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Every increment of global warming above 1.5C increases the risk of crossing key tipping points in the Earth system – even if the overshoot is only temporary, says new research.

It is well established that if global temperatures exceed 1.5C above pre-industrial levels, there is a higher risk that tipping points will be crossed.

The new study, published in Nature Communications, investigates the risk of crossing four interconnected tipping points under different “policy-relevant” future emissions scenarios.

The authors investigate the risk of tipping where warming temporarily overshoots 1.5C, but global temperatures are then brought back down using negative emissions technologies. They find that the longer the 1.5C threshold is breached, and the higher the peak temperature, the greater the risk of crossing tipping points.

The most pessimistic scenario in the study sees global warming hit 3.3C by the end of the century – in line with the climate policies of 2020 – before dropping back below 1.5C over 2100-2300. Under this pathway, there is a 45% chance of crossing tipping points by 2300, the authors say.

The authors also warn that if global temperatures rise above 2C, the additional risk of tipping for every extra increment of warming “strongly accelerates”.

For temperatures between 1.5C and 2C, the risk increases by 1-1.5% for every 0.1C increase in overshoot temperature. However, for temperatures above 2.5C, tipping risk increases to 3% per 0.1C of overshoot.

The research “underlines the need for urgent emission cuts now that do not assume substantial carbon dioxide removal later”, a scientist not involved in the study tells Carbon Brief.

Overshoot scenarios

Scientists have warned for decades that as the planet warms, there is an increasing risk that Earth systems will cross “tipping points” – critical thresholds that, if exceeded, could push a system into an entirely new state.

For example, if climate change and human-driven deforestation push the Amazon rainforest past a critical threshold, large parts of the forest could experience “dieback”. This would cause entire sections of lush rainforest to eventually shift to dry savannah.

(See Carbon Brief’s explainer on the nine tipping points that could be crossed as a result of climate change.)

The planet has already warmed by 1.3C above pre-industrial levels, and a recent study warned that five tipping elements – including the collapse of the west Antarctic ice sheet – are already within reach.

That study emphasised the importance of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels – in line with the 2015 Paris Agreement. It finds that warming of 1.5C would render four climate tipping elements “likely” and a further six “possible”. Meanwhile, 13 tipping elements will be either “likely” or “possible” if the planet warms by 2.6C, as expected under current climate policies.

Many of the potential pathways to limiting global temperature rise to 1.5C by 2100 see the planet initially “overshoot” the threshold before negative emissions methods are used to bring temperatures back down.

The new paper investigates 10 future warming scenarios which run to the year 2300. The authors use the PROVIDE v1.2 emission pathways, which they describe as “an extended version of the illustrative pathways identified” used in the recent sixth assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

The original scenarios run over 2015-2300, but the authors carried them forward for another 50,000 years by following the temperature trajectory set over 2290-2300. All scenarios stabilise at 1.5C, 1C or pre-industrial temperatures. However, many include overshoots, with peak temperatures ranging from 1.57C to 3.30C.

These scenarios show a range of options for how global temperatures change under these 10 scenarios in the “medium term” – until the year 2300 – as well as in the “long term”, which runs 50,000 years into the future to see how the planet eventually stabilises.

Scenarios that reach net-zero or negative emissions by 2100 and maintain them thereafter are classified as “NZGHG emission scenarios”. The table below gives more detail on each scenario.

Scenario Overshoot peak temperature NZGHG Stabilisation temperature Scenario assumptions
CurPol-OS-1.5C 3.30C Never-NZGHG 1.5C Follows current (2020) policies until 2100, then declines
ModAct-OS-1.5C 2.69C Never-NZGHG 1.5C Follows current (2020) pledges (NDCs) until 2100, then declines
ModAct-OS-1C 2.69C Never-NZGHG 1.0C Follows current (2020) pledges (NDCs) until 2100, then declines
Ref-1p5 not defined 1.5C Reference scenario designed in temperature space
SSP5-3.4-OS 2.35C No-long-term-NZGHG 1.5C Tests system response to rapid emission changes
SSP1-1.9 1.53C No-long-term-NZGHG 1.0C Sustainable development, no long-term compensation of non-CO2 emissions
GS-NZGHG 1.70C NZGHG pre-industrial Gradual strengthening, returns warming to 1.5 °C by 2215
SP-NZGHG 1.57C NZGHG pre-industrial Broad shift towards sustainable development
Neg-NZGHG 1.67C NZGHG pre-industrial Returns warming to 1.5 °C by 2100 with heavy CDR deployment
Neg-OS-OC 1.67C NZGHG pre-industrial Returns warming to 1.5 °C by 2100 with heavy CDR deployment

Table showing the 10 scenarios used in this study. Source: Möller et al (2024).

