This week’s European parliamentary election results saw parties on the populist right making big gains in France and Germany, while the historic “green wave” of 2019 receded.
Despite polling showing a large majority of EU voters are in favour of continued or strengthened climate action, the results have “raised concerns” over the future of the bloc’s climate ambition.
The Green Deal package of EU laws passed during the past five years are expected to be “hard to undo”. However, these laws will need to be fully implemented in order to meet EU climate targets.
Moreover, while centrist parties continue to hold a majority in the new European parliament, the stronger presence of right-wing parties could make ambitious new laws harder to pass.
Carbon Brief has asked a range of policy experts what they think the European election results will mean for EU climate action over the next five years.
These are their responses, first as sample quotes, then, below, in full:
- Prof Federica Genovese: “[W]e should expect a rhetorical downscaling of the relevance of climate action. Whether this also means a substantive downscaling of the Green Deal depends on whether the EU will be looking at climate as a social redistributive agenda or a geopolitical security one.”
- Simone Tagliapietra: “[T]he pro-European centre has retained its majority of seats in the European Parliament, [sd] Europe is not going to reverse course on the green transition.”
- Luca Bergamaschi: “The results are a strong wake up call for climate action compared to the euphoria of 2019…The politics of climate action needs to be reengineered and reconnected with the needs of society.”
- Linda Kalcher: “While the threat from Moscow lingers we can expect Brussels to back its Green Deal – even if it’s sold as a weapon against Putin.”
- Vincent Hurkens: “The upcoming negotiations on the next European Commission president and her/his policy agenda will be decisive for Europe’s capacity to address the severe impacts and risks of climate change for Europe and EU’s global climate leadership.”
- Nils Redeker: “The results will complicate EU climate politics…the overall shift is likely to dampen enthusiasm for ambitious climate policies in [the European] parliament and could deter member states in the European Council from adopting new measures.”
Prof Federica Genovese
Professor of political science and international relations
University of Oxford
At least two results of the European Parliament (EP) elections will have important implications for Europe’s climate policy.
The first one is the self-evident main election outcome at the aggregate level. The right and far-right European party families – the governing European People’s Party and the European Conservatives and Reformists, plus the NI group – visibly increased their vote share, while the more progressive Renew Europe liberal party and, in particular, the Greens lost significantly.
[See Carbon Brief’s EU elections manifesto tracker for more on the party groupings.]
Whereas this is less of a gain of extreme-right populism as some had predicted, it is still a clear ideological shift from left to right. This is climate news because more progressive left-leaning parties have so far championed the urgency of climate change mitigation and adaptation, so the composition of the new EP will threaten the political momentum of the EU climate policy agenda.
Some expression of continuity with past policies will remain, both because the historical EPP-S&D balance remains relatively strong, and also because [current European Commission president Ursula] Von Der Leyen will probably continue heading the commission.
However, we should expect a rhetorical downscaling of the relevance of climate action. Whether this also means a substantive downscaling of the Green Deal depends on whether the EU will be looking at climate as a social redistributive agenda or a geopolitical security one.
There is also another electoral result that deeply affects the future of Europe’s climate policy, namely that this shift is particularly determined by the French and German EP elections. This is important as it is not a result observed in other comparably large countries.
In the short term, this result could have some negative impacts. France and Germany are the largest European economies, where much of decarbonisation should take place. Despite their controversial policies, political leaders from both countries – Emmanuel Macron in France and Robert Habeck in Germany – have championed climate action in the past, and these voices are being traded with more ambiguous – if not openly sceptical – views.
At the same time, this could be the opportunity to rethink how climate issues can enter the heart of mainstream parties – in France and Germany, but also across Europe – that want to distinguish themselves and credibly compete with the far right. The Socialists and Democrats (S&D) from across the board now have a big chance to appropriate the climate issue and push the EP towards more progressive climate action.
Simone Tagliapietra
Senior fellow
Bruegel
In the run up to the European elections there has been substantial speculation about the future of the Green Deal, with some pointing at its potential being dismantled following an eventual dramatic surge in far-right parties.
The good news for Europe, and for the world, is that this scenario has been avoided: as the pro-European centre has retained its majority of seats in the European Parliament, Europe is not going to reverse course on the green transition.
However, business-as-usual is not an option, either. The elections have unveiled an important sense of unease in our societies – and in the case of Germany and France, even more than largely anticipated – that must be taken seriously and duly addressed, also when it comes to climate policy.
