Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Gearing up

PRE-COP COMMITMENTS: China has “become the defender of international cooperation on climate change”, said state-sponsored newspaper Global Times the day before COP30 opened. China’s commitment to “dual carbon” goals will be the “driving force” of building a “beautiful China”, said an article by the Communist party-affiliated newspaper People’s Daily under the byline of Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

WORLD’S EXPECTATIONS: China’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, Geng Shuang, said the country is “globally recognised as the [one] with the strongest determination, the most vigorous actions” on tackling climate issues, reported news agency Xinhua. John Kerry, former US climate envoy, told the Shanghai-based Paper: “The global climate agenda has undergone a fundamental shift, and calls are being made for China to continue playing a leading role in the event of a possible absence of the US.”

FINANCE PLEA: Meanwhile, Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva “urged” China’s vice premier Ding Xuexiang at a pre-COP30 meeting to “join financing initiatives for climate transition and resilience” and “help fund green technology and investment projects”, said the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post (SCMP).

‘OUTPERFORM[ING]’ TARGETS: Most experts in a new survey expect China to “outperform” its 2035 emissions-reduction target, reported Bloomberg. About 71% of the surveyed experts believe China’s carbon-emission peak will “happen between 2026 and 2030, with most expecting it in 2028” – ahead of the official timeline of 2030, said Agence France-Presse.

Early moves

‘PROMISES KEPT’: China “keeps its promises and delivers on its commitments” on climate change, Ding said on 6 November, in remarks at COP30’s leaders summit, according to a transcript published by Communist party-affiliated newspaper the People’s Daily. Ding suggested that, to “advance” climate action, the world must “stay on the right track”, balancing “environmental protection, economic development, job creation and poverty eradication”. In addition, Ding said countries must “remove trade barriers” if the world is to meet its targets, said BBC News.

BUILDING COALITIONS: Over the weekend ahead of COP, Brazil, China and the UK co-led a summit on methane, launching initiatives that could “accelerate global action on methane and other non-CO2 greenhouse gases”, said a press release published on the COP30 website. These included “mobilising” at least $150m to support seven developing countries’ efforts, it added. China and the EU also agreed to join a Brazilian-led carbon-market coalition, Bloomberg reported, which “aims to develop common standards for monitoring, reporting and verification”.

TFFF FOREGONE: There are “still no guarantees” that China will contribute to Brazil’s Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), CNN Brasil said, contrary to reporting by Reuters in July that China might invest in the fund. The outlet added that Brazil may be able to push for Chinese participation again at the G20 meeting in late November. SCMP said “Chinese negotiators told their Brazilian counterparts that Beijing supported the fund in principle”, but cited the common but differentiated responsibilities concept as a reason not to commit.

OPENING STATEMENTS: In the face of an “intensifying” climate crisis, China “will not stop supporting” international action, Huang said at the opening of the China pavilion at COP30, attended by Carbon Brief. A number of representatives of major international organisations – including the UNFCCC’s Simon Stiell, the UN climate advisor Selwin Hart, UNEP executive director Inger Andersen – as well as Chinese climate envoy Liu Zhenmin all spoke at the event. Hart captured the mood, saying: “We are certain to count on the leadership of China over the course of the next two weeks, and also over the next decade.”

Trade spats

AGENDA FIGHT: The agenda for COP30 was “adopted on Monday as originally drafted without any amendments”, despite a request by a country group that includes China that the lineup include “provision of finance from rich countries and unilateral trade measures” such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, Climate Home News reported. The topics are instead being discussed in presidency-led consultations, alongside calls from small-island states to push for greater emissions-cutting ambition and from the EU on emissions reporting. Carbon Brief’s Simon Evans set out the issues on Bluesky.

RIGHT HERE RIGHT NOW: The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) group – of which China is a part – together with the Arab Group stated that unilateral trade measures “penalise developing countries and impact their ability to take action to address climate change”, reported Earth Negotiation Bulletin. They pushed back against arguments by Japan, the EU and others that discussions of unilateral trade measures would be “more appropriate under the World Trade Organization”, it added.