There is quite a range between the 10 pathways.

At the high end, the “CurPol-OS-1.5C” scenario sees a continuation of the global climate policies implemented in 2020 until the year 2100, with warming peaking at 3.3C. It then sees a decline in global temperature until reaching a stabilisation of 1.5C by the year 2300.

At the low end, “Neg-OS-0C” scenario initially overshoots 1.5C to 1.67C, but then returns warming to 1.5C by 2100 using “heavy carbon dioxide removal deployment”. It also then sees average global temperatures drop to pre-industrial levels by the year 2300.

In the middle, the Ref-1p5 scenario is the only one that does not include an overshoot, instead stabilising quickly at 1.5C.

The chart below shows greenhouse gas emissions (top) and corresponding global temperature changes (bottom) associated with each scenario, identified by the different-coloured lines. The bottom chart illustrates the range in how quickly the pathways return to 1.5C or below.

Greenhouse gas emissions (top) and corresponding global temperature changes (bottom) associated with each scenario are shown in the graphics below.
Greenhouse gas emissions (top) and corresponding global temperature changes (bottom) associated with each scenario are shown in the graphics below. The table below gives more detail on each scenario. Source: Möller et al (2024).

Dr David McKay is a research impact fellow at the University of Exeter’s Global Systems Institute, who has published extensively on climate tipping points, but was not involved in this study.

He also notes that some of the scenarios shown in this study “may not be possible”, because there is debate about whether or not “the substantial carbon dioxide removal needed for large overshoots is feasible”.

Cascades

Many Earth systems are interlinked, so crossing one tipping point can increase the likelihood of crossing others. This is often described as a “domino effect” or “tipping cascade”.

The study focuses on four interconnected tipping points – collapse of the Greenland ice sheet and west Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation and dieback of the Amazon rainforest.

Annika Högner is a researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and co-lead author on the study. She tells Carbon Brief these four tipping points were chosen because they “play a significant role in the functioning of the Earth system” and “their tipping would have severe global impacts”.

The graphic below shows how the tipping points interact with each other. A “+” symbol indicates that crossing one tipping point can destabilise another. For example, a collapse of the Greenland ice sheet makes the AMOC more likely to shut down, as a result of the sudden influx of freshwater into the north Atlantic Ocean. A “±” symbol indicates that the relationship between two tipping points is uncertain.

A “-” symbol indicates that crossing one tipping point stabilises another. Högner tells Carbon Brief that the interaction between the Greenland ice sheet and AMOC is the only stabilising interaction in this study. She explains that if the AMOC were to cross a tipping point, “we [would] expect to see strong cooling in the northern hemisphere”, which will contribute to stabilising the Greenland ice sheet.

Interactions between the Greenland ice sheet collapse, west Antarctic ice sheet collapse, AMOC shutdown and Amazon dieback.
Interactions between the Greenland ice sheet collapse, west Antarctic ice sheet collapse, AMOC shutdown and Amazon dieback. A “+” indicates that crossing one tipping point destabilises another, “-” indicates that crossing one tipping point stabilises another and “±” indicates that the relationship between two tipping points is uncertain. Source: Möller et al (2024).

Earth system models “often don’t resolve tipping processes very well”, making them less suited to modelling full tipping cascades, Högner tells Carbon Brief.

Instead, she explains that the authors developed a “conceptual model”. This model does not attempt to simulate the entire Earth system, but instead just models the likelihood of tipping at different temperatures, based on existing knowledge about tipping elements from other studies.

The model takes temperature trajectories as an input and gives the state of the tipping elements after a specified time – that is, whether or not the element has tipped – as an output.

