The share of electricity in Great Britain generated from burning coal and gas fell to a record-low 2.4% earlier this month, Carbon Brief analysis shows.
The record low was reached at lunchtime on Monday 15 April and lasted for one hour. There have been a record 75 half-hour periods in 2024 to date when fossil fuels met less than 5% of demand.
There were only five such periods during the whole of 2022 – and just 16 last year.
The findings show that National Grid Electricity System Operator (NGESO) is closing in on its target of running the country’s electricity network without fossil fuels, for short periods, by 2025.
NGESO is “confident” this target will be met, its director of system operations tells Carbon Brief, adding that achieving the goal will be “absolutely groundbreaking and pretty much world leading”.
However, Carbon Brief’s analysis also illustrates some of the challenges to meeting the government’s target of a fully decarbonised electricity grid by 2035.
Fossil fuels fall
The island of Great Britain, comprising England, Scotland and Wales, has its own independent electricity system, which is managed at the transmission level by NGESO.
The transmission grid is effectively the motorway network for electricity.
It links large-scale electricity suppliers such as coal, gas and nuclear power plants to centres of demand, in towns and cities around the country.
Other companies run the low-voltage “distribution” networks, which take power from the transmission grid and distribute it to individual homes and businesses.
For most of its existence, this system had remained largely unchanged for decades. More recently, it has been in the midst of a rapid transformation as part of national efforts to reduce emissions.
In 2009, some 74% of GB electricity was coming from fossil fuels and only 2% was from renewables.
By 2023, there were several thousand large renewable sites dotted around the country, as well as nearly 1.5m small solar installations on the roofs of homes, offices and warehouses.
Only a third of GB electricity in 2023 came from fossil fuels – with 40% from renewables.
Yet these annual figures disguise even greater changes in the month-to-month, day-to-day, hour-to-hour and second-by-second operation of the electricity system.
The figure below shows the share of electricity in Great Britain being generated by fossil fuels in each half-hour period since 2009, including the record-low of 2.4% earlier this month.

The figure above shows how unprecedented it is for fossil fuels to be meeting such low shares of demand on the GB grid.
Indeed, the lowest half-hourly fossil fuel share in 2009 was 53% and, as recently as 2018, it had never dipped below 10%. The first half-hour period with less than 5% fossil fuels only came in 2022, when there were five such periods in total across the year.
During 2023, there were just 16 half-hour periods with less than 5% fossil fuels – the majority of which came during December of that year.
In contrast, there have already been 75 half-hours with less than 5% fossil fuels in 2024 to date.
The shift to ever lower fossil fuel use is illustrated in the figure below, which shows daily average shares starting to regularly drop below 10% in December 2023 and April 2024.

The daily average fossil fuel share fell to a record low of 6.4% on 5 April 2024, with the average on 15 April 2024 standing at 7.0%. Until 2022, the daily average had never been below 10%.
‘Zero-carbon operation’
Carbon Brief’s analysis shows that NGESO is closing in on the target, first set in 2019, of being able to operate the grid with “zero carbon”, for short periods, by 2025.
(NGESO defines this target as being able to run the GB transmission grid without fossil fuels. It bases its goal on a metric of 100% “zero-carbon operation”, meaning the share of demand, excluding imports, being met by renewables connected to the transmission grid or nuclear. It says this metric reached a peak of 90% during two half-hour periods in January and March 2023.)
The first-ever period of at least 30 minutes of “zero carbon operation” is most likely to come in autumn 2025, Craig Dyke, NGESO director of system operations tells Carbon Brief. “We’re confident that we will have the right capabilities on the system to be able to do that,” he adds.
Dyke says this moment will be “absolutely groundbreaking and pretty much world leading”, particularly given the size of the GB economy and the fact that, as an island, its grid is relatively isolated from neighbouring countries.
There have been two separate challenges in reaching this target. The first is having enough low-carbon electricity supplies to be able to cover demand during a given half-hour period.
The second challenge is having the technical capability to keep the grid stable without fossil fuels.
These technical requirements include maintaining the frequency of electricity supplies at close to 50Hz and responding to rapid changes in supply and demand through operational reserves.
NGESO also maintains the ability to restart the grid in the case of a total shutdown, sometimes referred to as “black start”, but now more formally called “restoration”.
Increases in wind and solar capacity mean low-carbon sources are now already sufficient to meet 100% of electricity demand in some periods. However, on the technical side, the 2025 target has been a “significant engineering challenge”, Dyke says:
“Getting to the 2025 ambition has been a significant engineering challenge, which we are solving.”
Grid services have, historically, been provided by fossil fuel power plants. Over the past five years, however, NGESO has been changing the way it procures these services, as well as reforming the rules of grid operation and the way it balances the grid in real time.
