China’s annual lianghui (两会) – also known as the “two sessions” – ended on 11 March, drawing the curtain on a key political event that saw limited climate targets set for 2024.
The “two sessions” political gathering, which usually takes place every March, gives an indication of China’s broad policy direction for the year, covering topics from the economy to industrial strategy to environmental protection.
In this article, Carbon Brief outlines the key signals from the 2024 “two sessions” on China’s plans for meeting climate targets, developing coal power, exporting clean-energy technology and more.
The article also assesses the impact of China’s goal of reducing energy intensity by 2.5% this year – described by analysts as “very soft-ball” – on its broader targets for reducing energy intensity and carbon intensity by 2025.
This is an update of Carbon Brief’s 7 March China Briefing newsletter, expanded with additional key points the government made about its approach to climate policy, as well as interpreting political signals sent throughout the “two sessions”.
- Why is the “two sessions” important?
- Does this year’s ‘government work report’ include hard climate targets?
- Is the report ambitious on climate?
- Will China continue to boost ‘green’ innovation?
- How will China manage geopolitical tensions around climate?
- What were other high-ranking policymakers saying about climate and energy policy at the “two sessions”?
- What next?
Why is the “two sessions” important?
The “two sessions” is the annual gathering of two bodies: China’s top legislative body, known as the National People’s Congress (NPC), and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory body similar to the House of Lords in the UK, but without any voting rights on legislation.
The gathering usually lasts for several days in Beijing and is attended by Chinese communist party members, as well as members of other political parties, academics, independent politicians and other prominent figures.
The “nearly 3,000” delegates represent the “democracy of China” and are given space to advance their own ideas. A select number of ministers are also given the opportunity to highlight their priorities in “minister’s corridor” press conferences.
Its centrepiece is the annual “government work report”, a speech traditionally delivered by the premier, who is the second most powerful leader in China. This speech underscores successes from the previous year and outlines priorities for the year ahead. It is also traditionally when China’s GDP growth target for the year is announced.
Alongside the government work report, China’s top economic planner, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), also announces more detailed plans for meeting the coming year’s other development targets.

Does this year’s ‘government work report’ include hard climate targets?
One of the few quantitative climate targets China set in this year’s government work report is to reduce energy intensity – its energy consumption per unit of GDP – by 2.5% over the coming year, a target that Bloomberg described as “modest”. The target was lower than analysts’ expectations of 4%, the outlet added.
Previous analysis for Carbon Brief found that China would need to reduce its energy intensity by 6% per year to meet its 2025 target of a 13.5% drop, with energy demand needing to fall in absolute terms.
The NDRC report says that the 2.5% target was set “after considering energy consumption in economic development, renewable energy substitution, and the need to make a green and low-carbon transition”. It also said that the goal reflects the fact that energy consumption will increase this year.
It acknowledges shortcomings in efforts to meet energy and carbon intensity targets in 2023, adding that this was due to “rapid growth of industrial and civilian energy consumption”.
The NDRC also significantly altered the energy intensity target, which will now “exclud[e] non-fossil fuels and coal, petroleum and natural gas consumed as raw materials”.
This shift means the government has “redefined” the energy intensity target to mean “fossil fuel intensity”, Lauri Myllyvirta, senior research fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), tells Carbon Brief, making the 2025 target “very soft-ball”.

Myllyvirta states that the report does not address the bigger problem – accelerating growth in energy intensive sectors to support China’s economy during the Covid-19 pandemic.
This growth – particularly in the exports, heavy manufacturing and construction sectors – would need to be “reversed” to make gains in energy intensity, he says, “but that’s not what they’re talking about [in the report]”.
By his estimate, if China’s energy intensity – under the new calculation – does fall by 2.5%, this would translate to “at best” a 3% fall in carbon intensity – the emissions per unit of GDP. This would be “very far from the 7% [fall] they need”, per his recent Carbon Brief analysis, to meet the 2025 target of an 18% reduction in carbon intensity.
Is the report ambitious on climate?
The government work report makes no significant changes to China’s direction of travel on climate and energy policy. Instead, the language around these policies continues to balance tensions inherent to China’s energy transition.