Importantly, these models include “hysteresis” – a feature of tipping systems, in which a system that has moved to a different state does not easily move back to the original state even if temperatures are reduced again.

Tipping risk

The authors use their conceptual model to calculate “tipping risk” under the 10 future warming scenarios. Högner tells Carbon Brief that tipping risk “refers to the model of all four interacting tipping elements analysed in the study”. For example, a 50% tipping risk means there is a 50% chance that at least one of the four climate elements will tip.

The top row of the graphic below shows the risk of tipping in the year 2300 (left) and in 50,000 years from now (right). Bars placed higher up indicate a greater likelihood of tipping. The dot shows the average value for each data point, while the bars show the 10-90% range.

The text on the right hand side gives likelihood levels in the calibrated language used by the IPCC: very likely means a likelihood of 90-100%, likely is 66-100%, about as likely as not is 33-66%; unlikely is 0-33%; and very unlikely is 0-10%.

The middle row shows the peak temperature under each scenario (left) and stabilisation temperature (right). The bottom row shows how long temperatures overshoot before stabilising in each scenario.

Risk of tipping in the year 2300 (left) and in 50,000 years from now (right).
Risk of tipping in the year 2300 (left) and in 50,000 years from now (right). Bars placed higher up indicate a greater likelihood of tipping. The middle row shows the peak temperature under each scenario (left) and stabilisation temperature (right). The bottom row shows how long temperatures overshoot before stabilising in each scenario. Source: Möller et al (2024).

The longer the 1.5C threshold is breached for, and the higher the peak temperature is, the greater the risk of crossing tipping points by the year 2300, the study shows.

The authors find the greatest risk of crossing tipping points in the CurPol-OS-1.5C scenario (red), which follows the climate policies of 2020 until the year 2100 and then reaches 1.5C by 2300, as this scenario has the greatest overshoot temperature and duration.

Under this scenario, there is a 45% tipping risk by 2300 and a 76% chance in 50,000 years, according to the paper.

The five pathways that do not return warming to 1.5C by the year 2100 have the greatest medium-term risks, and those with less than 0.1C overshoot have the lowest medium-term risks.

In the long-term – looking to the next 50,000 years – the authors find that stabilisation temperature is “one of the decisive variables for tipping risks”. They find that even in the Ref1p5 scenario – which sees global temperatures stabilise at 1.5C without any overshoot – there is a 50% risk of the system tipping over the next 50,000 years.

The results “illustrate that a global mean temperature increase of 1.5C is not ‘safe’ in terms of planetary stability, but must be seen as an upper limit”, the study warns.

Högner tells Carbon Brief that the paper “underlines the importance of adhering to the Paris Agreement temperature goal”.

Tessa Möller – a researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and co-lead author on the paper – tells Carbon Brief that “we have a wide portfolio of technologies available” to limit warming to 1.5C, and just need to “implement” them.

However, she also highlights the “large credibility gap” between pledges from individual countries and the policies they have actually implemented. She tells Carbon Brief that not only do we need “stronger pledges”, but it is also essential that countries follow through on them.

Long-term climate

The authors also explore the risk of each individual tipping point being crossed in different scenarios.

The plot below shows the tipping risk by 2300 under different scenarios, at different temperatures, on the left. Each colour represents one scenario. Dots positioned further to the right indicate a greater peak temperature and dots positioned higher up indicate a greater tipping risk.

The plot on the right shows the percentage change in tipping risk for every additional 0.1C of overshoot, for different peak global temperatures, for the Amazon (cross), AMOC (plus), West Antarctic ice sheet (black dot) Greenland Ice sheet (square) and overall (yellow dot).

The risk of tipping by 2300 under different scenarios, at different temperatures (left), where each colour represents one scenario.
The risk of tipping by 2300 under different scenarios, at different temperatures (left), where each colour represents one scenario. The percentage change in tipping risk for every additional 0.1C of overshoot (right), for different peak global temperatures, for the Amazon (cross), AMOC (plus), West Antarctic ice sheet (black dot) Greenland Ice sheet (square) and overall (yellow dot). Source: Möller et al (2024).

