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Japan to Restart the World's Largest Nuclear Power Plant

Japan is moving toward restarting the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power station, the world’s largest by capacity. The move could change the country’s energy policy, which relies on atomic power to tackle high fuel costs, boost energy security, and reduce carbon emissions.

The nuclear plant is run by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), and the restart of its biggest units, No. 6 and No. 7, together producing about 2,710 megawatts (MW), could happen soon, if regulators and local authorities approve.

It is the governor of Niigata prefecture who moves to approve the restart of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility. Hideyo Hanazumi plans to hold a press conference to announce his decision and said he will consult with the prefectural assembly. If the assembly also agrees, the restart will be officially authorized. He said during a media briefing:

“I would like to make a decision and express it soon.”

A Long Road Back: Why Japan’s Nuclear Revival Matters

After Fukushima in 2011, Japan shut down nearly all its reactors, and restarting them has been slow. By late 2024, only 14 reactors had started back up under the stricter post-Fukushima rules.

Japan nuclear reactor current status
Source: Renewable Energy Institute

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, also called KK, has a total capacity of 8,212 MW, making it the largest nuclear power plant in the world. The facility has mostly sat unused since 2012. This happened after safety worries and stricter rules came in after the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

In December, regulators lifted a de facto ban that had blocked TEPCO from loading fresh nuclear fuel into the plant. The company has done safety inspections and is now seeking approval from Niigata Prefecture. This includes getting the governor’s okay, as they have a lot of influence over the decision.

If approved, restarting even part of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa could dramatically boost Japan’s nuclear output. For TEPCO, this move may lower operating costs, reduce dependence on costly imported fuels, and improve its long-term financial outlook.

Japan’s Nuclear Comeback: The Bigger Picture

Nuclear’s share in Japan’s electricity mix has begun to rise, per the ISEP data. In fiscal year 2023, nuclear energy made up 8.5% of the country’s power generation. It is the highest level since before Fukushima. Fossil fuels, especially LNG and coal, still supply the bulk of power.

Japan Electricity Generation Mix Over Time (2016–2024)
Data source: ISEP

The country still has far to go. Many reactors remain offline as utility firms seek regulatory approval and local consent. The largest plant, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, could add back several gigawatts if its units restart. 

Policy now backs a larger nuclear role. The government’s strategic energy plan targets roughly 20% nuclear by 2040, alongside a big push for renewables (40–50%). These goals aim to cut fuel import bills and lower emissions, but they will require many more restarts, life extensions, or new builds.

Japan Nuclear Power Capacity in Operation projections
Source: Renewable Energy Institute

The commercial case for more nuclear in Japan rests on several factors. Restarted reactors reduce costly LNG use and help utilities stabilize generation costs. They also provide steady, low-carbon baseload power that complements intermittent renewables.

On the other hand, safety upgrades, decommissioning risks, and local opposition impose large financial and political costs.

In short, Japan’s nuclear comeback is real but cautious. Progress relies on a few key factors:

  • Regulatory approvals,
  • Local consent, ongoing safety investments, and
  • Nuclear’s ability to compete with cheaper renewables and storage as they grow.

Small but Mighty: Japan’s Growing Interests in SMR 

Japan is also studying the use of Small Modular Reactors, or SMRs, as part of its longer-term energy plan. These reactors are smaller and can be built in factories, which may reduce costs and construction time. They could help Japan add more nuclear power without the long delays that come with large plants. 

Several Japanese companies are already working with international partners to develop SMR designs. IHI, a leading equipment maker, is working with a U.S. firm, NuScale Power, on modular reactor technology. They have built full-scale mock-ups to test their engineering systems. 

Chubu Electric Power, one of the country’s major utilities, has also announced plans to invest in SMR projects at home and overseas. These steps show rising industry interest in this new type of reactor.

Even with this momentum, Japan’s SMR plans are still at an early stage. The government has not yet completed a full regulatory framework for these reactors. Safety rules, design standards, and licensing pathways still need more work before construction can begin. 

  • Japan faces key economic questions. Can SMRs compete with renewables, large reactors, and imported fuels?

Because of these factors, experts expect SMRs to grow slowly. The Asian country may first use them for research or for exports before they appear in domestic power grids.

Still, as the country looks for low-carbon energy and more stable power supplies, SMRs are becoming part of the national discussion about the future of nuclear power.

Hurdles Ahead: Safety, Costs, and Local Concerns

Even with regulatory and political momentum, restarting Kashiwazaki-Kariwa faces hurdles. Local consent remains a key issue: the governor needs the nod of the prefectural assembly. 

Safety is a major concern. TEPCO must run the plant under the tougher standards imposed after Fukushima. For residents near the plant, the disaster’s memory is still strong. This leads to local resistance in some communities.

There are financial risks, too. Restarting nuclear plants requires huge investments in safety upgrades, regulatory compliance, and community relations. If the market for electricity or nuclear power shifts, these costs could pose a burden.

Strategic Impact on Japan’s Energy Market

If put back online, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa could play a key role in lowering Japan’s import bill for liquefied natural gas (LNG). Japan is one of the world’s largest LNG importers, and atomic power offers a way to reduce its reliance on volatile markets.

More nuclear generation could also support Japan’s climate goals. The government’s energy roadmap targets a big increase in nuclear while also expanding renewables, aiming for a 40–50% renewable share by 2040. In that plan, nuclear provides a stable, carbon-free “baseload” to complement fluctuating solar and wind power.

The restart could also reshape investor sentiment. Utilities, financial institutions, and even global energy analysts are watching closely. A strong comeback of large nuclear power could show faith in Japan’s atomic revival. This might also encourage long-term investments in its nuclear industry.

Why the Restart is Significant Globally

Japan’s potential restart of the world’s largest nuclear plant comes at a moment when many countries are rethinking nuclear power. Rising energy prices, geopolitical instability, and stronger climate targets make nuclear more attractive. A revival in Japan could influence other nations to reconsider or expand their own nuclear programs.

For TEPCO, a successful restart strengthens its case for nuclear as a core part of its business. For the region, it offers more stable energy, local economic support, and lower emissions. And for Japan, it could signal that the nuclear sector is fully back in its long-term energy mix.

If the governor of Niigata approves the restart as expected, Japan may very soon add a major source of clean, reliable power — and a potent symbol of its atomic revival.

The post Japan to Restart the World’s Largest Nuclear Power Plant appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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