree of energy security.
CB: Is that because it would be complementary to a central system, not replacing a central system?
ZJ: At the very earliest stages of the development, it would be complementary, but beyond 2030, the share of distributed renewables in the overall renewables system will become higher and higher. Today, the share of distributed [renewables] are still lower than centralised renewables. But the incremental renewables growth has become higher than growth of centralised renewables in the past year or two, and I would assume this will remain a trend in the future. Some of the obstacles to developing centralised renewables, in terms of technology, in terms of institutions, etc, means that distributed renewables have some comparative advantages [which are currently] being formed. [Renewables are] lower cost and [grant] higher energy security, relying only on solar and the wind [means] you need not rely on imported oil or gas. And so gradually, you will de-link your energy use from coal [and] fossil fuels.
… But certainly, we are in the very early stages [of] developing [such a system]. I believe, in China, all stakeholders – including government, business, academia, and NGOs like us — wish to make a collective effort to make that happen.
CB: Absolutely. I’m aware that it is very late, so I’ll leave with one last question. In two scenarios – first of all, where there is more distributed energy and a kind of constellation of these microgrids that you described, and then, secondly, in a future where perhaps, there’s a more centralised system but ever-increasing renewable capacity, do you see a role in both of these scenarios for CCUS?
ZJ: Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) is still very controversial, among researchers and stakeholders. Especially in the power sector. But it is my understanding that in some sectors, like, for example, iron and steel, cement, chemicals and petrochemicals, we do need CCUS, because it is very difficult to phase out coal or carbon dioxide [completely]. I mean, even with the technology [coming down the pipeline], there [will still have to] be some [CO2] emissions.
Although you might be able to minimise the emission of CO2 in those fields, you cannot phase them out, only down. In [order to] achieve carbon neutrality, you have to capture those carbon emissions from those sectors. So we need CCUS for those specific sectors and technologies.
But for the power sector, I have mixed feelings about this. I have an ideal vision that, maybe, we can reach real zero emissions in these sectors through a more developed grid system, with more connectivity across provinces or regions and the use of AI technology to connect microgrids, for example, and let them trade with each other to complement each other’s peak and valley loads. This is one way out for the power sector, together with a more developed energy storage system, in the upstream, midstream and downstream ends of the power system.
My instinct is we should go in that direction [for the power sector]. We should not rely on coal for stabilising the grid system or for stabilising the whole power system. I know the mainstream thinking is we should rely on coal as the baseload for stabilising the power system. But I have a slightly different idea, that through more developed connectivity of the grid, more smart grids, together with very strong grid energy storage…If this is successful, then we would not need so much CCUS in the power sector.
I can share that the current mainstream academic understanding [is that], even though China will reach its [2060] carbon neutrality target, it will continue to have to maintain 600 gigawatts of coal-fired power plants capacity. These are the sort of estimations [we’re working with now], for the capacity [needed] to serve as the baseload to stabilise the power sector.
Maybe I’m too [optimistic] – I believe we may need some [coal] capacity there, as a backup in case of disaster, like Germany did right after the Ukraine war, when they opened several coal-fired power plants. But this doesn’t necessarily mean [that the government] will rebound the use of coal. Its function will just be as the backup.
The post The Carbon Brief Interview: Prof Zou Ji appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Wealthy nations risk undermining the loss and damage fund’s plan to deliver $250 million in aid next year to climate-vulnerable countries hit by extreme weather, board members from developing nations said this week.
While rich nations have pledged $789 million, they have only transferred $348 million so far to the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), which all governments agreed to set up two years ago and is now in its start-up phase.
Speaking on behalf of developing country board members, Honduras’s representative Elena Cristina Pereira Colindres expressed “concern” during a press briefing, adding that “transparency and predictability” on when the money would be paid is lacking.
Pereira did not name individual countries but Italy, the European Union and Luxembourg are the three donors that have promised money but not said when it will be given.
Other nations – like the United Arab Emirates, Australia and Sweden – are drip-feeding their promised pledges, only giving a part of them each year.
Pereira said that these “mutli-year disbursement schedules” severely limit the fund’s board’s ability to determine how much money they can spend and reduces “overall confidence in our partner’s commitments to long-term capitalisation of the fund”.
“Lemonade stand money”
While the fund’s board has agreed to spend $250 million next year, Pereira said that this “must not be used or considered as an indication of the future scale of the fund” because the needs are in the “hundreds of billions”.
A 2024 study in Nature found that climate change is causing $395 billion of loss and damage each year. Developing countries have called for developed nations to provide $100 billion of loss and damage finance per year by 2030.
Daniel Lund, Fiji’s representative to the fund, told an FRLD board meeting held in the Philippines on Wednesday that the amount the fund currently has is just “lemonade stand money”, adding that it was about a quarter of what it costs to build a coal-fired power plant.
Scientists hail rapid estimate of climate change’s role in heat deaths as a first
The fund’s board is drawing up a strategy to get more money – known as a resource mobilisation strategy – by the end of 2025. “It is of crucial importance to the constituency that this fund that was established for all developing countries serves their collective needs at the scale that is needed”, Pereira said.
In April, the fund approved a strategy for the initial $250 million start-up phase, in which it agreed to give out grants of between $5 million and $20 million to project proposals submitted by developing countries.