For example, through its “pathfinder” projects NGESO has contracted a series of sites that can offer grid services without fossil fuels. These include “synchronous condensers”, effectively giant spinning turbines that provide grid stability without burning fossil fuels.
Other key innovations include the use of batteries to manage the frequency of the grid and “grid forming inverters”, which use sophisticated power electronics to offer different types of grid support.
This development means renewable projects will be able to contribute grid stability services, such as “inertia”, that have traditionally only been offered by conventional fossil fuel generators.
Dyke tells Carbon Brief:
“This hasn’t just happened overnight. It’s been a culmination of a significant amount of effort over a number of years. That’s not just us [NGESO] operating in isolation, that’s planning and collaboration with industry, with [energy regulator] Ofgem and with the government…It’s not just about technologies, it’s about hearts and minds and processes and systems and people working together.”
Fully decarbonised grid
For NGESO, the 2025 goal is a stepping stone on the way to being able to run the grid at zero carbon constantly by 2035, in line with the government target of “fully decarbonised” electricity.
(The opposition Labour party is targeting a decarbonised grid by 2030. This target is seen as incredibly ambitious – and possibly even “unachievable” overall. A spokesperson for NGESO tells Carbon Brief: “Our previously published scenarios shows it is achievable – although challenging.”)
There are several further technical challenges to meeting this 2035 goal.
For example, the rise of variable wind and solar has expanded the ups and downs of fossil fuels in the mix, illustrated by the range between peaks and troughs in the first figure, above.
This is illustrated further in the simplified figure, below, by the increasing gap between the highest and lowest fossil fuel shares seen in each year (upper and lower blue lines, respectively).
The figure below also shows the annual average fossil fuel share of electricity (dashed line) falling from 74% in 2009 to 26% in 2024 to date. (The small increase in this annual average in 2022 was due to the GB grid exporting gas-fired power to France, where much of the nuclear fleet was offline.)

Notably, the maximum fossil fuel share in each half-hour period has declined more slowly than the average or minimum figures, falling from 88% in 2009 to 72% in 2023 and 66% in 2024 to date.
This reflects the fact that the GB grid still relies on gas-fired power stations being able to switch on when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining.
Crucially, the nation will need low-carbon alternatives to this gas capacity in order to reach the government’s target of a fully decarbonised grid by 2035.
These alternatives will need to operate across a range of different timescales, from seconds through to weeks and even years. For within-day timescales, this is likely to mean expanding energy storage capacity, principally with batteries, but also pumped hydro or compressed air.
For periods of weeks or seasons, the options include ongoing reliance on unabated gas – which would be incompatible with carbon targets – or the use of hydrogen turbines or gas plants that are coupled with carbon capture and storage (CCS).
The post Analysis: Fossil fuels fall to record-low 2.4% of British electricity appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Fossil fuels fall to record-low 2.4% of British electricity
Climate Change
“Next year is too late for regulations”: Beetaloo Energy’s 2GW gas-powered AI data centre a “disaster proposal” destined to cause climate chaos
SYDNEY, Wednesday 22 July 2026 — Beetaloo Energy has secured land from the NT Government for a massive $40 billion “hyperscale” AI data centre near Darwin, which would be powered by 2 gigawatts (GW) of gas power fracked directly from the Beetaloo basin, prompting calls from Greenpeace for urgent federal legislation.
The proposal marks a dangerous escalation in the AI data centre industry’s expansion, which threatens to entrench fossil fuel infrastructure for decades and put immense pressure on the region’s fragile water resources — while continuing to be unregulated.
Joe Rafalowicz, Head of Climate and Energy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “This disaster proposal for a 2GW gas-powered AI data centre in the NT is a shocking example of the unchecked expansion of hyperscale data centres in Australia. It is also, critically, more evidence for the urgent need for a moratorium on all new data centres until strong, binding regulations are put in place to protect our communities and climate.
“This proposal mirrors the frenzied, unchecked expansion currently wreaking havoc on communities in the US. We are seeing cowboy data centre operators treat Australia like a playground, steam-rolling ahead with projects that would lock down precious water resources and spike emissions, despite the overwhelming community opposition.
“Every day, more councils, communities and environmental groups are joining Greenpeace’s call for a moratorium on data centres, yet as of today there is still no system of safeguards or rules in place to regulate these companies.
“While Beetaloo Energy and the NT Government prepare to bulldoze ahead with this climate and water disaster, the Prime Minister is asleep at the wheel, promising to legislate a vague set of standards next year.
“Next year is too late, and anything less than mandating data centres cover their own energy demand, and then some, with new renewable energy is not enough.”
-ENDS-
Media contact
Lucy Keller on 0491 135 308 or lucy.keller@greenpeace.org
Climate Change
Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise
Reports of human rights and environmental abuses linked to Chinese companies’ overseas investments in the mining and refining of minerals needed for the clean energy transition are on the rise, research by a monitoring group has found.
