Connect with us

Published

on

China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.

The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.

The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.

The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.

The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.

However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.

This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.

Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.

Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.

What is China’s 15th five-year plan?

Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.

Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.

These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.

The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.

Category Indicator Indicator in 2025 Target by 2030 Cumulative target over 2026-2030 Characteristic
Economic development Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) 5 Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. Anticipatory
‘Green and low-carbon Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) 17.7 17 Binding
Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) 21.7 25 Binding
Security guarantee Comprehensive energy production
capacity (100m tonnes of
standard coal equivalent)
51.3 58 Binding

Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.

Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.

The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.

The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).

It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)

The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.

The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.

Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.

There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.

Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.

The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.

Back to top

What does the plan say about China’s climate action?

Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.

It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.

The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.

Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.

11th five-year plan (2006-2010) 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) 15th five-year plan (2026-2030)
Chapter title Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China
Sections Developing a circular economy Actively respond to global climate change Accelerate the development of functional zones Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking
Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems Strengthen resource conservation and management Promote economical and intensive resource use Continue to improve environmental quality Continuously improving environmental quality
Strengthening environmental protection Vigorously develop the circular economy Step up comprehensive environmental governance Accelerate the green transformation of the development model Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems
Enhancing resource management Strengthen environmental protection efforts Intensify ecological conservation and restoration Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles
Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources Promoting ecological conservation and restoration Respond to global climate change
Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security
Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries

Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.

The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.

Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.

Back to top

What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?

In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.

This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.

Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.

However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.

Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.

This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.

At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.

However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.

Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.

Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.

(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)

For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.

However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.

The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.

China reports meeting its latest carbon-intensity target after a change in methodology.
Dashed lines: China’s carbon-intensity targets during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plan periods. Bars: China’s achieved carbon-intensity reductions according to either the old methodology (dark blue) and the new one (light blue). The achieved reductions during the 12th and 13th five-year plans are from contemporaneous government statistics and may be revised in future. The reduction figures for the 14th five-year plan period are sourced from government statistics for the new methodology and analysis by CREA under the old methodology. Sources: Five-year plans and Carbon Brief.

The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.

It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.

To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.

As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.

Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.

This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:

“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”

Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.

He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.

Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.

Back to top

Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?

“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.

The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.

In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.

The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.

Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.

He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.

The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.

Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.

While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.

She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.

China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.

The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.

It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.

As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.

State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission ​lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.

Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.

The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.

Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.
Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.
Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.

The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.

It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.

Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.

Back to top

What does the plan signal about coal?

The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.

Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.

He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.

Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.

The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.

Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.

The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.

Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.

However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.

There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.

Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.

Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.

The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.

However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.

Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.

“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:

“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”

Back to top

How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?

Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.

Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.

“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.

Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.

The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.

China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:

“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”

Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.

At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.

This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:

“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”

The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.

This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:

“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”

The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.

China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:

“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”

Back to top

What else does the plan cover?

The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.

China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.

China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.

An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.

The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.

Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.

Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.

China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.

This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.

Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.

It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.

It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.

Back to top

The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Factcheck: 10 flaws in the Conservative report on ‘cheap power’

Published

on

Article Contents

In a new report, the opposition Conservatives argue that UK electricity prices are too high and that it would be better for the climate to have cheap electricity, even if that means using more gas.

The idea is that cheap power would encourage people to use more electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps, leading to higher electrification of the economy and lower emissions.

This is at the heart of a Conservative push to abandon the UK’s net-zero by 2050 target and various climate policies, which the party says are “bankrupting” the country.

Now, the party is using a report by centre-right thinktank Onward to advance this argument, claiming that the UK could save “over £320bn” by scrapping net-zero policies.

In the report foreword, shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho says this approach would make electrification “more attractive”, ensuring both “prosperity and a better environment”.

However, the report fails on these terms, as its alternative scenario ends up with less electrification of heat and transport and an extra 524m tonnes of carbon dioxide (MtCO2) emissions by 2050.

Moreover, the report relies on a series of questionable assumptions to claim that gas and nuclear will be cheaper than renewables – including the idea that gas prices will be low and stable.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that with credible assumptions, the report’s conclusions would be flipped on their head, such that renewables – not gas and nuclear – would bring the “lowest total costs”.

Iain Staffell, an associate professor of sustainable energy at Imperial College London, tells Carbon Brief that while the report “tells a good story”, the modelling underpinning it “has more holes than a Swiss cheese”.

In this factcheck, Carbon Brief speaks to experts and identifies flaws in the report, explaining why they undermine the anti-net-zero rhetoric of the Conservatives and their supporters.

The plan would increase UK emissions

The report by Onward is based on modelling by advisory firm Transira Energy, which compares two pathways out to 2050.