Priority for private finance?
With funds scarce, the secretariat which runs the FRLD has proposed that projects which bring in extra sources of funding like private-sector finance should be judged favourably by the fund’s board.
But some developing country board members and climate campaigners pushed back at the board meeting against adding this practice, known as leveraging, into the criteria.
Egypt’s representative Mohammed Nasr said he had “a very strong concern” about this. “This should not be part of any criteria when we deal with loss and damage funding”, he said.
The head of Climate Action Network (CAN) International Tasneem Essop said she was worried that the fund’s secretariat were pursuing “typical World Bank approaches”. The World Bank was chosen to host the fund – at least on an interim basis – despite opposition from some large NGOs like CAN.
Nigeria’s push to cash in on lithium rush gets off to a rocky start
Essop said she opposed leveraging and derisking. It’s “as if what we are setting up here is an investment fund,” she said, “no it’s not – this is a solidarity fund. This fund needs to benefit the people that are suffering from the climate crisis”.
Speaking after her, Nasr said he agreed. “A fund is not a bank. Solidarity is different to investment. Loss and damage is different to development”, he said.
When will funds be given out?
Despite funding constraints, board co-chair Richard Sherman said he expects the first projects to be approved early next year.
Sherman said he expects the fund to put out a call for proposals at the next board meeting in October and the first projects to be approved at the following meeting in February 2026.
The board is still working out the fund’s financial architecture, meaning how the money is banked and disbursed to countries, Sherman said. If done correctly, he added, a unique fund can be set up to deliver a “rapid disbursement in time of disaster or extreme event”.
“We are working wholeheartedly to make sure that (rapid disbursement) happens,” Sherman said during a press briefing, adding that he strives for the fund to “almost be a hotline for communities” facing loss and damage events.
In a statement read out by a minister before the board meeting, the president of the Philipines Ferdinand Marcos called for urgency, saying that “every delay means more families without shelter, more livelihood disrupted and worse – more lives lost”.
The post Wealthy nations accused of delaying loss and damage fund with slow payments appeared first on Climate Home News.
Wealthy nations accused of delaying loss and damage fund with slow payments
At least 120 people have died after a devastating flash flood swept through homes and holiday camps in central Texas in the early hours of 4 July.
The disaster unfolded after a severe rainstorm caused the Guadalupe River to swell to its second-greatest height on record.
Headlines have been dominated by the death of 27 children and counsellors from a summer camp for girls near the banks of the river.
In the aftermath of the flooding, many news outlets questioned whether the Trump administration’s decision to cut staff from the federal climate, weather and disaster response services may have impacted the emergency response to the disaster.
However, others defended the agency’s actions, saying that the appropriate warnings had been issued.
Scientists have been quick to point out the role of climate change in driving more intense rainfall events.
A rapid attribution analysis found “natural variability alone” could not explain the extreme rainfall observed during the “very exceptional meteorological event”.
Meanwhile, social media has also been awash with misinformation, including claims that the floods were caused by geoengineering – an argument that was quickly dismissed by officials.
In this article, Carbon Brief unpacks how the flood unfolded, the potential role of climate change and whether advanced warnings were affected by funding cuts to key agencies.
- How did the flooding develop?
- What impact did the flooding have?
- What role did climate change play?
- Were the forecasts and warnings affected by recent job cuts?
- What conspiracy theories have been circulating?
- How has the media responded?
How did the flooding develop?
The flash flooding began in the early hours of the morning on Friday 4 July, with early news coverage focusing on Guadalupe River in Kerr County.
According to BBC News, the US National Weather Service (NWS) reported a “swathe of around 5-10 inches (125-250mm) of rainfall in just three to six hours across south-central Kerr County”, equivalent to “around four months of rain [falling] in a matter of hours”.
The slow-moving weather system was fed by moisture from the remnants of Tropical Storm Barry, which had brought flooding to Mexico, before tracking north as it died out, the outlet explained.
Kerr County is a “hillier part of Texas than surrounding counties”, meaning that “moisture-laden air was forced upwards, building huge storm clouds”, the article noted:
“These storm clouds were so large they effectively became their own weather system, producing huge amounts of rain over a large area.”
Prof Hatin Sharif, a hydrologist and civil engineer at the University of Texas at San Antonio, explained in an article for the Conversation why Kerr County is part of an area known as “flash flood alley”:
“The hills are steep and the water moves quickly when it floods. This is a semi-arid area with soils that don’t soak up much water, so the water sheets off quickly and the shallow creeks can rise fast.”
He added that Texas as a whole “leads the nation in flood deaths” – by a “wide margin”.
As the rain lashed down, the “destructive, fast-moving waters” of Guadalupe River rose by 8 metres in just 45 minutes before daybreak on Friday, said the Associated Press, “washing away homes and vehicles”.
The Washington Post reported that the river reached its “second-greatest height on record…and higher than levels reached when floodwaters rose in 1987”. It added that “at least 1.8tn gallons of rain” fell over the region on Friday morning.
The floodwaters swept through camps, resorts and motorhome parks along the banks of Guadalupe River for the Fourth of July weekend.
A timeline of events by NPR reported that “boats and other equipment that was pre-positioned started responding immediately”.