The Green Deal has come a long way since it was conceived five years ago, and these elections mark a new beginning for this agenda rather than its dismissal. It must now restart with a new agenda focused on green investments, green social support and green industrial policy. Decarbonisation is the only route for Europe to get to resilience and competitiveness. The new majority in the European Parliament has the responsibility to drive it, by avoiding futile shortcuts.
Linda Kalcher
Executive director
Strategic Perspectives
While it’s correct that the European Parliament elections hit Green parties hard, it’s simply not the case that this means EU climate legislation and plans will be undone. We’ve seen a lot of – quite frankly – lazy analysis to this effect, but what matters here are the numbers across parliament and capitals in the European Council.
One: the European Green Deal still has a majority in the house. The appetite for any roll-backs of laws is really low, especially given the uncertainty of how the French parliamentary elections will affect majorities in Council. European industry knows it risks losing ground to China and the US in the clean energy transition and investors crave policy certainty.
Two: while climate may be less explicitly referenced by the Commission it will still be central. We can expect that many new initiatives under the next Commission will be about strengthening industrial competitiveness and energy security. The high geopolitical and economic cost of being dependent on gas, oil and coal imports remains a major challenge for the competitiveness of the economy and energy bills.
Three: energy prices are still two times higher in the EU than in the US. The answer to this is to invest in resilient and secure clean energy and storage systems that can offer the continent long term security and lower risks of Russia exerting leverage over gas-dependent members. While the threat from Moscow lingers we can expect Brussels to back its Green Deal – even if it’s sold as a weapon against Putin.
Luca Bergamaschi
Co-founding director
ECCO
The results are a strong wake up call for climate action compared to the euphoria of 2019. The low turnout and the increasing dissatisfaction with established parties in many countries are yet a further symptom of the distrust of many towards the current political offer – both in terms of representatives and policy.
The politics of climate action needs to be reengineered and reconnected with the needs of society. While the desirability of the transition remains high, politics is failing to make it more accessible and tangible for the most.
At citizens’ level, one of the main tasks should be to design and offer concrete solutions for different social classes. At the economic level, we need to see bolder plans for mobilising the capital needed and directing it to the industrial players that want to invest in innovation.
European leaders and ministers now need to work together to build an agenda and design policy that can bridge the gap between long-term targets and everyday needs and desires.
Vincent Hurkens
Programme lead
EU politics and climate governance at E3G
Although far-right gains have garnered significant attention, a large majority of Europeans supported centrist parties that have committed to continuing the green transition.
It depends on the largest pro-democracy political forces of social democrats, liberals – and particularly the centre-right – how much influence they allow the far right to have on the EU’s climate agenda for the next five years.
Sustained climate action and a predictable regulatory framework towards climate neutrality are crucial to deliver on electoral promises made by pro-European political families for more security, competitiveness and strategic autonomy.
The upcoming negotiations on the next European Commission president and her/his policy agenda will be decisive for Europe’s capacity to address the severe impacts and risks of climate change for Europe and EU’s global climate leadership.
The European Council and political groups in the European Parliament should prioritise a science-based green transition, integrating a strong and global dimension to ensure Europeans feel the benefits of it domestically and to increase the EU’s trust and credibility internationally.
Nils Redeker
Deputy director
Jacques Delors Centre thinktank
The results will complicate EU climate politics, primarily due to developments in a few major countries. In France and Germany, Green parties suffered losses, which will substantially reduce the number of Green lawmakers in the European Parliament. Additionally, these countries, along with Italy, contributed to a strengthening of far-right groups.
Although left-wing and green parties did unexpectedly well in Denmark and Sweden, the overall shift is likely to dampen enthusiasm for ambitious climate policies in parliament and could deter member states in the European Council from adopting new measures.
However, the next phase of the Green Deal will focus on implementation. The key question is, therefore, whether the EU will stick to its existing policies or unravel its landmark green legislation. The latter option seems unlikely. To secure a second term, Ursula von der Leyen will need the support of the Social Democrats. To avoid risks in her confirmation vote, she may also seek backing from the remaining Green forces. This will limit the scope for a big and official role-back.
But still, there is plenty of room to throw sand in the wheels of execution. Two key aspects are therefore crucial to watch. First, how the European People’s Party (EPP) will interpret its mandate on climate. The party may seek to dilute implementation by forming issue-specific alliances with the far-right. Our research suggests that this would be at odds with its electorate’s preferences, but recent months have already shown a willingness to pursue this approach. Second, it will be crucial to see how the next Commission integrates climate goals into less controversial areas where progress is still possible such as industrial policy, competitiveness and economic resilience.
The post Experts: What do the European elections mean for EU climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Experts: What do the European elections mean for EU climate action?