PRESIDENCY PAUSE: A “stocktaking plenary” on Wednesday ended abruptly with COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago announcing a further plenary on Saturday. Do Lago said that – despite “more than eight hours” of discussions – further consultations were still needed. Rumours are flying around how Brazil will manage this, with many expecting a COP30 decision responding to these thorny issues. It may be called a “cover decision” or be part of a “mutirão package”, a reference to an Indigenous word for collective efforts.

Cough up the cash

INDIA FOR BASIC: Meanwhile, according to a government press release, India has submitted a statement on behalf of the BASIC group, an institution initiated by China, as well as LMDCs, reaffirming that the “architecture of the Paris Agreement must not be altered, and that [common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)] remains the cornerstone of the global climate regime”. It added that “developed countries must…fulfil their obligations on finance, technology transfer and capacity-building to developing countries”, in particular by increasing adaptation finance flows by “nearly fifteen times” from current levels.

STATUS QUO: Chinese delegates have repeatedly emphasised China’s status as a developing country and the need for CBDR in early statements at COP. Writing in the Backchannel substack, Asia Society Policy Institute China climate hub and climate diplomacy director Kate Logan and E3G senior policy advisor Lily Hartzell wrote that China’s “high-level delegations have cautiously avoided any wording that might suggest a bid for formal climate leadership, particularly when it comes to climate finance”.

LEADING COMMENT: In his speech at the leaders’ summit, Ding stated that “developed countries should fulfill their obligations to take the lead in reducing emissions, honour their financial commitments and provide developing countries with more technical and capacity-building support”. This contrasts his address at COP29, where Ding highlighted China’s role in “provid[ing] and mobilis[ing]” climate finance – sparking much speculation that the country may soon change its approach to the topic.

COME BACK TO US: Li Gao, the head of China’s delegation at COP30, told Agence France-Presse that China “welcome[d]” the “Baku to Belém roadmap” towards the aspirational target of $1.3tn in climate finance by 2035 from all sources, but that it is “crucial” for the developed countries to fulfil their $300bn commitment made at COP29. Li added that “we hope that some day, and we also believe that some day in the future, the US will come back”, because “addressing climate change needs every country”.

Global south solidarity

KEY THEME: China is working towards “jointly creating a green future” for the global south, Huang said in a session on south-south development held on the first day of COP30, attended by Carbon Brief. He added: “We pay attention to the needs of developing countries.” President of the Belt and Road International Green Development Coalition (BRIGC) Zhao Yingmin said on a separate event at the China pavilion that “construction of the [Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)] is also an important driver for developing countries to advance their green transitions”. A number of initiatives were publicised during the first few days of COP, including an agreement between China, Malawi and Kenya on clean cooking and a project to collate “global case studies on green development” by BRIGC.

BUILDING CAPACITY: The BRIGC programme is “exactly the type of example we want [to see at] the COP – implementation, implementation, implementation”, said COP30 CEO Ana Toni, speaking at the launch event attended by Carbon Brief. Selwin Hart, special adviser to the secretary-general on climate action and just transition at the United Nations, emphasised at a China pavilion event that Brazil and China showed “leadership” in climate action, noting that “you [emerging economies] understand us better” than developed countries – referencing an understanding of the need for capacity building in global south countries.

‘FRANK REMARKS’: Meanwhile, an opinion article in the state-supporting Global Times, bylined simply as “Global Times”, quoted COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago saying “You can’t insist that China has to lower its emissions [and then] complain that China is putting cheap [electric vehicles] all over the world”. It added that these “frank remarks should serve as a wake-up call” against “politicising China’s green efforts”.

STRONG INTEREST: The two events on south-south cooperation, both attended by Carbon Brief, appeared to be the best-attended China pavilion events so far. One audience member, a Brazilian chemical engineer, told Carbon Brief that she was attending the session because she was interested in understanding China’s experience of navigating the energy transition as a developing country.

Views on the energy transition

‘CONCRETE PROGRESS’: “We have made concrete progress in energy transformation”, Li said at the China pavilion, adding it involved a “very hard effort”. Climate envoy Liu noted at the same event that “China, as a major country, reaffirms its confidence in achieving the [Paris Agreement] goals”. He said that China “sees the next 10 years as a critical period for delivering on the commitments made under the Paris Agreement”, adding: “We look forward to all countries delivering their contributions on this goal.”