The article quotes Texas lieutenant governor Dan Patrick, who said there were 14 helicopters, 12 drones and nine rescue teams in action – as well as “swimmers in the water rescuing adults and children out of trees”. He added that there were 400 to 500 people on the ground helping with the rescue effort.
By Saturday 5 July, more than 1,000 local, state and federal personnel were on the ground helping with the rescue operation, NPR said.
In the days that followed, further periods of heavy rainfall meant that flood watches remained in place for much of the weekend, said Bloomberg.
Newspapers and online outlets were filled with images from the area. For example, the Sunday Times carried photos and video footage of the floods, while BBC News had drone footage of the “catastrophic flooding”.
What impact did the flooding have?
The floods have killed at least 119 people, according to the latest count reports by the Guardian:
“In Kerr county, the area that was worst affected by last Friday’s flood, officials said on Wednesday morning that 95 people had died. The other 24 people who have died are from surrounding areas. The Kerr county sheriff said 59 adults and 36 children had died, with 27 bodies still unidentified.”
There are also 173 people believed to still be missing, the Guardian said, including 161 from Kerr County specifically.
Bloomberg noted that “some of the victims came from additional storms around the state capital Austin on 5 July”. It added that, according to officials, “no one had been found alive since 4 July, when the deluge arrived in the pre-dawn hours”.
BBC News reported that continuing rains following the initial flood “hamper[ed] rescue teams who are already facing venomous snakes as they sift through mud and debris”.
Headlines have been dominated by the death of 27 children and counsellors from Camp Mystic – a 700-acre summer camp for girls, which has been running for almost 100 years, noted the Guardian.
BBC News reported that “many of the hundreds of girls at the camp were sleeping in low-lying cabins less than 500ft (150 metres) from the riverbank”.
Lieutenant governor Patrick “told of one heroic camp counsellor who smashed a window so girls in their pyjamas could swim out through neck-high water”, the outlet reported. He added that “these little girls, they swam for about 10 or 15 minutes” before reaching safety.
The Associated Press reported:
“Dozens of families shared in local Facebook groups that they received devastating phone calls from safety officials informing them that their daughters had not yet been located among the washed-away camp cabins and downed trees. Camp Mystic said in an email to parents of the roughly 750 campers that if they have not been contacted directly, their child is accounted for.”
The New York Times published images and videos of the aftermath at the summer camp.
Visiting the site on Sunday 6 July, Texas governor Greg Abbott tweeted that the camp was “horrendously ravaged in ways unlike I’ve seen in any natural disaster”.
In the immediate aftermath of the floods, US president Donald Trump, at his golf club in Bedminster in New Jersey, signed a major disaster declaration that freed up resources for the state, reported France24.
A preliminary estimate by the private weather service AccuWeather put the damage and economic loss at $18bn-$22bn (£13.2bn-£16.2bn), the Guardian reported.
Former president Barack Obama described the events as “absolutely heartbreaking”, reported the Hill. In a statement, former president George W Bush and his wife Laura – who was once a counselor at the camp – said that they “are heartbroken by the loss of life and the agony so many are feeling”, another Hill article reported.
American-born pontiff Pope Leo XIV also “voiced his sympathies”, reported another Guardian article. Speaking at the Vatican, he said:
“I would like to express sincere condolences to all the families who have lost loved ones, in particular their daughters who were in a summer camp in the disaster caused by flooding of the Guadalupe River in Texas.”
What role did climate change play?
As the planet warms, extreme rainfall events are becoming more intense in many parts of the world.
This is principally because, according to the Clausius-Clapeyron (C-C) equation, the air is able to hold 7% more moisture for every 1C that the atmosphere warms, which means warmer air can release more liquid water when it rains.
For example, a recent study of the US found that the frequency of heavy rainfall at “durations from hourly to daily increased in 1949-2020”. It added that this was “likely inconsistent with natural climate variability”.
In addition, research indicates that, in some parts of the world, increases in the intensity of extreme rainfall over 1-3 hours are “stronger” than would be expected from the C-C scaling.
However, many other factors – such as local weather patterns and land use – affect whether extreme rainfall leads to flooding.
Local meteorologist Cary Burgess told Newsweek that “this part of the Texas Hill Country is very prone to flash flooding because of the rugged terrain and rocky landscape”. For example, the outlet notes, 10 teenagers died in flash floods in July 1987.
In the aftermath of the flooding in Texas, Dr Daniel Swain, a climate scientist at the University of California Agriculture and Natural Resources, told ABC News that there is “abundant evidence” that “highly extreme rain events” have “already increased considerably around the world as a result of the warming that’s already occurred”.
Prof Andrew Dessler from Texas A&M University wrote on climate science newsletter The Climate Brink that “more water in the air flowing into the storm will lead to more intense rainfall”. He added:
“The role of climate change is like steroids for the weather – it injects an extra dose of intensity into existing weather patterns.”
Dr Jennifer Francis, a climate scientist at the Woodwell Climate Research Center, told Bloomberg that Texas is “particularly flood-prone because the fever-hot Gulf of Mexico is right next door, providing plenty of tropical moisture to fuel storms when they come along”.
