China and Indonesia partnered for a series of business agreements worth $10 billion during the Indonesia-China Business Forum in Beijing on Sunday. This high-level forum followed a Saturday meeting between China’s President Xi Jinping and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto. Reuters revealed that the leaders expressed their plans for strategic economic growth across sectors like food, clean tech, biotechnology, and pressing issues related to water conservation, maritime resources, and mining, particularly nickel.
Notably President Prabowo Subianto said,
“We must give an example that in this modern age, collaboration — not confrontation — is the way for peace and prosperity.”
The joint statement further explained their plans to expand cooperation across new energy vehicles, lithium batteries, photovoltaic projects, and the digital economy. They also committed to advancing the global energy transition, securing mineral resources, and stabilizing supply chains.

Indonesia’s Nickel Surge: Fresh Billion-Dollar Deals from China
Indonesia’s nickel industry was a significant topic of discussion during the meeting. The country, which leads global nickel production always has been a major investment hub for Chinese firms.
In this regard, the latest news is that Chinese battery materials producer GEM Co., Ltd striking a groundbreaking deal with Indonesia’s PT Vale to build a high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) plant in Central Sulawesi. The agreement with a deal value of $1.42 billion, will ensure the nickel plant maintains nickel supplies which is crucial for battery-grade materials.
Moving on, Tsingshan Holding Group and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, the two major Chinese companies, continue to dominate Indonesia’s nickel industry. Their investments reflect faith in Indonesia as a prominent supplier of raw materials for EVs, lithium-ion batteries, and other green technologies.
Elaborating this further, Bloomberg reported that Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Co. is pursuing $2.7 billion in financing for its battery-nickel plant in Indonesia. The financing deal, backed by Ford Motor Co., is being coordinated by HSBC Holdings Plc and Standard Chartered Plc, who are inviting additional banks to participate.
The Pomalaa plant, located in Southeast Sulawesi, will use high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) technology to produce battery-grade nickel for electric vehicles. Notably, it will have a capacity of 120,000 tons of nickel annually, making it one of Indonesia’s largest HPAL projects.
Both nations consider the timing of these deals a boon to the slump nickel market. Currently, nickel prices are weak due to low demand in the stainless-steel market and slow growth of the EV sector.
The Ever-Expanding Indonesian Nickel Industry
Indonesia has always attracted foreign investment to boost its domestic nickel production. The country sees this as essential for boosting and adding value to its vast natural resources. Despite these market pressures, Indonesia and China remain committed to their long-term goals, with Indonesia flagging its nickel industry as an integral part of its economic strategy.
As one of the top producers of metallic commodities—including gold, copper, cobalt, and especially nickel—Indonesia produced over half of the world’s mined nickel in 2023. Indonesia’s cost-effective nickel industry spurred major shifts in the nickel market. While nickel prices have dropped since last year, the country still maintained a resilient and steady production.
According to S&P Global Commodity Insights, Indonesia’s mined nickel production is expected to reach 2.1 million metric tons in 2024. This value is more than 50% of the anticipated global output and more than 2X its 2020 levels.

Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights
However, the rapid increase could eventually result in a global supply shortage, pushing prices back up to $28,000 per metric ton.
New Ventures in Tech, Travel, and Trade
China and Indonesia are not limiting their partnerships to the resources sector. Credible media agencies reported that GoTo Gojek Tokopedia, a prominent Indonesian technology company, signed agreements with China’s Tencent and Alibaba to bolster Indonesia’s digital infrastructure.
These partnerships can advance cloud services and foster local digital talent. It also signals a long-term investment in Indonesia’s digital economy and improving digital literacy and infrastructure at large.
Notably, President Subianto envisions transforming Indonesia’s tech landscape with investments in the most advanced sectors like AI and cloud computing.
Reuters reported, in addition to high-level industry deals, China and Indonesia agreed to streamline travel and visa policies, introducing measures like multi-entry long-term visas. This will enable more bilateral exchanges, business trips, and tourism.
Furthermore, the nations also agreed to deepen trade in agricultural products, including fresh coconuts. Interestingly, President Subianto also secured export agreements during his visit. This expansion of agricultural exports creates new opportunities for Indonesian farmers while fulfilling China’s demand for tropical produce.
Overall, it is evident that President Subianto’s decision to choose China as its first state visit shows the nation’s strong intention to deepen ties with Beijing.
Source: China, Indonesia seal $10 billion in deals focused on green energy and tech | Reuters
- FURTHER READING: Nickel Could Be the Key to U.S. Energy Independence: Alaska Energy Metals’ Strategic Role
The post China and Indonesia Bolster Ties with $10B Deal in Strategic Sectors. How will it Impact Indonesia’s Nickel Industry? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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