FOSSIL PHASE-OUT?: In his opening speech at the leaders’ summit, Brazil’s Lula called on world leaders to draw roadmaps to “overcome dependence on fossil fuels”, adding that he was “convinced” that this could be done “despite [countries’] difficulties and contradictions”, Argus Media reported. In the opening session of the China pavilion, attended by Carbon Brief, UNEP’s Andersen said she “encourage[d] China to take even bolder action…[and] explore setting targets on coal”.

PRIORITIES FOR 2030: Lyu Wenbin, director general of China’s Energy Research Institute, stated that a key task in the next five years included “improving the quality of energy supply”, including “boosting non-fossil energy” while “shifting coal power to a supporting role” in the energy mix. He added that in the medium- to long-term, China will build an energy system that has “non-fossil energy as the main supply [of power] and fossil energy as a guarantee [of energy security]”.

FLAT OR FALLING: Meanwhile, analysis for Carbon Brief found that China’s carbon dioxide emissions were “unchanged from a year earlier in the third quarter of 2025, extending a flat or falling trend that started in March 2024”. The analysis has been covered widely in publications including China’s Global Times, the New York Times, Financial Times, Reuters, Bloomberg and on the frontpage of the Guardian.

Captured

Bai Quan, director of the Energy Research Institute of the Academy of Macroeconomic Research – a research institution managed by the National Development and Reform Commission – outlined how China’s energy landscape might evolve between 2024 and 2060, during the launch of the China Energy Transformation Outlook (CETO) 2025 at the China Pavilion, attended by Carbon Brief. Guest posts for Carbon Brief on previous CETO reports can be found here and here.

Watch, read, listen

EV MARKET: Research institute the Centre for Strategic and International Studies published a series of two videos talking about China’s EVs in the global market.

HEALTH AND CLIMATE CHANGE: The “Lancet Countdown” China report led by Tsinghua University found that “climate-related health risks in China reached record levels last year”, according to media outlet China.org.cn.

‘DOCUMENT 136’: China Power Enterprise Management analysed the impact of China’s “document 136” pricing reforms for new renewable energy projects.

CHINA-LAOS: A long article by Sky News talked about China’s “green technology exports” in developing countries, such as Laos.

789

The number of delegates China has sent to Belém, according to analysis by Carbon Brief. This includes more than 100 party delegates and almost 700 “overflow” delegates, including from local government, the private sector, non-government organisations and foreign consulting firms.

New science

A study on the promoting effect of environmental penalties on climate-friendly technological innovation in China

Scientific Reports

“Environmental penalties indirectly influence climate-friendly technological innovation through their effects on the digital economy and financial technology”, according to a new study. The paper used data from Chinese cities to model this influence. The authors found that environmental penalties have a “U-shaped” effect, noting a “critical inflection point where environmental penalties shift from promoting to inhibiting these innovations”.

Machine learning analysis of carbon rebound effect dynamics and drivers in Chinese prefecture-level cities

Scientific Reports

New research investigated the “carbon rebound effect”, defined in the paper as “the phenomenon in which, after energy efficiency improvements, carbon emissions rebound due to increased economic activity, thus undermining the reduction in emissions achieved through efficiency gains”. Using machine-learning methods, the authors assessed data from Chinese cities collected over 2010-21. According to the paper, the effect is stronger in the north of China than the south and in the east than the west.

China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org

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The post China Briefing 13 November 2025: COP30 special appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 13 November 2025: COP30 special

Developed countries have poured billions of dollars into railways across Asia, solar projects in Africa and thousands of other climate-related initiatives overseas, according to a joint investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian.

A group of nations, including much of Europe, the US and Japan, is obliged under the Paris Agreement to provide international “climate finance” to developing countries.

This financial support can come in forms such as grants and loans from various sources, including aid budgets, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private investments.

The flagship climate-finance target for more than a decade was to hit “$100bn a year” by 2020, which developed countries met – albeit two years late – in 2022.

Carbon Brief and the Guardian have analysed data across more than 20,000 global climate projects funded using public money from developed nations, including official 2021 and 2022 figures, which have only just been published.

The data provides a detailed insight into how the $100bn goal was reached, including funding for everything from sustainable farming in Niger to electricity projects in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

With developed countries now pledging to ramp up climate finance further, the analysis also shows how donors often rely on loans and private finance to meet their obligations.

