The average UK winter has become around 1C warmer and 15% wetter over the past century, new Carbon Brief analysis shows.
The analysis covers more than 100 years of data on temperature, rainfall, wind speed and snow, to assess how UK winters have changed.
The data show that extremely warm and wet winters are becoming more common. Six of the 10 warmest winters on record were in the 21st century, and four of these also rank in the top 10 wettest years on record.
Despite the trend towards milder conditions, extreme cold snaps still hit the UK. The winter of 2009-10, for example, was dubbed the “Big Freeze of 2010” and clocked in as the UK’s least-windy, second-snowiest and eighth-coldest winter on record.
However, extreme cold periods are becoming less common. On average, the UK saw more than 12 snow days each winter in 1971-2000. This dropped to 9.5 snow days each winter by 1991-2020.
As the climate continues to warm, the UK can expect winters to continue getting warmer and wetter. Met Office projections suggest that, under an emissions pathway in line with current global policies, the average UK winter by 2080-99 will be 2C warmer and 11% wetter than they were in 1981-2000.
Warmer winters
The UK Met Office has been collecting meteorological data from thousands of weather stations across the UK since the 1880s. Using this data, it has produced a gridded dataset called HadUK, which provides complete coverage across the UK for a range of climate variables – including rainfall, temperature, snow days and wind speed – on a one-square-kilometre grid.
Carbon Brief has analysed the data for meteorological winters – defined as December, January and February – to determine how weather conditions have changed since records began.
The plot below shows a timeseries of annual winter average temperature (dark blue) over 1884-2021. These are shown as anomalies – that is, the difference compared to a baseline, which in this case is the average winter temperature over 1991-2020.
(Winters are shown on graphs in this article according to the year in which December falls. For example, the winter of December 2021 to February 2022 is shown as 2021.)
The Met Office, in line with the World Meteorological Organisation, uses 30-year averages to assess changes in UK climate. The table below shows average absolute UK winter temperatures for overlapping 30-year time periods across the full data record.
| Time period | Average temperature | Maximum temperature | Minimum temperature |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1881-1910 | 2.96* | 5.77* | 0.18* |
| 1891-1920 | 3.29 | 6.06 | 0.53 |
| 1901-1930 | 3.50 | 6.21 | 0.80 |
| 1911-1940 | 3.51 | 6.21 | 0.83 |
| 1921-1950 | 3.41 | 6.12 | 0.73 |
| 1931-1960 | 3.29 | 6.05 | 0.56 |
| 1941-1970 | 3.09 | 5.84 | 0.35 |
| 1951-1980 | 3.17 | 5.91 | 0.46 |
| 1961-1990 | 3.22 | 5.94 | 0.51 |
| 1971-2000 | 3.65 | 6.40 | 0.91 |
| 1981-2010 | 3.75 | 6.58 | 0.94 |
| 1991-2020 | 4.12 | 6.97 | 1.28 |
Average, maximum and minimum winter temperatures for overlapping 30-year time periods, from 1881 to 2020, using the December-February average of mean monthly temperatures. An asterisk (*) indicates that a full 30 years was not available for this average.
The average UK winter in 1991-2020 was 0.9C warmer than during 1961-90. The most recent 30-year period also includes the warmest maximum, minimum and average temperatures since Met Office records began.
In addition, with an average winter temperature of 4.64C, the most-recent decade (2013-22) – not shown in the table – has seen a further temperature increase of 0.52C above the 1991-2020 average.
Warmer winters are already impacting UK wildlife. For example, Grahame Madge – senior press officer for the Met Office – told the Guardian that animals including hedgehogs, bats and butterflies are emerging from hibernation too early:
“Abnormal warm spells during winter can encourage species out of hibernation. Butterflies such as red admirals and small tortoiseshells and other insects can be particularly challenged as they can emerge largely without access to life-saving food sources like nectar. If the warm spell is followed by a return to colder conditions, the hibernating individuals will have used up valuable energy reserves without being able to replace them, possibly with disastrous consequences.”
Meanwhile, the National Trust says warmer winters have “particularly devastating impacts for trees”, as cold snaps are often not long enough to kill off harmful diseases and pests.
Looking at individual years gives a more detailed picture. The graphic below shows the warmest and coldest 10 winters in the UK since 1884. The dark blue line shows average UK winter temperature, and red and blue dots indicate the warmest and coldest individual winters, respectively. The table below shows the dates and temperatures of these winters.
| Warmest winters | Coldest winters | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Years | Temperature (C) | Years | Temperature (C) | |
| 1 | 1988-99 | 5.76 | 1962-63 | -0.31 |
| 2 | 2006-07 | 5.53 | 1894-95 | 0.42 |
| 3 | 2015-16 | 5.43 | 1946-47 | 0.75 |
| 4 | 1997-98 | 5.40 | 1978-79 | 1.13 |
| 5 | 2019-20 | 5.28 | 1939-4 | 1.23 |
| 6 | 1974-75 | 5.22 | 1916-17 | 1.33 |
| 7 | 2021-22 | 5.20 | 1928-29 | 1.46 |
| 8 | 2013-14 | 5.19 | 2009-10 | 1.63 |
| 9 | 1934-35 | 5.13 | 1885-8 | 1.65 |
| 10 | 2018-19 | 5.09 | 1940-41 | 1.80 |
Warmest and coldest 10 winters in the UK since 1884. The dark blue line shows average UK winter temperature, and red and blue dots indicate the warmest and coldest individual winters. The table beneath shows the dates and temperatures of these winters. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.
The graph shows that six of the 10 warmest winters on record have occurred in the 21st century. Conversely, only one of the UK’s coldest 10 winters were in the 21st century – the winter of 2009-10.
The Met Office also provides country-level data for different parts of the UK. The plot below shows 10-year rolling average winter temperature for England (dark blue), Scotland (red), Northern Ireland (light blue) and Wales (yellow).
The plot shows that Scotland consistently sees the coldest winters, while England, Wales and Northern Ireland experience winter temperatures that are an average of around 1.5-2C warmer.
Snow days
As average temperatures rise across the UK, extremely cold days are becoming less common, while record-breaking warm days are becoming more frequent.
Five of the top 10 warmest days ever recorded during UK winters occurred during a single week February 2019.