One is a “business-as-usual” scenario based on current “net-zero” policies. (Nevertheless, this only achieves a clean power system by 2045 – far short of the 2030 Labour target.)

The other is an “alternative policy pathway” (APP), developed by Onward, which assumes the UK’s 2050 economy-wide net-zero target is abandoned after the next election in 2029.

The latter says it places “greater emphasis on reducing the cost of electricity”, which includes fewer renewables, no electrification goals and more gas and nuclear power capacity.

This mirrors the policy platform set out by the Conservatives, who argue that “net-zero” drives up energy costs and that climate change can be tackled without such targets.

In fact, the Conservatives say their “common sense” approach would make it easier to cut emissions, as shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho states in the report foreword:

“If we want those emissions to fall, then we need people to want to use electric cars and electric heating – then our priority should be to make electricity cheap.”

Yet, this argument is firmly contradicted by the report itself.

The APP results in an extra 524MtCO2 being emitted between 2030 and 2050 – equivalent to the annual emissions of South Africa.

The Transira Energy analysts say this is “explained by an increased share of unabated gas-fired capacity”.

Finally, it is worth noting that the UK’s net-zero target is based on the fact that the planet will continue warming until global emissions reach net-zero. Without such targets, climate change – and its impacts – will get worse.

The plan would slow electrification

Contrary to Conservative claims, uptake of heat pumps and electric vehicles is actually expected to be slower in the alternative scenario, “despite lower electricity costs”.

This is due to the removal of supportive government subsidies and mandates, such as the boiler upgrade scheme and the 2030 ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars.

Overall electricity consumption is 7% lower in the APP, compared to the current pathway.

Daniela Quiroga, a senior associate at Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, questions this reliance on lower electricity demand in the APP, telling Carbon Brief:

“While this is an interesting scenario to explore, it overlooks potentially important feedback effects – mainly, as electricity prices and the capital costs of electrification technologies fall, uptake would be expected to increase.”

A related point was made in a LinkedIn post by Tara Singh, chief executive of trade body RenewableUK, who noted:

“APP makes the electricity system cheaper partly by electrifying Britain less – while leaving the fuel costs that replace electricity outside the model.”

For example, Singh estimates that the extra petrol and diesel fuel expenditure to replace the missing electric vehicles (EVs) on the road could be around £65-95bn over two decades. These costs are not included in the APP scenario.

The only sector that sees increased power demand is data centres, due to policy support to “prioritise” new grid connections for these facilities.

Quiroga notes that the costs of accelerating data centre connections “are not mentioned at all” in the report.

In short, the proposed pathway involves removing grants that help households buy EVs and heat pumps, while providing more policy support for the AI industry.

Josh Gabbatiss on Bluesky: Buried at the heart of the Conservative party's pitch to scrap net-zero is this

Finally, Onward stresses the UK’s “high spark gap” – referring to the electricity-to-gas price ratio. This makes switching from gas boilers to heat pumps less appealing for consumers, given the relatively high price of electricity, compared to gas.

However, Matt Elliott, lead economic analyst at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), says the analysis does not indicate this gap would substantially change in the proposed APP. He tells Carbon Brief:

“The report claims that electrification would happen even without specific policies, simply due to lower retail electricity prices driving consumer choice. However, its own modelling indicates that the gas-electricity price ratio would actually rise in the early years and end up only marginally lower than today by 2050.”

In other words, in the APP the price of electricity compared to gas would not fall sufficiently to drive consumers towards heat pumps without subsidies or other incentives.

Rather than scrapping net-zero policies, analysts have suggested shifting tax and policy levies from electricity to gas, or breaking the link between wholesale gas prices and electricity, as more effective ways to reduce the spark gap.

Gas prices are unlikely to remain low and stable

The “alternative” scenario pushed by the Conservatives continues to rely heavily on gas for both electricity generation and heating.

This includes constructing new gas power plants in a bid to lower electricity prices, despite the fact that gas is the main driver of high electricity prices in the UK.

In recent years, the largest spikes in energy prices have been triggered by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, which have disrupted fossil-fuel supplies and sent gas prices spiralling.

(Indeed, the report was published on the same day the Office for National Statistics announced that inflation had jumped to its highest rate in four months, due to energy costs surging because of the impact of the Iran war on global oil and gas supply chains.)

Despite this, the scenario set out by Onward assumes that gas prices drop to pre-conflict levels and remain that way for the next two decades.

