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China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
Higher EU tariffs on China-made EVs
TARIFFS DECIDED: The EU has announced additional tariffs of up to 38.1% on electric vehicles (EVs) manufactured in China, with “individual duties” on BYD, Geely and SAIC of 17.4%, 20% and 38.1%, according to Bloomberg. The outlet added that “while the probe targeted Chinese automakers, the higher rates…will hit a range of Western carmakers too”. The Financial Times reported that, given an existing 10% blanket tariff, companies could face total tariffs of “up to almost 50%”. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, an economic thinktank, “an extra 20% tariff on Chinese electric cars would reduce imports by a quarter”, or approximately 125,000 units worth a total of $4bn, based on 2023 figures. Politico quoted Elvire Fabry, senior research fellow at the Jacques Delors Institute, saying “something around 20-30% would give European manufacturers some breathing space to accelerate their investments in the sector and maintain their market share”.
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‘STRONGLY DISSATISFIED’: China said that it “is strongly dissatisfied” by the tariffs, which have “ignored facts and WTO rules”, state news agency Xinhua reported. Foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said China will take “all necessary measures to firmly safeguard its lawful rights and interests”, in comments published by Reuters. Will Roberts, head of automotive research at Rho Motion, wrote in an email that: “European drivers are crying out for affordable EVs and with the news today of sales plateauing in Europe, lower-priced cars will be critical to achieving the transition as planned. Having said that, Chinese manufacturers should be able to absorb some of these lower tariff levels into their padded profit margins.”
EXEMPTIONS EXPIRE: Meanwhile, an exemption on US tariffs for solar products imported from southeast Asia has expired, economic newspaper Caixin reported, causing Chinese solar manufacturer Longi Green Energy Technology to begin preparing to “suspend some production lines at its factories in Malaysia and Vietnam”. Bloomberg added that another Chinese firm, Trina Solar, was “shutting down capacity” in Thailand and Vietnam. Chinese finance newspaper Yicai reported that Trina denied it was permanently ending production, but the outlet also said Chinese-owned production in the region has been heavily impacted.
LOSING PARTNERS?: Chinese EVs in Turkey will also be subject to additional tariffs of 40%, as the Turkish government aims “to halt a possible deterioration of its current account balance and protect domestic automakers”, Reuters said. Elsewhere, the Brazilian government “reiterated [its] aspiration for increased Chinese investments in energy, agriculture and infrastructure sectors, and highlighted the remarkable growth in bilateral trade with China”, the state-run newspaper China Daily reported.
China’s new regulation on ‘new energy integration’
NEW CONSTRUCTION: The NEA issued a notice on new energy integration – the process of accommodating, distributing and balancing renewable energy fed into the grid – on 5 June, state news agency Xinhua reported. It said that the NEA will grant a “green channel” for development of grid infrastructure above 500 kilovolts (kV) to better integrate large solar, hydropower and wind projects, while provincial-level energy departments will be responsible for lower-voltage projects and creating better, more advanced “plans” for integration. Bloomberg said the new document also set a goal of “completing 37 major power lines and starting construction on another 33 by the end of the year”, as well as supporting broader goals to “increase the national target for battery storage capacity by 2025”.
POLICY BACKGROUND: The NEA’s own “interpretation” of the document said the policy is a response to China’s installed capacity of wind power and solar exceeding 1,100 gigawatts by the end of April, creating a “need” to better “adapt [grid development] to the rapid growth of new energy”. An article by Zhang Jianhua, the head of the NEA, published by China Electric Power News the day before the notification was released, also emphasised the “urgent need” to construct a “new electricity system” for “energy security” that includes the utilisation of both fossil fuels and new energy.
IMPROVE UTILISATION: An analysis by International Energy Net (IEN) said another factor behind the new policy is that a number of local governments have cancelled energy storage programs, hampering integration and “forcing” the central government to “intervene”. In addition, the wind and solar integration rate of big projects, such as those in Inner Mongolia, dropped to between 92-94% from January to April 2024, lower than the national average of 96.1%, added IEN. (An analysis by Shanghai-based The Paper said the utilisation rate of solar energy should be above 95%, according to a regulation in 2018, although this target has since been loosened for some regions.) The analysis concluded that establishing a “green channel” and requiring better planning can improve utilisation and allow the construction of China’s “ultra-high voltage” power infrastructure to become “more targeted”.