Many outlets pointed out the higher-than-average sea surface temperatures in the Gulf of Mexico. BBC News said:
“Sea surface temperatures in the Gulf of Mexico, where some of the air originated from, continue to be warmer than normal. Warmer waters mean more evaporation and so more available moisture in the atmosphere to feed a storm.”
Yale Climate Connections reported that sea surface temperatures were up to 1C above average in the central Gulf of Mexico. It said that human-caused climate change made these conditions up to 10 times more likely, according to the Climate Shift Index from Climate Central.
(This index gives the ratio of how common the temperature is in today’s climate, compared to how likely it would be in a world without climate change.)
Bloomberg was among a number of outlets to note that, in the run-up to the flooding, nearly 90% of Kerr County was experiencing “extreme” or “exceptional” drought. This meant the soil was hard and less able to soak in water when the intense rainfall arrived.
Just days after the event, rapid attribution group ClimaMeter published an analysis of the meteorological conditions that led to the flooding.
It stated that “conditions similar to those of the July 2025 Texas floods are becoming more favorable for extreme precipitation, in line with what would be expected under continued global warming”.
According to the analysis, the flooding was a “very exceptional meteorological event”. It explained that “meteorological conditions” similar to those that caused the floods are “up to 2 mm/day (up to 7%) wetter in the present than they have been in the past”. It added:
“Natural variability alone cannot explain the changes in precipitation associated with this very exceptional meteorological condition.”
The field of extreme weather attribution aims to find the “fingerprint” of climate change in extreme events such as floods, droughts and heatwaves.
ClimaMeter focuses on the atmospheric circulation patterns that cause an extreme event – for example, a low-pressure system in a particular region. Once an event is defined, the scientists search the historical record to find events with similar circulation patterns to calculate how the intensity of the events has changed over time.
The study authors warned that they have “low confidence in the robustness” of their conclusions for this study, because the event is “very exceptional in the data record”, so they do not have many past events to compare it to.
In its coverage of the attribution study, the Wall Street Journal highlighted some of the research’s limitations. It said:
“Remnant moisture from Tropical Storm Barry stalled over the region and repeatedly fed rainfall, making it hard to compare the weather pattern to historical data.”
The outlet quoted one of the study’s co-authors, Dr Davide Faranda, a scientist at France’s National Centre for Scientific Research, who said the data “nonetheless suggests that climate change played a role”.
Many other climate scientists have also linked the flooding to climate change.
For example, Dr Leslie Mabon, a senior lecturer in environmental systems at the Open University, told the Science Media Centre:
“The Texas floods point to two issues. One is that there’s no such thing as a natural disaster – and one area that disaster experts will be probing is what warnings were given and when. The second is that the pace and scale of climate change means extreme events can and do exceed what our infrastructure and built environment is able to cope with.”
Were the forecasts and warnings affected by recent job cuts?
Observers were quick to question how the response to the floods has been impacted by recent sweeping cuts to federal climate, weather and disaster response services by the Trump administration.
BBC News explained how staffing cuts overseen by the so-called Department of Government Efficiency – the initiative formerly led by Elon Musk – have reduced the workforce National Weather Service (NWS).
The news outlet reported that – since the start of the year – “most” probationary employees had their contracts terminated, 200 employees have taken voluntary redundancy, 300 opted for early retirement and 100 were “ultimately fired”.
(The Trump administration has also proposed a 25% cut to the budget of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) – the agency which oversees the NWS – but this would not come into force until the 2026 financial year.)
The Independent was among a raft of publications to report the weather service had predicted 1-3 inches (2.5-7.6cm) of rain for the region – significantly less than the 10-15 inches (25-38cm) that ultimately fell.
CNN detailed how the first “life-threatening flash flooding warning” for parts of Kerr County – which would have triggered alerts to mobile phones in the area – was issued just past 1am on Friday morning by the NWS. This was 12 hours after the first flash flood warning and followed “several technical forecasts” issued on Thursday afternoon and evening with “increasingly heightened language”, it said.
Other publications focused on staffing shortages at local branches of the weather service. The New York Times and Guardian were among the outlets who reported that “key staff members” had been missing at the two Texas NWS offices involved in forecasting and warning for the affected region. This included a “warning coordination” officer.
Writing on social media platform BlueSky, Dr Daniel Swain – the climate scientist from the University of California Agriculture and Natural Resources – said claims that the weather service “did not foresee” the floods were “simply not true”. He stated:
“This truly was a sudden and massive event and occurred at [the] worst possible time (middle of the night). But [the] problem, once again, was not a bad weather prediction: it was one of “last mile” forecast/warning dissemination.
“I am not aware of the details surrounding staffing levels at the local NWS offices involved, nor how that might have played into [the] timing/sequence of warnings involved. But I do know that locations that flooded catastrophically had at least 1-2+ hours of direct warning from NWS.”
Rick Spinrad, who led NOAA over 2021-25, speculated that the communication problems could have been caused by staffing shortages. He told the Hill:
“I do think the cuts are contributing to the inability of emergency managers to respond…The weather service did a really good job, actually, in getting watches and warnings and…wireless emergency alerts out.
“It is really a little early to give a specific analysis of where things might have broken down, but from what I’ve seen, it seems like the communications breakdown in the last mile is where most of the problem was.”