• The $100bn target was reached in 2022, boosted by private finance and the US
• Relatively wealthy countries – including China and the UAE – were major recipients
• A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects
• There was funding for more than 500 clean-power projects in African countries
• Some ‘least developed’ countries relied heavily on loans
• US shares in development banks significantly inflated its total contribution
• Adaptation finance still lags, but climate-vulnerable countries received more
• Methodology

The $100bn target was reached in 2022, boosted by private finance and the US

A small handful of countries have consistently been the top climate-finance donors. This remained the case in 2021 and 2022, with just four countries – Japan, Germany, France and the US – responsible for half of all climate finance, the analysis shows.

Not only was 2022 the first year in which the $100bn goal was achieved, it also saw the largest ever single-year increase in climate finance – a rise of $26.3bn, or 29%, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

(It is worth noting that while OECD figures are often referenced as the most “official” climate-finance totals, they are contested.)

Half of this increase came from a $12.6bn rise in support from MDBs – financial institutions that are owned and funded by member states. The rest can be attributed to two main factors.

First, while several donors ramped up spending, the US drove by far the biggest increase in “bilateral” finance, provided directly by the country itself.

After years of stalling during the first Donald Trump presidency, when Joe Biden took office in 2021, the nation’s bilateral climate aid more than tripled between that year and the next.

Meanwhile, after years of “stagnating” at around $15bn, the amount of private investments “mobilised” in developing countries by developed-country spending surged to around $22bn in 2022, according to OECD estimates.

As the chart below shows, the combination of increased US contributions and higher private investments pushed climate finance up by nearly $14bn in 2022, helping it to reach $115.9bn in total.

Both of these trends are still pertinent in 2025, following a new pledge made at COP29 by developed countries to ramp up climate finance to “at least” $300bn a year by 2035.

After years of increasing rapidly under Biden, US bilateral climate finance for developing countries has been effectively eliminated during Trump’s second presidential term. Other major donors, including Germany, France and the UK, have also cut their aid budgets.

This means there will be more pressure on other sources of climate finance in the coming years. In particular, developed countries hope that private finance can help to raise finance into the trillions of dollars required to achieve developing countries’ climate goals.

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Some higher-income countries – including China and the UAE – were major recipients

The greatest beneficiaries of international climate finance tend to be large, middle-income countries, such as Egypt, the Philippines and Brazil, according to the analysis.

(The World Bank classifies countries as being low-, lower-middle, upper-middle or high-income, according to their gross national income per person.)

Lower-middle income India received $14.1bn in 2021 and 2022 – nearly all as loans – making it by far the largest recipient, as the chart below shows.

Most of India’s top projects were metro and rail lines in cities, such as Delhi and Mumbai, which accounted for 46% of its total climate finance in those years, Carbon Brief analysis shows. (See: A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects.)

As the world’s second-largest economy and a major funder of energy projects overseas, China – classified as upper-middle income by the World Bank – has faced mounting pressure to start officially providing climate finance. At the same time, the nation received more than $3bn of climate finance over this period, as it is still classed as a developing country under the UN climate system.

High-income Gulf petrostates are also among the countries receiving funds. For example, the UAE received Japanese finance of $1.3bn for an electricity transmission project and a waste-to-energy project.

To some extent, such large shares simply reflect the size of many middle-income countries. India received 9% of all bilateral and multilateral climate finance, but it is home to 18% of the global population.

The focus on these nations also reflects the kind of big-budget infrastructure that is being funded.

“Middle-income economies tend to have the financial and institutional capacity to design, appraise and deliver large-scale projects,” Sarah Colenbrander, climate programme director at global affairs thinktank ODI, tells Carbon Brief.

Donors might focus on relatively higher-income or powerful nations out of self-interest, for example, to align with geopolitical, trade or commercial interests. But, as Colenbrander tells Carbon Brief, there are also plenty of “high-minded” reasons to do so, not least the opportunity to help curb their relatively high emissions.

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A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects

Japan is the largest climate-finance donor, accounting for a fifth of all bilateral and multilateral finance in 2021 and 2022, the analysis shows.

Of the 20 largest bilateral projects, 13 were Japanese. These include $7.6bn of loans for eight rail and metro systems in major cities across India, Bangladesh and the Philippines.