Ashutosh Padelkar, research lead at Aurora Energy Research, tells Carbon Brief that the gas price assumptions are “hard to fathom” and significantly at odds with future expectations, from both Aurora and other market analysts.

Simon Evans on Bluesky: Relying more on gas power will save money, as long as gas is cheap – and stays cheap in the future.

Analysis by E3G and ECIU in 2025 concluded that four years of energy spikes caused by the post-pandemic demand surge and Russia-Ukraine war had cost the UK £183bn.

The Onward report acknowledges that the new scenario is “more exposed to a future gas price shock” than the current net-zero scenario. It suggests that a new spike could increase fuel costs in the gas-reliant scenario by another £6bn in 2040.

However, Onward argues that the impact of gas price spikes on consumers would be “significantly smaller” than the shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is owing to existing renewable energy contracts and future nuclear power construction in the APP.

In the press release accompanying the new report, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch is clear that “our plan means using our own oil and gas in the North Sea”.

This mirrors rhetoric that has been widespread on the right of UK politics, stressing the importance of expanding North Sea drilling as a way to cut energy bills.

However, given the relatively small volumes remaining in the North Sea, the UK will likely remain reliant on gas imported from the US and the Middle East.

Gas prices will still be set globally and remain subject to geopolitical turmoil, no matter where the UK sources its supplies.

Given this, Johnny Gowdy, director of the thinktank Regen, tells Carbon Brief that the scenario presented by the Conservatives is “a call to rely on imported gas, with global gas prices”.

The plan assumes gas plants are cheap to build

The Conservative plan involves building new gas power plants, in order to meet part of the nation’s growing electricity demand without relying on renewables.

Onward states that the UK “has lost firm generation capacity” – such as gas and nuclear plants – and replaced it with “intermittent”, or variable, power in the form of wind and solar.

To remedy this, its alternative pathway involves building an extra 21 gigawatts (GW) of gas power plants by 2050 – equivalent to around 20 new facilities. This is roughly a 70% increase from the UK’s current capacity.

However, the small print in the accompanying Transira Energy report explains that it assumes capital expenditure – the cost of building the power plants – is £650 per kilowatt (kW).

This is considerably lower than other recent analyses, which tend to cite capital expenditure figures that are more than double this estimate.

For example, a 2025 GridLab report notes that new US gas power plants set for completion in 2026 and 2027 had a cost range of $1,116/kW (£819/kW) to $1,427/kW (£1046kW).

However, it adds that more recent projects are “routinely reporting” costs of $2,000/kW (£1467/kW) or more. Other sources have reported up to $2,800/kW (£2054/kW).

Gas power plant costs have increased significantly in recent years – a trend that has been attributed to a tight supply of gas turbines worldwide.

This, in turn, is the result of increased demand for gas turbines to power data centres and countries transitioning from coal to gas.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) says data-centre demand in the US is “limiting the availability of turbines for near-term deployment elsewhere in the world”.

Nuclear faces high costs and delivery challenges

The Onward report champions a substantial increase in nuclear power capacity.

However, it fails to explain how this could be facilitated or why its cost assumptions are lower than the most recent nuclear projects in the UK.

Within the report’s net-zero scenario, there is 13.3GW of nuclear power by 2050, roughly double the current capacity. It notes that this will be financed under the regulated asset base (RAB) model – a government-backed funding approach announced in 2022.

Under the APP scenario, nuclear power capacity more than triples from current levels to 20GW by the middle of the century, all backed by the RAB model.

The report adds:

“Reducing nuclear construction costs and timelines becomes the core energy priority of the UK government, with measures to improve the availability of sites and grid connections.”

The report acknowledges that the APP scenario “faces significant cost headwinds from expensive nuclear capacity”.

However, it suggests that large-scale nuclear power stations built in the 2040s could cost £122-£138 per megawatt hour (MWh) in 2025 terms.

Hinkley Point C – which in 2018 became the first new nuclear power plant to begin construction in the UK since the 1980s – has a “strike price” of £138/MWh for 2030. (This is the fixed price for the electricity it will generate, guaranteed by the power plant’s contracts for difference agreement.)

This price is at the top end of Onward’s forecast range for “levelised cost of electricity” (LCOE) – the average total cost of building and operating an asset over its lifetime.

Hinkley Point nuclear power station.
Hinkley Point nuclear power station. Credit: Rory Hailes / Alamy Stock Photo

As such, the report suggests, on average, costs will fall over the course of the decade from 2030, but provides little detail as to how this would happen.

