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A record-breaking amount of new offshore wind capacity has been secured at the UK’s latest auction for renewable energy projects.

Five fixed-foundation projects, amounting to 8.25 gigawatts (GW), secured fixed-price “contracts for difference” (CfDs) to supply electricity for an average of £91 per megawatt hour (MWh).

Additionally, two floating offshore wind projects with a combined capacity of 192.5 megawatts (MW) won contracts, securing a “strike price” of £216/MWh.

This new capacity, totalling 8.4GW, marks a significant increase from last year’s sixth auction, when 5.3GW had been secured as part of a bounce back from the “failed” fifth round.

While the latest auction saw offshore wind prices rising by around 10% since the previous round, analysis suggests that the outcome will, nevertheless, be roughly “cost neutral” for consumers.

Contrary to simplistic and misleading comparisons made by some opposition politicians and media commentators, this is because CfD payments would be balanced by lower wholesale costs.

The government welcomed the “stonking” results, saying that it put the country “on track” to reach its 2030 targets for clean power, create jobs and bring new investment. 

Below, Carbon Brief looks at the auction results, what they mean for bills and the implications for the UK’s target of “clean power by 2030”.

What happened in the seventh CfD auction round (AR7)?

The UK government announced the results of the seventh auction round (AR7) for new CfDs on 14 January 2026, hailing the outcome as a “historic win”. 

The CfD scheme was introduced in 2014 and offers fixed-price contracts to generators via a “reverse auction” process. The first auction was held in 2015.

Projects bid to secure contracts to sell electricity at a fixed “strike price” in the future. 

If wholesale prices are lower than this set amount, the project receives a payment that makes up the difference.

However, if the market prices are higher than this level, then the project pays back the difference to consumers. For example, according to a report from thinktank Onward, between November 2021 and January 2022, CfD projects paid back £114.4m to consumers.

For the seventh auction round, the results have been split into two, as part of reforms to help expedite the process for offshore wind. As such, the publication of results on 14 January covers fixed-foundation offshore wind and floating offshore wind. 

A second set of results will be released between 6-9 February 2026, covering technologies including large-scale solar and onshore wind.

A total of 17 fixed-foundation offshore wind projects totalling 24.8GW of capacity were competing for contracts at this auction, meaning many have missed out.

Still, a record 8.4GW of offshore wind secured contracts, making it the biggest ever offshore wind auction in Europe, according to industry group WindEurope

This includes 8,245 megawatts (MW) of fixed-foundation offshore wind and 192.5MW of floating offshore wind, which, collectively, will generate enough to power more than 12m homes.

As such, there was an increase of more than 3GW in offshore wind capacity compared to the sixth allocation round, as shown in the chart below.

(The 2.4GW Hornsea 4 scheme, which had been awarded a CfD at the previous auction round, went on to be cancelled in May 2025, with developer Ørsted citing cost inflation.)

New offshore- wind capacity secured in each CfD auction, megawatts
New offshore- wind capacity secured in each CfD auction, megawatts. The hatched area in AR6 shows the Hornsea 4 scheme, which was subsequently cancelled. Source: DESNZ and Carbon Brief analysis.

This follows on from the “fiasco” of the fifth allocation round in 2023, where no offshore-wind projects secured contracts due to the limit on prices set by the government.

Carbon Brief analysis suggests that the capacity secured in the latest auction will generate around 37 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity each year, around 12% of the nation’s total demand.

With onshore wind and solar results still to come, this means that projects with CfDs will generate some 135TWh of power by the time they are all completed, or nearly half of current demand.

When the current Labour government took office in 2024, a number of changes were made to encourage offshore wind capacity bids. This included separating the technology from solar and onshore wind into a separate “pot”, an allowance for “permitted reduction” projects in AR6 and a significant increase to the “budget” for the auction overall. 

Since then, there have been continued reforms to help meet the government’s target of decarbonising power supplies by 2030. (See: What does AR7 mean for clean power by 2030.) 

This includes extending the contracts from 15 years to 20 years, relaxing eligibility requirements related to planning consent and legislating to allow the secretary of state for energy – currently, Ed Miliband – to see anonymised bid information ahead of setting a final budget for that technology.