Carbon Brief analysed the warmest maximum and coldest minimum temperature on record for each UK winter. The table below shows the years with the warmest (red) maximum daily temperatures and coldest (blue) minimum daily temperatures since 1960.
| Warmest maximum temperatures | Coldest minimum temperatures | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Temperature (C) | Year | Temperature (C) | Year | |
| 1 | 16.1 | 2018-19 | -10.2 | 1986-87 |
| 2 | 14.3 | 1997-98 | -10.1 | 1962-63 |
| 3 | 14.0 | 2015-16 | -10.0 | 1981-82 |
| 4 | 13.8 | 1989-90 | -9.9 | 1978-79 |
| 5 | 13.6 | 2003-04 | -9.5 | 1971-72 |
| 6 | 13.5 | 1985-86 | -9.3 | 2010-11 |
| 7 | 13.4 | 2011-12 | -9.1 | 1995-96 |
| 8 | 13.3 | 2016-17 | -8.9 | 1969-70 |
| 9 | 13.3 | 2021-22 | -8.7 | 2009-10 |
| 10 | 13.2 | 1994-95 | -8.7 | 1968-69 |
Years with the 10 warmest (red) maximum temperatures, and coldest (blue) minimum temperatures, based on individual winter days since 1960. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.
Most of the warmest winter extremes on record were in the 21st century. Meanwhile, most of the coldest extremes were in the 20th century.
One way of measuring the change in extreme cold days is to count the number of “frost days” – days with a minimum temperature below 0C – recorded throughout the winter. Another way is to count the number of “snow days”, when snow can be seen on the ground at 9am.
Dr Mark McCarthy is the head of the Met Office National Climate Information Centre, which manages the UK’s climate records. He explains that to calculate snow days, an individual looks at a “representative patch of ground” at 9am in the morning, and if at least half of it is covered in snow, then it is counted as “snowy”.
These results are averaged across hundreds or thousands of observations. This means that, for example, “an average of five days of snow might mean that half of that region had 10 days and half the region had no days”, he explains.
The plot below shows the number of frost days since 1960 (red) and snow days since 1971 (blue) over winter. The black lines show the 10-year running average.
The table below shows the total number of first and snow days during UK winters for four overlapping 30-year time periods.
| Time period | Frost days | Snow days |
|---|---|---|
| 1961-1990 | 38.43 | – |
| 1971-2000 | 35.07 | 12.29 |
| 1981-2010 | 35.17 | 11.73 |
| 1991-2020 | 32.75 | 9.54 |
Total number of frost and snow days for 30-year time periods, from 1931 to 2020, using the December-February average of mean monthly temperatures. An asterisk (*) indicates that a full 30 years was not available for this average.
The plot shows that air frost and snow days are closely linked. Snow will generally not form if the ground temperature is above 5C, and in the UK, the heaviest snowfalls tend to occur when the air temperature is between 0C and 2C.
On average, the UK saw 12.3 snow days each winter over 1971-2000. This dropped to 9.5 snow days each winter by 1991-2020.
There is also regional variation in snow days. Over the entire 1971-2020 dataset, Scotland received 18.6 days of snow per winter on average, while the UK, Northern Ireland and Wales received between 7.2 and 8.8.
“Significant and widespread lying snow might have been considered fairly typical for a UK winter of several decades ago,” says the Met Office’s latest State of the UK climate report. However, it adds that “this type of event has become increasingly unusual in a warming climate over the last two or three decades”.
The graph below shows the UK winters with the greatest (light blue dots) and smallest (red dots) number of snow days since 1971.
| Snowiest winters | Least snowy winters | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Years | Snow days | Years | Snow days | |
| 1 | 1978-79 | 35.62 | 2019-20 | 2.12 |
| 2 | 2009-10 | 30.59 | 1991-92 | 2.39 |
| 3 | 1981-82 | 26.90 | 2007-08 | 2.97 |
| 4 | 1985-86 | 23.69 | 1988-89 | 3.15 |
| 5 | 2010-11 | 23.13 | 2021-22 | 3.35 |
| 6 | 1984-85 | 21.54 | 1997-98 | 3.45 |
| 7 | 1976-77 | 20.77 | 2013-14 | 3.49 |
| 8 | 1977-78 | 18.54 | 2016-17 | 3.57 |
| 9 | 1995-96 | 18.43 | 2005-06 | 3.72 |
| 10 | 1990-91 | 18.13 | 1974-75 | 3.90 |
Snowiest and least snowy 10 winters in the UK since 1884. The dark blue line shows seasonal “snow days”, and red and blue dots indicate the snowiest and least snowy individual winters. The table beneath shows the dates and number of snow days of these winters. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.
While the climate is becoming milder and snow is becoming less common, very cold and snowy winters can still happen. For example, the winter of 2009-10, dubbed the “Big Freeze of 2010” in parts of the UK media, was the least-windy, second-snowiest and eighth-coldest winter on record in the UK.
Severe snowfall that winter caused “very significant disruption across the UK”, according to the UK Met Office, which adds that “transport was particularly badly affected with snowfalls causing numerous road closures, and train and flight cancellations”.
On 18 December 2009, five Eurostar trains got stuck in the Channel Tunnel after cold temperatures caused electrical failures, trapping 2,000 people for 16 hours. All Eurostar services were cancelled for the next three days.
In January that winter, BBC News reported that “heavy snow and freezing temperatures has caused chaos across Scotland over the past three weeks, with hundreds of schools closed and motorists facing hazardous conditions on the roads”.
Research from the UK Met Office indicates that the odds of the UK having a winter as cold as the one in 2009-10 will drop to less than 1% by the end of the century as global temperatures continue to rise.
Wetter winters
The total volume of rainfall recorded during UK winters is also rising. The plot below shows total winter rainfall in mm over 1836-2021 (blue) and the 10-year rolling average (black).
The table below shows average UK winter rainfall totals for a series of overlapping 30-year time periods across the full data record.
| 30-year period | Average annual winter rainfall (mm) |
|---|---|
| 1831-1860 | 254.69* |
| 1841-1870 | 276.00 |
| 1851-1880 | 284.28 |
| 1861-1890 | 287.46 |
| 1871-1900 | 281.51 |
| 1881-1910 | 279.06 |
| 1891-1920 | 300.55 |
| 1901-1930 | 311.07 |
| 1911-1940 | 314.51 |
| 1921-1950 | 305.00 |
| 1931-1960 | 298.76 |
| 1941-1970 | 290.82 |
| 1951-1980 | 293.23 |
| 1961-1990 | 301.82 |
| 1971-2000 | 329.22 |
| 1981-2010 | 330.01 |
| 1991-2020 | 346.98 |
Average winter rainfall over overlapping 30-year time periods, from 1831 to 2020, using the December-February average of mean monthly temperatures. An asterisk (*) indicates that a full 30 years was not available.