As Richard Howard, global research director at Aurora, wrote on LinkedIn, the cost assumptions for nuclear are “optimistic”. He adds:

“It assumes that the LCOE of nuclear will fall 10-20% below the *original* cost of Hinkley Point C, when we know that nuclear costs escalated massively since the HPC deal was struck. The UK does not have a great track record of managing down the costs of nuclear.”

In fact, Sizewell C – a replica of Hinkley Point C in the early stages of construction in Suffolk, which received a final investment decision in 2025 – has a considerably higher strike price of £150/MWh in 2039.

Hinkley Point C is the first new nuclear power plant to be built in 30 years in the UK. It has been beset by delays and nearly doubled in cost since it was originally approved.

A footnote in the Transira Energy report adds that its calculations for the cost of nuclear include expected capital expenditure for new large-scale plants ranging from £10,000/kW to £12,500/kW.

While the 3.26GW Hinkley Point C was originally supposed to have a price tag of £18bn, which would equate to £5,521/kWh, costs have repeatedly increased. More recent estimates from developer EDF suggest a figure of £10,736/kW, closer to Onward’s figure.

However, if this is adjusted for inflation for 2026, this jumps closer to £14,724/kW.

As such, the upfront cost of new nuclear is already around £2,500 more per kilowatt than the assumptions in the report for 10 years from now.

The report provides limited information about how these costs would fall so substantially.

It suggests that the recommendations from the 2025 Fingleton review should be implemented in full to cut the cost of the technology.

The Fingleton report – a full review of the UK’s nuclear sector by the Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce, led by John Fingleton – found an “overly complex” and “bureaucratic” system was holding back the nuclear industry. It advocated for “smarter regulation”, as an overhaul of the planning regime.

In March 2026, the Labour government committed to full implementation of the Fingleton review by the end of 2027. Despite this, the Onward report includes the implementation of the Fingleton review in the APP scenario, but not the net-zero scenario.

The report’s high network cost estimates do not ‘add up’

The biggest drop in costs outlined in the Onward APP scenario comes from a reduction in network costs, but experts have said that this “just doesn’t add up”.

Network costs are broadly made up of the price of building, maintaining and operating the transmission and distribution systems.

A reduction in network spending accounts for £137bn of the £320bn in “savings”, compared to the net-zero scenario that sees significant network expansion to help facilitate more renewables on the grid.

This drop is “thanks to a higher utilisation of firm power system with supply located closer to demand”, the report says.

In particular, the report points to discrepancy between the “best wind resources” being located in the north of Scotland, while the major centres of demand are in the southeast of England. As such, currently grid expansion is needed to avoid constraints or the requirement to curtail generation in windy periods with low demand. 

By avoiding the connection of geographically dispersed generation assets, such as 78GW of generation, storage and interconnectors, the APP scenario can reduce total network costs by 43%, according to the report.

Staffell tells Carbon Brief that the £137bn saving has “a convincing story to it – if we build more fossil and nuclear capacity we can utilise the system better”.

However, he adds that Onward gives “so little detail about how this works that it’s hard to comment”.

The Transira Energy report notes that the APP still includes £19bn in investment for the electricity network, covering the cost to maintain the existing system and connect new gas and nuclear generation.

However, this 86% drop in new transmission investment compared to the BAU scenario leans on “flawed logic”, according to Tara Singh from RenewableUK.

On LinkedIn, she explained that it “rests on an extraordinarily aggressive assumption about how little grid Britain will need”, adding: 

“Onward assumes £137bn of new transmission assets under BAU between 2030 and 2050, but only £19bn under their plan, even though by 2050 it still has 32m EVs/hybrids, more than 6m additional heat pumps, 45GW gas, 20GW nuclear and – particularly strikingly – 62 terawatt hour (TWh) a year of datacentre demand. Is this grid figure credible…?”

Beyond this, the report also attributes a significant portion of the proposed savings to cuts in “balancing costs”. These are the costs to the system operator of balancing electricity supply and demand.

It claims that having more firm generation located closer to demand and existing transmission infrastructure will “save billions of expenditure on network expansion and balancing costs”.

Onward suggests that under the APP scenario, the cost of keeping generation and demand balanced would fall by £67bn.

However, claiming savings by both cutting network expansion and balancing costs amounts to “double counting” and “just doesn’t add up”, according to Aurora’s Padelkar.

He tells Carbon Brief that including both high capital expenditure for the electricity network and high balancing costs in the BAU scenario is “difficult to reconcile”.

Expanding the electricity network would reduce constraints, reducing the need for constraint management. Such a move would lower balancing costs.

As noted by the National Energy System Operator (Neso), retaining the current transmission network into 2030, with no expansion, would mean constraint costs could reach around £12.7bn a year. But building new network capacity could cut costs by as much as 75%.