Initially, the government set a total budget of £900m for fixed-foundation offshore wind projects and £180m for floating offshore wind.

The budget for fixed-foundation offshore wind projects was then raised to £1,790m.

(Note that the “budget” is a notional limit on the amount of CfD levies that can be added to consumer electricity bills. This does not come from government coffers and – as explained below – it does not translate into an equivalent increase in consumer costs, because CfD projects also reduce wholesale electricity prices, which make up the bulk of bills.)

Ahead of the auction, the maximum “administrative” strike price was set at £113/MWh for offshore wind and £271/MWh for floating offshore wind. 

The four winning fixed-foundation offshore wind projects in England and Wales secured a strike price of £91.20/MWh in 2024 prices and the one in Scotland £89.49/MWh, as shown in the table below. This comes out at a blended average of £90.91/MWh.

Projects (fixed-foundation) Capacity (MW) Owners Strike price (2024 prices) Delivery year (phase one)
Awel y Mor 775 RWE, SWM, Siemens Financial Services £91.20/MWh 2030/31
Dogger Bank South 3,000 RWE, Masdar £91.20/MWh 2030/2031
Norfolk Vanguard East 1,545 RWE £91.20/MWh 2029/2030
Norfolk Vanguard West 1,545 RWE £91.20/MWh 2028/2029
Berwick Bank 1,380 SSE Renewables £89.49/MWh 2030/2031

The two floating offshore-wind projects will see a strike price of £216.46/MWh, shown below.

Projects (floating) Capacity Owners Strike price (2024 prices) Delivery year (phase one)
Pentland 92.5 CIP, Eurus Energy, Hexicon £216.46/MWh 2029/2030
Erebus 100 TotalEnergies, Simply Blue Energy £216.46/MWh 2029/2030

These prices are around 19% below the maximum level set ahead of the auction – a figure that had been cited by opposition politicians as “proof” that the round would be a “bad deal” for consumers.

Successful projects include RWE’s Awel Y Mor (775MW), the first Welsh project to win a CfD contract in more than a decade.

Dogger Bank South in Yorkshire and Norfolk Vanguard in East Anglia – which will be two of the largest offshore windfarms in the world – at 3GW and 3.1GW, respectively – both secured contracts.

Additionally, Berwick Bank in the North Sea became the first new Scottish project to win a CfD since 2022. At 4.1GW, the project being developed by SSE Renewables is the largest planned offshore-wind project in the world.

The projects are located around the UK, which is expected to ease grid connections. Nick Civetta, project leader at Aurora Energy Research, noted in a statement:

“83% of the capacity connects in areas of high power demand and greater network capacity, lowering the cost of managing the system.”

Ember on Bluesky: The UK has awarded support to a RECORD eight new offshore wind capacity in its latest auction, including two floating wind projects

In terms of companies, German developer RWE has dominated the auction outcome, with 6.9GW of the capacity being developed overall. 

What does the record offshore-wind auction mean for bills?

The auction results arrive at a moment of intense interest in energy bills, which remain significantly higher than before the global energy crisis in 2022.

The government, along with much of the energy industry, said the new offshore wind projects would lower bills, relative to the alternative of relying on more gas.

Meanwhile opposition politicians and right-leaning media used misleading figures to argue that gas power is cheap or that the new offshore wind projects would add large costs to bills.

Broadly speaking, there is some evidence to suggest that electricity bills will rise over the years to 2030 – largely as a result of investment in the grid – before starting to decline.

However, this is the case whether the UK pushes forward with its efforts to expand clean power or not – and is mainly dependent on the timing of electricity network investments and the price of gas.

At the same time, electricity demand is starting to rise as the economy electrifies – as shown in the figure below – and many of the UK’s existing power plants are nearing the end of their lives.

Annual UK electricity demand 2000-2025
Annual UK electricity demand 2000-2025, terawatt hours (TWh). The truncated y-axis shows recent changes more clearly. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from NESO and DESNZ.

This means that new electricity generation will be needed, whether from offshore wind, gas-fired power stations or from other sources.