Between 1961-90 and 1990-2020, the UK winters became 15% wetter on average – increasing from around 300mm of rainfall to almost 350mm. The more recent decade of 2012-21 – not shown in the table – has seen further increases, with average winter rainfall of 380mm.
The Met Office also provides country-level rainfall data. The plot below shows 10-year rolling average winter temperature for England (dark blue), Scotland (red), Northern Ireland (light blue) and Wales (yellow).
The graph shows that rainfall is increasing across all four regions of the UK, but remains consistently the lowest in England and the highest in Scotland and Wales.
Looking at the wettest and driest years across the UK shows that individual rainfall extremes are becoming more common. In a ranking going back to 1884, seven of the driest years were in the 19th century, while three were in the 20th. None of the driest years on record have been in the 21st century.
Meanwhile, four of the rainiest winters have been in the 21st century. The graph below shows the wettest (blue dots) and driest (red dots) winters since 1884.
| Rainiest winters (mm) | Least rainy winters (mm) | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Years | Winter rainfall | Years | Winter rainfall | |
| 1 | 2013-14 | 540.3 | 1963-64 | 121.3 |
| 2 | 2015-16 | 505.7 | 1890-91 | 141.4 |
| 3 | 1994-95 | 498.2 | 1844-45 | 164.6 |
| 4 | 1989-90 | 482.2 | 1933-34 | 170.4 |
| 5 | 2019-20 | 474.5 | 1846-47 | 171.3 |
| 6 | 1876-77 | 458.0 | 1962-63 | 171.5 |
| 7 | 1914-15 | 450.7 | 1857-58 | 176.6 |
| 8 | 1868-69 | 439.6 | 1840-41 | 179.6 |
| 9 | 2006-07 | 435.8 | 1937-38 | 186.9 |
| 10 | 1993-94 | 431.4 | 1854-55 | 189.1 |
Wettest and driest 10 winters in the UK since 1884. The dark blue line shows total winter rainfall, and blue and red dots indicate the driest and wettest snowy individual winters. The grey dashed lines the volume of rainfall recorded during the rainiest and least rainy winters on record. The table beneath shows the dates and total rainfall in mm of these winters. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.
The fact that UK winters are getting wetter makes sense, McCarthy tells Carbon Brief, because as the atmosphere heats up, it is able to hold more moisture, which can then fall as rain. According to the Clausius-Clapeyron equation, the air can generally hold around 7% more moisture for every 1C of temperature rise.
However, he adds that the observed trend in UK winter rainfall is “somewhat larger than can be explained purely through the thermodynamic process”, and explains that natural variability is also very important when discussing changes in UK winter rainfall.
“We’re in a particularly wet regime at the moment,” McCarthy explains, “so we are seeing lots of winter rainfall records and wetter winters, but it’s the combination of variability and climate change”.
For example, December 2015 topped the charts as the UK’s wettest month on record, after Storm Desmond swept across the UK, bringing very heavy rainfall and gale-force winds to much of northern England, southern Scotland and Ireland. The resulting floods left many homes inundated and at least 60,000 without power.
The winter of 2015-16 was also the third warmest on record. Preliminary analysis conducted at the time suggested that the exceptional rainfall totals were 40% more likely because of rising global temperatures.
The jet stream
The graph below shows the relationship between temperature and rainfall, where warm and wet winters are shown in the top right, while cool and dry winters are in the bottom left. Darker dots indicate more recent years.
The UK’s winter weather regime is strongly linked to the strength of the jet stream. This thin, fast flowing ribbon of air in the troposphere – the lowest layer of the earth’s atmosphere – acts to steer weather systems towards the UK.
A strong jet stream brings warm and damp winds to the UK from the west, resulting in a warm and wet winter.
For example, the winter of 2023-24 has already been dominated by a series of storms. Storm Jocelyn, which swept across the UK at the end of January 2024, was the 10th named storm of the season. “The storms have mainly been driven by a powerful jet stream,” BBC News reported.
Similarly, during the winter of 2013-14, a series of storms brought record-breaking rainfall to the UK, clocking in as the wettest and eighth-warmest winter on record in the UK. Intense rainfall led to “remarkably widespread and persistent flooding”, according to the Met Office. Around 18,700 insurance claims related to flooding were filed across the UK in the aftermath of the storms, costing an estimated £451m.
One study suggests that climate change made the sustained wet and stormy weather seen around 43% more likely, and put an extra 1,000 houses at risk of flooding along the River Thames.
The study attributes about two-thirds of the increase in likelihood to the atmosphere being able to hold more moisture because the world is warming up and the remaining third to the position of the jet stream.
Conversely, a weak jet stream allows cold air from the Arctic and mainland Europe to enter from the east and north. “A slower, more buckled jet stream can cause areas of higher pressure to take charge, which typically brings less stormy weather, light winds and dry skies,” the Met Office says.
This was the case in the winter of 2009-10, which clocked in as the eighth-coldest and least-windy UK winter on record.
Sometimes, the jet stream can even get “stuck” – a phenomenon called blocking – and instead of shunting weather systems from west to east, it can allow a spell of cold, dry weather to sit over the UK for many days.
While there is a clear trend of UK winters getting warmer and wetter, the data on wind speed is less clear-cut. However, cool weather in the UK is often associated with low speeds, while warm weather is often brought by strong gusts.
The plot below shows average UK winter wind speed over 1969-2021 in knots. The darker line shows the 10-year rolling average, and the most and least windy years are shown by red and blue dots, respectively.
| Windiest winters | Least windy winters | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Years | Average windspeed (knots) | Years | Average windspeed (knots) | |
| 1 | 1973-74 | 13.08 | 2009-10 | 7.90 |
| 2 | 1989-90 | 12.77 | 2010-11 | 8.62 |
| 3 | 1974-75 | 12.72 | 2005-06 | 8.81 |
| 4 | 1994-95 | 12.71 | 2008-09 | 9.03 |
| 5 | 2013-14 | 12.47 | 1984-85 | 9.04 |
| 6 | 1982-83 | 12.41 | 1976-77 | 9.31 |
| 7 | 1980-81 | 12.24 | 2018-19 | 9.32 |
| 8 | 1999-2000 | 12.11 | 2000-01 | 9.54 |
| 9 | 1988-89 | 12.11 | 1986-87 | 9.59 |
| 10 | 2019-20 | 12.08 | 2016-17 | 9.68 |
Windiest and least windy 10 winters in the UK since 1969. The dark blue line shows winter average wind speed, and red and blue dots indicate the windiest and least windy individual winters. The grey dashed lines the average wind speed during the windiest and least windy winters on record. The table beneath shows the dates and wind speeds of these winters. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.
