Russia’s increasing influence in African countries and its focus on critical minerals pose significant challenges for the West. In a historic announcement on March 16 this year, Niger declared the immediate termination of its military cooperation with the US. The country nullified a military agreement that permitted US bases on its territory.
Critics argue that Russia’s resource-driven approach may exacerbate existing governance challenges, including corruption, environmental degradation, and social unrest.
As reported by Oregon News, Niger’s military junta and US officials, had a crucial meeting during which the latter conveyed apprehensions regarding Russia’s growing military involvement in the nation. Niger made the “announcement” immediately after the meeting. Additionally, concerns were raised about attempts by the junta to renegotiate mining contracts with potential implications for energy leverage against Western interests.
Let’s learn how Russia’s pursuits for Africa’s critical minerals can impact the country and its global resource acquisition efforts.
Russia’s Quest for African Mineral Resources
One of the focal points of Russia’s interest lies in rare earth elements (REEs), essential components in various high-tech applications, including electronics, renewable energy technologies, and defense systems.
Africa boasts 30% of the world’s mineral reserves, making it an attractive target for resource-hungry nations like Russia.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) emerges as a prime target in Russia’s mineral quest, given its abundant cobalt reserves, a crucial element in lithium-ion batteries powering EVs and smartphones. Russia’s interest in cobalt aligns with its ambitions to establish a stronger foothold in the rapidly expanding electric vehicle market.
In addition to cobalt, Russia has set its sights on other critical minerals such as lithium, vanadium, and platinum group metals. All these REEs are indispensable to modern industries involved in energy storage, battery and catalytic converters, etc.
Furthermore, Russia had always weighed minerals as a currency. They have intervened in Africa to bolster their control through paramilitary means. By providing security and employing intimidation tactics, Russia grabbed lucrative mining agreements. Furthermore, it offers military support to sustain the weaker regimes.
Russian tactics are in absolute contrast to the Western nations. The country operates ruthlessly without considering human rights, democracy, or legal frameworks.
Russia Intensifies Use of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in Africa
According to media reports, in recent years Russia has increased deployment of private military contractors (PMCs) to put a tight foothold on the continent. PMCs are for-profit organizations that provide combat, security, and logistical services for hire.
Russian PMCs first arrived in Africa under a contract with the Libyan Cement Company in 2017.
One notable example of Russia’s use of PMCs in Africa is its involvement in the Central African Republic (CAR). In 2018, the Russian government signed a military cooperation agreement with the CAR, leading to the deployment of the Wagner Group, the most famous Russian PMC.
Subsequently, the PMCs have swiftly extended their presence into Sub-Saharan Africa. They operate in Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), Madagascar, Mozambique, and Libya.
The group trains local armed forces to use Russian-supplied arms, protects Russian-operated gold, uranium, and diamond mines, and acts as bodyguard and advisor to the Central African president.
Africa’s Share of Critical Mineral Wealth
A few years back the World Bank projected that a ~ 500% rise in the production of key minerals and metals like lithium, graphite, and cobalt by 2050 is needed to meet global demand for REEs.
With a focus on revenue within Africa, the McKinsey Group has conducted an evaluation. It states:
- Africa could generate between US $200 million and US $2 billion of additional annual revenue by 2030 and create up to 3.8 million jobs by building a competitive, low-carbon manufacturing sector.
- Additionally, minerals could play a crucial role in meeting African citizens’ huge housing and transport needs by driving the sustainable development of these sectors.
Africa holds 40% of the world’s gold and up to 90% of its chromium and platinum reserves. The continent also possesses the largest cobalt, diamonds, platinum, and uranium globally. Zimbabwe has huge lithium potential while Zambia’s copper reserves are capable of substantial revenue generation.
Despite owning 30% of the world’s mineral reserves, Africa accounts for less than 10% of global mining exploration spending. For instance, untapped raw mineral deposits in the DRC are estimated to be worth more than US$24 trillion.
Therefore, accessing Africa’s abundant resources is imperative to achieve these ambitious goals.
Image: Distribution of Africa’s shares of global production of selected critical minerals.

Russia’s Engagement in Africa: Understanding Strategic Motivations
1. Bypassing sanctions: Gold and diamonds provide Russia with a means to circumvent economic sanctions enforced since the invasion of Ukraine. Africa, boasting 40% of the world’s gold reserves and the largest diamond reserves, serves as a key resource hub.
2. Geopolitical influence: As already explained, Russia has established fresh military and political alliances to reduce Western influence in African nations. Specifically, Russia offers “regime survival packages” in exchange for natural resource extraction rights, bolstering its geopolitical standing. This serves as a huge vantage point for native Africans.