The authors find that AMOC collapse and Amazon dieback would likely be the first components to tip. This could be in the next 15-300 years and 50-200 years, respectively, depending on the scenario, they find.

Meanwhile, the Greenland and west Antarctic ice sheets have tipping timescales of 1,000-15,000 years and 500-13,000 years, respectively.

However, they note that as temperatures increase, the relative risk of each element tipping changes. The graph shows that while AMOC is the main driver of tipping risk at lower temperatures, the Amazon becomes the main driver once global temperatures exceed 2C.

Finally, they find that as global temperatures rise, the risk of tipping accelerates. Overall, tipping risk increases by 1-1.5% per 0.1C increase in overshoot temperature, for temperatures below 2C, according to the study. However, above 2.5C, tipping risk increases to 3% per 0.1C increase overshoot.

McKay notes that there are some limitations in the study. For example, he notes that the paper “has to rely on tipping threshold and timescale estimates with often wide ranges and sometimes low confidence, while tipping interaction estimates are based on dated expert judgement”.

However, he adds:

“This work makes it clear that every fraction of warming increases the chance of tipping points, even if global temperature subsequently falls, and underlines the need for urgent emission cuts now that do not assume substantial carbon dioxide removal later.”

The post ‘Every 0.1C’ of overshoot above 1.5C increases risk of crossing tipping points appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Will the world’s drying lands get relief from COP17 in Mongolia?

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Starting on Monday, about 10,000 government negotiators, scientists, journalists and campaigners will gather at a purpose-built venue in a national park in Mongolia’s capital Ulaanbaatar to discuss how to stop land turning into desert as the world warms.

Drought is currently sweeping much of the Northern hemisphere, leaving normally green urban parks looking like dry savannah, causing crops to fail, food prices to rise and billions to be shaved off economic output.

On Wednesday, Britain’s prime minister chaired an emergency meeting of the government’s Cobra committee. These are usually reserved for wars, terrorist attacks, riots and pandemics – but this one was on the extreme heat and drought the UK has been suffering since May. 

With many countries facing far worse with fewer resources than the UK, the issues to be discussed at the UN’s COP17 summit in Mongolia – often overlooked – should be nearer the top of policy-makers minds.

But what is COP17?  What will be decided and announced there over the next two weeks? How does it relate to climate change and how will it help restore the lands on which we all rely for our food, water and other essential resources? Climate Home News explains all below.

What is COP17?

It is the conference of parties (COP) to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The parties are 196 governments, which includes all of the countries recognised by the UN.

The convention was conceived at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, at the same time as the other two larger “Rio trio” conventions on climate and biodiversity. 

While the climate convention’s COP takes place every year, the UNCCD COP happens only once every two years. COP17 will be its seventeenth gathering.

Negotiators at COP16 in Riyadh (Photo: IISD/ENB | Anastasia Rodopoulou)

What is desertification?

It is the process by which land degrades and becomes more like a desert, making it harder – and sometimes impossible – to grow crops or graze livestock there.

Climate change and other human activities – like excessive irrigation which depletes ground water – are making this process worse, causing poverty, hunger, health problems, forced migration and loss of species.

It’s a widespread problem. The UN estimates that half a billion people live within areas that have experienced desertification since the 1980s and that two-fifths of the world’s land is degraded.

What has it got to do with climate change?

The planet’s climate is heating up, mainly due to humans burning fossil fuels, and drying out its land. This kills plants and exposes the soil which can then be blown away by wind and washed away by water.

Without a top layer of soil, plants struggle to grow again and the land gets closer to being a desert. So combating desertification is a way of adapting to climate change.

It is also a way of lessening the pace of climate change, as land degradation releases carbon dioxide previously stored in healthy soils and plants.

What will be negotiated at COP17?

The main issue is what form a new initiative to tackle drought could take. The last COP saw Africa push hard for this to be a protocol – a kind of binding sub-treaty to the UNCCD.

But the US, Europe, Argentina and others argued that would take too long to set up, cost too much and take money away from what can be spent on the ground. They prefer a legally weaker alternative – a framework instead of a protocol. 