Adam Berman, director of policy and advocacy at industry group Energy UK, said ahead of the auction that renewables were the “cheapest” source of new supplies.

Similarly, Pranav Menon, senior associate at consultancy Aurora Energy Research, tells Carbon Brief that the key question is how to meet rising demand most cost-effectively. He says:

“Here, it is quite clear that the answer is renewables (up to a certain price and volume), given that new-build gas is much more expensive…(even after accounting for costs and intermittency for renewables).”

The government said that the price for offshore wind secured through AR7 was “40% lower than the cost of building and operating a new gas power plant”. It added:

“Britain has taken a monumental step towards ending the country’s reliance on volatile fossil fuels and lowering bills for good, by delivering a record-breaking offshore wind result in its latest renewables auction.”

In a similar vein, Dhara Vyas, head of Energy UK said in a statement that the results would “deliver lower bills”. She added:

“Today’s auction results will deliver critical national infrastructure that will strengthen our energy security and deliver lower bills, as well as provide jobs, investment and economic growth right across Great Britain.”

These statements rely on updated government estimates of the cost of different electricity-generating technologies, published alongside the auction results.

They also rely on two studies published by Aurora and another consultancy, Baringa, both commissioned by renewable energy firms involved in the auction.

The government’s new cost estimates reflect the inflationary pressures that have hit turbines for gas-fired generation, as well as offshore wind supply chains.

Carbon Brief analysis of the latest and previous figures suggests that the government thinks the cost of building a gas-fired power station has more than doubled. (Reports from the US point to even steeper three-fold increases in gas turbine costs.)

As such, building and operating new gas-fired power stations would be relatively expensive, at £147/MWh, according to the government. (This assumes the gas plant would only be operating during 30% of hours in each year, in line with the current UK fleet.)

While the offshore wind prices secured in AR7 are around 10% higher than in AR6, at £91/MWh, they would still be considerably lower than the cost of a new gas plant.

However, these figures for new gas and for offshore wind in AR7 do not reflect the wider system costs of keeping the electricity grid running at all times.

In late 2025, Baringa concluded that a strike price of up to £94.50/MWh for up to 8GW of offshore wind would be “cost neutral”. This does not include system balancing costs, which the study argues are relatively modest for each additional gigawatt of capacity.

Carbon Brief understands that, when taking this into account, the “cost neutral” price for further offshore capacity would be reduced by a few pounds. This implies that the AR7 result at £91/MWh is likely to be in or around the “cost-neutral” range, based on Baringa’s assumptions.

Also, in late 2025, Aurora concluded that new offshore wind could be secured at “no net cost to consumers”, provided that contracts were agreed at no more than £94/MWh.

In contrast to Baringa’s work, this study is based on what an Aurora press release describes as a “total system cost analysis”. This means it takes into account the cost of dealing with the variable output of offshore wind, such as system balancing and backup.

In an updated note following the results of the auction, Aurora said that it would “generate net consumer savings of just over £1bn up to 2035”. This is relative to a scenario where no offshore wind had been procured at the latest auction.

Simon Evans on Bluesky: Here's how Aurora Energy Research sees the UK offshore wind auction (AR7) cutting bills for consumers "£1bn by 2035

(In its pre-auction analysis, Aurora pointed to a reduction in consumer electricity bills of around £20 per household per year by 2035, relative to relying on more gas power instead.)

Writing on LinkedIn, Aurora data analyst Ivan Bogachev said that this was the case, even though it might appear to be “counterintuitive”. He added:

“Moreover, AR7 projects are primarily clustered in areas which see few network constraints, limiting any contribution to higher balancing costs.”

In contrast, Conservative shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho and right-leaning media commentators cited misleading figures to claim that the auction was “locking us in” to high prices.

Coutinho has repeatedly cited a figure for the cost of fuel needed to run a gas-fired power station in summer 2025 – some £55/MWh – as if this is a fair reflection of the cost of electricity from gas.

However, this excludes the cost of carbon, which gas plants must pay under the UK emissions trading system and the “carbon price support”. It also ignores the cost of building new gas-fired capacity, which as noted above has soared in recent years.

