Last month, the U.S. shocked global trade with a 10% tariff on all imports. China was hit harder—34% overall, and up to 145% on battery products. However, it was later reduced to 30%. So far, key battery minerals like lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and copper are exempt. This is because the U.S. still depends on imports to meet clean energy targets.
In April 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order to investigate how relying on imported processed critical minerals could harm U.S. national security. Nonetheless, lithium is safe for now, but uncertainty is growing.
IEA has recently analyzed that new tariffs could raise EV costs, delay battery projects, and shake supply chains. If lithium is targeted, prices may spike, and the race for U.S. refining will speed up. Let’s study the case of lithium more deeply.
Lithium Prices Stabilize as Supply Overtakes Demand
After years of volatility, lithium prices have stabilized. As per the IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025, last year global lithium demand rose 30% year-over-year. It reached more than 200,000 tonnes of lithium, or around 1.1 million tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE). This was roughly equal to all lithium demand in 2018.

This growth was largely driven by the electric vehicle (EV) sector, while energy storage systems (ESS)—now accounting for 9% of lithium use are contributing significantly.
However, supply grew even faster, jumping by over 35%. This oversupply pushed lithium prices down to around USD 12,000 per tonne of LCE, a sharp decline from the record highs of 2022.
Economic uncertainty and weaker consumer confidence in the U.S. could also reduce EV purchases, hitting lithium, cobalt, graphite, and copper demand. Large-scale supply projects, particularly for capital-heavy minerals like copper, may stall or face delays, impacting future availability.
China Remains the Demand Giant
According to the EU’s Raw Materials Information System (RMIS), China consumed over 75% of global lithium in 2024 due to its stronghold in battery manufacturing. South Korea and Japan followed, owing to their significant battery cathode production capacity.
The rise of LFP (lithium iron phosphate) batteries in EVs channeled most demand toward lithium carbonate, while lithium hydroxide, used in nickel-rich batteries, experienced slower growth.
However, RMIS has a different prediction. It reveals that demand for most battery materials will likely exceed supply after 2029–2030, except for graphite, because of China’s rapid growth in synthetic graphite production.
Lithium demand is rising fast. However, without major new investments, shortages could hit lithium markets between 2030 and 2040.
Forecast of global Supply-Demand Balance for Lithium

Cost Relief for Battery Makers
The dip in prices brought welcome savings. IEA highlighted that in 2022, the lithium cost in a typical 57 kWh EV battery was USD 67. By 2024, that figure dropped to just USD 15, easing the pressure on EV manufacturers.
Industry Shakeups: Mergers, Closures, and New Players
IEA also analyzed how the low-price environment triggered a major industry consolidation. For instance, Rio Tinto acquired Arcadium Lithium, a company formed from the merger of Livent and Allkem.
At the same time, mine closures and project cancellations occurred. Several Australian operations shut down, and projects in the U.S., like Rhyolite Ridge, were scrapped due to poor economics.
Yet, new production hubs emerged:
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Africa saw a fivefold jump in lithium supply, contributing 30% of new output, especially from Zimbabwe and Namibia, up from just 6% in 2023.
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Latin America recorded a 65% increase, led by Argentina and Brazil. One highlight was Eramet’s Centenario project in Argentina, which began small-scale production using direct lithium extraction (DLE)—a promising new method for tapping brine resources.
Lithium Prices in 2025: Volatility Ahead
Analysts at Shanghai Metals Market (SMM) expect lithium prices to remain volatile throughout 2025. Projections for battery-grade lithium carbonate range between USD 9,000 and USD 12,000 per tonne, depending on how supply keeps pace with growing EV and ESS demand.
Here’s the latest lithium price trend prevailing between April and May.

Lithium hydroxide is also expected to rise in price, driven by the shift toward high-performance battery chemistries.
The post Lithium Supply Outpaces Demand—for Now: What’s Ahead? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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Carbon Footprint
Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions
Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?
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