Negotiations went late into the last night of talks in Riyadh, with the Saudis hosting informal consultations, but eventually governments had to agree to disagree and pick up talks again in Ulaanbaatar. 

As Earth dries out, countries fail to reach drought agreement

Governments will also negotiate a new policy on protecting rangelands and pastoralists from degradation. Rangelands are areas where animals graze. They cover around half the Earth’s land and include almost everything other than forest, deserts, farms, glaciers and cities. Pastoralists are people who herd animals on these rangelands, often moving from place to place to find fresh pasture. 

COP17 host country Mongolia has a lot of both – and pushed successfully for the UN to declare 2026 the International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists. It is keen to agree a decision at COP17 bringing those issues more to the forefront of the UNCCD.

Negotiators will also debate the UNCCD’s post-2030 strategic framework, which they hope to adopt at COP18 in 2028. Campaign groups like the World Wildlife Fund want a stronger focus on biodiversity and nature-positive food systems.

What will happen when?

The COP will formally open with a ceremony on Monday August 17, followed by opening statements by governments and the adoption of the agenda.

Negotiations will begin, mostly behind closed doors for two weeks until the closing plenaries on Friday August 28.

While talks rumble on in the background, the second week will see senior government representatives including ministers get involved, with a “high-level segment” running from August 24-26.

A delegate at COP16 in Riyadh (Photo: IISD/ENB | Anastasia Rodopoulou)

They will discuss issues like drought resilience, finance and pastoralist communities. This is likely to be when any announcements – of new funding, for instance – are made.

On Monday August 24, there will also be an open dialogue between government officials and civil society members. Here, local practitioners are likely to share stories of how they are helping their communities reverse land degradation. UNCCD prides itself on being a bottom-up convention.

Unlike climate COPs, which often end a day or two over time, UNCCD COPs usually finish on the evening of their last day and – while they have gone late into the night – have never run into the next day.

What else should we watch out for?

At the last COP two years ago, host Saudi Arabia led the creation of an initiative called the Riyadh Global Drought Resilience Partnership to help 80 of the poorest nations deal with drought.

It received $12 billion in pledges, mainly from Gulf-based development finance institutions. Saudi Arabia is expected to report back on whether these pledges have been delivered and how the money will reach those in need now.

There are also hopes that governments will announce financial support for Mongolia’s Rangelands Flagship Initiative, which aims to mobilise investment in projects to fight land degradation.

Who will preside over COP17?

While the last five and the next two climate COPs have been or will be presided over by men, COP17 will be woman-led with Mongolia’s foreign minister, Battsetseg Batmunkh, as president.

Mongolia’s foreign minister and COP17 president Battsetseg Batmunkh (Photo: Uugansukh Byamba)

This will also be the first COP for the UNCCD’s new executive director Yasmin Fouad. Before being appointed environment minister in her native Egypt, Fouad was a scientist and lead author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s special report on desertification. She played a key role at the COP27 climate summit in Egypt in 2022.

Although Saudi Arabia’s UNCCD COP presidency is ending, the Gulf power house will likely continue to be influential. It has supported the COP financially as part of the Riyadh-Ulaanbaatar action agenda and will be following up on initiatives announced two years ago.

While Saudi Arabia is often blamed for obstructing progress at climate talks, as a desert nation it is generally thought to have played a constructive role at UNCCD COPs.

What are the negotiating dynamics?

The UNCCD has six main negotiating groups: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Northern Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe, and developed donor countries. Governments can also speak in their own capacities.

While divisions between the Global North and Global South do exist at UNCCD COPs, they are not as stark as at climate COPs. The Global South’s umbrella group – the G77 and China – usually only speaks on finance issues, on which developing countries tend to be united.

    Civil society groups are present but not as vocal or as confrontational as at climate COPs. There are generally no protests and campaigners tend to try to hold governments accountable more quietly. There are likely to be far fewer journalists than at climate COPs too.

    What role will the US play?

    While the US has left the UN’s climate convention, it remains in the UNCCD and is expected to bring a delegation of officials from its departments of agriculture and state. It is likely to resist any renewed push from Africa for a drought protocol.