Moreover, Russia’s engagement in African mineral extraction extends beyond traditional mining operations. The Kremlin has forged strategic partnerships and investment deals with African nations, leveraging its resource extraction and infrastructure development. These partnerships often come bundled with political and military agreements, bolstering Russia’s influence in Africa.
A stark example is the Blood Gold Report’s Findings that stated,
“The Kremlin has earned more than US$2.5 billion from trade in African gold since Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.”
Is Russia’s Intervention Loosening the West’s Grip on Africa?
The intensification of Russia’s mineral scramble in Africa has raised concerns among Western powers and regional stakeholders. They anticipate worse implications from the geopolitical dynamics and local governance. Critics argue that Russia’s resource-driven approach may exacerbate existing governance challenges, including corruption, environmental degradation, and social unrest.
Furthermore, Russia’s expanding presence in African mineral extraction poses a potential challenge to Western dominance in resource markets. It prompts calls for increased vigilance and strategic engagement from Western policymakers.
Niger’s Recent Decision: A Threat to the West
Niger, the world’s seventh-largest producer of uranium, supplies France this vital resource for nuclear power generation. Apart from uranium, Niger has abundant natural resources of coal, gold, iron ore, and phosphates.
However, Niger’s recent decision to temporarily halt the issuance of new mining licenses highlights the challenges faced in maintaining stable supply chains.
Niger’s situation exemplifies the broader concern regarding Russia’s increasing influence in African nations.
It poses a looming threat to the West in securing its critical mineral supply chains. The withdrawal of US troops from neighboring Chad is another testament to the burgeoning geopolitical tensions.
Jack Watling, land warfare specialist at the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) has examined the situation and commented,
“While lithium and gold mines are clearly important, in Niger the Russians are endeavoring to gain a similar set of concessions that would strip French access to the uranium mines in the country.”
Image: Share of Africa’s critical minerals and their global demand projections

As Russia continues to deepen its involvement in Africa’s mineral sector, the geopolitical implications will likely reverberate far beyond its borders. Balancing the economic opportunities with the geopolitical risks inherent in this mineral scramble will be paramount for both African nations and the broader international community.
The post Russia Power Plays: Deploys Military Might Over Africa’s Critical Minerals appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
The Strategic Case for Nature-Based Carbon Investments
Nature-based carbon investments deserve consideration when they address a specific business dependency and produce outcomes you can measure. Imagine Moonbucks, a global coffee roaster planning next season’s espresso blend. It is considering natural Grade 4 coffee from Jimma, in southwestern Oromia, Ethiopia. Its sourcing decisions affect the roasting schedule and the cash tied up in coffee purchases. Moonbucks needs to understand which measures could protect that supply, what they would cost and how it would judge the results.
1. Define the sourcing problem before choosing a project
Moonbucks needs a dependable component for its espresso blend. Its procurement team wants continuity of volume and an agreed cup profile. Replacing a shipment at short notice could require new sample approval and changes to the blend, and given the schedules for cultivation, processing, and freight delivery, is practically impossible. Moonbucks needs to get this right, and its initial concern is inconsistent deliveries. It commissions an assessment of the supplying farms and post-harvest chain. The questions cover land condition, harvest availability and whether drying or storage problems are affecting saleable lots.
This distinction changes the investment brief. A tree-planting proposal cannot be assumed to fix drying problems. Better storage cannot restore eroded land. The team must establish which problem exists before selecting the response.
CCC’s guide to finding nature-based solutions in your supply chain explains where to look. Here, the next task is to turn a broad concern into a testable proposal.
2. Develop nature-based carbon investments around the actual supply chain
The assessment would trace Moonbucks’ purchases back through the exporter and supplying producer groups. Which farms supply the contracted lots? Who controls land-management decisions? How long does the buyer expect to maintain the purchasing relationship?
Furthermore, Jimma natural Grade 4 cannot be treated as interchangeable with every Ethiopian coffee. Moonbucks would need to test any substitute against its own blend and quality requirements.
Suppose Moonbucks’ assessment identifies an opportunity to maintain shade trees and restore vegetation along exposed streambanks. The IPCC describes agroforestry as a way to store carbon in vegetation and soil, with potential benefits for erosion control and water quality.1 Moonbucks would need local advice on species, growing conditions and maintenance before deciding how these measures fit its sourcing plan.
The proposal now has a defined sourcing connection and a candidate intervention. The next steps are to test its effect on production, assess carbon eligibility and build the financial case.
3. Compare the proposal with other ways to protect supply
WBCSD’s Nature-based Solutions Blueprint recommends comparing nature-based options with other responses across their benefits and costs.2 For Moonbucks, that means evaluating the landscape proposal alongside drying improvements, storage controls and alternative sourcing arrangements.