It signals that China will continue to manage the relative prioritisation of “both high-quality development and greater security”. It also asks policymakers to balance “actively” and “prudently” reach climate targets.
Efforts will be made to reduce carbon emissions and pollution, as well as to develop large-scale wind and solar bases and distributed energy, the government work report says.
China will also develop methods to measure carbon emissions and a “carbon footprint management system”; push the “green transformation” of industry, energy, transport and construction; and expand the scope of the national emissions trading market.
But, at the same time, the report also doubles down on the commitment to fossil fuels. Coal will continue to play a “crucial role in ensuring energy supply”, it says, while China increases development of oil, gas and strategic minerals in the name of security.
“You could almost see the government struggling with the language”, Li Shuo, director of ASPI’s China climate hub, tells Carbon Brief. He adds that there “seems to be an increasing lack of consistency” both in the report and in other policy papers.
He attributes this to the increasingly challenging economic situation facing the government and competing interests within the political system.
In addition, the lack of targets around air pollution, forestry and other environmental issues, could be interpreted as a “deprioritisation” of climate issues, he adds, or “as a reflection that the government has been distracted by some of the other competing issues, in particular economic challenges”.
“We’re getting very concerned” about China’s ability to meet its wider climate goals, Li says. Based on the recent surge in energy consumption, “it is going to be very challenging for China to hit [its energy and carbon intensity] targets. They certainly will not be able to meet those targets if they stick to…2.5% [annual] energy intensity reduction.”
Will China continue to boost ‘green’ innovation?
The government work report trumpets China’s clean-energy development in 2023, including growing installations of renewable energy, its contributions to the global energy transition and the 30% growth in exports of the “new three” industries of lithium-ion batteries, solar panels and electric vehicles (EVs).
(Previous analysis for Carbon Brief found that clean technologies – particularly the new three – were the top driver of China’s economic growth last year.)
Research and development of gas turbines and “generation IV” nuclear power units are also singled out as areas in which China has seen “substantial progress”.
Going forward, China will “consolidate and enhance [its] leading position” in industries such as electric vehicles and hydrogen, and “create new ways of storing energy”, the report says. This was the first time either energy storage or hydrogen have been mentioned in an annual government work report at the “two sessions”.
“I [can’t] think of a[nother] country where the economic agenda and the climate agenda are so aligned,” Li tells Carbon Brief. “The challenge for China is when and how and how fast will the positive[s]” lead to the “phasing down or the phasing out of the dirtier [aspects]”.

How will China manage geopolitical tensions around climate?
The greater emphasis placed on clean-tech exports comes as tensions with western countries grow around China’s dominance in solar and electric vehicle (EV) supply chains.
The European Commission recently required that imported China-made EVs register with customs, which could signal an intention to apply retroactive tariffs if they are believed to have received unfair subsidies.
The UK is planning a similar probe into Chinese EV subsidies. The US is deciding whether to increase tariffs on Chinese EVs, with commerce secretary Gina Raimondo arguing they could also pose data security risks.
More broadly, language in the government work report around foreign policy is notably assertive. It underscores that “protectionism and unilateralism were on the rise” in 2023, adding that these tensions “exerted a more adverse impact on China’s development”.
It also states that China will “oppos[e] all hegemonic, high-handed and bullying acts” in 2024 – words that did not appear in the government work report either last year or in 2022.
At the same time, China also pledges to continue to “implement…‘small and beautiful’ projects” in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partner countries, the majority of which are located in the global south.
The Panda Paw Dragon Claw newsletter, says that the government work report “covered much of the language we would expect” in terms of the BRI. It adds, however, that “less prominent individuals in the [CPPCC] offered slightly more nuanced perspectives”.
What were other high-ranking policymakers saying about climate and energy policy at the “two sessions”?
This year is the first time in decades that China cancelled its most-widely followed press conference at the “two sessions”, usually held by the premier and offering a rare opportunity for the media to interact directly with top leaders in China.
While the spotlight on 5 March was still on premier Li’s government work report, the domestic media gave more attention to the president, Xi Jinping.
One of the few meetings at the “two sessions” to be publicly announced was Xi’s meeting with the “group of environment and resources”, a new sub-group within the advisory CPPCC. It currently has 85 members, including party and government leaders, scientists, and industry leaders, according to analysis by China Energy Net.