Claver Gatete is Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Jason Veysey is Energy Modeling Program Director and Senior Scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute. Lisa Sachs is Director of the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment at Columbia University.
The case for global energy transition has rarely been clearer. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year exposed the cost of unplanned, fossil-dependent systems, while the falling cost of renewables, the rising penetration of electric vehicles, and the growing value of demand flexibility have made the direction of travel obvious. The benefits of a clean, secure, integrated system are no longer in dispute. What remains unclear is how to build it.
Countries around the world have called for faster renewable energy deployment and alternative energy arrangements. A secure, affordable, resilient, decarbonised system requires specific investments in specific places in a specific sequence, optimised across sectors and borders. But very few governments have the analytical foundation to translate those imperatives into investment.
The two instruments that are supposed to determine investment priorities for decarbonisation – Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and country platforms – cannot answer the most basic question facing any country undertaking an energy transition: what should the energy system look like?
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To close this gap, every country needs a bankable, economy-wide optimisation model for its energy system. A model is not a plan, but it can help answer the critical question of what the future energy system should look like. It shows how optimal scenarios vary as assumptions and policies are adjusted, calculates investment requirements and sequencing, and quantifies how system costs are affected by assumptions, policies, and exogenous variables like trade policy and financing terms.
Tool for efficient investment
Optimisation is a simplified way of simulating an energy system, but it can be an extremely powerful tool for moving energy planning from reactive (how do we manage the disparate actions in the energy system?) to intentional (what energy system underpins our national objectives?). A model can show how optimal scenarios vary as assumptions and policies are adjusted, and how investment requirements are quantified and sequenced.
Optimisation models can treat the energy system and the sectors it serves as an integrated whole, optimising across sectors and projects in ways that can be mutually reinforcing. If considered independently, growth in industrial demand, transport electrification, and digital infrastructure can add stress to the energy system. But an optimised plan can arrange these and other changes in an efficient, synergistic way.
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New load can be added where low-cost power is available; industrial customers can ensure the viability of investments in energy supply; electric vehicle charging policy can smooth load curves and reduce costs for all consumers.
Additionally, optimisation modeling can also change the financeability of investments. Taken alone, each project faces uncertainty about the rest of the system, which raises the cost of capital and causes projects to stall or unwind after contracts are signed. A coherent, optimised plan makes visible the coordination that private capital would otherwise have to bet on: identified offtake, sequenced and committed transmission, contracted power supply, and so on.
What COP31 and COP32 should do
The upcoming COPs in Turkey and Ethiopia can shift the center of gravity of international climate cooperation from fragmented commitments to planning. Three moves are urgently needed.
First, optimised, economy-wide, long-term energy system planning must be the foundation on which any meaningful NDC, country platform, or finance commitment rests. NDCs are typically drafted by environment or single-line ministries, with limited cross-sectoral input from ministries of energy, finance, and planning. They contain targets, derived from sectoral strategies or national commitments, not from an analytically grounded picture of what the energy system should look like and what investments would make it work. Country platforms are generally a portfolio of investments assembled from existing project pipelines, rather than derived from a system-level analysis of what an optimised, decarbonised energy system would require.
Second, recognise regions as a key planning unit. Modern integrated energy systems are inherently regional. Renewable endowments are unevenly distributed; balancing variable supply across borders lowers aggregate cost, reduces redundant backup capacity, and unlocks economies of scale no individual nation can achieve. Many energy investments in Southeast Asia, East Africa, Southern Africa and Central Asia may only be financeable in a regional context. Assessing domestic infrastructure without regional optimisation perpetuates the perception that decarbonisation is more expensive than it is.
COP31 leaders unveil global targets, with spotlight on electrification
Third, finance the planning capacity. A coordinated commitment by multilateral development banks, bilateral donors, and philanthropic partners to help every region and its constituent countries develop and maintain their own modelling capability, with open-source tools and regional analytical hubs, would close the most consequential gap in the current architecture. The cost is small relative to current spending on country platforms, failed project preparation, and misallocated infrastructure investment.
This includes supporting regional institutions such as the ASEAN Centre for Energy, the African Energy Commission, regional power pools, and the Latin American and Caribbean Energy Organization to determine what optimised regional systems require. Country-by-country pledging, repeated at every COP, will not deliver what meaningfully integrated systems can.
The 2026 energy crisis made the cost of unplanned, fossil-dependent systems newly visible. That window of clarity will close. The international community should seize the moment to build the planning foundation that has been missing for thirty years, rather than commissioning another round of NDCs or pledges, striving for outcomes neither was designed to deliver.
