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China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.

The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.

The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.

The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.

The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.

However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.

This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.

Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.

Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.

What is China’s 15th five-year plan?

Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.

Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.

These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.

The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.

Category Indicator Indicator in 2025 Target by 2030 Cumulative target over 2026-2030 Characteristic
Economic development Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) 5 Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. Anticipatory
‘Green and low-carbon Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) 17.7 17 Binding
Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) 21.7 25 Binding
Security guarantee Comprehensive energy production
capacity (100m tonnes of
standard coal equivalent)
51.3 58 Binding

Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.

Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.

The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.

The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).

It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)

The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.

The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.

Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.

There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.

Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.

The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.

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What does the plan say about China’s climate action?

Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.

It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.

The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.

Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.

11th five-year plan (2006-2010) 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) 15th five-year plan (2026-2030)
Chapter title Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China
Sections Developing a circular economy Actively respond to global climate change Accelerate the development of functional zones Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking
Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems Strengthen resource conservation and management Promote economical and intensive resource use Continue to improve environmental quality Continuously improving environmental quality
Strengthening environmental protection Vigorously develop the circular economy Step up comprehensive environmental governance Accelerate the green transformation of the development model Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems
Enhancing resource management Strengthen environmental protection efforts Intensify ecological conservation and restoration Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles
Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources Promoting ecological conservation and restoration Respond to global climate change
Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security
Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries

Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.

The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.

Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.

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What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?

In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.

This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.

Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.

However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.

Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.

This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.

At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.

However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.

Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.

Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.

(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)

For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.

However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.

The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.

China reports meeting its latest carbon-intensity target after a change in methodology.
Dashed lines: China’s carbon-intensity targets during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plan periods. Bars: China’s achieved carbon-intensity reductions according to either the old methodology (dark blue) and the new one (light blue). The achieved reductions during the 12th and 13th five-year plans are from contemporaneous government statistics and may be revised in future. The reduction figures for the 14th five-year plan period are sourced from government statistics for the new methodology and analysis by CREA under the old methodology. Sources: Five-year plans and Carbon Brief.

The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.

It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.

To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.

As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.

Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.

This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:

“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”

Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.

He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.

Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.

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Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?

“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.

The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.

In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.

The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.

Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.

He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.

The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.

Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.

While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.

She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.

China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.

The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.

It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.

As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.

State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission ​lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.

Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.

The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.

Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.
Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.
Maps showing layout of key energy projects in China during 2026-2030 (top) and 2021-2025 (bottom). Source: Chinese government’s 15th five-year plan and 14th five-year plan.

The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.

It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.

Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.

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What does the plan signal about coal?

The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.

Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.

He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.

Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.

The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.

Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.

The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.

Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.

However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.

There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.

Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.

Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.

The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.

However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.

Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.

“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:

“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”

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How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?

Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.

Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.

“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.

Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.

The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.

China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:

“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”

Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.

At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.

This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:

“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”

The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.

This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:

“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”

The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.

China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:

“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”

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What else does the plan cover?

The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.

China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.

China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.

An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.

The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.

Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.

Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.

China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.

This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.

Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.

It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.

It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.

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Experts: Why carbon removal needs a ‘major scale up’ to return warming to 1.5C

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Last week, more than 260 researchers convened in Milan to discuss the opportunities, challenges and risks involved in scaling “carbon dioxide removal” (CDR) to help curb climate change.

The conference – held on the campus of the Politecnico di Milano – is the fourth in a series, with previous editions held in Oxford, UK in 2024, and Gothenburg, Sweden in 2018 and 2022.

A broad range of academics – from forests, oceans and soils experts through to social and political scientists – discussed the co-benefits and trade-offs involved in drawing down CO2 from the atmosphere at scale, as well as the ways policy could drive CDR deployment.

Dr Soheil Shayegh, director of the industrial and planetary carbon cycle programme at the Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC), told Carbon Brief the idea behind the conference was to “bring scientists together to convey a message to policymakers about where the technology stands”.

He continued: “We should be very clear that there still are huge uncertainties about the effectiveness of lots of this CDR technology – are they marketable or not? But what is clear for us is the need for CDR.”

Dr Morgan Edwards, the lead author of the recently published “state of CDR report”, told delegates that meeting the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C goal by the end of this century would require CDR to “scale up rapidly” from 2.2bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2 per year) today to 8.8GtCO2 by 2050.

She added: “We need to see an upscaling in ambition over the next few years to get on a track consistent with these long-term scenarios.”

Below, Carbon Brief summarises the key talking points at the conference.

