The global shift towards a clean-energy system is much more than just a technological switch – it is a profound transformation of markets, industries and societal behaviours.
This complex undertaking is often characterised by “non-linearity” and “feedback loops”, where small changes can go on to have disproportionately large impacts and where seemingly straightforward paths encounter unexpected roadblocks.
Interventions can be self-amplifying – leading to runaway change, or they can be self-defeating – when progress seems impossible to attain.
Our new policy brief sheds light on these intricate dynamics, which can be overlooked when governments use analytical frameworks based on standard economic thinking.
The brief sets out the most common archetypes of system change and behaviour, as well as the underlying feedback loops that drive them, with the aim of helping policymakers to understand the recurring patterns that can either accelerate or impede progress.
Governments that can recognise these patterns – as well as the ways they can be harnessed or sidestepped – are likely to be better equipped to manage structural change.
This article delves into three key examples from the policy brief, exploring how they are influencing the energy transition and what lessons can be drawn for effective policymaking.
Reinforcing feedback loops
At the heart of the energy transition lies a powerful engine: the reinforcing feedback loops inherent in the development and diffusion of many clean-energy technologies.
This virtuous cycle operates through several mechanisms.
First, “learning by doing”, which means that as more units of a technology, such as solar panels or wind turbines, are produced and deployed, manufacturers and developers become more efficient, processes are refined and costs fall.
Second, economies of scale kick in: as production volumes increase, unit costs decrease due to efficiencies in manufacturing and more developed supply chains.
Finally, wider deployment can trigger network effects and the emergence of complementary innovations. This means that as the adoption of a given technology grows, it can foster an ecosystem of supporting infrastructure, skilled labour and supporting technologies, which can further boost its attractiveness and viability.
Together, these three elements create a powerful reinforcing loop: initial investment drives innovation and cost reduction, which spurs increased demand, attracting further investment.
Solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind turbines are prime examples of this dynamic.
The astonishing growth of solar offers a particularly vivid illustration of the way in which reinforcing feedback loops can blindside experts and policymakers alike.
Solar growth has far exceeded projections made in the early 2000s. Indeed, the world’s actual installed capacity in 2020 was over 700 gigawatts (GW), more than ten times the level expected in outlooks published in 2006, as shown in the figure below.
Global solar deployment has exceeded expectations due to disparate trends and drivers in individual markets that, together, all point in the same direction. China, for instance, met its 2030 target for wind and solar capacity six years ahead of schedule in 2024.
Batteries are also riding this wave, with costs plummeting by around 85% over the past decade as deployment, particularly in road transport, scales up.
However, not all clean-energy technologies benefit from this self-amplifying pattern.
Nuclear power and hydropower, for example, have historically not shown the same rapid cost declines, due to their large, complex and site-specific nature. This contrasts with the smaller, modular and replicable characteristics of technologies, such as solar PV.
This does not negate the potential role of such technologies, but it does mean that they are less likely to see disruptive, exponential and self-reinforcing growth.
There are a number of potential conclusions for policymakers.
Early in the transition, interventions such as feed-in tariffs and public procurement were crucial in kick-starting these reinforcing feedbacks for solar and wind.
As these technologies mature and become cost-competitive, the focus shifts to removing other barriers, such as streamlining permitting processes, investing in grid expansion and reforming markets so they are better able to integrate variable renewable output.
These same principles could now be applied to newly emergent clean-energy technologies. Policies that directly nurture these reinforcing loops, such as deployment subsidies and clean technology mandates, can be expected to be most effective in the initial stages.
Turning again to the example of solar energy, while such initial efforts appeared to be expensive, they paid off over time by unlocking future cost reductions and, thus, kick-starting the self-amplifying feedback loops that are now driving further progress.
This contrasts with the idea that carbon pricing is necessarily the most efficient policy for decarbonisation. It may well be helpful, but as it will not drive rapid early technology adoption, it is less likely to have a self-amplifying effect in the initial stages of the transition.
Renewable ‘cannibalisation’
While the growth of renewable energy is the driving force of the energy transition, another system dynamic, termed “renewable cannibalisation“, can act as a dampening feedback loop. This can potentially slow progress long before full decarbonisation is achieved
This cannibalisation process results in variable renewable energy (VRE) sources, such as solar and wind, receiving decreasing prices for the electricity they generate.
Essentially, the more solar and wind capacity that is connected to the grid, the more they undermine their own revenue. This happens through three main channels.
First, the merit order effect, whereby solar and wind, which have very low operating costs, push more expensive fossil-fuel generators out of the market when supply is abundant.