Xi gave a speech at the meeting, in which he said group members “should make new contributions to strengthening ecological environmental protection, and support high-level protection alongside high-quality development”.
One member of the new group is Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) head Huang Runqiu, who gave a speech on behalf of the members on 9 March. Huang argued that the “construction of a ‘Beautiful China’ is a long-term task” and that the construction of a ‘Beautiful China’ zone, balancing high-level protection and high-quality development, is a priority piece of work.
Huang also participated in a “minister’s corridor” press conference, during which he said that China will “synergistically push forward carbon reduction, pollution reduction, green expansion and growth”.
He added that focus areas for the MEE include: fighting “the battle against pollution”; promoting the construction of “Beautiful China” zones; encouraging green, low-carbon and high-quality development; and “supervising” ecosystem protection and restoration.

Meanwhile, National Energy Administration (NEA) director Zhang Jianhua submitted a proposal at the “two sessions” on how to “improve” the way China communicates its position on climate change with the outside world.
His proposal argues that China needs to address “injustices in global carbon reduction [efforts]” and “promote global fair and just carbon reduction”, and better communicate the “effectiveness of China’s [energy] transformation”.
The proposal is notable because, traditionally, the MEE leads on climate diplomacy in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), while the NEA focuses on domestic policy. Nevertheless, the NEA has commented in the past on geopolitics in relation to energy security concerns and participated in bilateral energy dialogues.
Zheng Shanjie, director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), also spoke at a press conference, choosing to highlight that “China’s ‘new three’ exports…[demonstrated] China’s strength in its manufacturing exports”.
However, China’s leadership also warned against “unfettered” industrial development at the “two sessions”, while top solar company Longi called on the government to “crack down on low prices and ensure panel quality”.
Xi said at the meeting with delegates from Jiangsu province that China “must prevent local rush and oppose irrational, blind investments that create bubbles”.
Xi did not link his comments to China’s clean energy industries explicitly but, as well as being politically important, Jiangsu province is “known for its exports, advanced manufacturing [and] clusters of new industries including solar and new energy vehicles”, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post added.
What next?
The government work report merely sets the framework for the year and functions as a signal for the general public, especially for industries, investors and corporations.
In the closely watched report, premier Li expressed concern that “achieving this year’s targets will not be easy, so we need to maintain policy focus, work harder, and mobilise the concerted efforts of all sides”.
An article in the Wall Street Journal said the speech “doesn’t show [a] clear path to recovery” and the Economist said China’s “confidence crisis goes unfixed”.
Following the central-level gathering, ministries and local governments must now develop concrete policies to meet its goals and encourage investors and industries to follow its lead.
Whether and how China progresses towards its “dual carbon” goals and other targets will depend on how this implementation proceeds.
The post Q&A: What does China’s ‘two sessions’ mean for climate policy in 2024? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s ‘two sessions’ mean for climate policy in 2024?
Climate Change
Week Two at COP30: What Happens When the World Can’t Agree
I’m writing this from Boston, not Belém. I left COP30 a day before it ended—exhausted, frustrated, and strangely hopeful all at once.
Brazil’s presidency pushed hard to close the deal, with President Lula returning to witness what they hoped would be a historic finish. Draft texts circulated rapidly. But negotiators were still debating language that over 80 countries wanted included, while others refused. The venue briefly shut down after a fire, then reopened. Civil society held a “funeral for fossil fuels” in the streets while diplomats removed any mention of a fossil fuel phase-out from the draft agreement.
This is what Week Two taught me: global climate policy is messy, imperfect, and maddeningly slow. And yet, something important is still happening.
The Hard Truth About Consensus
Here’s what didn’t make it into the final text: a roadmap for a fossil fuel phase-out. Over 80 countries pushed for it. Small island nations whose existence depends on it advocated for it. Youth activists and Indigenous leaders demanded it. And it was removed.
Some negotiating blocs, including the Arab Group and Like-Minded Developing Countries, opposed any language on fossil fuels in the final agreement. In consensus-based negotiations, that’s all it takes. One bloc says no, and the whole thing stalls.
