The escalating trade war between the United States and China is reshaping the global energy transition. As the two largest economies exchange restrictions and tariffs, the impact on clean energy technologies—especially those reliant on critical minerals and international supply chains—is becoming increasingly apparent.
These geopolitical tensions could stall renewable energy adoption or accelerate innovations and diversification strategies to reduce dependence on China’s dominance.
China’s Critical Minerals Ban: A Strategic Signal
In December 2024, China escalated tensions by banning exports of key minerals to the United States. The targeted minerals—essential for technologies in semiconductors, defense, and renewable energy—are gallium, germanium, antimony, and graphite.

This marks a new phase in the trade war, with China signaling its readiness to leverage its dominance in these materials as a geopolitical tool.
Combs and Trivium China co-founder Andrew Polk noted that those restrictions suggest that the largest Asian economy is “ready to counter the US moves much more aggressively”.
While the immediate effects are muted, given prior restrictions on these minerals, the potential for broader economic pain looms large. For example, graphite, a vital material for lithium-ion battery anodes, is critical for electric vehicle manufacturing and grid storage systems.
- China controls 80% of global graphite output and processes 70% of it, making its dominance a significant bottleneck in the clean energy supply chain.
Here are the other critical minerals that China has a substantial grip on as per the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment analysis:

As seen above, China also controls over half of the global processing capacity for aluminum, indium, lithium, silicon, and rare earth elements (REEs), while also leading in REE extraction.
So, how can this control impact the most needed transition to clean energy, particularly for the U.S.?
Rising Costs for Key Technologies:
The price of EV batteries, solar panels, and other clean technologies could rise as supply chain disruptions drive costs. Batteries, which already represent a significant portion of an EV’s cost, require vast quantities of graphite.
Any further restrictions could exacerbate pricing pressures, slowing consumer adoption of EVs and renewable energy solutions. EVs’ high price tags are one of the biggest hurdles for buyers.
Diversification Challenges:
While the U.S. and its allies are pursuing alternatives, building domestic supply chains or sourcing from other nations takes time. Recent investments include a $150 million loan to accelerate graphite mining in Mozambique and a proposal to reopen a gold mine in Idaho to extract antimony for military applications.
These efforts, while promising, are years away from meeting current demand. For instance, the proposed reopening of the Yellow Pine mine in Idaho could bolster domestic antimony supply, but full-scale operations are unlikely before 2027.
Economic Ripple Effects:
A U.S. Geological Survey found that a complete ban on gallium and germanium exports could reduce U.S. GDP by $3.4 billion. While niche applications dominate these materials, their use in semiconductors, LEDs, and military components underscores their strategic importance.
U.S. Strikes Back: Tariffs and Supply Chain Resilience
President Donald Trump’s administration has pledged to impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports, ranging from 10% to potentially 100%. These measures aim to curb dependence on Chinese goods but risk further inflating costs for clean energy technologies.
Efforts to counter China’s influence include bolstering domestic production and securing new trade agreements. However, the U.S. relies heavily on Chinese manufacturing for components like solar panels and wind turbine parts. This highlights the challenges of quickly achieving supply chain independence.
Global Ripple Effects: Beyond the US and China
The trade war is not only impacting U.S.-China relations; it is reverberating across the globe.
Europe, Japan, and other nations reliant on Chinese-made clean energy components face similar vulnerabilities. For instance, Europe has ambitious offshore wind targets but remains dependent on Chinese supply chains for cost-effective production.
China’s dominance in solar panel and wind turbine manufacturing gives it leverage over global renewable energy development. However, disruptions in its supply chain could also hurt its economy, as nations shift toward alternative suppliers and technologies.

China’s Paradox: Leading with a Dominant Grip on Supply Chains
China’s position in the clean energy sector is paradoxical. On one hand, it dominates the production of critical materials and components. On the other, it is also a leader in renewable energy deployment, accounting for more than half of global offshore wind installations in 2023.
- China also produced over 80% of the world’s solar panel supply in 2023, making any disruption in trade a significant challenge for global renewable energy targets.
This dual role creates mutual dependencies. While China can disrupt global supply chains, its economy benefits from being the world’s primary supplier of clean energy components. This tension underscores the complexity of the trade war’s impact on both nations.
The US-China trade war, while disruptive, presents opportunities to accelerate innovation and diversification in the energy sector. Here’s how:
- Innovation in Battery Materials:
Researchers are exploring alternative chemistries that reduce reliance on graphite and other materials dominated by China. Advancements in solid-state batteries and recycling technologies could lessen dependence on traditional supply chains. - Strengthening Domestic Supply Chains:
The U.S. and its allies are increasing investments in mining and processing critical materials domestically or through friendly nations. Check out how this energy metals company is doing just that, strengthening U.S. energy independence. Moreover, diversifying supply sources not only reduces reliance on China but also enhances energy security.
The Bigger Picture: Trade Wars and Climate Goals
Global clean energy goals depend on the rapid deployment of renewable technologies. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) estimates that renewable energy capacity must triple by 2030 to meet climate targets.

Trade wars and supply chain disruptions threaten to derail these efforts, particularly in regions heavily dependent on Chinese imports. Even more solar and wind energy together take up over 80% (8,991 GW) of the 2030 renewable tripling pledge.
At the same time, the conflict could drive nations to prioritize long-term energy independence and sustainability. Balancing these competing dynamics will require strategic planning, investment, and international cooperation. The stakes are high—not just for the U.S. and China but for the entire planet.
The US-China trade war highlights the delicate balance between geopolitical rivalry and global cooperation in the clean energy transition. It serves as a stark reminder of the interconnectedness of global supply chains and the need for collective action to secure a sustainable future.
- FURTHER READING: Trump’s Tactic to Make America Great Again: Expanding Domestic Oil, Gas, and Critical Minerals
The post US-China Trade War: Can the US Beat China’s Critical Minerals Grip? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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