Padelkar says:

“They’re saying ‘we continue to invest in the network’…But somehow the network [balancing] costs just don’t come down…This is basically saying ‘we’re paying both to fix the problem and to have the problem’. You can have one of the two, but you can’t have both.”

Despite the claim that the APP approach will lead to the cheapest electricity, Padelkar says that the report does not present a “consistent picture” as to how the system would operate, pointing to the approach to network and balancing costs. He adds:

“Overall, we would expect that once these figures are correctly accounted for, that renewable energy would remain the cheapest form of a form of decarbonisation. I would even further flip the argument around, to say that decarbonisation is not a prerogative [on] its own, but because it also achieves lowest total costs.”

The system integration costs are ‘far out of line with mainstream thinking’

A central argument in the Onward report is that the costs of renewables are higher than often claimed by proponents, due to the wider system costs of having a large amount of “intermittent” generation.

As such, it proposes pulling back support for wind and solar, and instead putting focus on “firm generation” sources, particularly gas and nuclear power.

This relies heavily on the claim that “system integration costs” for wind and solar are much higher than is being “properly revealed” in either contracts for difference (CfD) auctions or levelised costs estimates.

(CfD’s are power contracts between generators and the government, which work as the UK’s main method for supporting the development of renewables by providing long-term price certainty to developers.)

Therefore, when assessing the overall cost of renewable energy, the cumulative network investment, balancing and ancillary services system costs necessary to manage such variable generation must be considered, it suggests.

The existence of integration costs is not widely understood, but the scale of their impact is disputed.

The report continues that if these costs are taken into account, the “marginal system integration costs” of renewables are “much higher than their individual levelised costs”.

Onward suggests that the cost to integrate additional offshore wind, onshore wind and solar onto the electricity system is £125/MWh. This is far higher than the cost of generating electricity from these sources in the first place.

The figure has been challenged by a number of commentators, with Staffell telling Carbon Brief that this is “very far out of line with mainstream thinking”.

Analysis published in Nature suggests that if 80% of the electricity mix comes from renewables, the system integration cost is around €30/MWh (£26/MWh).

Elsewhere, engineering firm Afry put the total cost of electricity at around £55-75/MWh in a high-renewable system. This is “less than [Onward’s] integration cost alone”, Staffell adds.

The high price tag of the £128/MWh marginal integration “is derived by apportioning additional balancing and transmission costs solely to 60GW of new wind and solar deployed from 2030 onwards”, explains Callum MacIver, research fellow at the University of Strathclyde and the UK Energy Research Centre.

He adds:

“[This figure] only looks at the cost side and there is not enough published detail on where the renewables are deployed and the transmission upgrades it triggers to critique the scale of the numbers presented.

“It also excludes potential wider system benefits of further renewables deployment, including reduced wholesale prices, avoided fuel and carbon costs and reduced exposure to future external gas price shocks, which are properly examined by looking at overall system costs and testing various sensitivities including different gas price futures.”

Writing on LinkedIn, Adam Bell – a partner at consultancy Stonehaven – suggests that the £125/MWh system costs are “really egregious”. He explains:

“The ‘system costs’ of renewables…rests on assuming that all additional network upgrades and balancing costs for a net-zero system after 2029 are attributable to additional renewables deployed in that net-zero system.

“Many of those costs relate to existing renewables as well as nuclear, so this likely overstates system costs by an order of magnitude [roughly 10-fold].”

Furthermore, the system costs for the APP scenario are not fully accounted for in the report. Regardless of the technology mix, old network and generation assets will need replacing, adding additional costs to the system.

The proposed changes could undermine investor confidence

The APP scenario involves stripping back all support for renewables going forward.

It calls for the CfD scheme to end in 2030. Pre-existing CfD contracts would continue under APP, but after this decade, all further support would “exclusively” be for nuclear power.

Additionally, the renewable obligation (RO) payments for existing wind and solar would end from 2033. These are legacy contracts signed ahead of the scheme closing to new applicants in 2017. Payments are expected to continue until 2037.

(Onward makes an exception for the large-scale biomass power plant owned by Drax, which already has a contract with the UK government to switch from an RO to a low-carbon “dispatchable CfD”. This switch is included under both the net-zero and APP scenarios, in recognition of the “importance of its contribution to generation and to system stability”.)

Both the CfD and RO schemes have contributed significantly to the expansion of the renewable energy sector in the UK. For example, despite coming to an end in 2017, nearly 30% of current electricity supplies are still covered by RO contracts.