But here’s what educators and students need to understand: the absence of that language doesn’t mean the conversation isn’t shifting. Three years ago, fossil fuel phase-out wasn’t even on the agenda. Now it’s what over 80 countries are fighting for. That’s movement, even when it doesn’t feel like it.
The Shift No One’s Talking About
Here’s what I’ve learned after attending multiple global forums: the real negotiations aren’t happening where you think they are.
Brazil’s aggressive push to finish on time revealed something important — when host countries center their own priorities (in this case, Indigenous leadership and Amazon protection), it fundamentally changes what’s “negotiable.” The fossil fuel language got removed, yes, but Indigenous participation went from roughly 200 people at previous COPs to over 900 at COP30. That’s a 350% increase.
This is strategic presence in action. When you change who’s in the room, you change what’s possible — even if outcomes aren’t immediate.
After years of working in global meetings and events, I’ve developed what I call the Presence-to-Policy approach. It has four elements: who’s in the room (strategic presence), how they engage (cultural intelligence), what networks form (relationship architecture), and what outcomes emerge (policy influence). COP30 demonstrated this perfectly — increase Indigenous presence from 200 to 900+ participants, and you don’t just add voices. You shift what’s considered legitimate knowledge, what matters as a priority, and which solutions are explored.
For educators: this is the lesson. Representation isn’t symbolic. It’s tactical.
When Money Becomes the Sticking Point
Adaptation finance became one of the headline topics this year — and one of the most contentious. Countries were pushed to triple adaptation finance to $120 billion, but by the end of Week Two, no new concrete commitments emerged. The Adaptation Fund is facing a significant deficit while wealthy nations negotiate how much they’ll actually contribute.
This is where cultural intelligence matters. In many Western diplomatic contexts, finance discussions and moral discussions often operate separately. But many Global South delegations frame climate finance as reparations, as justice, as basic accountability. When you understand that framing, you know why these negotiations feel so urgent, so non-negotiable.
One encouraging shift: finance ministries and environment ministries are finally working together on climate issues. Initiatives like the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action are bringing economic decision-makers into conversations previously dominated by environmental officials. This convergence matters more than most headlines suggest — it’s the structural change that enables everything else.
What Stayed Strong
Despite frustrations, some things held. Indigenous representation remained centered throughout Week Two. Over 900 Indigenous participants continued to lead conversations, present traditional knowledge systems, and refuse to be sidelined. Even when access to decision-making spaces remained imperfect, they fundamentally changed what this COP prioritized.
Civil society showed up relentlessly. The “funeral for fossil fuels” wasn’t just theater — it was thousands refusing to let negotiators ignore what science demands. Health workers added urgent voices, bringing research showing that fossil fuels drive 7 million premature deaths annually from air pollution alone. Yet even as medical professionals demonstrated direct connections between fossil fuels and human suffering, these fuels remained largely absent from official negotiations.
For Climate Generation’s Work
This connects directly to overcoming disinformation. Because one form of disinformation is the narrative that global forums are useless, that diplomacy doesn’t work, that nothing ever changes. The truth is more complex: change happens slowly, unevenly, and through sustained pressure from multiple directions.
And when negotiations fail to produce what’s needed, localized action becomes even more critical. That’s where actual implementation happens — in communities, classrooms, and organizations that refuse to wait for international consensus. This is Climate Generation’s approach to personalizing and localizing climate change action in practice.
Three Classroom Applications
For educators working with Climate Generation’s mission, here are practical ways to use COP30:
1. Teach coalition-building, not just science. Have students map the 80+ country alliance pushing for fossil fuel language. What do Small Island Developing States, European nations, and Latin American countries have in common? This teaches geopolitics through climate.
2. Explore the disinformation narrative. The “COPs don’t work” message serves fossil fuel interests. Help students analyze who benefits from climate action paralysis. This builds critical thinking about the systems that perpetuate the crisis.
3. Examine power through presence. Compare Indigenous participation at previous COPs with that at COP30. What changed when representation increased by 350%? How did this shift priorities? This connects directly to Climate Generation’s work centering anti-racism and systemic equity.
What COP30 Means for Antalya
COPs are often judged immediately and deemed “failures.” But their real impact shows up 2-3 years later when relationships built here materialize into policy shifts.