In fact, Japan’s funding for rail projects was so substantial that it made up 11% of all bilateral finance. This amounts to 4% of climate finance from all sources.

While these rail projects are likely to provide benefits to developing countries, they also highlight some of the issues identified by aid experts with Japan’s climate-finance practices.

As was the case for more than 80% of Japan’s climate finance, all of these projects were funded with loans, which must be paid back. Nearly a fifth of Japan’s total loans were described as “non-concessional”, meaning they were offered on terms equivalent to those offered on the open market, rather than at more favourable rates.

Many Japan-backed projects also stipulate that Japanese companies and workers must be hired to work on them, reflecting the government’s policies to “proactively support” and “facilitate” the overseas expansion of Japanese business using aid.

Documents show that rail projects in India and the Philippines were granted on this basis.

This practice can be beneficial, especially in sectors such as rail infrastructure, where Japanese companies have considerable expertise. Yet, analysts have questioned Japan’s approach, which they argue can disproportionately benefit the donor itself.

“Counting these loans as climate finance presents a moral hazard…And such loans tied to Japanese businesses make it worse,” Yuri Onodera, a climate specialist at Friends of the Earth Japan, tells Carbon Brief.

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There was funding for more than 500 clean-power projects in African countries

Around 730 million people still lack access to electricity, with roughly 80% of those people living in sub-Saharan Africa.

As part of their climate-finance pledges, donor countries often support renewable projects, transmission lines and other initiatives that can provide clean power to those in need.

Carbon Brief and the Guardian have identified funding for more than 500 clean-power and transmission projects in African countries that lack universal electricity access. In total, these funds amounted to $7.6bn over the two years 2021-22.

Among them was support for Chad’s first-ever solar project, a new hydropower plant in Mozambique and the expansion of electricity grids in Nigeria.

The distribution of funds across the continent – excluding multi-country programmes – can be seen in the map below.

A lack of clear rules about what can be classified as “climate finance” in the UN climate process means donors sometimes include support for fossil fuels – particularly gas power – in their totals.

For example, Japan counted an $18m loan to a Japanese liquified natural gas (LNG) company in Senegal and roughly $1m for gas projects in Tanzania.

However, such funding accounted for a tiny fraction of sub-Saharan Africa’s climate finance overall, amounting to less than 1% of all power-sector funding across the region, based on the projects identified in this analysis.

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Some ‘least developed’ countries relied heavily on loans

One of the most persistent criticisms levelled at climate finance by developing-country governments and civil society groups is that so much of it is provided in the form of loans.

While loans are commonly used to fund major projects, they are sometimes offered on unfavourable terms and add to the burden of countries that are already struggling with debt.

The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) has shown that the 44 “least developed countries” (LDCs) spend twice as much servicing debts as they receive in climate finance.

Developed nations pledged $33.4bn in 2021 and 2022 to the 44 LDCs to help them finance climate projects. In total, $17.2bn – more than half of the funding – was provided as loans, primarily from Japan, France and development banks.

The chart below shows how, for a number of LDCs, loans continue to be the main way in which they receive international climate funds.

For example, Angola received $216.7m in loans from France – primarily to support its water infrastructure – and $571.6m in loans from various multilateral institutions, together amounting to nearly all the nation’s climate finance over this period.

Oxfam, which describes developed countries as “unjustly indebting poor countries” via loans, estimates that the “true value” of climate finance in 2022 was $28-35bn, roughly a quarter of the OECD’s estimate. This is largely due to Oxfam discounting much of the value of loans.

However, Jan Kowalzig, a senior policy adviser at Oxfam Germany, tells Carbon Brief that, “generally, LDCs receive loans at better conditions” than they would have been able to secure on the open market, sometimes referred to as “concessional” loans.

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US shares in development banks significantly raised its total contribution

The US has been one of the world’s top climate-finance providers, accounting for around 15% of all bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2021 and 2022.

Despite this, US contributions have consistently been viewed as relatively low when considering the nation’s wealth and historical role in driving climate change.

Moreover, much of the climate finance that can be attributed to the US comes from its MDB shareholdings, rather than direct contributions from its aid budget.

These banks are owned by member countries and the US is a dominant shareholder in many of them.