The post Every country needs a model to help optimise its energy transition appeared first on Climate Home News.
Every country needs a model to help optimise its energy transition
The world is currently experiencing what is expected to become the strongest El Niño on record – dubbed a “super El Niño” by many.
El Niño is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific that releases heat from the ocean into the atmosphere.
This temporarily raises global temperatures and reshapes rainfall and extreme weather around the world – impacting the lives of billions of people.
The current El Niño event began in June and is expected to last into 2027.
El Niño is part of a wider climate pattern called the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle.
The ENSO cycle also has a cool phase, known as La Niña, as well as a “neutral” phase. El Niño and La Niña events typically last between nine and 12 months, but can go on longer.
Below, Carbon Brief explains how the ENSO cycle works, its impacts on extreme weather and global temperatures and why this El Niño event is projected to be the most intense since records began.
The post Explainer: How the ‘super El Niño’ will reshape the world’s weather appeared first on Carbon Brief.
https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/el-nino-explainer/index.html
The second-largest reservoir in the US reached a record-low water height on Saturday – just days after the country’s largest reservoir broke its own record.
Both Lake Mead and Lake Powell are located on the Colorado River.
They provide water for populations across seven US states in the south-western US, with around 40 million people getting some or all of their municipal water from the Colorado River.
The river also provides water for around 5.5m acres (22,258 square kilometres) of farmland across Colorado, Arizona, California and the other states in the river basin.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that climate change, population growth and over-consumption are all contributing to the current record-low levels of the reservoirs.
Record lows
At full capacity, Lakes Mead and Powell can hold a combined 68 cubic kilometres of water – enough to supply all household consumption in the contiguous US for nearly 1.5 years. However, the water level in both reservoirs has been declining for decades.
The chart below shows the water level of Lake Mead, in metres above mean sea level. The reservoir, which began to fill in 1935 following the construction of the Hoover Dam, has a “full pool” maximum capacity of 347.60 metres. The water level in Lake Mead reached a record low of 317.11 metres on 7 August.
The following chart shows the water level of Lake Powell, in metres above mean sea level. Lake Powell’s full-pool level is 1,127.76 metres.
While the reservoir reached its maximum capacity several times in the 1980s, it has not done so since. On 15 August, the water level in Lake Powell was recorded at a new record-low of 1,072.87 metres.
Both reservoirs have continued to decline in the days since breaking their respective records. The downward trend will largely continue in both lakes until next spring, when the snowpack in the mountains of the Upper Colorado River Basin begins to melt, says Dr Jack Schmidt, a senior research scientist at Utah State University’s Center for Colorado River Studies. He tells Carbon Brief:
“The big dilemma of the moment is that we’re only in the middle of August, and we have no assurance of what the coming winter will be. The only thing we can be sure of is that we will be depleting overall total basin reservoir storage from now until, roughly, early April.”
Compounding factors
The record lows across the two reservoirs are the result of several compounding factors, experts tell Carbon Brief.
Since the turn of the 20th century, the amount of water flowing along the Upper Colorado River has declined by about 20%. Research suggests that half of this decline can be attributed to human-induced climate change.
Most of the river’s streamflow comes from the snowpack of the Upper Colorado River Basin, which stretches across five western US states but is primarily located in Colorado and Utah.
This region has been gripped by a historic “megadrought” for more than a quarter of a century. Nearly half of the megadrought’s intensity over 2000-18 is attributable to climate change, according to a 2020 study.
At the same time, the increasing population in the US south-west has put added pressure on the Colorado River’s water supply. The number of people obtaining some or all of their water from the Colorado system has grown by 15 million (around 60%) since 1992.
Schmidt tells Carbon Brief:
“There’s an ultimate cause of the present water crisis, and there’s a proximate cause. The ultimate cause is a warming climate, a warming planet and a pretty clear correlation between warming conditions and decreased runoff in the Colorado River Basin.
“The proximate cause is that in this messy democratic republic of ours, big policy decisions that match the variability of the climate occur painfully slowly – with intense political negotiations – and only incrementally.”
On 31 July, the US Bureau of Reclamation, which manages water resources in the western US, released an environmental impact statement on its proposed post-2026 strategy for managing Lakes Powell and Mead. The strategy itself has not been released yet.
Schmidt notes that the statement does appear to give the Bureau flexibility to “respond to crisis” by reducing the delivery of water to several states. However, he adds:
“They acknowledge it won’t work if we just stay critically dry, and of course every climate model for the 21st century, especially with a continually warming planet, says that that’s exactly what’s going to happen.”
The post Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels
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