Dr Callum McIver, a researcher at the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) and research fellow at the University of Strathclyde, tells Carbon Brief that “you can’t credibly strip out the cost of carbon” and that the £55/MWh figure is not an “apples-to-apples” comparison with the AR7 result.

McIver says that a fairer comparison would be with a new-build gas plant, which, according to the latest DESNZ cost of generation report, would come in at £147/MWh – and would remain at £104/MWh, even if the cost of carbon is ignored.

UKERC director Prof Robert Gross, at Imperial College London, tells Carbon Brief that Coutinho’s £55/MWh figure for gas is “unrealistically low” because it is below current wholesale prices, which averaged around £80/MWh in 2025.

Gross adds that, as well as ignoring carbon pricing, the figure is also for “existing and not new gas stations, which we will need and which will need to recover much increased CAPEX [capital cost]”.

Another factor often not taken into account by those criticising the price of renewable energy contracts is that these projects reduce wholesale prices, as noted in Aurora’s modelling.

Separate analysis published by the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) thinktank finds that wholesale power prices would have been 46% higher in 2025 – at £121/MWh rather than £83/MWh – if there had been no windfarms generating electricity.

This is because windfarms push the most expensive gas plants off the system, reducing average wholesale prices. This is a well-known phenomenon known as the “merit order effect”.

What does AR7 mean for reaching clean power by 2030?

Offshore wind is expected to be the backbone of the UK’s electricity mix in 2030, making the stakes for this CfD auction particularly high.

Under the National Energy System Operator’s (NESO) independent advice to the government, half of electricity demand will be met by offshore wind by 2030. It says this requires between 43GW and 51GW of generating capacity from the technology.

This advice informed the government’s action plan for meeting 100% of electricity demand with clean power by the end of the decade, which also sets a target of 43-50GW of offshore wind.

Currently, the UK has around 17GW of installed offshore wind capacity, leaving a gap of 27-34GW to the government’s target range.

A further 10GW of capacity already had a CfD prior to the latest auction, excluding the cancelled Hornsea 4 project. The additional 8.4GW contracted in AR7 means the remaining gap to the minimum 43GW end of the government’s range is just 7GW, as shown below.

Offshore wind capacity that has already been built, previously contracted, or awarded in AR7
Offshore wind capacity that has already been built, previously contracted, or awarded in AR7, along with the gap that would need to be filled in order to reach the targets set out in the clean power action plan. Source: Carbon Brief analysis.

Speaking to journalists after the auction results were announced, Chris Stark, who is head of “Mission Control” for clean power 2030, told journalists that securing 8.4GW in AR7 put the UK on track for its targets. He added:

“The result today actually takes us now to within touching distance of the goals that we set for 2030 – more to come on that, as I mentioned, with the onshore technologies and the storage projects up and down this country.

“But this is, I think, a real endorsement for the steps that Ed Miliband has taken to bring about that goal of clean power by 2030, it will bring huge benefits to people here in the UK.”

There remain a number of challenges with the delivery of these offshore-wind projects – including securing a grid connection – that could threaten delivery before 2030.

Writing on LinkedIn, Bertalan Gyenes, consultant at LCP Delta, says that with a third of the new capacity set to deliver before 2030, a “swiftly delivered and ambitious [allocation round eight] would put DESNZ within touching distance of its targets”. However, he adds:

“The job is not over yet, the windfarms need to be connected, the network upgraded, consenting pipelines de-clogged – there can be no more delays and certainly no cancellations like what we had seen with Hornsea 4 after last year’s auction.”

McIver wrote on LinkedIn that the auction result “takes us into the goldilocks zone that just about keeps CP30 targets alive, if AR8 can similarly deliver”. He added:

“OK, looking at delivery years [for the contracted projects], maybe we’re aiming for roughly CP33 [clean power by 2033] now? Maybe that would be no bad thing.”

Within the briefing for journalists, Stark highlighted a number of steps undertaken by the government over the past 18 months to ease the challenges around the expansion of the renewable energy sector.