Watch what happens at COP31 in Antalya, Turkey, next year. The over-80-country coalition pushing for fossil fuel language won’t disappear. The health workers making connections between fossil fuels and human suffering won’t stop. The finance and environment ministries learning to work together will keep building bridges.
Climate Generation’s work preparing the next generation matters because these young people will inherit these coalitions, these relationships, these incremental shifts. They need to understand not just the science of climate change, but the mechanics of how power actually moves.
That’s not taught in most classrooms. But it should be.
Coming Home
As I sit in Boston processing these two weeks, I keep thinking about that environmental justice leader from the Gulf Coast, the Indigenous forest guardians who traveled days to make their voices heard, and the youth activists holding a funeral for fossil fuels in the streets.
They’re not waiting for perfect agreements. They’re building movements that outlast individual COPs, that shift power gradually, that create change from multiple directions at once.
That’s what Climate Generation does — it builds sustained capacity to act through centering marginalized communities, working with BIPOC partners on the convergence of racial and climate justice, and engaging educators and students where disinformation is most prevalent.
COP30 didn’t deliver everything it needed to. But it delivered relationships, knowledge, pressure, and possibility. That’s not nothing.
The work continues — in Belém, in Antalya next year, in communities worldwide, and in every classroom — refusing to accept an inadequate status quo.
___
About This Partnership: Climate Generation provided COP30 credentials to Terra40 in exchange for on-the-ground insights and educational content. Learn more at climategen.org. Learn more about Terra40’s global climate engagement work at terra40.com.
The post Week Two at COP30: What Happens When the World Can’t Agree appeared first on Climate Generation.
Climate Change
COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel shift but triples finance for climate adaptation
After all-night talks, governments at COP30 agreed on Saturday to launch limited initiatives to strengthen emissions-cutting plans, as well as tripling finance to help poor countries cope with worsening climate change impacts by 2035. But the Amazon summit’s outcomes fell short on the global transition away from oil, gas and coal.
In an effort to deliver something on fossil fuels, the Brazilian presidency complemented the final Belém package by promising to create roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels and protecting forests – as requested by Brazilian President Lula da Silva.
Brazil tabled its roadmap proposal at the eleventh hour as a compromise solution after some nations – especially European and Latin American states – voiced disappointment that a formal deal was not reached on one after strong pushback from large fossil fuel producers led by Saudi Arabia.
Brazil’s roadmap process will sit outside the UN climate regime. It will be supported by other countries such as Colombia, which is organising the first global conference on the issue, said COP30 president André Aranha Corrêa do Lago. He added that he will also craft a second roadmap to halt and reverse deforestation and report back to the COP on them both.
“We know some of you had greater ambition for some of the issues at hand,” Corrêa do Lago told a closing plenary. “I will try not to disappoint you.”
After week-long row, COP30 fails to mention fossil fuels
After more than 80 countries called for a roadmap to phase down oil, coal and gas to be kickstarted at COP30, observers said fossil fuel heavyweights, including Gulf States, Russia and India, had insisted it stay out of the final Global Mutirão decision adopted in Belém, along with any explicit mention of fossil fuels.
On Friday, the European Union and the UK had fought hard against that opposition but ultimately had to settle for two new processes that are meant to reinforce ambition and implementation of countries’ national climate plans (NDCs), with reports and a high-level dialogue due next year.
Before the final plenary, EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra said it had been “an intense and sometimes difficult week and evening”, adding “we would have liked to have more”. But, he said, “we think we should support [the COP outcome] because at least it is going in the right direction.”
The Mutirão text encourages countries ”to strengthen their existing nationally determined contribution at any time with a view to enhancing its level of ambition” and calls on them to accelerate their implementation “while striving to do better collectively and cooperatively”.
In a last-minute push, Colombia – which championed a declaration to transition away from oil, coal and gas – told the closing plenary the country was “left with no other choice” but to object to the outcome of the dedicated mitigation track on emission-cutting efforts unless a mention to fossil fuels was added. After the presidency tried to dismiss concerns, Colombia insisted and the plenary was suspended.