The Trump administration, meanwhile, was quick to push back on the suggestion that budget and job cuts to climate and weather services had aggravated the situation.
In an official statement provided to Axios, a White House spokesperson said criticisms of the NWS and funding cut accusations were “shameful and disgusting”. It added:
“False claims about the NWS have been repeatedly debunked by meteorologists, experts and other public reporting. The NWS did their job, even issuing a flood watch more than 12 hours in advance.”
Meanwhile, when a reporter asked Trump whether the administration would investigate whether recent cuts had led to “key” vacancies at the NWS, he responded that “they did not”.
Asked if he thought federal meteorologists should be rehired, Trump said:
“I would think not. This was the thing that happened in seconds. Nobody expected it. Nobody saw it.”
Media outlets highlighted how the disaster put a spotlight on the risks of forthcoming federal cuts to NOAA and the government’s plans to dismantle the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The Guardian reported on warnings that such floods could become the “new normal” as “Trump and his allies dismantle crucial federal agencies that help states prepare and respond to extreme weather and other hazards”.
Dr Samantha Montano, professor of emergency management at Massachusetts Maritime Academy, told the outlet.
“This is what happens when you let climate change run unabated and break apart the emergency management system – without investing in that system at the local and state level.”
CBS News reported about how, in 2017, Kerr County officials rejected proposals to install an outdoor warning system for floods on the grounds of cost. The outlet noted that neighbouring counties Guadalupe and Comal both have flood sirens in place.
What conspiracy theories have been circulating?
As with many other natural disasters, the floods have been followed by a wave of fast-spreading online misinformation.
One of the most popular theories to have taken hold is that the floods were caused by cloud seeding – a form of geoengineering where substances are purposefully introduced into the clouds to enhance rainfall.
In a pair of Twitter posts, each viewed by several million people, one account claimed the state of Texas was “running seven massive cloud seeding programs” and asked: “Did they push the clouds too far and trigger this flood?”
It also linked the floods and cloud seeding operations conducted by Rainmaker Technology Corporation, a weather modification start-up partly funded by US billionaire Peter Thiel.
Rainmaker Technology Corporation CEO Augustus Doricko found himself in the eye of the social media storm, as social media users pointed to his organisation’s links to Thiel and shared a photo of the businessman with former US president Bill Clinton.
The cloud seeding theory received a major boost when it was promoted by Mike Flynn, Donald Trump’s former national security advisor and one of the “most integral figures in the QAnon movement”, according to the Guardian.
The weather modification theory was picked up by existing and prospective Republican politicians.
The Daily Beast reported how Kandiss Taylor – a Republican congressional candidate in Georgia – blamed the event on “fake weather” in a string of tweets. She wrote: “This isn’t just ‘climate change.’ It’s cloud seeding, geoengineering, & manipulation.”
Meanwhile, sitting Georgia congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene announced on Twitter that she had introduced a bill that “prohibits the injection, release, or dispersion of chemicals or substances into the atmosphere for the express purpose of altering weather, temperature, climate, or sunlight intensity”.
(This is not Taylor Greene’s first foray into weather manipulation conspiracies. In 2021, she postulated that Jewish bankers had started deadly fires in California in 2018 by firing a laser from space in order to benefit themselves financially.)
Meteorologists were quick to debunk the claims around cloud seeding. In a Facebook post, chief meteorologist for Texas news station ABC13 wrote:
“Cloud seeding cannot create a storm of this magnitude or size. In fact, cloud seeding cannot even create a single cloud. All it can do is take an existing cloud and enhance the rainfall by up to 20%.”
At a press conference on Monday, Texas senator Ted Cruz said there was “zero evidence of anything like weather modification”. He added:
“The internet can be a strange place. People can come up with all sorts of crazy theories.”
Theories about geoengineering were not the only form of misinformation to swirl online in the wake of the disaster.
Snopes reported how local outlet Kerr County Lead pulled a story about two girls rescued 30 metres up a tree two days after the flood event after the account was found to be false.
The story, which cited “sources on the ground”, was circulated widely on Twitter and replicated by other news outlets, including the Daily Mirror and Manchester Evening News in the UK. Both outlets subsequently deleted the articles.
In a retraction statement, the editor of Kerr County Lead said the story was a “classic tale of misinformation that consumes all of us during a natural disaster”.
Another widely-circulated story – debunked by Snopes – claimed that musician Eric Clapton would pay funeral expenses for the families of those killed.
How has the media responded?
The scale of flooding and the resulting death toll have prompted many news outlets to ask whether more could have been done to avoid the tragedy.
Newspapers in Texas highlighted perceived failures by local, state and federal authorities.
“Flash floods happen frequently enough in the Hill Country that many Texans rightly wonder whether at least some of the devastation and death…could have been prevented,” the Dallas Morning News said. “Answers must follow,” agreed the Austin American-Statesman.
An editorial in the San Antonio Express-News said there would likely be “plenty of finger-pointing”, arguing that “people will try to push narratives that serve political and personal agendas”. It added:
“The truth may reveal inevitability, failure or something in between.”
An editorial in the Houston Chronicle criticised “misguided decisions” by Trump to cut support for the “federal agencies that keep us safe from storms”. It stated:
“What will protect Texans is a fully staffed, fully supported weather service – with the scientists and infrastructure in place to warn us in time.”