The table below shows average UK wind speed totals for three overlapping 30-year time periods.
| 30-year averages | Average wind speed (knots) |
|---|---|
| 1971-2000 | 11.06 |
| 1981-2010 | 10.60 |
| 1991-2020 | 10.55 |
Average winter wind speed for overlapping 30-year time periods, from 1971 to 2020, using the December-February average of mean monthly temperatures.
McCarthy tells Carbon Brief that there has been a notable decline in UK wind speed when looking at annual data, which is consistent with the trend of “stilling” – a slowdown in near surface wind speeds – measured globally. However, he says that this trend is less obvious in the winter-only data.
Meanwhile, the UK State of the Climate report 2022 states that there are no compelling trends in storminess when considering maximum gust speeds over the last four decades.
A range of other atmospheric circulation patterns can also impact UK winters.
The North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) is a large-scale atmospheric pressure see-saw in the North Atlantic region, which describes the difference in air pressure between the high pressure sitting over the Azores, to the west of Portugal, and the low pressure over Iceland.
When the NAO is “positive” and the pressure difference is stronger than usual, the jet stream shifts towards the poles, bringing mild, wet and windy weather to North American and Eurasian winters and leaving the Arctic very cold.
When it is “negative” and the pressure difference weakens, storm tracks shift towards the equator, bringing cold, dry and calm winters to Europe.
Another mechanism is the “stratospheric polar vortex”. This low-pressure weather system sits around 50km above the Arctic in the stratosphere – the layer of the atmosphere above the troposphere. Its main feature is the strong west-to-east winds which encircle the north pole. These winds are known as the “polar night jet” because they only appear during the dark Arctic winter.
As with the jet stream in the troposphere, the polar night jet forms a boundary between the very cold Arctic air and the warmer air over the mid-latitudes. However, if something disrupts the stratospheric polar vortex it can weaken, reverse direction and even split into two. This can trigger a “sudden stratospheric warming” event where air collapses in over the Arctic, causing a spike in temperatures in the stratosphere – by as much as 50C in just a couple of days.
This allows the cold air the polar vortex was holding in to spill out into the mid-latitudes during the weeks that follow. This is what caused the “Beast from the East” snowstorm that hit the UK in 2018. (This is not well reflected in the UK winter data, as the brunt of the storm hit in March 2018 after the end of meteorological winter.)
In general, however, the UK has experienced a run of mild, wet winters in the most recent decade, including the very wet winters of 2013, 2015 and 2019. These are consistent with a positive phase of the NAO and strong polar vortex, according to the latest State of the UK Climate report.
Projections
As the planet continues to warm, the UK’s climate will shift “towards warmer, wetter winters and hotter, drier summers”, the Met Office says.
The UK Climate Projections 2018 (UKCP18) is a series of climate change projections for the UK produced by the UK Met Office, taking advantage of the latest observed data and climate models
The projections include temperature and rainfall changes – for averages and extremes – for each month and season of the year, and for different emissions scenarios and future time periods throughout this century.
The maps below show the probabilistic projections for summer average temperature (top) and winter precipitation (bottom) in the 2080s under the RCP4.5 emissions pathway, relative to a 1961-90 baseline. In this pathway, global temperatures are projected to rise by around 2.7C of warming above pre-industrial levels by 2081-2100, which is broadly in line with the trajectory under current global policies.
The three percentiles (10th, 50th and 90th) reflect the likelihood of those temperatures and rainfall anomalies occurring. The 50th percentile (middle maps) is the “central estimate” across the models, while the 10th (left) and 90th (right) percentiles reflect the lowest 10% and highest 10% of the model results.
The table below shows UKCP18 projections for changes in average UK winter temperature and precipitation under RCP4.5, under the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile, for 2080-99, compared to a 1981-2000 baseline.
| 10th percentile change | 50th percentile change | 90th percentile change | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Change in average winter temperature (C) | +0.7 | +2.0 | +3.5 |
| Change in average winter precipitation (%) | -2.0 | +11.0 | +25.0 |
Source: UKCP18 Key results spreadsheet
As a central estimate, these projections suggest that by 2080-99, UK winters will be 2C warmer and 11% wetter than they were in 1981-2000.
However, the picture is more complex for wind speed. The Met Office explains that storms in the UK are influenced by factors including sea surface temperatures, Arctic sea ice melt and the jet stream.
It says that “under climate change some of these influences will strengthen storms and others weaken them, as well as potentially change the parts of the world that storms affect”.
It adds:
“UKCP18 projected an increase in near surface wind speeds over the UK for the second half of the 21st century for the winter season when more significant impacts of wind are experienced. However, the increase in wind speeds is modest compared to natural variability from month to month and season to season, so confidence is low.”
The post Analysis: How UK winters are getting warmer and wetter appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate Change
Coal mine approval as Albanese meets Pacific leaders undermines Pacific partnership, as UN warns of 1.5C overshoot
SYDNEY, Thursday 3 September 2026 — Greenpeace Australia Pacific has branded the Albanese government’s approval of BHP’s coal mine extension in Central Queensland an affront to Pacific leaders and communities grappling with climate disasters, and a reckless move that undermines Australia’s partnership with the Pacific as the PM meets regional leaders at the Pacific Islands Forum.
The approval of BHP’s coal Saraji Mine Grevillea Pit Continuation Project, an extension of one of Australia’s largest coal mines, would allow mining to continue for another 30 years, locking in the production and export of polluting coal and fuelling dangerous extreme weather disasters and sea level rise in Australia and across the Pacific. It will be the 10th fossil fuel project approved during this term of government and the 37th new fossil fuel project approved since the Albanese government was elected in 2022.
The announcement comes as a UN report warns of dangerous climate overshoot, and just two months before Federal Climate and Energy Minister Chris Bowen is due to take the reins of UN climate negotiations at COP31 — a moment that will test the government’s climate credibility and bring global attention to Australia’s fossil fuel exports. It also comes as fracked gas from the Beetaloo Basin climate bomb started flowing.
Speaking from Palau, Dr Simon Bradshaw, COP31 Lead at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “It is deeply insincere for Prime Minister Albanese to meet Pacific leaders here in Palau to discuss security, the energy crisis, and regional threats, while his government fast-tracks the biggest security threat to the Pacific, the climate crisis.