The number of recorded allegations of harm at projects tied to Chinese firms have increased every year since 2021, rising to 148 in 2025, according to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC). On Wednesday it released new data showing that a total of 434 allegations of abuse were made against Chinese-backed projects over the five-year period in projects across the world.
The world’s top cleantech manufacturer, China is also the leading financier of critical minerals projects worldwide. The country has committed more than $120 billion in foreign direct investment into mineral mining and processing since 2023, Australian think-tank Climate Energy Finance recently found.
“China plays a central role in global transition mineral supply chains, and as such has a unique opportunity to raise the bar on human rights and community engagement at every stage of mining,” said Michael Clements, BHRC’s executive director.
“While there have been encouraging developments, from stronger regulations to more company engagement, there remains a gap between human rights commitment and action,” he said.
The report comes as communities affected by Chinese-backed mineral projects have filed the first two cases to a Beijing-based mediation mechanism intended to bring willing Chinese companies to the discussion table with affected communities.
Allegations of harms on the rise
BHRC’s latest analysis – including data for the period 2023-2025 – covered mining, smelting and refining projects for 11 minerals considered key to manufacturing clean energy technologies such as batteries, EVs and solar panels needed to move away from climate-heating fossil fuels.
The highest number of abuses was recorded in Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of nickel, which is used to make EV batteries. After the Indonesian government banned exports of raw nickel, Chinese firms invested billions of dollars to develop a large-scale nickel smelting and processing industry in the Southeast Asian country, largely powered by coal.
Other countries with a high number of recorded harms include the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Chinese firms dominate cobalt and copper production; Myanmar, where unregulated rare earths mining has caused widespread environmental destruction; Serbia, where Chinese-backed mining of some of Europe’s most significant copper and gold deposits is swallowing land and homes, and Zimbabwe, where Chinese investments have turned the nation into Africa’s top lithium producer.
Growing risks for people and nature
Allegations tracked by BHRC included negative impacts on local livelihoods, health and land rights, workers’ health and safety and work-related deaths, as well as water pollution and environmental contamination. In addition, 18 people were attacked for raising concerns about Chinese transition mineral projects between 2023 and 2025.
The report shows that 10 Chinese companies, including Zijin Mining, Tsingshan Group and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, accounted for nearly two-thirds of all allegations recorded in the last five years. It found that some Chinese companies “still appear to turn a blind eye to these issues” but noted that several others have been more responsive to allegations of abuse. However, even among companies with human rights policies, implementation remains a challenge, BHRC warned.
Zijin Mining and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt repeatedly responded to the allegations of harm by saying they take environmental and social risks seriously and adhere to international standards. Tsingshan Group never responded to BHRC’s requests for comment.
Platform for dialogue between communities and Chinese firms
At the same time, Chinese authorities have made “significant progress” on introducing a more specific framework for managing environmental and social risks in overseas investment, BHRC said.
This includes global consultation on a draft Sustainable Mining Code, adherence to UN guiding principles on business and human rights, and greater emphasis on oversight of companies operating overseas.
The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) set up a mediation and consultation mechanism intended to provide a platform for dialogue between affected communities or civil society groups that have raised concerns and Chinese companies.
More than three years since its launch, the mechanism has now received its first two complaints from local communities and many more are considering filing a case, Margaux Day, executive director at the nonprofit Accountability Counsel, told an event hosted by Climate Home News last month.
“This is incredibly exciting in that it fills a governance and accountability gap where often communities who are seeking to protect their rights and the environment can’t reach someone who will respond to them,” she told the panel discussion at London Climate Action Week.
Climate Home News understands that the complaints were filed by communities in Latin America and Southeast Asia over labour rights and resettlement issues. No information about the cases has yet been made public. The mechanism’s secretariat did not respond to Climate Home News’ questions.
The mechanism was set up after the Chinese regulator for banks and insurers called on investor-level institutions to establish complaints bodies to hear from communities outside of China. But whether the new initiative will prove effective in tackling grievances remains an open question.
“Real potential” for better mining practices
Participation in the mechanism is voluntary for Chinese firms and it doesn’t have a fact-finding function, nor can it impose provisions for compensation or compliance with human rights standards.
But Day told Climate Home News that, if successful, it could bring companies to negotiate an outcome that is better for people and the planet and leads to more sustainable mining practice.
Chen Yu, an independent China advisor for campaign group Global Witness, agreed that the mechanism holds “real potential”.
“There exists nothing else at a similar level to promote dialogue between communities and Chinese mining companies in particular,” she said.
For companies, the mechanism opens “a channel for problem-solving and dialogue with communities”, she added, as “Chinese companies often remain cautious of approaching affected communities directly, afraid of making the problem bigger”.