This includes removing “zombie projects” from the queue for connecting projects to the electricity network and announcing £28bn in investment for gas and electricity grids.

As such, the auction results fit within a “host of policies” designed to make the ambitious clean power by 2030 target possible, said Stark.

The second half of the CfD results, covering technologies such as onshore wind and solar, are expected out next month. DESNZ’s action plan set a range of 27-29GW and 45-47GW of capacity for the two technologies, respectively, if the country is to meet its 2030 clean-power target.

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Factcheck: No, Europe’s heatwaves are not being ‘caused’ by declining air pollution

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This summer has seen Europe suffer through a series of record-breaking heatwaves.

Amid widespread media coverage of the number of deaths and the influence of climate change, the UK’s Daily Telegraph reported on new research with the incorrect headline: “Heatwaves caused by fall in pollution.”

The article was shared on social media by Richard Tice – deputy leader of the hard-right, climate-sceptic Reform UK party – along with a number of prominent rightwing commentators.

Tice claimed that “net stupid zero is contributing to rising temperatures, not helping”, adding that “we have been gaslit and lied to”.

GB News followed up with its own article, incorrectly headlined: “Britain’s scorching heatwaves caused by falling pollution levels, researchers find.”

Scientists tell Carbon Brief that the framing of heatwaves being “caused” by declining air pollution is “wrong”.

While a drop in pollution has reduced the cooling impact it has had in the past, the scientists say, Europe’s summer heatwaves are primarily becoming more extreme “as a result of greenhouse-gas-induced warming”.

Another scientist adds that “any attempt” to link this research to net-zero policies is “simply wrong”.

Fast warming

The extensive reporting around Europe’s heatwaves in recent months has often mentioned that Europe is the world’s fastest-warming continent.

Europe has warmed rapidly since the 1980s

The new study in question aims to unpack why Europe’s summer temperatures are rising more quickly than other regions of the northern hemisphere’s mid and high latitudes.

The research – published in Geophysical Research Letters – explores the role of air pollution and, specifically, how it affects circulation patterns in the atmosphere.

(The study focuses on long-term trends in European summers and does not include the very recent heatwaves.)

Human-caused emissions of aerosols – tiny, light‑scattering particles produced mainly by burning fossil fuels – have long acted to “mask” global warming. This is largely because they absorb or reflect incoming sunlight and influence the formation and brightness of clouds.

To understand how the climate of Europe – or any region – is changing, scientists need to take into account a whole range of factors, says Prof Bjørn Samset, a research professor at Norway’s Center for International Climate Research (CICERO), who was not involved in the work.

This includes “greenhouse gases, aerosols, land-use change, natural variability and how they all interact”, he says, adding:

“The effects of air pollution on circulation, which is the topic here, has long been difficult to pin down.”

As European countries improved their air quality through the second half of the 20th century, the cooling effect of aerosols has gradually been removed.

This can boost heatwaves in two ways – directly, by letting more sunlight reach the land surface and, indirectly, by influencing the jet stream.

Using hundreds of simulations from nine climate models, the new study finds that a decline in aerosols is resulting in more frequent “quasi-stationary Rossby waves”.

Rossby waves are huge meanders in the jet stream. Occasionally, they become slow-moving – or “quasi-stationary” – which allows weather systems to get stuck over one region, leading to prolonged heatwaves.

These circulation changes have contributed to Europe’s rapidly warming summers.

However, while Europe’s heatwaves are being influenced by declining aerosols, it is “wrong” to say they are being “caused” by them, says Prof Erich Fischer, a climate scientist at ETH Zurich.

Headline in the Daily Telegraph, 22 July 2026.
Headline in the Daily Telegraph, 22 July 2026.

Fischer, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief:

“Heatwaves are caused by high-pressure systems and are now much more frequent and intense because they are happening in a climate that is much warmer than 100 years ago as a result of greenhouse-gas-induced warming.

“The paper shows that the greenhouse-gas-induced summer warming had been temporarily masked by air-polluting aerosols. The full extent for European summers only becomes visible now as the air-polluting aerosols have declined.”

Samset adds:

“Air pollution never causes or removes global warming, it only temporarily moderates it.”