“As leaders meet, thousands remain missing or dead in the Nepal-Tibet floods. Parts of Australia are bracing for a heatwave that will see temperatures approach 40 degrees, just days out of winter, and a new report finds 2,000 kilometres of coral reefs along the WA coast experienced the worst coral bleaching on record.
“We are witnessing dangerous climate change driven by the production, export and burning of fossil fuels, wreaking havoc across the world. Continuing down the path of fossil fuels and approving new coal is an act of recklessness at a pivotal moment in the world’s energy transition and response to the climate crisis. Communities must not pay the price for fossil fuel greed.
“No more double talk. Australia must get squarely behind longstanding Pacific leadership on climate change, fight to protect the all-important goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C, and ensure that COP31 builds further momentum in the global transition away from fossil fuels.
“A pathway back to 1.5°C is possible. The Pacific Pre-COP and COP31 in Türkiye are critical moments for Australia to work with Pacific leaders to better align energy, climate and trade policies towards a prosperous shared future beyond fossil fuels.”
-ENDS-
Media contact
Kate O’Callaghan on 0406 231 892 or kate.ocallaghan@greenpeace.org
China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the second quarter of 2026, as oil consumption plummeted amid the strait of Hormuz crisis.
The country’s use of oil fell by 9% overall and by 16% for transport, after the disruptions to supply from the Gulf through the strait.
This guest post is by:
Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air
China’s total CO2 emissions fell despite a continued rebound in coal-fired power generation.
This is the first time that reductions in oil consumption have been responsible for a fall in CO2 emissions overall – in all previous cases, coal consumption has been the main driver.
Other key findings for the second quarter of 2026 include:
- Electric vehicles (EVs) and public transport have become key factors in China’s oil demand, enabling transportation levels to increase even as fuel use fell sharply.
- The effect of EVs on oil consumption was almost twice as large as would be expected based on the increase in the number of EVs on the road alone, as the usage of existing EVs surged.
- Oil consumption displaced by EVs in China in the first half of 2026 exceeded the UK’s total oil consumption over a six-month period.
- These structural factors are not sufficient to account for the size of the fall in oil consumption, leaving behaviour changes as the other explanation.
- “Curtailment” of solar and wind output caused coal power to rise, despite strong hydro output, solar and wind capacity growth, as well as slower demand growth.
- Major increases in coal-power capacity and a power market that continues to favour coal limited the amount of coal generation displaced by new wind and solar capacity.
- Defying expectations of a boom, annual growth in coal use for chemicals production slowed down to 8%, from 15% in 2025 and 19% in the first quarter.
The second quarter of 2026 was a busy time for China’s government planners, with numerous energy-related five-year plan documents being released.
These plans list new measures to address solar and wind curtailment, as well as signalling a higher bar for the approval of new coal-power plants, but add few new quantitative targets.
After a 2% increase in the first quarter of 2026 and a 1% decline in the second, emissions are up marginally across the first half of the year, but they remain below their peak in 2023-24.
In addition, China is on track to add enough wind, solar, nuclear and hydropower this year to cover electricity demand growth, despite a slowdown in new capacity.
Given the structural pressures on oil demand, continued declines in real-estate construction and slower growth for coal-chemicals, China’s emissions could still fall this year. The emission trend remains a race between energy demand growth and clean-energy growth, both of which have slowed down this year.
Emissions still flat
There has now been a plateau in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement for more than two years, following a peak in March 2024.
Previous analysis for Carbon Brief described this as a “flat or falling” trend, which extended until the end of 2025. There was then a 2% increase in emissions year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026, resulting from a rise in the amount of “wasted” wind and solar power.
The latest analysis shows that this was followed by another decline in the second quarter of this year, when China’s emissions fell by 1%, as shown in the figure below.
For further details see: About the data.
Notably, China’s emissions fell in the second quarter despite an increase in coal use. For the first time ever, a drop in oil use was sufficient to drive a decline in emissions overall.
Oil use plummeted while coal grew
Within the overall 1% decline in China’s emissions in the second quarter of 2026, there were divergent trends when looking sector by sector and fuel by fuel.
The largest fall in CO2 emissions came from the consumption of petrol, diesel and jet fuel, with oil consumption in industry also falling, as shown in the figure below.
For further details see: About the data.
Crude oil processing volumes fell 11% in the second quarter, but some of the fall was absorbed by drawing down oil product inventories, with Sinopec sales down 9%.
In total, China cut back oil imports by 32% in the second quarter. The million–barrel question has been how much of this was enabled by genuine reductions in oil consumption and how much by the drawdown of the country’s vast oil stockpile.
Energy mix numbers reported by the National Bureau of Statistics indicate that oil consumption fell by 3% in the first half of the year and around 9% in the second quarter. This shows that reduced consumption played a substantial role, while still leaving 60% of the fall in imports to be covered by the swing from building stockpiles to using them.
The sector with the largest increase in emissions during the second quarter of the year was power, where coal use grew 2.4% while gas-fired generation fell 1.2%. This was despite strong growth in wind and solar capacity over the preceding year, a significant rebound in hydropower generation, a small increase in nuclear power output and a slowdown in electricity consumption growth.
The explanation for the rise in emissions was – similar to the first quarter of 2026 – an increased amount of solar and wind generation being “wasted” due to the power market and grid not being adapted to increasing shares of variable renewable generation.
In other sectors, there was a fall in cement production, driven by falling construction volumes, which accelerated to 9% in the second quarter, from 8% in the first quarter. Crude steel output fell by 1% and pig-iron production by 3% in the second quarter.
Growth of coal use for chemical production slowed down in the second quarter, both compared with the previous quarter and the last year.
The rate of utilisation of installed coal processing capacity was already high before the current oil shock, so there was no headroom for production to increase even though rising oil prices made coal-chemicals more profitable. Oil-based chemical production also kept growing, with ethylene output up 17% and primary plastics production flat.
Coal use for heating continued to increase, with the sector’s coal consumption in the second quarter dominated by industrial heat, as there is little need for space heating at this time of year. Growth has continued despite the prominent drive for “zero-carbon industrial parks”, demonstrating the importance of the initiative for tackling industrial coal use.
What drove the fall in oil consumption?
The dramatic fall in China’s demand for oil imports during the Hormuz crisis has been widely hailed as the most important price stabilising factor for the global oil market.
To understand the implications for China’s oil consumption and CO2 emissions going forward, it is important to unpack what enabled this reduction in imports.