However, Chen said the mechanism remains at an early stage of development, faces resourcing challenges and is not yet sufficiently understood by communities in mining areas or Chinese firms.
To help it address some of these challenges, the secretariat is currently seeking technical support from a range of organisations, including civil society groups. But, Chen said, “it will take time for the mechanism to show its value”.
The post Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise appeared first on Climate Home News.
Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise
Climate Change
Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture
Andreas Sieber is head of political strategy at 350.0g. Cat Abreu is director of the International Climate Politics Hub.
From the US abduction of Venezuela’s president at the start of this year to the Iran war which rumbles on, disruption is the new normal for global geopolitics, more often than not linked to conflict over supplies of oil and gas.
Events so far in 2026 – driven largely by the desire of the Trump administration to grab control of fossil fuels around the world – show that the climate community’s approach to energy diplomacy will have to evolve if we are to operate effectively and push for climate action in such a volatile landscape.
Today’s climate and energy governance must be able to cope with trade wars, genocide, fascism, spiralling inequality and challenges to multilateralism. The increasingly dominant paradigms of economic competitiveness, energy security and green industrialisation can help drive the transition but they also challenge our collective mission to deliver an equitable green shift.
US-China rivalry dominates
Longer-term geopolitical trends that are seeing power move from West to East and North to South have fuelled a US–China “superpower rivalry”, which is pulling the global economy apart and reining in trade.
A key question will be how the fracture “lines” are drawn: by the US and China, or also by other countries or blocs? Many governments will try to remain “in the middle” between the two giants to capture economic gains from both sides. Yet despite the language of “strategic autonomy”, Washington and Beijing may be in a position to force choices via market access, export controls and sanctions.
At first glance, this may not seem particularly relevant for climate and energy politics. But Huawei’s exclusion from 5G operations across the political West and India following the so-called Clean Network Campaign by the US government serves as a warning of what could happen to climate green tech.
And the recent debate to cut out Chinese inverters from European markets follows the same pattern – US security forces perceive a risk and start encouraging their allies to drop Chinese technology.
The new drivers: competition and security
Despite this fracturing geopolitical and economic context, energy transition is still happening. To ensure it is effective and equitable, we need to understand what is driving it and how to adapt climate politics so that it better responds to these drivers.
Put simply, China is supplying the world with low-cost renewables (roughly 60% of critical wind and 80% of solar components), batteries, EVs and other key elements. Other countries now also want their piece of the green tech pie and are forming industrial policies to get it.
It is this new competitiveness-driven logic that will shape the quest for decarbonisation, which has shifted from cooperating around the cost of tackling climate change to rivalry for the benefits of climate action.
Over 90% of new renewables projects are now cheaper than fossil alternatives. Gas-fired power is 3–4 times more expensive than solar and wind. In 2015, most decarbonisation policies were “traditional” emissions-cutting strategies like carbon pricing or net zero dates, whereas green industrial policies now underpin the majority.
Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister
Meanwhile, security has become a central driver of energy politics. We are living through the second major fossil fuel crisis in just four years. Elevated oil and gas prices will impose up to $1 trillion in additional costs on the global economy by the end of the year if disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz. Fossil fuel supply chains have exposed countries to conflict, coercion and brutal price shocks.
Fossil fuel volatility destabilises whole economies – higher fuel costs drive up food prices, increase political instability, and push millions into poverty and hunger. This incentivises governments to shield themselves from global shocks, especially in countries that are net fossil fuel importers and home to roughly three-quarters of the world’s population.
Yet security fears can cut both ways. The same instability that makes fossil fuel dependence untenable is also sharpening concern over China’s dominance of critical clean technologies and supply chains.
Equity, cooperation and the opportunity for change
Developing countries benefit from the rapid uptake of renewables enabled by low-cost Chinese technologies. But significant fiscal space and public investment is needed for the electricity grids and infrastructure required to fully unleash the energy transition, as well as for green industrialisation to diversify revenue streams.
Despite this, industrial-scale domestic production and ownership often remain out of reach for too many countries that lack the fiscal space to allow green supply chains to flourish and compete with their traditional industrial base. But more just and diversified green tech supply chains could be achieved with concomitant support.
Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future?
For the first time in decades, the international order is being substantially reshaped. If within this context, decarbonisation is increasingly driven by green industrial policy, energy security and competitiveness, the climate policy community must better anticipate where these debates are moving. We must speak the same language, and enter the forums where decisions are made, including security, trade and bilateral or trilateral spaces.
We should build on an enlightened self interest recognising that cooperation remains essential and beneficial. This includes using the UN climate process differently: less as an ever-expanding negotiation machine, and more as a space for norm-setting, political alignment and deal-making. In an age of fragmentation, effective cooperation must not only be framed as necessary but thought of as a strategically compelling source of resilience and shared advantage.
The post Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture appeared first on Climate Home News.
Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture
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