Overshoot

The removal of carbon from the atmosphere is seen as crucial to compensate for the emissions from human activities that are difficult to decarbonise – for instance, those generated in aviation and agriculture.

This, scientists have emphasised, must come in addition to steep emissions cuts.

CDR has another role, which is as a mechanism to return average global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, in the likely event that the Paris Agreement’s temperature target is exceeded.

The Milan conference comes after 2024 was the first single year to breach the 1.5C target and as scientists have projected that the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C target – typically interpreted in terms of a 20-year average – could be exceeded by the end of this decade.

Prof Sabine Fuss, head of research department at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) told Carbon Brief the likely breach of the 1.5C limit means the CDR research agenda was getting “even bigger” as the world would need to contend with “even larger scales” of CDR. She added:

“Some of the things that we were worrying about already in a net-zero context are getting even more pertinent. Also, [we need to think about] what will happen under climate change. A lot of [CDR approaches] may not be super resilient if we’re facing higher temperatures and more disturbances. Think about forests.”

Prof Massimo Tavoni, scientific director of the RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment, described the prospect of returning temperatures to 1.5C with CDR as the “biggest Earth restoration project ever”.

Speaking in the plenary, Tavoni said the concepts of “overshoot” and “CDR” were “closely connected, but not the same thing”.

Broadly speaking, there have been three “phases” of overshoot research, Tavoni said:

  • 1995 to 2005: a period where overshoot was not “seriously considered”, he argued. It was during this period that researchers first explored scenarios that would “now be classified as overshoot pathways” and “set out CO2 removal as a mechanism” for stabilising the climate, he said.
  • 2005 to 2015: the age when “overshoot was discovered”, according to Tavoni. At this time, he said, “[climate] ambition was rising and emissions were also rising, which led to the incorporation of CDR in the models”.
  • 2015 to the present day: an “age of reckoning” where overshoot has become “formally entangled” in the scenarios created by the climate community due to the “absolute need for overshoot and CDR to achieve [temperature] targets in the face of growing CO2 concentration”.

Tavoni noted that all of the new emissions scenarios set out ahead of the seventh phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP7) – unveiled in April – exceeded the 1.5C limit.

(CMIP is a global initiative that coordinates the work of dozens of climate modelling centres around the world, recommending a common set of model experiments that can collectively shed light on the climate and how it could change.)

Half of the CMIP7 scenarios, Tavoni said, first “overshoot” the 1.5C goal and then “return back”.

The indicative global temperature rise under these seven scenarios is shown in the chart on the right below.

(For more on CMIP7 and the emissions scenarios, see Carbon Brief’s recent guest post).

The greenhouse gas emissions for each of the CMIP7 climate scenarios (left) and the associated estimated average temperature change from 1850-1900 (right) using the FaIR emulator. Source: Adapted from Van Vuuren et al. (2026)
The greenhouse gas emissions for each of the CMIP7 climate scenarios (left) and the associated estimated average temperature change from 1850-1900 (right) using the FaIR emulator. Source: Adapted from Van Vuuren et al. (2026)

Tavoni noted that there was no “significant relation” across the scenario database between the cumulative CDR levels a scenario assumes and the level of temperature overshoot it would likely cause.

This, he said, is because “many other factors” contribute to CDR uptake, including the policy environment, progress on emissions reduction in different countries and decisions about what types of emissions might constitute “hard-to-abate” or “residual”. He added:

“You can have scenarios with no ‘negative emissions’, but still a lot of CDR for compensating residual emissions.”

A number of sessions at the conference looked at Earth-system response to overshoot pathways with large-scale CDR.

For example, CMCC’s Dr Momme Butenschön presented research looking at how the oceans would respond to “global net-negative emissions” – a hypothetical situation where more carbon is being removed from the atmosphere than is being added through emissions.

He explained that model runs to 2100 show that a decline in global surface temperature would fail to reduce temperatures in the upper layer of the ocean for at least 30-40 years. Ocean temperatures would “stay flat” during this period due to the ocean’s inertia, he said.

The response to negative emissions further down in the ocean would be even slower, he explained to Carbon Brief:

“If you go to the mesopelagic zone – the twilight zone 200-1,000 metres beneath the surface – the ocean will continue to warm and then, after some years, it will flatten out again. [Its temperature] will not go down.

“And, if you go to the deeper ocean, everything – acidification, deoxygenation, warming – they all continue on their path. So the deep ocean doesn’t even realise you are doing negative emissions.”