Study lead author Dr Pedro Roldán‐Gómez, an associate researcher at the Barcelona Supercomputer Centre, is quoted in the Daily Telegraph saying that “most” of the “excess warming” in Europe, beyond that of comparable regions in the northern hemisphere, can be linked to declining aerosols.

But, earlier in the article, the newspaper interprets this as, simply, “most of the extra heat experienced in Britain and Europe” is down to air pollution.

GB News uses a similar phrasing, reporting that “much of the additional warming across Britain and western Europe since the 1980s is linked to the sharp decline in airborne particles known as aerosols”.

This is “misleading”, says Fischer, while Roldan-Gomez tells Carbon Brief that this is a “tricky point”, which “could lead to wrong interpretations if not properly explained”. He adds:

“The contribution of greenhouse gases is, in any case, the most important factor.”

Headline on GB News, 23 July 2026.
Headline on GB News, 23 July 2026.

Cleaner air

The Daily Telegraph’s article was seized upon by Reform’s Richard Tice to claim that “cleaner air” was causing higher temperatures, rather than CO2.

This continued his position – refuted by long-established climate science – that CO2 does not drive global warming.

Richard Tice on X on 23 July 2026

Tice also claimed in his post that net-zero policies are “contributing to rising temperatures”. Tice appears to be linking declining air pollution to a shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy.

Samset points out that net-zero became a goal “decades later” than the cumulative efforts to reduce air pollution since the 1980s and that it is “simply wrong” to link it to the study.

“The scientific community will keep working to understand how greenhouse gas warming and air pollution interact,” he says, but “nothing we do will change the fact that the consequences of global warming are due to human-induced CO2 emissions”.

Fischer adds:

“Let us not forget that cleaning up air-polluting aerosols is highly desirable. According to the World Health Organisation, 7 million people still die prematurely every year due to air pollution.”

Clean air legislation

Finally, the Daily Telegraph article and the study itself both attribute Europe’s declining air pollution from the 1980s onwards to the Montreal Protocol.

This is a “glaring error”, Samset says, and it is “surprising that it wasn’t picked up” in the peer-review process for the study. He explains:

“The Montreal Protocol did not deal with air pollution. It dealt with ozone-depleting gases and has been an extremely successful multi-national effort against environmental damage. “

Clean air legislation was already in place in many European countries by the time the Montreal Protocol was signed in 1987, says Samset.

In response, Roldán‐Gómez says that while the protocol did not target aerosols specifically, it “boosted the clean air policies”.

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Access to finance ‘strengthens climate resilience’ among sub-Saharan women

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Empowering women through greater access to finance could “strengthen” households’ resilience to “climate shocks”, according to a new study.

Published in Climate Risk Management, it analyses the impact of financial access on “women-headed households” in sub-Saharan Africa.

The study finds that where women had formal financial access – such as through owning a bank account – households were more able to withstand short-term shocks.

It adds that “climate shocks”, such as extreme weather events and the impacts of climate change, can cause economic crises, which destabilise communities and households.

However, the authors say that in order to protect households from long-term climate vulnerabilities – including “droughts, floods and sea-level rise” – financial access would need to be paired with wider efforts to tackle gender inequality.

They add that the findings could have important implications for policy in sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries and households are vulnerable to climate disasters.

Financial inclusion

The study highlights that entrenched gender disparities mean many women still have unequal access to financial services in sub-Saharan Africa

For example, women are still less likely to have their own bank accounts and instead are often dependent on male relatives for access to finance.

The number of women with access to an account in the region had risen to 52% as of 2024, according to data from World Bank Group.

However, as shown in the chart below, the gap between men and women has also increased, rising from just under 5 percentage points in 2011 to 12 in 2024.

Chart showing that more sub-Saharan women now have bank accounts, but the gap to men has widened from 2011-2024
Share of population with bank accounts by gender over 2011-2024, %. Source: Global Findex Database, World Bank Group

Using survey data from Afrobarometer, the new study analyses 25,511 women-headed households across 37 sub-Saharan countries.