It is unclear from the report what the 10GW of capacity currently expected to receive the RO would do beyond 2033.

Writing on Bluesky, Tom Haddon, senior economist at Arup, says that if, as the APP scenario proposes, the UK “bin[s the] RO”, this could force 10GW of renewable capacity still on the system to simply shut down after 2033.

Such a dramatic change to a longstanding support system could have an impact on investor confidence.

Tom Haddon on Bluesky: The capacity has to shut down because their other idea is to close CfD auctions from 2030.

Padelkar tells Carbon Brief that energy investors are often involved in numerous technologies. He adds:

“You wouldn’t be able to say ‘yeah, not going to continue honouring this contract [for renewables], but I expect you to sign this new one for me [to build new nuclear]’. That just wouldn’t work.”

As such, there is no guarantee that investors would agree to enter into government-backed RAB contracts to develop nuclear power plants, having just seen government-backed RO contracts being reneged on four years early.

Carbon market ‘savings’ are ‘just rearranging things on a spreadsheet’

One of the large chunks of “savings” identified to bring down electricity prices in the Onward report is £94bn from “lower wholesale prices, thanks to the removal of carbon taxes”.

This refers to removing power plants from the UK emissions trading scheme (UK ETS) from 2031.

Onward argues that this reduces the cost of gas power plants, which frequently set wholesale power prices under the marginal pricing system.

Staffell tells Carbon Brief that this is a “concern” when considering the report’s findings:

“That is £94bn no longer going into the government coffers, so it’s not saving the country any money; it’s just rearranging things on a spreadsheet. This lowers electricity bills, but does that get compensated for by higher taxes elsewhere, or do we have to take on a larger national deficit, or does it go hand-in-hand with cutting public services?”

Tom Edwards, a consultant at Cornwall Insight, wrote on Bluesky that it would be “madness” to simply remove the UK ETS and “expect things to remain stable”.

The UK currently sources around a tenth of its electricity via interconnectors that link its grid up with Ireland and parts of mainland Europe. It also exports electricity to other European countries when it has surplus supply.

These relationships would be complicated if the UK abandoned its carbon price on electricity altogether.

The UK and EU have been negotiating over linking their carbon pricing systems, which would involve the UK navigating the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).

Alongside ending support for renewables, the new Onward scenario also removes subsidies for new interconnectors, although it says “existing interconnectors will continue”.

The Transira Energy analysis says there would be “new cross-border trading arrangements” from 2031. Such “arrangements” would, presumably, need to be negotiated from scratch with the EU.

Specifically, the report proposes a “carbon reference price” for electricity sold to the EU to “prevent carbon leakage and the distortion of cross-border electricity flows”.

Adam Berman, policy director at Energy UK, pointed out that the post-Brexit trade and cooperation agreement between the UK and the EU includes a legal commitment by the UK to maintain a carbon price on electricity. He wrote that the Onward proposal “would run contrary to that agreement”.

The report ‘grossly simplifies’ long-duration energy storage

The Onward report states that it would cancel support for long-duration energy storage (LDES), such as large batteries and pumped hydropower.

This follows the government recently launching a “cap-and-floor scheme” to support the technology. In June 2026, the nation’s energy regulator Ofgem identified 16 LDES that it is “minded to” support under the new scheme.

LDES can store power across days, weeks or even seasons, helping to boost electricity system security. Analysis by analytics company LCP Delta suggests that rolling out LDES technologies could cut energy system costs in the UK by more than £24bn between 2030 and 2050.

Onward lists support for storage systems – including LDES, as well as smaller batteries, which are only briefly mentioned in the report – as one of the “costs of an intermittent-first, low-carbon electricity system”.

As such, alongside cuts to support for renewable energy technology, the APP scenario includes ending the cap-and-floor scheme for LDES. (See: The proposed changes could undermine investor confidence)

The report suggests that even if all 16 of the projects shortlisted by Ofgem were built, the total would only provide around five and a half hours of generation.

It adds: “This is not enough to make it through a winter spell of low wind and sun”.

This assertion is based on the total storage capacity of all the projects being 136GWh.

However, the report “grossly simplifies the operation of LDES”, explains Padelkar. He adds:

“This assumes a rate of discharge that the fleet doesn’t have. Further, this LDES capacity would play a key role in reducing the balancing and ancillary costs, even in the early 2030s, by helping absorb cheap wind generation in Scotland in constrained periods and then discharging it when the transmission from Scotland to the south of Great Britain is not constrained.”

The role of LDES is more complex than simply all projects providing the entire electricity demand for the nation in one go. The projects are designed to act together with other assets to absorb excess supply, smooth out peaks in demand and step in to provide cheaper power when prices spike.