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    Pushing the climate crisis: How advertising fuels high-carbon lifestyles

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    Helen Phillips’ book, ‘Hum’, is set in a dystopian near future, in a city suffering the effects of climate breakdown and with dire air quality. Robots (the Hums) press advertising messages during conversations, meetings and even as they carry out medical procedures.

    The Hums are vehicles for these ad messages, which are often for products like cosmetics, sweets or anything that might be relevant during interactions with humans. This advertising is poorly disguised, and merges with sentiments that lean towards concerns of well-being, convincing people how much better off they’ll be if they make a purchase.

    While the novel is futuristic, the insidious way advertising permeates daily life is resonant of how adverts show up in our world today. And these ads are directly contributing to the worsening future climate Phillips describes in her book.

      Already by the summer of 2026, Europe had seen a 57% increase in wildfires in just four years with western Europe recording the hottest ever June and July on record. We’re facing droughts and floods, as well as predicted hikes in food costs or even chronic food shortages – and that’s before the expected additional effects of a strong El Niño later this year.

      Frequent flying and bigger burgers

      A portion of this climate breakdown is fuelled by over-consumption in richer countries, particularly of products that are high carbon – for which advertising can take some of the blame. Research shows that adverts drive citizens to consume about a third more goods and services in general, over and above what they might have purchased.

      Yet despite a clear link between promoting high-carbon behaviours and climate breakdown, little advertising regulation exists in the UK. Take frequent flying for instance, one of the most carbon-intensive activities we can partake in.

      EasyJet’s latest ad campaign is called “Drop Everything”. It encourages consumers to book cheap flights departing within the next 48 hours for presumably short or weekend getaways. Rather than promoting a specific destination, “Drop Everything” promotes a mindset that encourages indiscriminate consumption of flying. The ads were shown on billboards with clever creative slogans, as well as on digital media and through influencer campaigns.

      Overall, flight numbers are increasing. The UK Civil Aviation Authority reported the highest number of UK passengers in the first quarter of 2026 (more than 61 million, breaking previous records for travel between January and March). It seems we’re still not joining the dots between flying and a worsening climate.

      And how about meat consumption? Scientists advocate for less meat-eating, especially beef which has the highest carbon footprint of nearly all foods. Yet adverts from McDonald’s proliferate, helping make it one of the highest-volume sellers of fast-food chain beef burgers. In 2024, the outdoor advertising budget for McDonald’s UK rose to £86 million, an increase of 71% on previous years.

      A billboard carrying McDonald’s UK advertising for one of its biggest burgers, which won “Badvert” of the month in May 2026 (Photo: Badvertising)

      A billboard carrying McDonald’s UK advertising for one of its biggest burgers, which won “Badvert” of the month in May 2026 (Photo: Badvertising)

      Small share for sustainability

      While over half of UK ad professionals feel increasingly queasy about their profession and its effects on the climate crisis, the people running the show – the UK trade bodies – prefer to focus on the growth advertising brings.

      In the first three months of 2026, they stated that UK advertising spend increased by 9.3%, reaching a total of £11.7 billion for that quarter, fuelling consumption and market growth.

      But how many of those adverts actually promote low carbon goods and services? Kantar’s Sustainable Ads Tracker shows the percentage of ads featuring sustainability messaging in 2026 is around 4.3%. That’s woefully low, and much of this is made up of messaging that promotes recycling.

      PR firm working for Shell wins COP30 media contract

      Additionally, the ad industry continues to happily produce adverts for the large oil and gas corporations that are fuelling climate breakdown. These adverts only narrowly pass the Advertising Standards Authorities’ advertising codes, allowing the continued greenwashing of the world’s most polluting brands.

      There is essentially no leadership from the UK trade bodies, likely because they are directly funded by the brands and advertisers themselves. They are essentially ‘ad shushing’ – pushing for indiscriminate growth and directing attention to their sustainability awards, while confusingly denying that adverts drive higher consumption overall.

      Let’s ‘un-shush’

      Where does this leave us as we are subjected to hundreds, if not thousands, of persuasive advertising messages every day that support high-carbon lifestyles? Most ad professionals are unable to push back against this agenda at work, often due to the threat of job loss. The advertising trade bodies won’t take the lead as they work in service to big brands and advertisers.