The product’s natural-process designation matters. Moonbucks should examine the drying and dry-milling chain alongside land conditions. Its team would check storage practices, contamination risks and incoming-lot quality to see whether problems arise before or after the coffee leaves the farms.
The revised proposal might combine land stewardship with separate post-harvest controls. Each component needs its own purpose and budget. A sustainability label should not obscure which activity is expected to solve which problem.
The project develops as the evidence improves. Its scope should follow the diagnosis rather than preserve the first idea unchanged.
4. Establish what the carbon outcome could count toward
Moonbucks’ sustainability team now tests the proposed carbon case separately from the sourcing case. Is the objective a measurable change in Moonbucks’ value-chain emissions, verified credits for separate voluntary use, or distinct outcomes under carefully defined arrangements?
Scope 3 covers value-chain emissions. A purchasing relationship alone does not prove that a farm intervention can be included in Moonbucks’ inventory. The team needs an applicable accounting method, defensible boundaries and evidence supporting attribution.
SBTi’s FLAG Guidance (forest, land and agriculture), version 1.2, says purchased credits used as offsets cannot meet near-term FLAG or energy and industry targets. Eligible land-based removals are subject to accounting requirements.3 Moonbucks needs to test its proposal against those rules before including an outcome in its targets.
For Moonbucks’ Jimma proposal, maintaining existing trees and establishing new vegetation could involve different carbon questions. Specialists must examine the baseline and additionality, meaning what changes because the project proceeds. They must also assess measurement and the risk that stored carbon is lost. CCC’s MRV and additionality article introduces those tests.
Until that work is complete, Moonbucks should not budget an assumed Scope 3 reduction or credit-sale receipt. Direct emissions reductions remain the priority.
5. Build a financial case that survives weaker assumptions
Moonbucks’ finance team would now build a multi-year budget. UNEP’s State of Finance for Nature 2023 compares current finance with the investment needed to meet climate, biodiversity and land-restoration goals.4 The company would cost its proposed activities, farmer participation and ongoing monitoring. Verification, where required, is a separate expense. Maintenance and responsibility for replacing failed plantings must remain visible after the initial establishment budget ends.
Operational benefits need equally careful treatment. If fewer rejected lots reduce emergency purchasing, count that saving once. Do not add “supply resilience” as another financial benefit when it represents the same avoided cost.
Moonbucks should compare a base case with slower benefits, higher implementation costs and no carbon revenue. It should also distinguish production outcomes from quality and shipment outcomes. A single good harvest would not prove that the landscape intervention caused better delivery performance.
A project can remain worth funding even when its carbon case needs more work. That decision must rest on the operational evidence and the company’s objectives, without unsupported environmental claims.
6. Fund a pilot with a clear expansion decision
Moonbucks’ first approval would fund a bounded pilot, rather than commit the entire sourcing program. Before spending, Moonbucks would agree on participating farms, responsibilities and the evidence needed at review.
Its scorecard could track farmer participation, implementation costs and plant survival, alongside accepted coffee volumes and lot-quality results. Carbon measurements would follow the selected method. Farm-level traceability must connect the intervention to the actual sourcing relationship.
Suppose Moonbucks’ review later finds that storage changes explain most quality improvements, while the land measures need longer observation. Those findings would shape the next decision: expand the proven component, adjust the landscape work or pause further spending. They would not justify crediting all improvements to tree planting.
This gives nature-based carbon investments a practical place in a multi-year strategy. Funding increases as the evidence supports it, and the project can change direction before a larger commitment.
Discuss a sourcing opportunity with CCC
Carbon Credit Capital’s nature-based supply-chain investment service uses its Dual-Value Model to examine supply-chain economics alongside potential sustainability outcomes.
Schedule a consultation to discuss your sourcing exposure and the questions to resolve before allocating capital.
Sources
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change, Chapter 7, Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses, section 7.4.3.3 (Agroforestry).
- World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Nature-based Solutions Blueprint, 5 June 2024.
- Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi), Forest, Land and Agriculture Science-Based Target-Setting Guidance, version 1.2, March 2026, section 3.1.4, pp. 37–38.
- United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), State of Finance for Nature 2023, 2023.
Carbon Footprint
How to buy plastic credits, and what to check before you do
A plastic credit funds the collection of plastic waste in places where no formal system exists to collect it. Each credit represents a measured, independently audited quantity of plastic taken out of the environment or returned to use, tracked on a public registry.
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Carbon Footprint
EU carbon credit claims after 27 September 2026
EU carbon credit claims changed on 27 September 2026, the day the Directive (EU) 2024/825 began to apply across the European Union. The change is narrow. It changes how a company can talk about the credits it buys. A product can no longer be called neutral on the strength of compensation alone; however, every specific, evidenced statement about what a company measured, reduced, and funded stays fully available.
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