China announced more policies on industry emissions
STEEL EMISSIONS: China published an action plan for energy conservation and carbon reduction in the steel industry, aiming to cut emissions by 53m tonnes of carbon dioxide (MtCO2) by 2025, Jiemian reported. The plan added that “by the end of 2030…the industry will have “achieve[ing]d significant results in the development of green, low-carbon and high-quality development”. It was one of several industry-specific documents that followed the National Energy Administration (NEA)’s announcement of an industry-wide action plan on the topic at the end of May. China Environment News interviewed a representative of the China Iron and Steel Association, who stated that the steel industry is “expected to be included” in China’s carbon market this year. Dialogue Earth said that the “likely inclusion of the steel, cement and aluminium industries is expected to add 2,000-3,000MtCO2 coverage”. (The market currently covers the power sector’s roughly 5000MtCO2.)
CARBON FOOTPRINT: The government also announced a plan to establish a “carbon footprint management system”, which “will go into effect in 2027, setting standards for measuring carbon emissions for about 100 key products throughout the Chinese economy” that year and may include 200 products by 2030, according to Reuters. The plan was a response to the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which “has set clear rules on the measuring and disclosure of product carbon footprints”, the newswire added. International Energy Net interviewed an official from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, who said the plan “improves domestic rules, promotes convergence with international [efforts], and establishes a unified and standardised carbon footprint management system”.
Spotlight
US-China subnational climate cooperation
The US and China are the world’s two leading CO2 emitters and their cooperation on climate change has often pressaged progress on the international stage. However, climate cooperation could be hit by geopolitical disagreements, such as the ongoing debate over China’s electric vehicles (EV) exports.
In this issue, Carbon Brief looks at recently concluded US-China climate talks and explores the possibilities for continued subnational climate cooperation.
When the US and China signed the Sunnylands statement in late 2023, the two countries agreed to continue the climate conversations this decade.
Last month, the US-China high-level event on subnational climate action was held by the China-California Climate Institute (CCCI) in Berkeley, California.
The event covered various climate-related topics. For example, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the economic planning body under the central government, and the US Department of Energy agreed to cooperate on a carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) project, according to a CCCI announcement.
At the regional level, the state of California furthered cooperation with Chinese local governments in the areas of transport, joint climate research, carbon markets and agricultural methane, the CCCI announcement added.
Much of this cooperation started before the Sunnylands statement.
Continued cooperation
In 2022, California and Shanghai jointly established a “green shipping corridor”.
Under the project, two ports – the port of Los Angeles and the port of Shanghai – along with other industry partners, including shipping lines and cargo owners, are aiming to demonstrate the feasibility of deploying “the world’s first zero lifecycle carbon emission container ship” by 2030
“We’re hoping to do something in late summer with the green shipping corridors,” Giles Giovinazzi, senior advisor to the California State Transportation Agency, told Carbon Brief.
He added that “there’s a structured conversation that’s been going on at the local government level” and the state wants more cooperation with China.
Another project being eyed by the California authority is Hainan’s battery-swapping facility for heavy-duty trucks, which are responsible for 20% of transport emissions in the state.
“Regardless of geopolitical issues and ideological issues…we want to be fact based and learn from each other,” Giovinazzi said.
The debate over engagement
Jerry Brown, former governor of California and CCCI chair, echoed this message at the CCCI event. “We are here not because of our differences, but because of the common ground we share and the common threat we face in confronting the climate crisis,” he told attendees.
The event was part of an effort “to build an exchange platform or partnership for the future, no matter what happens to the government’s official conversations,” Hu Min, director and co-founder of the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, a Beijing-based thinktank, told Carbon Brief.
However, some of the delegates in Berkeley were less optimistic. Speaking anonymously to offer frank reflections on the event, a number of participants told Carbon Brief they were concerned about trade protectionism raising the cost of renewable energy products and the impact of this on climate action, as well as escalating geopolitical tensions stalling climate cooperation.
Outside the talks, Chinese corporations are contending with rising criticism in the US.
Several Republican members of Congress, including Colorado representative Lauren Boebert, expressed in a letter to US president Joe Biden that they are “concerned that [a meeting in May] between [US climate envoy] John Podesta and Chinese counterparts will further leverage American energy security for empty promises from China’s government”.