The researchers behind the project – named RESCUE – have asked for an extension to run the models up to 2300 so they can better understand what the “long-term reaction” of the ocean to negative emissions technologies would be.

Forests

Speaking in a plenary session, Dr Edwards – assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin and lead author of the 2026 state of CDR report – explained that the “vast majority of CDR that is happening today is so-called ‘conventional’ CDR – so, primarily removal of CO2 from forests”.

Edwards was summarising some of the findings of the latest “state of CDR” report, which says that, at present, 99.9% of existing CDR is “conventional”, land-based techniques such as tree-planting.

The world’s forests currently remove 2.2GtCO2 per year, equivalent to around 5% of gross global CO2 emissions, according to the report. It also notes that “high ambition climate scenarios” will require all forms of CDR to reach a median value of 3.9GtCO2 by 2035 and 8.8GtCO2 by 2050.

Edwards said that conventional CDR methods “tend to be well established and have relatively high readiness levels”. Typically, they also have lower costs – “in some cases less than $10 per tonne of CO2” – than “novel” methods.

Experts pointed out repeatedly throughout the conference that CDR methods would need to be diversified for CDR to achieve levels required to meet climate goals, given land-use constraints and concerns around the permanence of carbon stored in forests.

CMCC’s Shayegh said the world would need a “portfolio” of solutions, given the “big trade-offs” involved in different CDR approaches. He explained:

“For forests, for example, to get the scale you need, you have to have lots of managed land for CDR, which means interfering with agriculture. So you will compete with food and biofuel – and it’s not a very easy or efficient way of creating jobs.”

In a research session, Dr Clemens Schwingshackl from LMU Munich noted that CDR from afforestation and reforestation compensated for about 6% of human fossil-fuel emissions between 2014-23.

However, he said that there was “large uncertainty” in calculations of forest-based CDR. Current bookkeeping models and national greenhouse gas inventories – two key methods for estimating levels of forest-based CDR – have uncertainty rates of 20% and 30%, respectively.

“Missing processes” in bookkeeping models include the impact of disturbances on forests, such as fire, as well as information about the effectiveness of afforestation and reforestation projects, he said.

Dr Giacomo Grassi, scientific officer at the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, noted the differences in the ways “conventional” CDR levels are calculated by countries, the “state of CDR” report and by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

CDR, he said, “excludes” CO2 uptake that is not directly caused by human activities. However, separating direct human effects on land from indirect human-caused effects – such as the impacts of climate change – cannot be achieved through observations alone and instead relies on models and model assumptions. He explained:

“Because national greenhouse gas inventories typically rely on observations, they include a broader [human-caused] land carbon sink than what is counted as CDR. As a result, conventional land-based CDR cannot be fully tracked in these inventories.”

Grassi illustrated the different approaches to defining CDR by showing the graphic below.

Infographic showing the different definitions of anthropogenic CO2 removals
Credit: Grassi et al. (2023)

Barbara Saget from the Paris School of Economics presented the findings of an exercise where researchers used a “dynamic social planner model” to understand the optimum timing and scaling of nature-based and technological CDR and the extent to which net-zero targets can rely on nature-based CDR.

The research showed that nature-based CDR was needed in the medium-term to offset hard-to-abate emissions and limit reliance on more expensive solutions.

However, the model results showed that, as forests grow, an increasing share of captured CO2 is used to compensate for carbon produced during forest disturbances, rather than human-caused greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, in the EU, the issue of tight land availability restricts the expansion of forest-based removals. She explained:

“This theoretical model shows that forests are not reliable in the long-run to offset the hard-to-abate emissions, first because of the release of emissions – this reversal risk – but also because of land constraints. So, we need to rely on technological CDR to compensate for these remaining emissions.”

Other forms of CDR

Other research sessions focused on the challenges, uncertainties and opportunities in scaling in other CDR techniques, sometimes referred to as “novel”, “engineered” or “technological” CDR.

In the opening plenary, Edwards noted that, despite making up less than 0.1% of current levels CDR, “novel” solutions were “growing rapidly”.

She added that “the major scale up of novel CDR that we might need to meet climate goals will likely require substantial cost reductions for these technologies”.

Ashwin Murphy, negative emissions fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, explained the various international agreements governing “marine CDR” – a category that includes ocean alkalinity enhancement and direct ocean capture. He said:

“As much promise as marine CDR holds, it also holds the potential for harm, environmental, social and otherwise. The laws that apply to CDR as a whole are unclear, because there are older laws that have been taken out and forced into the CDR framework and that means that they often don’t fit right.