The authors use the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) framework to measure “financial inclusion”. This looks at factors such as having a bank account, owning a mobile phone and having internet access.

Francis Anaisie, a co-author on the study, tells Carbon Brief the researchers were motivated by the UN’s sustainable development goals (SDGs). Anaisie, an economist at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, says the study specifically looked at SDGs five and 13, on gender equality and addressing climate issues. He adds:

“Financial inclusion is one of the key policy tools for empowering women or for empowerment. But as to whether this actually translates into better climate outcomes for women is not known or is limited; this study seeks to address that gap.”

The study finds households with higher levels of financial access for women had higher levels of women’s empowerment, when this is defined as the ability to make choices and have control over economic and social outcomes.

This was checked by cross-comparing financial access against different measures of women’s empowerment, such as financial security, voting rights and connection to communities.

In particular, the study found that “financially included” women had greater political and economic empowerment, such as financial security and voting rights. On some measures of social empowerment, however, the link was weaker – financial access alone was not enough to erase cultural and social barriers to gender equality.

Women and climate change

It has been well documented that women are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change than men.

Environmental shocks affect women disproportionately due to a range of factors. These include income disparities, higher rates of displacement and unequal access to land.

Financial inequality and barriers to economic resources, such as needing internet access to make digital payments, play a key role in climate vulnerability, says Tracy Kajumba. She is director for the Least Developed Countries initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) interim secretariat at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).

Kajumba, who was not involved in the study, explains to Carbon Brief:

“Women are on the front line doing farming, planting, harvesting and these things that are all impacted [by climate change]. If they don’t have the income to invest either in drought-resistant crops or water-saving technologies, it becomes difficult for households to adapt.”

Calculating climate resilience

The new study measures the impact of financial inclusion on women’s empowerment and, in turn, on climate resilience.

It evaluates a household’s ability to withstand and recover from “shocks and stressors” by using a UN Food and Agriculture Organization metric for “resilience index measurement and analysis” (RIMA).

For example, questionnaires are used to gather information about households in certain areas. The data is then used, together with key indicators, to quantify a household’s resilience to food insecurity, climate variability and economic crisis, amongst other risks.

The 25,511 households surveyed across sub-Saharan Africa were found to be relatively resilient overall and had a high capacity to bounce back from climate shocks. However, they had much lower ability to adapt, in order to build protective capacity in advance of extreme events.

In addition, the study finds that women’s financial empowerment had a positive impact on a household’s ability to “absorb” a climate shock, suggesting that financial access is critical for responding to climate change.

Community garden and climate adaption project, focusing on women's empowerment, Niger.
Community garden and climate adaption project, focusing on women’s empowerment, Niger. Credit: Joerg Boethling / Alamy Stock Photo

Increased empowerment through financial access enables women to make decisions about planting crops, to access credit in emergencies and to buy or sell food at a better price, the study notes.

For example, it says increased financial access and women’s empowerment help households to deal with the immediate consequences of an extreme weather event, such as a drought. This could be through building community mutual-support networks and by enabling access to savings, to keep the household running.

Anaisie says the study shows women’s empowerment has a significant impact on climate resilience. He tells Carbon Brief:

“If we include women in the financial system, in the case of any climate issue they can save, they can be independent, they can rely on investment to absorb these shocks. This empowerment will help them to be more resilient to climate shocks…We can make progress because SDG goals are all about inclusiveness. It’s all about inclusive growth.”

However, the study notes that financial access does not necessarily create long-term change, which would make the household less vulnerable to extreme weather in the first place.

The authors suggest that lasting structural and cultural change is important for bringing about long-term resilience. They say that policies to address gender inequalities would help bring this about.

They say such policies could include gender-sensitive agricultural credit schemes, subsidised climate insurance for women farmers in drought-prone regions, joint land-titling programmes and quotas for women in local climate-adaptation committees.

Such policies would have helped women impacted by recent severe floods in Ghana to protect their savings, Anaisie explains. He tells Carbon Brief: 

“Women are engaged in economic activities, especially informal activities. They have resources and money, but when the flood came in, many women lost that. If they had access to insurance, this flood wouldn’t have cost them that much.