Chinese companies have also faced direct opposition to their investments in the US. Battery manufacturer Gotion received protests against its planned factory in Michigan, with residents worrying over “communist influences”. Microvast, a Texas-based battery manufacturer with a Chinese subsidiary, faced similar criticism from Republican lawmakers.
Ford’s use of battery technology from Chinese manufacturer CATL in its Michigan battery plant saw residents lodge concerns about the “plant’s effect on the environment”, as well as concerns about communist influence in the state.
‘California Effect’
Continued US-China climate cooperation is likely to hinge on the outcome of the upcoming presidential election.
Republican candidate and former president Donald Trump mentioned that he would establish at least a 60% tariff on all products imported from China.
(Joe Biden’s Democratic administration recently has announced a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs.)
“We have a possibility of a second Trump administration, [where] presumably bilateral climate talks with China would more or less cease, as they did during his first term,” Scott Moore, director of China programs and strategic initiatives at Penn Global, told Carbon Brief.
But California seems to have been able to avoid such disruption in the past. Despite the Trump administration pulling out of climate action, California maintained climate cooperation with China. The state is viewed as an alternate channel for climate dialogue.
Scott added:
“There is a term: the California Effect, which refers to the state’s emissions standards [being] set higher than the national average for several decades, [thereby] forcing car manufacturers and the federal government to adopt more stringent regulations because the state was such a big market that it wasn’t practical to make cars or set standards that applied just in California.”
Nevertheless, any state could be limited in the actions it could take to tackle emissions under a second Trump term.
As such, California-China subnational climate action is “not a substitute” for national-level cooperation, Scott added.
This Spotlight is by freelance climate journalist Alok Gupta for Carbon Brief.
Watch, read, listen
LIU’S LETTER: China’s climate envoy Liu Zhenmin wrote in the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily that “China and other developing countries hope that the US will…respect the law of the market and freedom of trade, and join hands with other countries…to address climate change”.
NDC TARGET: The Asia Society Policy Institute’s Lauri Myllyvirta in Dialogue Earth argued that, when China submits its 2035 climate targets next year, it should “commit to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of at least 30%” from their peak level, to remain aligned with the Paris Agreement.
BIGGER PICTURE: Speaking on the Redefining Energy podcast, the Lantau Group’s David Fishman summarised how China’s energy system and energy transition works.
CLIMATE FINANCE: Thinktank the Lowy Institute mapped China’s climate finance to the Pacific and Southeast Asia, finding that it averaged $1.2bn per year between 2015-2021, or 13% of all climate finance to the two regions.
Captured

China’s investment in clean energy is estimated to reach $676bn in 2024, or one-third of such investments worldwide, according to the IEA’s World Energy Investment 2024. This would account for 78.5% of China’s energy investment this year, with fossil fuel investment continuing to remain flat, at $185bn.
New science
Environmental Research Letters
A new study found that the fraction of short-duration extreme precipitation episodes that are compound events “preconditioned” by heatwaves (“CHEPs”) has risen by nearly a fifth between 1979-2021. It concluded: “As short-duration storms may trigger severe flash floods, ample attention should be paid to the escalating risks of CHEPs under climate change.”
Global and Planetary Change
New research quantified the contributions of China’s terrestrial carbon sinks to offsetting CO2 emissions between 2001 and 2060 under different “shared socioeconomic pathways”. It found that, under a low emissions scenario, approximately 50%-80% of China’s emissions could be offset by the terrestrial carbon sink by 2060, while, under high and very high emissions scenarios, only approximately 10% of emissions could be offset. The study “underscores the critical role of terrestrial carbon sink in achieving carbon neutrality in China”, the authors wrote.
China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 13 June: EU EV tariffs; Grid buildout; US-China subnational climate cooperation appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China Briefing 13 June: EU EV tariffs; Grid buildout; US-China subnational climate cooperation
Climate Change
Brazil confident new rainforest fund will reach $10bn donor milestone
Brazil’s environment minister says he is “very optimistic” that the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) – a new rainforest fund to channel private and public finance to developing nations – can meet a key $10 billion funding target this year, and is not at risk from his country’s elections next month.
The TFFF, launched by Brazil at COP30 in the Amazon last November and co-led by Norway, is intended as an alternative to traditional grant-based forest finance. The fund aims to raise $125bn in public and private capital, invest it in bond markets, and then pay countries that keep their forests standing from the annual returns. Donor contributions needed to get it going have tailed off after an initial burst.