The analysis reveals that around three-quarters of US climate finance provided in 2021-22 came via multilateral sources, particularly the World Bank. (For information on how this analysis attributes multilateral funding to donors, see Methodology.)

Among other major donors – specifically Japan, France and Germany – only a third of their finance was channelled through multilateral institutions. As the chart below shows, multilateral contributions lifted the US from being the fifth-largest donor to the third-largest.

While the Trump administration has cut virtually all overseas climate funding and broadly rejected multilateral institutions, the US has not yet abandoned its influential stake in MDBs.

Prior to COP29 in 2024, only MDB funds that could be attributed to developed country inputs were counted towards the $100bn goal, as part of those nations’ Paris Agreement duties.

However, countries have now agreed that “all climate-related outflows” from MDBs – no matter which donor country they are attributed to – will count towards the new $300bn goal.

This means that, as long as MDBs continue extensively funding climate projects, there will still be a large slice of climate finance that can be attributed to the US, even as it exits the Paris Agreement.

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Adaptation finance still lags, but climate-vulnerable countries received more

Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries committed to achieving “a balance between adaptation and mitigation” in their climate finance.

The idea is that, while it is important to focus on mitigation – or cutting emissions – by supporting projects such as clean energy, there is also a need to help developing countries prepare for the threat of climate change.

Generally, adaptation projects are less likely to provide a return on investment and are, therefore, more reliant on grant-based finance.

In practice, a “balance” between adaptation and mitigation has never been reached. Over the period of this analysis, 58% of climate finance was for mitigation, 33% was for adaptation and the remainder was for projects that contributed to both goals.

This reflects a preference for mitigation-based financing via loans among some major donors, particularly Japan and France. Both countries provided just a third of their finance for adaptation projects in 2021 and 2022.

However, among some of the most climate-vulnerable countries – including land-locked parts of Africa and small islands – most funding was for adaptation, as the chart below shows.

Among the projects receiving climate-adaptation funds were those supporting sustainable agriculture in Niger, improving disaster resilience in Micronesia and helping those in Somalia who have been internally displaced by “climate change and food crises”.

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Methodology

The joint Guardian and Carbon Brief analysis of climate finance includes the bilateral and multilateral public finance that developed countries pledged for climate projects in developing countries. It covers the years 2021 and 2022.

(These “developed” countries are the 23 “Annex II” nations, plus the EU, that are obliged to provide climate finance under the Paris Agreement.)

The analysis excludes other types of funding that contribute to the $100bn climate-finance target for climate projects, such as export credits and private finance “mobilised” by public investments. Where these have been referenced, the figures are OECD estimates. They are excluded from the analysis because export credits are a small fraction of the total, while private finance mobilised cannot be attributed to specific donor countries.

Data for bilateral funding comes from the biennial transparency reports (BTRs) each country submits to the UNFCCC. The lag in official reporting means the most recent figures – published around the end of 2024 and start of 2025 – only go up to 2022.

Many of the bilateral projects recorded by countries do not specify single recipients, but instead mention several countries. These projects have not been included when calculating the amount of finance individual developing countries received, but they are included in the total figures.

The multilateral funding, including projects funded by MDBs and multilateral climate funds, comes from the OECD. Many countries – including developing countries – pay into these institutions, which then use their money to fund climate projects and, in the case of MDBs, raise additional finance from capital markets.

This analysis calculated the shares of the “outflows” from multilateral institutions that can be attributed to developed countries. It adapts the approach used by the OECD to calculate these attributable shares for developed countries as a whole group.

As the OECD does not publish individual donor country shares that make up the total developed-country contribution, this analysis calculated each country’s attributable shares based on shareholdings in MDBs and cumulative contributions to multilateral funds. This was based on a methodology used by analysts at the World Resources Institute and ODI. There were some multilateral funds that could not be assigned using this methodology, which are therefore not captured in each country’s multilateral contribution.

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The post Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met

Pia Marchegiani is environmental policy director and deputy director at Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN), and Vanina Corral is FARN’s environmental policy programme officer.

At 3,400 metres (11,150 feet) above sea level in the arid highlands of northwest Argentina, 29-year-old Franco Vedia tends his llamas and fields in the Indigenous community of Tusaquillas – one of more than 30 communities across the Salinas Grandes and Laguna de Guayatayoc Basin.