“When a CDR project takes place and for whatever reason there’s an issue – whether it’s environmental harm or otherwise – liability questions are complicated, and there’s not often a clear answer as to what happens next.”

Oumaima Rhalem of Utrecht University described research which looked at the potential of biochar as a CDR technology. She said the findings show that biochar’s potential to tackle climate change depended on a region’s agricultural soils and biomass resources.

In the longer-run, however, she noted that carbon pricing would influence the geography of biochar deployment and would eventually shift biochar from an “agricultural technology” to a “carbon-removal technology”.

Dr Christian Rischer from the Kiel Institute presented findings of a literature review on the CDR potential of blue-carbon ecosystems, such as mangroves, salt marshes, sea grasses and macroalgae.

He said that “low ranges of estimates” suggest these ecosystems currently sequester around 270m tonnes of carbon per year and have a “mitigation potential” of up to 448m tonnes of carbon per year 2050.

Meanwhile, Dr Leon Stephan, a scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research presented the results of a review of the scientific and “grey” literature – which includes reports, white papers and other evaluations – on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of CDR up to 2023.

He noted an “exponential growth” in the MRV literature, with two-thirds of the 184 publications assessed focused on “conventional” CDR approaches, such as afforestation and deforestation. On the other hand, he said, marine CDR, DACCS and bioenergy and carbon capture and storage (BECCS) were “rarely studied” in the MRV literature. The analysis also showed that terminology and definitions were used inconsistently, he said.

The literature focused largely on the quantification of MRV, followed by monitoring and removal quality, he added, noting that there was “very little” on governance of solutions.

The researchers also conducted an analysis of 60 CDR certification methodologies used to issue credits for 11 CDR methods in the voluntary and compliance carbon markets.

IPCC CDR methodology report

The conference comes as the IPCC gears up to publish a methodology report on CDR technologies in 2027.

The report will be produced by the Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, the group responsible for the internationally-agreed methodologies used for countries’ calculation of greenhouse gas emissions and removals.

The European Commission’s Grassi noted the report aims “to provide a consistent methodology that allows countries to report greenhouse gas emissions removal under the UNFCCC [UN Framework Convention on Climate Change]”.

Dr Oliver Geden, senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and Working Group III vice-chair for the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle, tells Carbon Brief the report will bring together experts on CDR methods, as well as specialists on compiling inventories.

He said the methodology report differed from previous climate inventory reports, given that many of the solutions it would be drawing up guidelines for do not yet exist at scale:

“If you look into the guidelines of established processes, like emissions from gasoline use…you don’t have to measure the emissions, you just have statistics about the activity and then you have an emissions factor. It’s an established process.

“The problem with the methodology report is that it is very unusual that you try to regulate things that are not really there yet…So, it can be problematic to come up with ‘standard removal factors’.”

Nevertheless, he said the report was a “start” and signalled that policymakers had started to take CDR beyond forestry seriously.

He added that it will “need to be reworked constantly because experience with what these methods deliver, and under which circumstances, may change”.

Policy

A significant tranche of the conference was focused on how policy could drive uptake of carbon removal solutions.

Speaking in a plenary, Geden presented a table from the “state of CDR” report, which sets out three types of policy that can drive uptake of CDR.

Table outlining the typology for CDR policy assessment that lists policy categories, policy objectives, and examples.
Credit: State of CDR (2026).

Geden said that, at present, there was a “lack of robust demand signals” for CDR. This includes measures such as binding targets, government procurement initiatives and tax incentives for buyers.

The state of CDR report notes that the 140 countries around the world that have announced net-zero targets – including virtually all of the world’s major emitters have “implicitly included a role for CDR in their climate plans”.

However, this does not always translate into measures specifically designed to scale up CDR. Only the EU has adopted a binding, quantified removals target into law – namely, the goal to reach 310m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) of annual net removals in the land sector by 2030.

In general, conventional CDR is the main focus of policy, according to the state of CDR report, with various governments focusing on tree planting to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere.

Speaking in a plenary at the conference, Fabien Ramos, carbon removal lead at the European Commission, detailed the way the bloc was incorporating carbon removals into its policy, both through its headline carbon targets and via the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS).

Ramos said that “carbon removal would have a significant role in the ETS in the future”, noting that the EU will need “lots of carbon removal after 2030” to achieve its 2050 net-zero goal.