Speaking to Climate Home News on the sidelines of Climate Week in New York, Brazilian environment minister João Paulo Capobianco pointed out that in less than a year since its official launch, the TFFF has already secured $7.3bn from governments.
“How many other initiatives can say that?” he asked. “Of course, if you have $7 billion, it’s easier for more countries to consider their own contribution. And not just countries – non-governmental organisations also. We are expecting even more support.”
As its initial target, the TFFF aims to raise $10bn in seed capital from governments by the end of 2026, and still needs to fill a gap of $2.7bn. Its backers say that for each dollar in public funding, they can secure $4 from the private sector. Critics say the $10bn goal barely covers the fund’s expenses and would not allow it to make any significant payments to forest countries.
Because setting up its financial architecture, raising the starting capital and making the first investments will take time, experts say the TFFF is unlikely to generate any payments for developing countries before 2028.
Seeking new pledges
Capobianco told Climate Home News that Brazil is still in talks with potential new contributors to the fund, among them China, Korea and Japan, and said he hoped to see more pledges announced at the upcoming biodiversity and climate COPs in October and November. The Netherlands is expected to up its first small contribution and Canada may also come in, according to other sources close to the TFFF.
Because the fund was not created as part of the UN climate talks and is hosted by the World Bank, developing countries can contribute without taking on wider donor responsibilities for climate finance. Brazil and Indonesia – both large emerging rainforest nations – have each pledged $1bn to the TFFF.
Earlier in September, the UK became the latest country to pledge funding – promising a loan of £400 million (about $540 million). Capobianco welcomed the contribution and noted that Britain has also said it will keep “under review” the possibility of putting in more.
Currently the largest donor is Norway, which announced a $3bn pledge last year at COP30 in Belém. However, that pledge came with conditions, among them that the fund must reach $10bn in sponsor capital by 2026, and that Norway’s contribution can’t make up more than 20% of that total. Over the longer term, this means the fund must raise $15bn from governments to unlock Norway’s full investment.
Comment: UK’s budget juggling trick with rainforest loan for bus-fare cap needs transparency
Speaking at a forest finance event in New York, Norway’s environment minister Sigrun Aasland said the country’s pledge was made not “only out of solidarity but because of shared interests”, adding that protecting rainforests is critical for climate and biodiversity goals as well as for national security.
“Tropical deforestation matters to people in the Amazon and in the Congo. But let’s not forget that it also matters to global food production and to the cost of living in Oslo or in London,” she said.
At the event, Guyana’s minister of natural resources Vickram Bharrat said the TFFF is “one in a menu of options” to finance forest protection in developing countries. He added that to boost its capital “maybe we should put some amount of pressure on oil companies to contribute to the fund”.
Upcoming election “not a risk”
Brazil, which has been pivotal to getting the fund off the ground, is now heading into a national election that could see the country swing back to an anti-climate stance if right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro beats current left-wing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Capobianco, however, said the election result does not pose a risk to the TFFF.
“It’s a global initiative, not a Brazilian initiative. We proposed the first idea, but nowadays it’s a global initiative,” he said. “We believe the investor countries and the tropical countries together have the possibility to continue this process.”
In Brazil, the first round of voting is scheduled for Sunday, October 4. If no candidate wins more than 50% of valid votes, a run-off ballot will take place on October 25.
COP30 roadmap to end deforestation will invite countries to draft domestic plans
In July, the TFFF board adopted a charter, which outlines the instrument’s objectives and values, including that 20% of the payments made to tropical countries will go directly to Indigenous people and local communities.
The charter also says the TFFF board may comprise up to 12 member countries during the initial phase. Currently, seven seats are filled by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Germany, Brazil, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Indonesia.
The board has also formally incorporated the Tropical Forest Investment Fund (TFIF) – the TFFF’s investment arm that will trade bonds in financial markets – hosted in Luxembourg.
The post Brazil confident new rainforest fund will reach $10bn donor milestone appeared first on Climate Home News.
Brazil confident new rainforest fund will reach $10bn donor milestone
Climate Change
COP31 must aim higher to cut emissions from the use of materials
Patrick Schröder is a senior research fellow at Chatham House’s Environment and Society Centre.