A significant contribution comes from ongoing, structural reductions in transport oil demand driven by electrification. Sinopec had forecast 6% and 5% drops in diesel and petrol consumption this year, respectively, already before the start of the war on Iran. Actual sales fell 9% in the first half of the year.
Transportation levels show a slowdown in growth, but no outright decline. Cross-regional passenger trips were 0.1% higher year-on-year in the second quarter, while urban passenger trips were 2.9% higher. Commercial freight tonnage increased 2.4%.
The exception is air travel, where passenger numbers fell 7% in May-June, after 7% growth in the first quarter. However, this sector plays a minor role in overall transport oil consumption in China.
The stable or growing transportation levels show that the shift to electric vehicles, rail, public transport and other clean transportation, rather than a fall in mobility, played the key role in reducing oil consumption.
The rise in fuel prices that accompanied the Hormuz crisis only accelerated the structural shifts in transportation that were already underway.
Electric heavy-truck sales rose about 77% in the second quarter, year-on-year, with June sales more than doubling and the market share of electric trucks exceeding 45% of all new sales.
The total number of EVs on the road at the end of the quarter grew 33% year-on-year. Some 12.1m EVs were added, of which 8.1m were electric-only battery EVs.
EV usage saw even more of a shift. Charging volumes increased 60% in the second quarter, indicating that EVs already on the road were utilised much more than before, at the expense of petrol and diesel vehicles, with plug-in hybrid drivers likely favouring electricity over fuel.
One factor enabling EV utilisation to grow was the increased use of electric taxis. Intense competition in the sector has pushed prices down at the same time as the use of private petrol vehicles has become more expensive.
Stronger subway and rail use also made a contribution. Rail-passenger traffic increased 5% in the first half of the year.
The fall in diesel demand has been particularly pronounced in the construction and mining sectors. The heavy machinery in the sectors is well-suited for electrification, in addition to which construction levels are also falling.
Based on reported growth in charging volumes, EVs helped avoid an estimated 19m tonnes of oil consumption (Mtoe) in the second quarter, up 50% year-on-year.
This took the total amount of oil displaced by EVs to 36 Mtoe in the first half of the year, as shown in the figure below, well exceeding, say, the total oil consumption of the UK over six months. Notably, trucks are the fastest-growing source of oil displacement, with avoided fuel use up 90% year-on-year in the first half of 2026.
For further details see: About the data.
The increase in avoided oil consumption due to EVs is equal to 4.5% of China’s oil imports in the same period in 2025. If EV sales and charging volumes continue their growth at the same rates in the second half of the year, avoided oil consumption will reach 80 mn tonnes, equal to the consumption of Mexico.
Estimated emissions avoided are 35 MtCO2, or 1.3% of China’s total CO2 emissions in the second quarter, after taking into account emissions from power generation for vehicle charging.
While the amount of oil displaced by the shift to EVs is significant – and is rising fast – the year-on-year increase in displaced oil still only accounts for a third of the drop in China’s oil consumption in the first half of the year, with the fall in consumption only accounting for half of the drop in imports. The remaining reduction is due to the shift from building to drawing down stockpiles, slower growth in chemical industry output, as well as behavioral adaptations by consumers and operational adaptations by businesses.
Coal power continued to rise despite clean-capacity growth
China saw record increases in solar and wind capacity over the past year. In addition, hydropower generation increased 9% in the second quarter of the year, compared with the same period in 2025, and there was a small 2% increase in nuclear-power output.
At the same time, the rate of power demand growth slowed down from 5.9% in the second quarter of 2025 to 5.2% in the same period in 2026.
Yet, power-sector emissions increased 3.0% in the first half of 2026, after falling 3.2% in the first half of 2025. Power generation from fossil fuels rose because of an increase in the amount of potential solar and wind generation that was wasted, as well as exceptionally poor wind conditions. Without those factors, coal-fired power generation and power-sector emissions would also have fallen in 2026.
Wind-power capacity has continued strong growth in 2026, with capacity additions in both the first and the second quarter of the year comfortably exceeding those in any year other than the record-setting 2025.
Solar power additions have slowed sharply from the rates seen in 2025, even falling behind 2024. Yet, they are in line with 2023, when more than 200 gigawatts (GW) was added by year-end.
Nuclear power development continues at pace, with eight new reactors approved in July and five reactors with 4.5GW total capacity expected to enter commercial operation this year. This includes China’s second commercial small modular reactor, Linglong One, with new policies paving the way for further development.
Reactor commissioning will pick up further next year: the government has approved 10 new reactor projects every year since 2022 and those projects will begin to come online. Meanwhile, 3GW of conventional hydropower was added, with a total of 6GW of projects targeting operation in 2026.
Taken together, this clean-energy growth puts China on track to add enough non-fossil generating capacity in 2026 to cover electricity demand growth of up to 5%, despite the slowdown in solar.
Power demand grew 5.3% in the first six months of 2026 and the energy regulator projects 5-6% for the whole year. This means that the increase in power-sector emissions seen in the first half would be reversed, once the obstacles to solar and wind sending their output to the grid are addressed – and once wind conditions revert to average levels.
Moreover, total energy demand growth has slowed down much more sharply than electricity demand, making it more feasible for clean-power generation growth to significantly exceed the increase in total energy consumption and to drive down fossil-fuel consumption.
For further details see: About the data.
The key reason for solar and wind curtailment in China is that neither the power-grid operating model nor the electricity market model require – or encourage – the flexible operation of coal-power plants, hydropower plants and inter-provincial transmission lines.
This situation has been exacerbated by a wave of new coal-power plants entering operation, with newly added capacity reaching 30GW in the first half of 2026, the highest level since 2016. Another 25GW started construction, while less than 3GW was retired.
The electricity prices paid to coal-fired generators are fixed months in advance, as are the volumes of electricity that will be transmitted through long-distance power lines.
This removes the incentive for plants to adjust their output in response to conditions. This could include variations in solar and wind supply, or changes in power demand.
As a result, there is limited ability for the grid to absorb variable renewable power. Furthermore, coal plants are entitled to “capacity payments”, which require them to be available to generate, but do not reward them for operating flexibly.
One solution to integrate more solar and wind into the grid is increasing energy storage capacity. Battery storage capacity continued to grow, with 17GW added in the first half of 2026, bringing total installed capacity to 153GW. This represents a slowdown in storage additions, however, down from 23GW in the first half of 2025.