Geden told Carbon Brief that net-negative emissions would be the “next frontier for European countries to commit to” if overshoot scenarios were to be successfully realised:

“If you talk about exceeding 1.5C and returning, and you need net-negative [emissions] globally. You don’t get to net-negative globally if nobody even plans to go net-negative individually…Currently, only Denmark has a net-negative target right now. Others will have to follow.”

Lucia Dora Simonelli, from US-based non-profit Carbon Removal Standards Initiative, said it would be important to establish how to “weave” the carbon removal process into existing policies. She said:

“This is not about creating a new CDR policy. This is not about creating climate policy. It’s about truly leveraging existing policy infrastructure.”

PIK’s Fuss similarly told Carbon Brief that one of her key takeaways from the conference was the need to “expand the carbon lens and see what other opportunities we have to mainstream CDR into other policy agendas – so, looking at benefits, for instance, in terms of health or adaptation”.

Dr Steve Smith from the University of Oxford’s Smith School of Enterprise & Environment told Carbon Brief:

“If CDR is to scale to gigatonne levels – as indicated by nearly all global pathways to the Paris Agreement goals – then governments will likely need to introduce markets to create demand for CDR or obligations for it to happen.

“CDR is a public good – like our current waste management systems for sewage – and it’s highly unlikely to happen at that scale through voluntary action alone.”

Societal buy-in

A number of delegates pointed to the need to build societal demand and acceptance for CDR technologies.

Dr Livia Fritz from the University of Geneva presented results of a survey of more than 10,000 people in six countries, focused on three CDR approaches: DACCS, BECCS and enhanced rock weathering. Each respondent was assigned one technology and asked to weigh in on five imagined scenarios of how the solutions would be implemented.

The exercise found that support for CDR hinges on taking “procedural and distributive” fairness “seriously” and opening up planning processes to public and expert scrutiny, she said. It also found that benefit-sharing, as well as not-for-profit arrangements “consistently increase” public support for CDR across all countries and technologies.

Speaking in a plenary, Dr Holly Buck from the University of Buffalo discussed the cultural shift required to enable overshoot scenarios. She explained that a national survey exploring US public opinion about decarbonisation and climate policies – including CDR – had revealed that many members of the US public see the concept of a return to 1.5C from above as “fantastical and implausible”. She said:

“Its not just about social support or acceptance or licence. This sort of industry really requires an active demand or desire for it. It’s not enough to just tolerate [CDR]. It’s not going to work unless there’s a wish that’s felt.”

The post Experts: Why carbon removal needs a ‘major scale up’ to return warming to 1.5C appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Experts: Why carbon removal needs a ‘major scale up’ to return warming to 1.5C

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How Shining a Light on Ships Could Help Solve Illegal Fishing

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Sixteen countries have adopted the Mombasa Declaration to combat illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. The biggest weapon in their arsenal: transparency.

Mamadou Sarr remembers when an artisanal fisherman in Dakar only had to helm his wooden pirogue a single kilometer offshore to find a rich bounty of sardines and cuttlefish. For generations, Senegal’s near shore was the staging ground for a noble trade passed down from father to son.

How Shining a Light on Ships Could Help Solve Illegal Fishing

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Mombasa ocean summit drives progress on marine protection, but threats persist

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Governments at the annual oceans summit reaffirmed commitments to protect key marine ecosystems including the high seas and coral reefs, but observers said funding barriers and polluting projects are hampering progress on putting them into practice.

At the Our Ocean Conference in Kenya’s coastal city of Mombasa this week, some 3,000 delegates – including government officials, scientists, business representatives and activists – gathered to discuss ocean protection and push for marine issues to move from the margins to the centre of global climate diplomacy. 

Campaigners said the overall picture was positive. Oceans are gaining more visibility in international climate discussions: from blue carbon ecosystems such as mangroves, to coastal adaptation, marine biodiversity, ocean finance and the High Seas Treaty. 

In this year’s preliminary conference report, the secretariat listed 320 existing ocean commitments worth $6.4 billion, with about $1.1 billion destined to address the climate crisis. Many of these pledges were already announced before the conference.

But as momentum builds ahead of the COP31 climate summit in Türkiye, John Kerry, former US climate envoy and founder of the Our Ocean Conference, warned that the conversations and commitments on ocean protection will mean little if implementation continues to lag behind action. 