Developed countries – especially the EU – had felt isolated in their push for stronger language on emission-cutting measures after failing to win vocal support from traditional allies such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
That was mainly because of Europe’s inability to make a compelling offer on finance for adaptation, negotiators and observers said.
“Adaptation COP” triples finance for climate resilience
A demand from the world’s poorest nations to triple adaptation finance was agreed, but only by a deadline of 2035 rather than 2030, and without a clear number.
However, the main Mutirão decision urges developed countries to increase their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to the Global South. It also sets up a two-year process on climate finance as well as a high-level ministerial roundtable to discuss progress towards meeting the new climate finance goal agreed last year at COP29.
That COP29 goal sets a target for rich nations to provide $300 billion a year for climate action by 2035 – and the tripling of adaptation finance decided in Belem will be part of this, as the EU had insisted.
“It is very clear that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with the poorest nations,” the EU’s climate chief Wopke Hoekstra said before the final conference session began.
Some African ministers gave the outcome on adaptation finance a cautious welcome. But many countries – including the EU, some Latin American states, Switzerland and Canada – were angry about a text that adopted indicators to measure progress on adaptation efforts.
They made interventions rejecting the decision on a new Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) – expected to be a flagship outcome at this COP – which included a rewritten and shortened list of metrics to measure progress on climate resilience originally developed by technical experts.
Jiwoh Abdulai, environment minister of Sierra Leone, said they had worked tirelessly to craft a set of indicators that would reflect “lived realities” on the ground, but are now left with “unclear, unmeasurable and – in many cases – unusable” ones.
“For us, this is not technical, this is about our survival,” he added before the plenary was suspended.
Trade and just transition land wins in Belém deal
As the Belem political package was adopted to muted applause from countries, campaigners at the back of the room whooped with joy as the conference approved a decision on just transition.
They and developing countries had swung behind a new “Belém Action Mechanism”, intended to serve as a hub to support countries in taking concrete steps to ensure their shift from dirty to clean energy systems is fair and equitable.
The Mutirão decision also includes trade, another key issue that was not on the official negotiating agenda, along with long-term climate finance and the gap in emissions-cutting ambition.
Annual dialogues will take place at the next three mid-year Bonn sessions on boosting international cooperation on trade – an emerging economy priority in the context of a carbon levy on imports proposed by the EU.
Experts said the inclusion of trade in a COP decision was a big win for China. “For the first time, trade is elevated alongside mitigation and finance as a critical third pillar for climate progress,” said Kate Logan, director of China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, adding that this “is likely to remain a key arena for China’s influence” in the climate regime.
The decision reaffirms that “measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.
The post COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel shift but triples finance for climate adaptation appeared first on Climate Home News.
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2025/11/22/cop30-brazil-deal-fossil-fuel-transition-fails-triples-finance-climate-adaptation/
Climate Change
COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel transition but triples finance for climate adaptation
After all-night talks, governments at COP30 agreed on Saturday to launch limited initiatives to strengthen emissions-cutting plans, as well as tripling finance to help poor countries cope with worsening climate change impacts by 2035. But the Amazon summit’s outcomes fell short on the global transition away from oil, gas and coal.
In an effort to deliver something on fossil fuels, the Brazilian presidency complemented the final Belém package by promising to create roadmaps on transitioning away from fossil fuels and protecting forests – as requested by Brazilian President Lula da Silva.
Brazil tabled its roadmap proposal at the eleventh hour as a compromise solution after some nations – especially European and Latin American states – voiced disappointment that a formal deal was not reached on one after strong pushback from large fossil fuel producers led by Saudi Arabia.
Brazil’s roadmap process will sit outside the UN climate regime. It will be supported by other countries such as Colombia, which is organising the first global conference on the issue, said COP30 president André Aranha Corrêa do Lago. He added that he will also craft a second roadmap to halt and reverse deforestation and report back to the COP on them both.
“We know some of you had greater ambition for some of the issues at hand,” Corrêa do Lago told a closing plenary. “I will try not to disappoint you.”
After week-long row, COP30 fails to mention fossil fuels
After more than 80 countries called for a roadmap to phase down oil, coal and gas to be kickstarted at COP30, observers said fossil fuel heavyweights, including Gulf States, Russia and India, had insisted it stay out of the final Global Mutirão decision adopted in Belém, along with any explicit mention of fossil fuels.