While none of these Texan newspaper editorials pointed to a potential role for climate change in exacerbating the extreme rainfall, some of their wider reporting on the disaster did.
Other US news outlets, such as the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post emphasised this link in their coverage.
“We hope this tragedy will lead to renewed support for the systems we’ve devised over the years to help prepare for and respond to natural disasters,” Louisiana’s New Orleans Advocate stated in an editorial, adding that “we all are vulnerable to increasingly extreme weather events caused by climate change”.
In Pennsylvania, a Patriot-News editorial said that, following the floods, “government officials at all levels need to accept the reality of climate change. Too many do not.”
Writing in his news outlet, Bloomberg, businessman and former Democratic presidential nominee Michael Bloomberg made a direct link between the “climate denialism” of the Trump administration and the disaster in Texas.
The New York Times has an opinion piece on the floods by MaryAnn Tierney, former regional administrator at the FEMA. Besides making a clear link to climate change, Tierney stated that:
“The uncomfortable truth is this: With each passing day, the federal government is becoming less prepared to face the next big disaster.”
More overtly right-leaning and Trump-supporting media outlets in the US took aim at “left-wing critics” for linking the event to climate change and Trump administration cuts.
An article in Fox News, which has broadcast discussions of flood-related conspiracy theories, criticised “liberals” for “politicising the disastrous flooding”.
An editorial in the New York Post is headlined: “Lefty responses to the Texas flooding horror are demented and depraved.” It argued that Democrats had “wrongly suggest[ed] that Team Trump slowed the disaster response”.
Diana Furchtgott-Roth, from the climate-sceptic Heritage Foundation, wrote in the UK’s Daily Telegraph that Democrats were trying to “politicise mother nature” by linking weather-service cuts to the deaths in Texas.
Meanwhile, Guardian columnist Rebecca Solnit urged caution in definitively linking the floods to any specific political issue amid “the information onslaughts of this moment”. She concluded that “both the weather and the news require vigilance.”
The post Media reaction: The 2025 Texas floods and the role of climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Media reaction: The 2025 Texas floods and the role of climate change
Climate Change
China Briefing 10 July 2025: New sector targets; Overcapacity dressing-down; Adaptation scorecard
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.
China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
New sector targets in renewable portfolio standard
NEW QUOTAS: China has published the 2025-2026 provincial quotas for renewable energy consumption, which for the first time included sectoral targets for iron and steel, cement, polysilicon and certain types of data centres, industry news outlet BJX News reported, as well as updates to the aluminium sector targets established last year. Bloomberg said that the steel, cement and polysilicon sectors will need to use low-carbon energy to “meet between 25% and 70% of their demand” under the policy. Energy news outlet International Energy Net noted that Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai provinces faced the “highest quotas”, at 70%. (For comparison, the average provincial quota is 38%, Carbon Brief calculated. A separate quota for these three provinces that does not include hydropower is much closer to the national average.)
POWER RUSH: In contrast to expectations that renewable installations in China would slow for the rest of 2025, the state-run thinktank State Grid Energy Research Institute estimated that 380 gigawatts (GW) of solar, 140GW of wind power and 120GW of thermal power (likely mostly coal) will be added this year, Bloomberg reported. It noted that the solar figure is “more than 50% higher than forecasts from the leading solar industrial group”. According to NEA data, the estimate implies China will add 182GW in solar, 94GW in wind and 102GW in thermal power between June and December.
MANAGING THE INCREASE: Li Chao, spokesperson for the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), told reporters that “large-scale xiaona (消纳) consumption of renewable energy is critical” given rapid capacity growth, according to industry outlet China Energy News, adding that consumption rates continue to exceed 90% – meaning no more than 10% of potential output is being wasted, according to government calculations. However, separate outlet China Energy Net reported that wind and solar utilisation rates (利用率) in some provinces fell below the government-set red line of 90%, due to rapid growth. Dr Muyi Yang, senior energy analyst for Asia at thinktank Ember, told Carbon Brief: “The recent dip in utilisation rates in the western regions is an early warning that [investment in the grid] needs to speed up.”
OPEN ARMS?: Coal power still has “room to grow” during the fifteenth five-year plan period (2026-2030) despite market challenges, China Electricity Council chief expert Chen Zongfa told BJX News. Chen said this was due to the changing “attitude of the government”, which “no longer demonises coal”. The influential State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) pledged to “speed up the construction of thermal power projects” and “ensure the safe and stable supply of coal”, according to China Energy News. Another China Energy News article quoted an NDRC official saying China needed to “ensure the stability of coal supply”. Meanwhile, in a visit to Shanxi, President Xi Jinping told local policymakers to transform the coal industry “from low-end to high-end” while also developing clean-energy, Xinhua said.
Floods and heatwaves
‘INTENSE’ RAINS: Several regions in China, including the southern Henan, Guizhou and Hubei provinces, were hit by “intense rainfall” throughout late June and early July, causing “severe flooding” and several deaths, Bloomberg reported, in an article noting that climate change is “fuelling” extreme weather events. Meanwhile, high temperatures “enveloped China’s eastern seaboard…raising fears of droughts and economic losses”, Reuters said, adding that “extreme heat, which meteorologists link to climate change, has emerged as a major challenge for Chinese policymakers”.