In markets with marginal pricing, this leads to lower wholesale electricity prices during periods of high renewable output. While this cuts prices for consumers – at least in the short term – these lower prices also reduce revenues for renewable generators, potentially undermining the economic case for further investment.
For example, in California, solar power unit revenues fell by $1.30 per megawatt hour (MWh) for each percentage point increase in solar penetration between 2013 and 2017.
Second, price volatility, where uncertainty over future trends in the generation mix and the balance between supply and demand can make long-term revenues difficult to predict.
This increased uncertainty can raise the cost of capital for new renewable projects, again acting as a brake on investment
The UK, for example, experienced this before the introduction of “contracts for difference” (CfDs), which helped stabilise revenue expectations for renewable developers.
Third, volume risk, where rising VRE capacity increases the likelihood of more frequent curtailment – periods when renewable generation exceeds demand or grid capacity, forcing generators to scale back output and lose potential revenue.
Curtailment in itself is nothing new, but the scale and frequency is changing. Recent analysis by University College London suggests that without significant flexibility or storage, UK renewable generation could exceed demand for more than 50% of the time by 2030.
The analysis found that installed wind and solar capacity is set to surge beyond current levels of electricity demand, as illustrated in the figure below, finding that this could “deter investment” in new projects if no action is taken to address the problem.
These dampening feedback loops illustrate a classic “limits to success” scenario. The very success of renewables, if unmanaged, can create conditions that hinder their continued expansion.
The policy implications here are nuanced. One solution is CfDs, which offer renewable generators a fixed price and have been effective in many countries at mitigating the merit order effect and price volatility, thus maintaining investment.
However, as VRE penetration becomes very high and surplus generation becomes a regular occurrence, other solutions are likely to be needed. This is because existing CfD designs often include clauses that stop payments when market prices drop below zero.
As a result, alternative CfD designs, guaranteeing revenues based on installed capacity or potential – rather than actual – electricity generation might be considered, for example, even though these have other drawbacks.
More fundamentally, our research suggests the solution to this challenge lies in fostering the co-evolution of renewables with technologies such as energy storage and green hydrogen production. These can absorb surplus generation and turn a problem into an opportunity.
Whereas, traditionally, it might be assumed that the market on its own can optimally allocate risk, research suggests that a redesign of market structures may be needed to enable investment and fully realise the cost-saving opportunities of the new technologies.
This is one of several sets of feedbacks discussed in a separate new report published today, looking at the power sector transition in China.
The power of connection
The energy transition is not a series of isolated changes in different sectors. Instead, it is an interconnected system, where progress in one area can catalyse shifts elsewhere. Shared technologies can create reinforcing feedbacks that accelerate decarbonisation across multiple fronts, generating cross-sector synergies.
The relationship between clean power and transport electrification is a powerful example of this. As batteries are deployed at scale in electric vehicles (EVs), their costs fall, enabling ever-wider deployment and further cost declines, as shown in the chart below.
This is due to the learning-by-doing and economies-of-scale feedbacks discussed above.
This cost reduction then makes batteries more viable for grid-scale energy storage, which, in tur, helps integrate more low-cost VRE into the power system.
Cheaper, cleaner electricity then further incentivises the electrification of transport, as well as heating and light industry. This increased electrification boosts demand for renewable power, driving further deployment and cost reductions in solar and wind. It also expands the potential for demand-side response, where consumers adjust their electricity use to help balance the grid.
A similar dynamic is anticipated for “green” hydrogen. As deployment in one anchor sector – perhaps fertilisers or refining – drives down the cost of electrolysers, it makes green hydrogen more competitive for other applications, such as shipping or even long-duration energy storage in the power sector.
Each sector’s adoption of green hydrogen contributes to the shared learning and cost reduction, benefiting all.
The policy implications of these cross-sector synergies could be significant. Their existence suggests, for example, that there is no need to wait for decarbonisation of the power sector to advance further, before beginning the electrification of transport, heating or industry.
This is in contrast to the argument that transport should only be electrified after cutting power sector emissions, since increased EV charging will drive up demand for gas- or coal-fired generation.
While there will be a marginal increase in emissions from plugging a new EV into the power grid, the insights described in our brief imply that it is still likely to be more effective to pursue the transition away from fossil fuels in multiple sectors in parallel, because it can activate beneficial cross-sector feedback loops that are greater than the sum of their parts.
As such, our research suggests that policymakers hoping to take advantage of cross-sector synergies could aim to deliberately strengthen technological linkages between different parts of the energy system. Examples include electricity tariffs and market structures that reward “smart” EV charging and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) services, encouraging industrial participation in demand-side response and promoting integrated home energy systems. These interactions can amplify the benefits of early investment in the transition.