On Friday, the European Union and the UK had fought hard against that opposition but ultimately had to settle for two new processes that are meant to reinforce ambition and implementation of countries’ national climate plans (NDCs), with reports and a high-level dialogue due next year.
Before the final plenary, EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra said it had been “an intense and sometimes difficult week and evening”, adding “we would have liked to have more”. But, he said, “we think we should support [the COP outcome] because at least it is going in the right direction.”
The Mutirão text encourages countries ”to strengthen their existing nationally determined contribution at any time with a view to enhancing its level of ambition” and calls on them to accelerate their implementation “while striving to do better collectively and cooperatively”.
In a last-minute push, Colombia – which championed a declaration to transition away from oil, coal and gas – told the closing plenary the country was “left with no other choice” but to object to the outcome of the dedicated mitigation track on emission-cutting efforts unless a mention to fossil fuels was added. After the presidency tried to dismiss concerns, Colombia insisted and the plenary was suspended.
Developed countries – especially the EU – had felt isolated in their push for stronger language on emission-cutting measures after failing to win vocal support from traditional allies such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
That was mainly because of Europe’s inability to make a compelling offer on finance for adaptation, negotiators and observers said.
“Adaptation COP” triples finance for climate resilience
A demand from the world’s poorest nations to triple adaptation finance was agreed, but only by a deadline of 2035 rather than 2030, and without a clear number.
However, the main Mutirão decision urges developed countries to increase their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to the Global South. It also sets up a two-year process on climate finance as well as a high-level ministerial roundtable to discuss progress towards meeting the new climate finance goal agreed last year at COP29.
That COP29 goal sets a target for rich nations to provide $300 billion a year for climate action by 2035 – and the tripling of adaptation finance decided in Belem will be part of this, as the EU had insisted.
“It is very clear that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with the poorest nations,” the EU’s climate chief Wopke Hoekstra said before the final conference session began.
Poorest countries appeal for more adaptation finance at COP30
Some African ministers gave the outcome on adaptation finance a cautious welcome. But many countries – including the EU, some Latin American states, Switzerland and Canada – were angry about a text that adopted indicators to measure progress on adaptation efforts.
They made interventions rejecting the decision on a new Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) – expected to be a flagship outcome at this COP – which included a rewritten and shortened list of metrics to measure progress on climate resilience originally developed by technical experts.
Jiwoh Abdulai, environment minister of Sierra Leone, said they had worked tirelessly to craft a set of indicators that would reflect “lived realities” on the ground, but are now left with “unclear, unmeasurable and – in many cases – unusable” ones.
“For us, this is not technical, this is about our survival,” he added before the plenary was suspended.
Trade and just transition land wins in Belém deal
As the Belem political package was adopted to muted applause from countries, campaigners at the back of the room whooped with joy as the conference approved a decision on just transition.
They and developing countries had swung behind a new “Belém Action Mechanism”, intended to serve as a hub to support countries in taking concrete steps to ensure their shift from dirty to clean energy systems is fair and equitable.
The Mutirão decision also includes trade, another key issue that was not on the official negotiating agenda, along with long-term climate finance and the gap in emissions-cutting ambition.
Annual dialogues will take place at the next three mid-year Bonn sessions on boosting international cooperation on trade – an emerging economy priority in the context of a carbon levy on imports proposed by the EU.
Experts said the inclusion of trade in a COP decision was a big win for China. “For the first time, trade is elevated alongside mitigation and finance as a critical third pillar for climate progress,” said Kate Logan, director of China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, adding that this “is likely to remain a key arena for China’s influence” in the climate regime.
The decision reaffirms that “measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.
The post COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel transition but triples finance for climate adaptation appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP30 fails to land deal on fossil fuel transition but triples finance for climate adaptation
-
Climate Change3 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases3 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Spanish-language misinformation on renewable energy spreads online, report shows
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change Videos2 years ago
The toxic gas flares fuelling Nigeria’s climate change – BBC News
-
Climate Change1 year ago嘉宾来稿:满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Renewable Energy4 months ago
US Grid Strain, Possible Allete Sale