The post Factcheck: 10 flaws in the Conservative report on ‘cheap power’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Factcheck: 10 flaws in the Conservative report on ‘cheap power’
Continue Reading

Climate Change

As marine heat breaks records, countries seek ocean roadmap at COP31

Published

on

With record-breaking ocean temperatures weakening the world’s largest carbon sink, a group of countries is pushing for the UN COP31 summit to deliver meaningful commitments to protect marine ecosystems. Yet this effort could be hobbled by a shrinking pool of climate finance, experts warn.

While discussions on oceans at UN climate talks have so far been limited to annual informal dialogues on the sidelines, African countries, the European Union, some Latin American nations and small island states have launched a bid for COP31 to incorporate ocean protection measures into “negotiated decisions”.

COP31 co-presidents Türkiye and Australia have responded to this call and are working with interested countries on a voluntary ocean roadmap, described as a “concise action plan” and expected to include regional and international steps to integrate measures to safeguard the planet’s ocean and climate.

    At a meeting in Türkiye in September, which plans to convene more than 25 ministers from Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe and Latin America, governments will consider how to incorporate the recommendations of the informal UN ocean dialogues into global climate policy, according to the Turkish co-presidency.

    Whitney Berry, associate director of climate policy at the nonprofit Ocean Conservancy, said that even an informal “multi-year” plan, instead of a negotiated roadmap, could help guide the ocean dialogues series in the UN climate process towards more concrete results.

    “If this plan informed the following dialogues and made sure they were aligned with the Paris [Agreement] ambition cycle, including opportunities like the Global Stocktake, we’d have such a strengthened opportunity for ocean integration,” she said.

    The upcoming stocktake – an international assessment of countries’ climate policies that takes place every five years and will culminate at COP33 in 2028 – presents a “huge opportunity” to turn fragmented actions into a “globally recognised evidence base” that can inform the next round of climate plans, Berry added.

    Addressing rocketing ocean temperatures

    Influenced by this year’s projected “super El Niño” on top of climate heating, the world’s oceans have experienced the warmest July on record, according to both EU and US monitoring data. Scientists are warning of severe mass die-offs of key species like corals, sponges and macro-algae.

    John Bruno, a marine ecologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, told journalists in a briefing that some organisms like coral reefs can only tolerate an increase of about 1 degree Celsius before they start experiencing heath declines. In some seas like the Mediterranean, marine heatwaves have caused temperature increases of up to 6C.

    As climate pressure mounts on ocean systems, a group of more than 150 top scientists has called on the COP31 Turkish and Australian presidencies to urgently “integrate ocean priorities into negotiation texts on mitigation, adaptation, and finance”.

    They also urged world leaders to issue a “clear political declaration and finance outcomes” on ocean-based climate solutions at the World Leaders Summit, a two-day event during COP where heads of states give speeches laying out their climate priorities.

    Measures to protect marine ecosystems have gathered more attention in recent years, as 90% of national climate plans submitted last year included at least one ocean-based target, compared to 62% in 2015. But countries have faced challenges implementing these commitments due to finance and governance constraints, according to a paper published in June by the World Resources Institute (WRI).

    Most of the current targets focus on protecting marine areas, but have so far lacked commitments to reduce emissions produced at sea, for example through offshore wind or cleaner maritime transport.

    Will the world’s drying lands get relief from COP17 in Mongolia?

    Rethinking ocean negotiations at COP

    At COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, countries agreed to “integrate and strengthen ocean-based action” across climate negotiations, which led to the creation of a yearly informal Ocean and Climate Dialogue. This dialogue does not produce a negotiated agreement like other parts of the COP.

    The dialogue’s informal nature is both an advantage and a challenge, said Jonathan Baines, ocean programme manager at WRI. It provides a more flexible space than formal negotiations and has helped raise the ambition of countries’ climate plans, but COP presidencies have not fully incorporated its outcomes into the official climate talks, he said.

    After five years of holding this dialogue at the mid-year climate negotiations in Bonn, countries called for more tangible outcomes in their submissions to this year’s Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue in June. Some proposed the creation of a roadmap to guide discussions on specific topics and feed them into the formal COP negotiations.

    In their submission, the African Group of Negotiators called for a “structured, multi-year roadmap” aligned with the next Global Stocktake. The EU also backed this roadmap proposal, while Pacific islands and some Latin American countries supported incorporating the dialogue outcomes into the negotiations without specifically endorsing the roadmap initiative.