A climate summit serious about implementation cannot afford to leave major emissions reductions off the table. Yet, that is the risk COP31 faces unless it makes reducing raw material use central to the way countries decarbonise their economies.
On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York last week, COP31 host Türkiye laid out proposals to accelerate emissions cuts in the next decade. Its plans include global goals to increase the share of recycled products in material use to at least 15% (up from 6.9% in 2025) and halve waste generation by 2035.
COP31 offers an opportunity to connect efforts to improve material circularity with stronger national climate commitments and mitigation pathways. But these targets could be a lot more ambitious.
The case for circularity
The Paris Agreement cannot be delivered through cleaner electricity alone. We must also reduce the emissions that are embedded in the way we extract resources, manufacture products, build infrastructure and dispose of waste.
Circularity principles are pivotal to credible mitigation pathways: designing technologies and products to last, repairing and reusing them, and reducing demand for virgin resources.
The scale of the opportunity is striking. A recent European Environment Agency review found that adopting such principles could deliver average global emissions reductions potential of 52% in the waste sector against a business-as-usual scenario, 48% in construction and buildings, 28% in transport and mobility, 26% in industry and 24% in agriculture.
These figures make a compelling case for raising circularity ambitions across the economy, offering the promise of far more than better recycling bins.
In fact, recycling minerals used in cleantech equipment, for example, illustrate the extent of the emissions savings available. The carbon footprint of minerals and metals recovered from secondary sources is up to 80% lower than those produced from new mining and processing, according to the International Energy Agency.
A major EU-funded project estimates that recovered materials could substitute up to 56% of Europe’s primary critical raw material requirements by 2050, provided they achieve the necessary quality. The main takeaway goes beyond Europe: yesterday’s products can become tomorrow’s strategic resources while mitigating climate change.
In this light, a target to increase the share of recovered material use to 15% isn’t enough.
The evidence-based Circularity Gap Report found a 17% target by 2032 is possible and could unlock additional emissions reductions amounting to several gigatonnes of CO2.
Reducing material demand
A higher circularity metric is only part of the answer, however. An economy can increase its recycling rate at the same time as extracting more primary materials if total material demand keeps growing.
The tougher issue governments need to address is identifying what reductions in primary material use are needed.
The Circularity Gap Report uses an indicative benchmark of eight tonnes of virgin materials consumed per person annually. This is already being translated into policy: Germany’s 2024 circular economy strategy aims to reduce primary resource consumption, with the German Federal Environment Agency identifying six to eight tonnes per person as an ambitious target.

Reducing primary material demand will require a closer integration of energy and resource policies. Efficient EVs charged with solar power can complement better public transport and walkable cities, while batteries designed to be repaired and reused for stationary energy storage before being recycled will reduce the materials footprint of transport and clean energy services.
Coordinated infrastructure development and urban planning can prevent unnecessary overbuild, while renovating existing building stock reduces demand for new steel, cement and aluminium, which are emissions-intensive to produce. Connecting industrial waste heat to district heating networks can further reduce energy demand and emissions.
What governments should agree at COP31
COP31 can translate this approach into three concrete commitments.
First, governments should agree a stronger circularity ambition, supported by material-footprint indicators and milestones. The presidency should seek recognition of these priorities in negotiated outcomes, alongside concrete delivery partnerships under its COP31 Action Agenda.
Second, countries should include quantified circular economy measures in their updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and implementation plans. Such measures should include reuse, material efficiency and circularity targets, as well as transparent estimates of emissions savings that avoid double counting across sectors. By the end of 2025, countries had developed 101 national circular economy roadmaps and action plans, yet these often remained disconnected from their NDCs.
Third, climate finance should support the delivery of circular solutions such as material recovery at scale, investments into circular critical mineral value chains beyond mining, developing a circular plastics economy, and designing buildings and cities that support material reuse. Developing countries need technology, affordable finance and support to deliver these ambitions, including for the informal workers whose livelihoods depend on recovering and recycling materials.
The test for COP31 is to reach an agreement that can start the transformation of our production and consumption systems and how they are financed.
A headline circularity target will achieve little without policies that address absolute resource demand and deliver measurable emissions cuts. But COP31 offers an opportunity to make circularity a central element of climate policy, with targets strong enough to matter and institutions equipped to deliver them.