    “The ocean can no longer be an afterthought in climate policy,” Kerry told delegates at the opening ceremony of the conference. “Now it must become central to our climate solutions.”

    “The challenge before us is not a lack of knowledge. We know exactly what has happened,” he said. “The challenge is whether political will can finally catch up with the science.”

    He added that the meeting taking place on the shores of the Indian Ocean should be remembered as the moment the process moved “from commitments to implementation”.

    The ocean has quietly shielded humanity from the worst impacts of climate change for decades, absorbing around 90% of the excess heat generated by global warming while sustaining the livelihoods of billions of people.

    From pledges to progress

    Oceans have been largely absent from international climate negotiations, often treated as a conservation issue rather than a core component of climate action. 

    Yet scientists say the ocean absorbs around a quarter of humanity’s annual carbon emissions and plays a critical role in regulating global temperatures.

    Research suggests that ocean-based solutions – from restoring mangroves and seagrass meadows to decarbonising shipping and expanding marine protected areas – could deliver up to 35% of the emissions reductions needed to keep global warming within 1.5 degrees Celsius by mid-century.

    That growing recognition has fuelled calls for oceans to play a larger role in climate policy and negotiations. Against that backdrop, the Our Ocean Conference – launched in 2014 to mobilise governments, business, philanthropies and activists – has emerged as a platform for advancing action to keep the planet’s seas healthy. 

    According to the conference secretariat, the process has generated more than 2,900 commitments worth nearly $170 billion in the 10 years since its launch. The gathering in Mombasa was the 11th conference and the first to take place in Africa.

    This week, Canada and Jamaica were confirmed as the hosts of the next two Our Ocean conferences in 2027 and 2029. There is none planned for 2028, as the UN Ocean Conference will be co-hosted by South Korea and Chile that year, the secretariat said.  

    Science ‘under attack’ from fossil fuel interests at UN climate talks

    In Mombasa, governments reaffirmed more than 300 commitments linked to the creation of new marine protected areas, reducing marine pollution, and developing sustainable fisheries, among others.

    Most of the finance mobilised went to “blue economy” initiatives, including the European Union’s Ocean Eye initiative, which will mobilise €50 million ($57 million) to offset a Trump administration decision to scale back the US Ocean Observatories Initiative and weaken scientific marine data.

    “More important than the new pledges is the actual delivery of commitments,” Cynthia Barzuna, who heads the conference secretariat at the World Resources Institute, told Climate Home News. “That is what makes a difference for marine ecosystems and coastal communities.”

    Last year, the secretariat published its first comprehensive assessment of implementation, finding that nearly 80% of commitments made through the conference were either completed or progressing towards completion.

    A side event on the EU's Ocean Eye initiative at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya. (Photo: Kenya State Department for Blue Economy and Fisheries)
    A side event on the EU’s Ocean Eye initiative at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya. (Photo: Kenya State Department for Blue Economy and Fisheries)

    Barriers remain

    Yet while oceans are climbing the political agenda, significant barriers remain to turning ambition into meaningful action.

    The secretariat’s assessment found that successful projects involved local communities, strengthened local expertise, and secured long-term financing. Many organisations, however, reported difficulties accessing sustained funding, particularly in developing countries. 

    African initiatives, for example, tend to rely on short-term project grants, creating what Barzuna described as a “patchwork of impacts on the ground” rather than the systemic change needed to protect marine ecosystems and coastal livelihoods. 

    Campaigners say a broader challenge lies in ensuring that growing recognition of the ocean’s importance is reflected in wider climate and economic policies.

    While countries have pledged to expand marine protected areas, restore coastal ecosystems and strengthen ocean governance, many continue to pursue activities that place additional pressure on marine environments, including offshore fossil fuel development.

    “This year’s Our Ocean Conference comes at a critical moment where the incoming presidencies for COP31 – both Türkiye and Australia – have a strong interest increasing the prominence of the ocean in the COP,” Shamini Selvaratnam, director of International Climate and Clean Energy at the Ocean Conservancy, told Climate Home News.

    “But we cannot talk about ocean health and then continue to explore offshore oil and gas – those two things are incompatible. It’s like asking the dolphin to swim on the land.”

    For supporters of the ocean agenda, the question is no longer whether oceans matter to climate action. The challenge now is ensuring that governments match rising political ambition with funding, implementation and accountability. 

    “The ocean has actually been acting as Earth’s life support system – and it has been protecting us,” Kerry told delegates. “The question before us is whether we are willing to protect the ocean in return.” 

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