Here, life revolves around a single, sacred element: water, the source that feeds the lagoon, sustains crops and animals, and has anchored centuries of Indigenous life.

The Salinas Grandes, shared between the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, is one of the largest salt flats in South America. Beneath it lies another resource: lithium, the mineral driving the global race for batteries that power the energy transition.

“Lithium activity is water mining,” Franco said. “It consumes vast amounts of water in the Puna – a resource already scarce and extremely valuable here.”

Across Argentina’s northern provinces, environmental groups warn that lithium extraction has already dried rivers and degraded fragile Andean wetlands. The struggle of the Puna communities mirrors that of others across the Gran Atacama region – spanning Argentina, Chile and Bolivia – the so-called lithium triangle, home to more than half the world’s known reserves.

For communities like Franco’s, the balance kept for generations is breaking under a development model that promises progress at the cost of survival.

“If the water disappears, life disappears,” he added.

Families grow beans, potatoes and corn; raise llamas, sheep, and goats; and weave textiles by hand. In recent years, some have opened small community-based tourism projects. “We want to show the world how we work the land and what it means to us,” Franco said.

Their livelihoods sustain an ancient way of life – one now threatened by the expansion of lithium mining.

The energy transition paradox

Global demand for lithium is soaring as countries in the Global North accelerate their energy transitions. While lithium extraction is often portrayed as a solution to the climate crisis, the extraction process risks irreversible damage to fragile ecosystems such as the Andean wetlands.

Franco reflected on the global paradox of the energy transition: “We all use cellphones, computers and cars. It would be hard to imagine a world without technology. But what’s truly impossible is imagining a world without water.”

In the Andean cosmovision – a worldview that sees nature as part of the community – water is a living being. “When a water source is destroyed, a part of the community is destroyed. Without water, there is no balance and no existence,” Franco added.

A decade of community resistance

For more than 10 years, the Indigenous communities of Salinas Grandes and Laguna de Guayatayoc have resisted the entry of lithium companies. Mining projects have advanced without basin-wide environmental assessments or reliable baseline data – in a region already parched and vulnerable to climate change.

Their defence is not only of water and life, but of human rights: the right to information, participation and free, prior, and informed consent, guaranteed under the the UN-brokered Escazu Agreement, and the International Labour Organization’s Convention 169, a binding agreement concerning the rights of Indigenous peoples.

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To protect their rights, the communities have taken their claims to national and international courts and created the Kachi Yupi Biocultural Protocol, defining how consultation must take place. Supported by organizations such as FARN (Environment and Natural Resources Foundation), they are building networks of technical and legal assistance.

Franco emphasised the importance of developing these networks to protect their territory: “It is very important for us that support comes from within, from our own people and from those individuals and organisations who want to defend life, the territory, Mother Earth, and the cosmovision of Buen Vivir.”

The road to COP30 in Belém

Franco will bring the voice of the Salinas Grandes to COP30 in Belém, Brazil.

“We want to show the world what is happening in our territories. Many communities across Latin America face the same situation. We need to unite our voices to defend water, human rights, and our collective right to live,” he said.

As the energy transition accelerates and minerals like lithium are treated as the next frontier, Franco carries an ancestral truth: “Water is worth more than lithium – because without water there is no life.”

Global call to rethink transition model

The defence of the Salinas Grandes Basin is more than a local struggle. It is a global call to rethink an energy-transition model that risks repeating the extractivism it claims to replace.

A truly just transition must respect community rights and participation, safeguard the ecosystems on which life depends, and place justice, equity and human rights at its core. The extraction of so-called critical minerals cannot repeat the same logic that has long harmed Indigenous peoples and degraded nature.

Colombia proposes expert group to advance talks on minerals agreement

As COP30 gets underway, the proposed Belém Action Mechanism (BAM) – a civil-society call for a global just transition rooted in rights and ecological integrity – offers a path towards the transformation Franco’s community demands.

His message to Belém is simple and urgent: “The energy transition cannot be built on the destruction of water. True progress means caring for life.”

The post “Water is worth more than lithium,” Indigenous Argentine community tells COP30 appeared first on Climate Home News.

“Water is worth more than lithium,” Indigenous Argentine community tells COP30