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NEW WARNINGS: At the launch of the China Blue Book on Climate Change 2025 – a document outlining global and China-specific impacts of climate change – National Climate Center deputy director Xiao Chan stated that the “national average temperature in June was 21.1C”, marking the hottest June since records began, according to business news outlet 21st Century Business Herald. State news agency Xinhua quoted Chen Min, vice-minister of the Ministry of Water Resources, telling reporters that 329 rivers had flooded “above warning levels” as of 4 July. Meanwhile, the government established a new heat-health warning system, which “aims to strengthen public health preparedness amid growing climate challenges”, the state-run newspaper China Daily said.
GRID PRESSURES: Linked to high temperatures along the east coast, the National Energy Administration (NEA) revealed that China’s maximum power demand reached a “record high” of 1,465GW on 4 July, finance news outlet Yicai reported, adding that air-conditioning load “accounted for about 37%” of the peak power grid load in eastern China. Bloomberg said that the grid is “in better shape to take on peak summer demand this year”, following preparations to avoid previous blackouts.
Setting the tone on ‘overcapacity’
MIIT HAUL-UP: In a meeting with solar industry representatives, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) head Li Lecheng said MIIT “will further increase macro-guidance and governance of the industry” in the face of “low-price disorderly competition”, BJX News reported. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP) noted that Li also said companies should be “guided” to phase out “outdated production capacity”. In its coverage, Bloomberg noted that it was “unclear” what impact the meeting would have, but that it “highlight[ed] the seriousness with which Beijing views” the issue.
CLEAR SIGNALS: The meeting followed days of signalling from China on the need to crack down on industrial overcapacity, which has been blamed for “flood[ing trading] partners’ markets with artificially low-cost goods”, according to the Financial Times. In late June, the front page of the party-affiliated newspaper People’s Daily carried an article under the byline Jin Sheping – used to signal the thoughts of party leadership on economic matters – stating that “rat race competition”, a term linked to overcapacity, would “destroy” industries such as solar, lithium-ion batteries and new-energy vehicles (NEVs). At an economic policy meeting, Xi said China must “govern low-price and disorderly competition…and promote the orderly withdrawal of outdated production capacity”, BJX News said. (He also noted the need to develop more “offshore wind power” and a “unified national market”.) On the same day, ideological journal Qiushi also published an article criticising “rat race competition”. Meanwhile, the Associated Press reported, China also “shows signs of tackling” similar overcapacity issues in the NEV industry.
EUROPE UNHAPPY: European policymakers appear unconvinced, however, with top EU diplomat Kaja Kallas telling her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi that China must “put an end to its distortive practices…which pose significant risks to European companies and endanger the reliability of global supply chains”, according to Reuters. It added that the remarks came during meetings aiming to “lay the groundwork for a summit between EU and Chinese leaders” set to take place on 24 July. Meanwhile, the EU is refusing to consider publishing a joint EU-China climate declaration at the leaders’ summit “unless China pledged greater efforts to cut its greenhouse gas emissions”, the Financial Times reported.
BRICS message on climate finance
MITIGATION FUND: The heads of the BRICS nations, a grouping of China and several other global south countries, “demand[ed] that wealthy nations fund mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions in poorer nations” at a leaders summit in early July, Reuters said. It added that, while Brazil “urged a global transition away from fossil fuels”, the resulting joint statement “argued that petroleum will continue to play an important role in the global energy mix, particularly in developing economies”. Reacting to the summit, the campaign group WWF said in a press release: “When it comes to climate, the message falls short.”
GLOBAL SOUTH VOICE: The Guardian noted that “Brazilian diplomats see the BRICS alliance as part of an emerging new world order”, noting that the summit featured “pushback against the EU” over “discriminatory protectionist measures under the pretext of environmental concerns”. Brazil also used the summit to ask “China and BRICS member states in the Middle East to be among the seed funders” for long-term financing for conservation, the newspaper said, adding that this did not seem to have been successful. The absence of Xi from the meeting, in a first at a BRICS leaders summit, sparked significant speculation around how valuable China saw the block as being.
Spotlight
Key takeaways from China’s latest climate adaptation progress report
China’s Ministry of Ecology and the Environment (MEE) recently published a report outlining China’s progress last year in adapting to climate change. In this issue, Carbon Brief outlines three key messages from the assessment.
Extreme weather events are becoming more severe
China’s climate was “relatively poor” (偏差) in 2024, the MEE report stated, with several “record-breaking or severely disastrous” extreme weather events.
These include extreme heat and cold, rainfall, typhoons, flooding and severe convective weather.
Weather events have generally worsened year-on-year, the report said. In 2024, China’s average temperature stood at 10.9C – the warmest since modern records began.
Similarly, national average rainfall totalled almost 698 millimetres, up 9% year-on-year. More typhoons made landfall in China in 2024 compared to 2023, of which several had “large disaster impacts”, according to the report.
It added that these events had “serious adverse” socio-economic impacts, noting that extreme weather led to at least 500 deaths or disappearances in 2024. (Statistics for deaths and disappearances were not included in the 2023 edition of the report.)