Policy insights from system dynamics
Archetypes such as the self-reinforcing growth of clean technologies, the potential for renewable cannibalisation, the accelerating power of cross-sector synergies and seven others described in our new report paint a picture of a transition that is far from linear. Instead, we find that it is governed by complex interdependencies and feedback loops.
Consequently, our research suggests that policymakers will be much better equipped to manage and steer the transition, if they adopt a systems thinking approach.
Recognising these recurring patterns allows for the design of more robust and effective policies that anticipate challenges and leverage opportunities.
For instance, understanding the power of reinforcing feedback loops in technology diffusion underscores the value of early-stage support for nascent clean-energy technologies.
Conversely, anticipating the dampening effects of renewable cannibalisation highlights the likely benefits of combining renewable buildout with evolving market designs and strategic investments in flexibility solutions, such as storage and demand-side response.
Policymakers that understand and work with these dynamics are likely to be in a better position to spark self-amplifying changes – achieving maximum value for minimum effort – and to avoid self-defeating interventions that go nowhere.
The post Guest post: How ‘feedback loops’ and ‘non-linear thinking’ can inform climate policy appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How ‘feedback loops’ and ‘non-linear thinking’ can inform climate policy
This is a republication of November’s edition of The Climate Agenda – a subscriber-only newsletter designed to keep you informed of the key events, negotiations and announcements happening every month. If you want to receive The Climate Agenda straight to your inbox at the start of each month, sign up as a subscriber today.
COP31 begins in one week, and we’ll have five specialist reporters on the ground in Antalya, Türkiye, bringing you every development as it happens. From the negotiations to leaders’ speeches and side events, we’ll be there to dissect what it all means for international climate policy on electrification, just transition, adaptation finance and much more.
Here’s what you need to know for November, why it matters and what to expect.
US midterm elections
Tuesday 3 November – United States
The geopolitical highlight for the first week of November is the US midterm elections, which will show whether American voters are in any mood to forgive President Donald Trump for failing to bring down the cost of living. From an energy perspective, his pro-oil and gas stance hasn’t led to cheaper prices for consumers, pushed up by the US-instigated Iran conflict. And his diesel deal with Russia won’t yet have made a difference at the pump.
The key issue for climate and energy policy is whether the Republicans hold onto their governing trifecta. If so, then expect continued dismantling of regulations that protect the environment, as well as strong backing for fossil fuel production. If the Democrats regain control of Congress, which polls suggest is possible, it could trigger a push to restore Biden-era clean energy tax credits, and support states wanting to restart mothballed wind and solar projects.
Data centres have been a hot-wire issue, with growing community opposition to their expansion – partly due to concerns over rising utility bills as the facilities gobble power. Whether Republicans or Democrats win Congress, both are likely to make tech firms pay for the extra electricity production they need, with the latter favouring renewable sources.
Governor races are also taking place in key states for climate issues, including Democrat-run California, which has used the courts to fight Trump’s attacks on clean energy.
Read more: National climate plans now promise half the emission cuts expected by UN
Read more: The more Europe relies on the US for energy, the more it’s vulnerable to pressure by Trump
COP30 Deforestation and Fossil Fuel Transition Roadmaps
Tuesday 3 November – Brazil
Brazil is set to unveil two global roadmaps: one for transitioning away from fossil fuels, the other for ending deforestation.
The COP30 presidency promised them in the dying hours of the Belém summit last November as a last-minute fix to break a political impasse. Since then, it has been consulting with countries, experts and campaigners around the world to gather ideas and sketch out the elements to include in these blueprints.
Don’t expect the roadmaps to offer any new global targets or give direct instructions on what countries must do, either to cut fossil fuel production and consumption or better protect forests. Rather, Brazil has said the documents will identify barriers and priority actions, highlight existing mechanisms and present a range of options that can be adapted to different national contexts.
It remains unclear what will happen with the reports once they are delivered on Tuesday. At the Bonn talks last June, a group of European and small island nations called for the roadmaps to be brought into the official negotiations, warning that a one-off report won’t cut it. But such efforts would undoubtedly face stiff opposition from fossil fuel-producing nations that objected to drafting the energy transition roadmap within the formal UN process last year.
Read more: European, island states seek clear future for global roadmap to cut fossil fuels
Read more: COP30 roadmap to end deforestation will invite countries to draft domestic plans
Read more: What we need to see in the roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels
UNEP Adaptation Gap Report
Wednesday 4 November – Nairobi, Kenya
The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) will publish its annual assessment of how well the world is planning, implementing and – crucially – financing measures to cope with worsening climate impacts.