      NGOs urge Brazil to prevent fossil fuel capture of COP30 climate summit

      So, who can push for the changes we need? Members of the public.

      Through pressuring our city officials and governments, we can force through restrictions, such as the watershed bans on unhealthy foods on TV before 9pm in the UK. Through supporting the efforts of organisations such as Ad Free Cities and others, we can help achieve bans on outdoor advertising for fossil fuels, aviation, meat and even single-use plastics in cities and regions such as Amsterdam, The Hague, Edinburgh, Florence, Uppsala and many more.

      If we’re serious about climate change and stopping big global brands pushing their high-carbon products onto us, then advertising restrictions are one of the best ways to achieve this. If we don’t want a world like the one Phillips describes in her book, we need to make our voices heard above the advertising noise.

      The post Pushing the climate crisis: How advertising fuels high-carbon lifestyles appeared first on Climate Home News.

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      Analysis: Weaker EV targets could cost UK consumers £3bn a year by 2030

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      An upcoming UK government consultation on weakening targets for electric vehicles (EVs) could cost consumers as much as £3bn a year by 2030, according to Carbon Brief analysis.

      It could require the UK to import an extra 17m barrels of oil in 2030, raising expected net imports by 8%, as well as adding 2.5% to national emissions that year, the analysis shows.

      After years of fierce lobbying by parts of the car industry – and despite the significant savings on offer for EV drivers – media reports suggest that EV targets could be “watered down”.

      Under current rules, battery EVs – BEVs, those which run only on electricity – must make up a rising share of new car sales in the UK.

      This policy, known as the “zero-emission vehicles” (ZEV) mandate, was introduced by the previous Conservative government and sets a goal for 33% BEV sales in 2026, rising to 80% in 2030.

      (Carmakers are able to use “flexibilities” to help meet their targets, which reduces the effective target under the ZEV mandate to an estimated 25% of sales in 2026.)

      Now, the government under new Labour prime minister Andy Burnham is reported to be considering a cut in the BEV target for 2030 to just 50% of new car sales, alongside options for 60% or 70%.

      Carbon Brief understands that a consultation on weakening the ZEV mandate is being reviewed by the prime minister’s office in Number 10, ahead of being formally released.

      If the mandate is weakened to 50% by 2030 – and if carmakers make more use of “flexibilities” – there could be up to 3m fewer BEVs on UK roads by 2030, according to the NGO T&E.

      Previous Carbon Brief analysis found that BEVs are around £1,100 cheaper to run per year than a petrol car, thanks to far lower fuel costs.

      Overall, BEVs are more than £1,000 per year cheaper to own than either petrol cars or plug-in hybrids (PHEVs, which can run on petrol or electricity).

      This is according to analysis of the “total cost of ownership” by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), including purchase price, fuel costs, insurance and proposed pay-per-mile charges.

      In total, Carbon Brief analysis shows that UK drivers could be hit with an extra £3bn in annual ownership costs by 2030, if the ZEV mandate is weakened, as shown below.

      Bar chart showing that weaker EV targets could cost UK consumers £3bn a year by 2030

      A weaker ZEV mandate could “put billions of pounds of committed investments at risk”, reports BusinessGreen, including in the EV charging network and battery supply chains.

      Industry group Energy UK says that the mandate is “working in the way it was designed to work” and that it is the “single biggest driver of emissions reductions” in government climate plans.

      However, Carbon Brief analysis shows that a weaker ZEV mandate could result in an extra 7.4m tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions (MtCO2) in 2030. This would add the equivalent of 2.5% to national emissions in 2030, under the UK’s international climate goal for that year.

      In addition, a weaker ZEV mandate could result in the UK needing to import an extra 17m barrels of oil in 2030, equivalent to 8% of projected net imports that year.

      Energy UK says that shifting to EVs will help to reduce household energy bills “for everyone”. This is not only through direct cost-of-ownership savings for EV drivers, but also by spreading the costs of upgrading the electricity system across a wider user base.

      Car industry group the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders claims that its members are spending “blilions…on discounts, finance incentives and marketing support” and that “natural” EV demand is below the level required to meet the current ZEV mandate. Its claims are disputed.

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