Outlook for China’s CO2 emissions
The key developments affecting the outlook for China’s emissions in the second quarter include the effects of the Hormuz oil-and-gas crisis, the release of a long list of sectoral five-year plans and a slowdown in energy consumption growth.
The rise in oil prices has caused a stronger shift in China’s transportation sector than anyone anticipated, with EV deployment and use accelerating from an already high base. This trend is unlikely to be reversed. It has also proven the value of electrification to China’s energy security strategy.
The government is targeting a slight acceleration in the pace of electrification, aiming for electricity to make up 35% of energy end-use by 2030, up from 30% in 2025. This is a larger increase than achieved over the past five years, when the share of electricity rose from 26.5% in 2020 to 30% by 2025. The transportation sector plays a significant role in this, with a target for EVs to make up 30% of the vehicle fleet, up from 12% in 2025, and 25% of commercial vehicles.
Electrification both reduces emissions immediately and sets different sectors up for deep decarbonisation as electricity is much easier to produce without CO2 emissions than fuels. Faster transport sector electrification lowers the outlook for oil demand, increases the role of the sector in peaking and reducing emissions, plus means that more of China’s clean energy growth ends up displacing oil.
While transport emissions fell, power-sector emissions continued to rebound for the second quarter in a row. The increased coal-fired power generation and emissions can be attributed to increased solar and wind curtailment. Curtailment has emerged as the key obstacle to both continued rapid solar and wind capacity growth and full utilisation of existing capacity.
Several sectoral five-year plans published in recent months have laid out measures to improve solar and wind utilisation.
Long-distance transmission will continue to expand, helping to move wind and solar generation from remote “energy bases” to centres of demand. There is also a growing emphasis on local consumption of clean power. The power sector five-year plan, published in August, promotes direct purchases of clean electricity, smart microgrids, zero-carbon industrial parks and closer coordination between renewable resources and AI computing infrastructure
Yet the same plan further loosened the limits on the amount of wind and solar that can be curtailed.
The limit for curtailment was 5%, until it was relaxed to 10% in 2024 in provinces with good wind and solar resources. The new plan allows the limit to be increased further to 15% for some provinces, while keeping it at 5% and 10% for others.
Looking at the 2025 data on reported curtailment, very few provinces had higher rates than 15% – only Tibet for wind and Qinghai and Tibet for solar.
Unless the most lenient limit is only applied to those two provinces, it means the plan would allow for higher levels of curtailment.
This is also true of the national average target of “around” 10% curtailment, given reported rates in 2025 were 94% and 95% for wind and solar, respectively.
Notably, monthly data on curtailment has not been published in recent months, raising the possibility that the indicator is being revised. Reported data has understated actual curtailment by a wide margin, compared to implied curtailment.
If the curtailment indicator is revised, such that it captures more of the actual curtailment, then this could make the headline targets stronger than they appear, in comparison to previously reported numbers.
The new five-year plans also lowered the overall level of ambition on coal use. Chinese president Xi Jinping announced in 2021 that China would “gradually reduce coal consumption during the 15th five-year period”, covering 2026-30. However, the target now is for coal consumption to “enter a plateau” during those five years.
The five-year plans call for “reasonably controlling coal-power capacity and generation”, signaling a higher bar for the approval for new coal-power projects, after the government’s active promotion of new coal power in recent years. This could also imply more retirements of older coal plants. However, there is 204GW of coal-power capacity under construction, even after the wave of new coal-power plants starting operation in 2025 and in the first half of 2026, making the implementation of the “reasonable control” more challenging.
It is the first time that the government has vowed to control “coal-power generation” and not just “generation growth”, as the energy regulator did in 2021, but the significance of that distinction is unclear.
The renewable energy five-year plan also broadens the concept of system reliability, which was a key justification for new coal power during the previous five years. Rather than relying primarily on coal-fired power for system stability, it increasingly looks to other options.
Alternatives include storage, flexible demand, EVs, “virtual power plants” and smarter system operation to provide balancing services. The plan also puts an emphasis on increasing the contribution of renewable energy to meeting demand peaks.
Therefore, while coal remains an important backup resource in the plan, reliability is no longer framed as something that can only be provided by coal.
The Chinese government has published numerous other sectoral five-year plans since its overarching plan came out in March. These include plans for the energy sector (“new-type energy system”), power system, renewable energy, carbon peaking, coal, climate-change mitigation, and the environment (“Beautiful China”). Some clear priorities emerge from these plans: electrification, electric vehicles, energy storage, offshore wind and “green”” fuels.
The energy plan also substantially increased ambition on the development of conventional hydropower, despite ecological and social risks and potential for tensions with neighbouring countries. The capacity additions will largely only materialise after 2030, however.
At the same time, energy consumption growth has slowed down markedly after the surge during and immediately after the “zero-Covid” period, making it more feasible for clean energy to meet all incremental demand.
If this trend continues, then total CO2 emissions will begin to fall even as power-sector emissions continue to plateau.
About the data
Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, as well as from industry data provider WIND Information and from Sinopec, China’s largest oil refiner.
Electricity generation from wind and solar, along with thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power were taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.
Total primary energy consumption is converted to the electricity equivalent using the substitution method.
Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power-sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.
CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2021. The CO2 emissions factor for cement is based on annual estimates up to 2024.
For oil, total oil consumption is calculated based on energy mix data for the first quarter and first half of the year released by the National Bureau of Statistics. Consumption of transport fuels – diesel, petrol and jet fuel – is estimated based on the sales growth reported by Sinopec for the first quarter and the first half of the year, with monthly disaggregation based on production minus net exports. The consumption of these three fuels is labeled as oil product consumption in transportation, as it is the dominant sector for their use. Apparent consumption of other oil products is calculated as the residual.
Estimated non-energy use of fossil fuels is subtracted from total chemical industry fossil fuel consumption, and process emissions are calculated based on fossil fuel consumption with carbon retained in products subtracted. Emissions from the incineration of plastics are based on a peer-reviewed estimate of plastics incineration in 2022, combined with growth rates in the overall power generation from waste-to-energy plants. Metals industry process emissions are calculated using industrial output data and IPCC default emission factors.
Oil consumption displaced by EVs is estimated using China Association of Automobile Manufacturers’ sales data, via Wind Financial Terminal. The data breaks down vehicle sales by type and powertrain: passenger cars, buses, vans, semis and trucks of different sizes, each split into battery-electric and plug-in hybrid, with assumptions about how far each vehicle type is driven per year and the fuel economy of the conventional vehicle it replaces.