Past editions have made for grim reading. Last year’s report warned of a widening gap between what developing countries need for adaptation and what they can access. It estimated they will need $310–365 billion a year by 2035, which is 12 to 14 times current international flows. The report also found that a goal of doubling international public adaptation finance by 2025 was likely to have been missed.
This year’s edition will be closely watched with adaptation expected to be a big-ticket item at COP31. Governments are likely to discuss the specifics of a commitment to triple adaptation finance for developing nations by 2035, agreed at COP30 last year – particularly what the baseline for that pledge is. Negotiators will be debating how to track progress against the 59 indicators of the Global Goal on Adaptation.
Read more: Editor’s Desk: Nepal’s disaster has laid bare the world’s adaptation accountability gap
Read more: Bonn climate talks end in “gridlock” on adaptation and emissions-cutting
Read more: New data shows rich nations likely missed 2025 goal to double adaptation finance
COP31 Climate Conference
Monday 9 November – Friday 20 November – Antalya, Türkiye
The climate community’s attention turns this month to Antalya for the annual UN climate summit. From the outset, COP31 will have an unprecedented, and potentially explosive, set-up: Türkiye is COP president overseeing the non-negotiated Action Agenda, while Australia runs the negotiations.
Billed, once again, as an “implementation COP”, the talks come amid a global energy crisis largely sparked by the actions of the US government, which is not expected to show up on the Turkish Riviera. It is also the first COP in the era of climate overshoot, coming just weeks after the UN officially confirmed the 1.5C warming limit will be breached and set out a narrow pathway to bring temperatures back down to the most ambitious Paris goal.
Unlike most recent COPs, the formal negotiations lack a clear headline item. Countries are due to establish and define the scope of the Just Transition Mechanism agreed in Belém last year, including its rules, governance and possible funding arrangements. On adaptation, vulnerable countries want a clearer path to delivering last year’s pledge to triple finance by 2035 and to putting the new progress indicators to work on the ground.
Governments are also likely to clash over next steps on the transition away from fossil fuels, and especially over whether the mitigation work programme – the forum dedicated to emission-cutting measures – has any future beyond this year.
Notable events to look out for in Antalya:
Opening session (9 November): The summit kicks off with the customary first-morning plenary. After the usual pageantry from the host nation, negotiating blocs and individual countries will deliver statements setting out their stall for the next two weeks. Watch out for a potential fight over the summit’s agenda – perhaps on issues relating to finance and trade following submissions requesting additional items – also a COP tradition.
Electrification (10 November): On Energy Day, the Turkish presidency is expected to formally launch its flagship electrification pledge, revealing which countries have signed up. Signatories will voluntarily commit to raising electricity’s share of global final energy consumption to 35% by 2035, though the current text does not require that power to come from clean sources. There is also a question mark over whether and how this can be included in the political cover decision the COP co-hosts have said they will aim to produce.
Leaders Summit (11-12 November): Heads of state and governments will jet into town for the traditional high-level segment in the middle of the first week, where world leaders typically talk up their climate record, air their grievances and call for more action.
Relatively few powerful leaders are on the list this time. Brazil’s Lula is set for another star turn this year, fresh from his surprise election win in October. The UK’s Andy Burnham, Spain’s Pedro Sanchez and China’s vice-premier Ding Xuexiang are expected, alongside Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Australia’s Anthony Albanese. In addition, African and small island nations will feature prominently.
Our COP31 Briefing newsletter will offer a more in-depth preview of the talks later this week.
Read more: Early speakers’ list suggests few powerful leaders will attend COP31
Read more: COP31 electrification pledge leaves out clean power commitment
Read more: From Belém to Antalya – gains, gaps and challenges for a new Just Transition Mechanism
International Maritime Organization (IMO) Shipping Talks
Monday 23 November – Friday 4 December – London, United Kingdom
One year on from explosive talks in which Trump’s officials teamed up with Saudi Arabia to delay a deal to make the shipping industry greener, governments will gather on the banks of the Thames for another attempt to reach agreement.
The Net Zero Framework, provisionally agreed in October 2025, includes a series of emissions reduction targets for the owners of large ships along with penalties for not meeting them, rewards for doing so and measures to make the maritime transition fair.
The framework is likely to be either tweaked or radically rewritten so that it’s more acceptable to the US and Saudis. Brazil and Japan have submitted compromise proposals. Analysts find those will move shipping further away from being able to meet its climate goals.
There will be closed-door talks between November 23-27 and a second week of talks open to accredited media from November 30 to December 4. Agreement on a proposal, perhaps decided through a vote, is expected after long and technical negotiations. The shipping industry’s 3% share of the world’s emissions is at stake.
Read more: London talks raise hopes for green shipping deal
The post What’s on the climate calendar for November 2026? appeared first on Climate Home News.