The post COP31 must aim higher to cut emissions from the use of materials appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP31 must aim higher to cut emissions from the use of materials
Climate Change
As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers
An exceptional El Niño is building. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) says it has intensified to very strong levels and is likely to last at least through February 2027. If its current trajectory holds, it could become stronger than anything seen since WMO monitoring began four decades ago.
That is bad news for agriculture. El Niño – a naturally occurring weather phenomenon – can scramble rainfall patterns across the world, bringing drought to some regions and floods to others. And this time it is unfolding against the backdrop of a significantly hotter climate, with farmers already contending with unreliable growing seasons, extreme heat and less predictable rainfall because of global warming.
El Niño expected to bring next record-hot year as soon as 2027
We are seeing the consequences already. In Sri Lanka, drought linked to El Niño has dried wells and reservoirs and cut into crops and farmer incomes. Indonesia is experiencing its worst wildfire season in 11 years, with prolonged drought and extreme heat exacerbated by El Niño. And in Peru, authorities are preparing for the opposite extreme: intense rains, flooding and landslides which the national civil-defence agency says could affect around 1.2 million people.
These impacts will multiply as El Niño intensifies.
And yet, just as the risks to food production are rising, the money available to help farmers withstand them is shrinking.
10% funding decline in 2024
A forthcoming analysis from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) shows that climate-related development finance for agrifood systems is moving in the wrong direction. In 2024, the latest year for which data is available, it fell by 10 percent compared with a 2 percent overall decline. The sectors that put food on our tables — crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries — received just 5 percent.
Yet this is precisely the moment when climate investment in agriculture needs to grow, not shrink. It can help communities adapt, build resilience and protect food security, while unlocking larger flows of public and private finance. Agriculture feeds us, supports the livelihoods of well over a billion people, and is often the first sector hit by drought, floods and extreme heat. Cutting that investment now is a false economy.
One failed harvest can plant the seed for the next crisis, forcing farmers to eat the seed they have saved for planting, sell livestock or tools, or take on debt. It can also deepen food insecurity, disrupt supply chains and drive up prices, showing up months later in supermarket aisles far away.
The Central American Dry Corridor, stretching through much of the region, shows both how exposed farmers are, and what investment can do. Based on an analysis of 41 years of satellite observations, FAO finds that some crop and pasture areas there face more than a 50 percent chance of agricultural drought over the coming months.
About half of Central America’s 1.9 million producers of maize, beans and other basic grains live in the Dry Corridor. Many grow food both for sale and for their own families. When a harvest fails, they lose both income and dinner.
El Salvador project conserves water and soil
In El Salvador, which lies within the Dry Corridor, more than 50,000 farmers have adopted practices to better withstand drought and increasingly unreliable rainfall through RECLIMA, a project financed by the Green Climate Fund and implemented by FAO in partnership with the government of El Salvador. It has substantial national co-financing, including from the country’s Environmental Investment Fund.
El Niño can intensify El Salvador’s annual mid-season dry spell, known as the canícula, turning it into a longer, harsher drought just as maize needs water most.


For María Cristina Corvera de López, a second-generation farmer in rural Nahualapa, adapting means changing how every drop of rain is captured and used. She plants trees alongside her crops to provide shade and minimise evaporation and uses simple irrigation channels and a homemade drip system to conserve water. Instead of burning stalks, leaves and husks after harvest, as generations before her did, she turns them into mulch to hold moisture in the soil.
“The effects of climate change are a constant challenge,” she says. But the new techniques have made her farm more resilient to El Niño as well. Where she once harvested about 50 bags of maize per acre, she now gets around 80, even during droughts. It’s enough to feed her family and sell the surplus.
Managing risk now cuts future costs
Together, these adaptations can mean the difference between losing a crop and getting through a dry season with enough food, seed and income to plant again. They are also the result of climate finance invested before disaster strikes.
RECLIMA shows what that kind of adaptation investment can buy. Adaptation accounted for 45 percent of climate-related development finance to agrifood systems in 2024, and multilateral development banks are directing more agricultural finance towards resilience. That shift reflects a growing recognition that adaptation is a form of risk management, not just a development cost.
We need much more of it. The same investments that help farmers withstand El Niño also enable them to adapt to a hotter, more unpredictable future. Cutting investment in the people who produce our food just as climate risks intensify does not save money. It simply pushes a much larger bill into the next harvest, the next food crisis, and the next El Niño.
The post As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers appeared first on Climate Home News.
As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers
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