Annual mileage and fuel-consumption assumptions are compiled from different sources, including the International Council on Clean Transportation. Each electric vehicle sold is credited with avoiding the fuel a comparable internal-combustion vehicle would have burned; plug-in hybrids are credited only with the portion of driving done on electricity (a utility factor of 64%).
The electricity and oil figures are calibrated to figures from China’s National Energy Administration, which put new-energy-vehicle charging at 142.3 TWh in 2025 and reported 56.9% year-on-year growth in the first half of 2026. The second half of 2026 is a projection: each vehicle segment’s actual second-half-2025 displacement is grown by its first-half-2026 year-on-year rate.
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The post Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions fall in Q2 2026 due to plummeting oil use appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: China’s CO2 emissions fall in Q2 2026 due to plummeting oil use
After last week’s catastrophic flash flooding caused hundreds of deaths and an estimated $5 billion of destruction in Nepal, some board members of the UN’s new loss and damage fund board have called for an extraordinary meeting to allocate money to help the Himalayan country.
Following a direct appeal for funding from Nepal’s government on Monday, developing-country board members gathered online and eight signed a letter, seen by Climate Home News, asking the fund’s board to hold a meeting to respond to the request.
The letter, signed by eight African, Asian and Least Developed Country board members, said the debris-laden torrent – which scientists believe was unleashed by a glacial slope collapsing after unusually hot weather – constitutes “precisely the kind of climate-related extreme weather events the fund was established to address”.
“The scale of loss of life, displacement, and destruction of energy, transport, and economic infrastructure warrants the board’s urgent consideration of how the fund’s existing instruments should be mobilised to support Nepal’s government and affected communities,” the letter said.
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The rules of the fund’s initial phase, which it is now in, allow for it to support “rapid response”, the letter noted. The fund’s governing instrument says it can provide funds “complementary to humanitarian actions taken immediately after an extreme weather event” as well as funds for “immediate or long-term, reconstruction or rehabilitation”, the letter added.
Governments agreed at UN climate talks to set up the fund in 2022 and it launched its first call for proposals at the end of last year. It received 180 submissions, mainly for long-term projects to help countries reduce the risks from climate threats, like improving water infrastructure in Jamaica or flood response in Bangladesh.
After delaying decisions at its last board meeting as it continued to work out processes, it has yet to approve any funding requests. Despite being set up on the back of the 2022 floods in Pakistan, the board has not yet given out any money in response to climate disasters nor expressed a clear willingness to do so.
The secretariat of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) had not responded to a request for comment at the time of publication. A few days ago, it expressed solidarity for those affected by the disaster in a social media post.
Rapid response precedent
The board members signing the letter on Nepal want to set a precedent, with the letter saying the board should consider “any procedural lessons” the response to the flooding “offer for strengthening the Fund’s rapid-response modalities and operational protocols for sudden-onset extreme weather events”.
Harjeet Singh, global convenor of the Fill the Fund campaign, told Climate Home News civil society has pushed “really hard” for the FRLD to be a rapid response fund rather than just inviting requests for project funding and reviewing them at regular board meetings as other UN climate funds do.
“Climate disasters like the one unfolding in Nepal cannot wait for scheduled committee cycles,” he said. “The Loss and Damage Fund was built for moments exactly like this.”
Nepal has received multi-million dollar humanitarian pledges from several governments already and the United Nations’ Central Emergency Response Fund is designed to rapidly disburse aid cash for disasters.
But Singh – also founding director of India’s Satat Sampada Climate Foundation – said that, with disasters becoming more frequent and severe, the humanitarian system cannot support all countries in their recovery efforts and the fund should bridge the gap.
“The Board Co-Chairs must heed the call of developing nations, convene an emergency session immediately, and prove that this Fund is ready to deliver real support when frontline communities need it most,” he told Climate Home News.
While the FRLD’s response to Nepal’s recent disaster could set an important precedent, it is only likely to be of limited practical help. The fund’s rules mean it can only give out a maximum of $20 million to each project in its current initial phase. With only $820 million pledged by rich countries and not all of that yet delivered, it has allocated a total of $350 million to spend so far and without further contributions could run of money next year.
Nepalese climate negotiator Manjeet Dhakal, who visited the affected area just days before the flood, told The Nation magazine that while $20 million “may only be a symbolic gesture”, it “could set an important precedent for how the fund responds when such disasters strike vulnerable countries in the future”.
The government’s preliminary estimate of the damage is $5 billion, with many homes and critical infrastructure destroyed, as well as over 1,000 people dead.
A letter to the FRLD board from Nepal’s finance and environment ministers said that Nepal had only contributed “negligibly to global greenhouse gas emissions yet continues to bear disproportionate and escalating climate impacts”.
Requesting the fund’s board take a special decision to allocate funding to Nepal, the ministers emphasised that “time is of the essence”. “A prompt response would help protect affected populations, restore essential services, prevent further suffering and demonstrate that the fund can translate international solidarity into timely support for vulnerable countries and communities when it is most urgently needed,” they wrote.
Glaciers ‘melt like butter’
Despite initial reports of an earthquake, the US Geological Survey has said the floods were caused by a glacier collapsing and the resulting landslide hitting the bottom of the valley causing “subsequent catastrophic impacts downstream”.
Alton Byers, a scientist at the University of Colorado Boulder’s Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research, told journalists this week that global warming has seen glaciers recede, glacial lakes forming and glacial lake outburst floods increasing.
He said that a heating glacier is like butter taken out of the refrigerator. “It becomes mushy. It no longer has the ability to hold together. What that means is that masses of rock and glaciers no longer are as resistant to gravity as they once were,” he explained. “Add to that melting water at altitude, which lubricates the interface between the rock and the glacier and you get an increased likelihood of slippage.”
He added that a trigger – like gravity or an earth tremor – can then set off the sudden release of masses of bedrock and glacial ice, “which is what happened last week”.
As well as reducing emissions to rein in climate change, Byers said that authorities can adapt to climate change by not building in flood plains. Many of the destroyed buildings in Nepal were located in places that have flooded before, he noted.
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The disaster took place on the Himalayan border of Nepal and Tibet, which is governed by China. Chinese state media are reporting at least 16 people dead and hundreds missing. China’s government has made no appeal to the loss and damage fund and the board’s letter does not mention China or Tibet.
The FRLD board’s co-chairs are now expected to respond to the letter, with any extraordinary board meeting likely to be held online, so that members from around the world can attend at short notice.
The post Loss and damage fund urged to hold crisis meeting on Nepal appeared first on Climate Home News.
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