In 2024, the central government spent more than 2.5bn yuan ($350m) on “natural disaster relief funds”, covering flooding, drought and extreme cold.
Climate-resilient infrastructure still a main focus
Extreme weather is also increasingly damaging infrastructure, the report noted. For example, more than 29m users lost power due to extreme weather.
Much of the report is dedicated to describing China’s efforts to develop infrastructure that can resist or help mitigate the effects of extreme weather events.
Managing “water resources” and water conservation continued to receive a strong focus in the report, which added that, in 2024, “major water conservancy projects continued to be developed to a high quality”.
It also noted that this infrastructure buildout “played a key role” in mitigating the impact of floods in 2024, with thousands of reservoirs nationwide being used to store floodwater.
This, it said, “reduced” the impact of 26 floods on 2,300 cities and towns and 17m mu [slightly more than 1m hectares] of arable land”.
The country is also strengthening its ability to predict future extreme weather events, building more than 10,000 new monitoring and early-warning stations in 2024.
Cities are being encouraged to become more “climate resilient”, with 39 authorised to develop pilot programmes exploring possible solutions.
The report noted that, in 2024, 60 cities were developing “sponge city” projects, using nature-based solutions to absorb, collect or reuse floodwater.
Liu Junyan, project lead for the climate risk project at campaign group Greenpeace East Asia, told Carbon Brief that sponge-city solutions did seem to play a beneficial role during the deadly Henan floods in 2021, where floodwaters receded more quickly in Zhengzhou city than other areas.
“But sponge-city methods are not made to handle the extreme rainfall caused by climate change,” she added.
China’s response is relatively ‘holistic’, but disconnects remain
The MEE report emphasised that China’s overarching climate adaptation strategy covers a broad range of socio-economic impacts.
For example, it mentioned efforts in 2024 to prepare technical guidelines for assessing climate change impacts and risks. Carbon Brief understands that the aim of these efforts is to help provincial governments use more standardised, science-based assessments of climate risk, as well as how they should respond.
The report also noted efforts to develop climate-conscious behaviours, such as campaigns encouraging farmers to use “water-saving” irrigation technologies and guidelines to “enhance public awareness” of potential climate-related health risks.
Liu said China’s approach to adaptation is “holistic”, but added that it remains “top-down”, sometimes causing local needs to go unmet.
Furthermore, the report said China needs to further develop strategies for climate impacts on “urban and rural habitats” and “sensitive” industries such as finance, tourism and energy.
Watch, read, listen
HAWKS AND DOVES: The European Parliament broadcasted a debate on EU-China relations ahead of the upcoming leaders’ summit, in which European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen spoke on electric vehicles, rare earths and overcapacity.
DEFINING MOMENT: Shanghai-based news outlet the Paper interviewed former UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon on China’s role in accelerating climate ambition this year.
CLIMATE PATH: Analysts at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s China climate hub spoke on Environment China about China’s latest emissions, clean-energy and climate diplomacy trends.
STUNTING GROWTH: The US-based National Public Radio explored how climate change is affecting China’s tea-growers, with crops “stunted” and farmers struggling with “changing rhythms”.
6%
The electrification rate of China’s transport sector – well below the economy-wide figure of close to 30% – despite the rapid adoption of NEVs, Chen Ji, executive director at China International Capital Corporation, said at the China launch of the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Investment 2025 report, attended by Carbon Brief. Chen added that the low figure was due to the lack of progress in electrifying aviation and heavy-duty trucks.
New science
Increased socioeconomic impacts with future intensifying flash droughts in China
Geophysical Research Letters
A new paper found that “China will experience longer and more severe droughts, exposing 33% of the population and 35% of gross domestic product to risks under a medium-emission scenario”. The authors analysed economic and soil moisture data over 2000-22 to quantify past changes in “flash droughts”, using models to assess future changes under different climate scenarios. The paper found that “droughts are becoming more frequent in some areas, with a twofold increase in frequency in approximately 32% of these areas by the century’s end”. It added that wealthier regions will face greater economic losses due to flash droughts.
Communications Earth & Environment
Rice cultivation in China’s Sanjiang Plain has expanded northeast by more than two million hectares between 2000 and 2020, driving up irrigation demand by 6bn tonnes, according to a new study. The authors analysed data on “rice migration”, finding that rice expansion drove up irrigation by 122% over 2000-20, while an increase in rainfall due to climate change reduced irrigation demand by 22%. The authors said their findings “highlight the urgent need to make integrated strategies balancing crop migration [with] climate change and water resource conservation”.
Climate Change Research
The poorest counties in China are much more likely to experience record-breaking extreme weather events, which may push them “back to poverty”, according to new research published in a Chinese academic journal. The study combines more than twenty models with eight extreme weather indices to assess “patterns of extreme weather across 832 poverty-alleviated counties [as well as] other counties in China”. The authors recommend actions covering “water infrastructure; disaster mitigation; catastrophe insurance; and public awareness and education” to support climate adaptation in these areas.
China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 10 July 2025: New sector targets; Overcapacity dressing-down; Adaptation scorecard appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China Briefing 10 July 2025: New sector targets; Overcapacity dressing-down; Adaptation scorecard
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