    As part of a preparatory event before COP31 focused on oceans, Türkiye has confirmed to Climate Home News plans for a Blue COP31 roadmap, which will be discussed by the ministers attending the gathering in September.

    “In essence, this programme is designed to ensure that the ocean is no longer the missing link in climate action, but rather the driving force behind a more resilient, sustainable, and prosperous future for all coastal communities,” Türkiye’s COP31 presidency said in a written comment.

    Co-facilitators in the Ocean and Climate Change dialogue Ulrik Lenaerts from Belgium and Sivendra Michael from Fiji.
    Co-facilitators of the Ocean and Climate Change dialogue Ulrik Lenaerts from Belgium and Sivendra Michael from Fiji. (Photo: IISD/ENB/Maja Schmidt-Thomé)

    Opposition emerges to “additional burdens”

    Some regional groups have already started presenting their priorities publicly, with small island nations calling for more finance, ocean-based renewable energy and bolstering regional research institutes.

    African diplomats said “the core problem remains translating these paper commitments into real-world, on-the-ground implementation” and noted that while countries in the region have strengthened their climate plans, “the support required to implement these commitments has not kept pace”.

    “The truth is that ambition without implementation is an illusion,” the African submission reads, adding that nearly half of all ocean-related commitments in national climate plans are “strictly conditional on external support”.

    This year’s Ocean and Climate Dialogue, chaired by Fiji and Belgium, urged countries to discuss ways of “transitioning away from fossil fuels”, which generated pushback from big fossil fuel-producing and consuming countries who said they would not accept this as a negotiated agreement.

    Both the group of Arab nations and India, meanwhile, warned against “imposing additional burdens” on developing countries and rejected a dialogue with “prescriptive expectations”.

    The Arab group submission said its members oppose “any report that explicitly or implicitly targets specific energy sources, advocates sectoral restrictions, or fails to adequately reflect different national circumstances, development priorities, and energy security considerations”. This is a thinly veiled reference to singling out fossil fuels within the discussions.

    New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus

    Climate finance constraints

    While developing countries are already seeking more funding to implement ocean-based conservation, carbon storage and clean energy measures, experts said this will be a “difficult discussion” at COP31, as developed countries will arrive in Antalya with shrinking aid budgets.

    Historically, ocean-related finance has accounted for only a small share of overseas development assistance (ODA), fluctuating between 0.8% and 1.4% of the total, according to data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

    Berry of the Ocean Conservancy said one opportunity to “grow the pie” of available climate funds will come at a meeting of the UN climate convention’s Standing Committee on Finance, which this year will be held in September in Sydney and will concentrate on financing water systems and the ocean.

    “We haven’t had a focused conversation on ocean climate finance before from the UN climate process,” she said. “If they can clarify those financing pathways specific to ocean climate action and help provide the necessary support for countries to translate commitments into projects, that will be a real benefit.”

    The post As marine heat breaks records, countries seek ocean roadmap at COP31 appeared first on Climate Home News.

    As marine heat breaks records, countries seek ocean roadmap at COP31

    Continue Reading

    Climate Change

    Test of nature law standards is major curb on deforestation

    Published

    on

    SYDNEY, Thursday 20 August 2026 — Commenting on the release of the government’s final nature law standards made today, including for Matters of National Environmental Significance, the following lines can be attributed to Glenn Walker, Head of Nature at Greenpeace Australia Pacific:

    “Ultimately the test of the new nature law standards will be whether they materially bring down Australia’s shockingly high rates of deforestation caused by bulldozing for beef and logging of native forests.

    “Deforestation severely threatens the forest homes of some of Australia’s most threatened species including the koala, greater glider and swift parrot. In Queensland the bulldozing of forests is causing mass erosion and the run off of hundreds of thousands of tonnes of muddy soil on the Great Barrier Reef each year.

    “Unless these standards deliver protection for the Great Barrier Reef from deforestation runoff and ensure the healthy recovery of wildlife under threat then they will have failed.

    “There’s clear improvement on the draft standards that were released, which we welcome, but what we have today still falls well short of what would be optimal. In particular, the heavy reliance on offsets and the failure to address the cumulative impacts of hundreds of instances of deforestation–death by a thousand cuts–create serious ongoing weaknesses in the way the standards work. The acid test will now be in the operation: will the standards succeed in stopping deforestation, or not.

    “The effectiveness of the nature law reforms hang heavily on these standards. We will be watching closely as they are implemented and raising the alarm on any failure to curb deforestation.”

    -ENDS-

    Test of nature law standards is major curb on deforestation

    Continue Reading

    Trending

    Copyright © 2022 BreakingClimateChange.com