“So, if the government comes out with financial initiatives, training, civic education and gender-focused initiatives, leadership training, women will be empowered and this will translate into their resilience with regards to climate change.”

Addressing climate vulnerability in sub-Saharan Africa

The study could have policy implications for sub-Saharan Africa, a region particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The region faces increasingly extreme weather, heatwaves, droughts, wildfires and floods, as well as food scarcity and threats to crops.

The study suggests that policies to address structural and cultural barriers to women’s financial autonomy could be a key way to build climate resilience across the region.

However, it recognises that even where financial access is expanded, gender norms and cultural constraints continue to shape women’s social empowerment. This, in turn, affects their ability to adapt to climate change in the long term.

Ultimately, addressing structural inequalities is needed to minimise climate vulnerability, says Kajumba. She adds that supporting adaptation with financial access can allow households to absorb shocks without falling into poverty – and to rebuild after climate impacts.

Kajumba says that supporting adaptation with women’s financial access can allow households to absorb shocks without falling into poverty – and to rebuild after climate impacts. She adds:

“When they are supported [with] microloans, savings and all that, you will see change in income, change in households, change in health and education for the children as well.”

However, Kajumba notes that structural inequalities still “amplify” women’s vulnerability to climate impacts and make it harder for them to exercise agency and leadership. She adds:

“The tools that are being used are not always favourable for women…When we look at women in leadership and participation, you cannot lead or you cannot participate unless you have some level of income.”

The post Access to finance ‘strengthens climate resilience’ among sub-Saharan women appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Access to finance ‘strengthens climate resilience’ among sub-Saharan women

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State of the climate: Rapidly developing El Niño raises chance of record-warm 2026

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As 2026 passes its halfway point, the world is watching one of the most rapidly intensifying El Niño events in the modern record take shape in the tropical Pacific.

The developing El Niño is boosting expectations for global temperatures, both this year and next.

El Niño is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific that releases heat from the ocean into the atmosphere, temporarily raising global temperatures and reshaping rainfall and extreme weather around the world.

Carbon Brief’s “state of the climate” report in April gave 2026 a 19% chance of setting a new global temperature record.

That chance now stands at 35% – a near-doubling in four months – with virtually all of the change driven by ever-stronger El Niño forecasts.

The key findings from the first half of 2026 include:

  • The first six months of 2026 were the third-warmest start to a year on record – around 1.4C above pre-industrial levels – behind only 2024 and 2025. 
  • While the first few months of the year came in as the fourth or fifth warmest, both May and June were the second-warmest ever recorded as El Niño conditions took hold.
  • El Niño conditions arrived in April and reached the threshold for a “strong” event by June, when the Niño3.4 index reached 1.6C. Of the 667 model runs Carbon Brief examined, 91% project a peak later this year that is above the strongest El Niño in history.
  • The chance that 2026 beats 2024 as the warmest year on record has risen to 35%. Carbon Brief’s central estimate remains that 2026 will be the second-warmest year, at around 1.51C above pre-industrial levels.
  • Whether 2026 sets a record will depend on the dataset: the odds range from around two-in-three in NASA and Berkeley Earth data to around two-in-10 in ERA5 and one-in-10 in the JRA-3Q reanalyses.
  • June 2026 was western Europe’s hottest June on record, amid a heatwave that set hundreds of individual records. Nearly 9% of the world’s surface saw record June warmth.
  • The developing El Niño will have its largest impact on 2027, which Carbon Brief projects to be around 1.7C above pre-industrial levels – this would comfortably set a new record for the warmest year.
  • Arctic sea ice has spent 39 days of 2026 so far at, or below, record daily lows following its joint-lowest winter maximum in the satellite era.

Third-warmest start to a year

Carbon Brief analyses records from six different groups that report global surface temperatures: NASA GISTEMP, NOAA GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA HadCRUT5, Berkeley Earth, Copernicus/ECMWF ERA5 and the JMA JRA-3Q reanalysis.

The first half of 2026 was the third warmest on record in every one of the six datasets, behind only 2024 and 2025. The figure below shows annual temperatures since 1970, along with the 2026 year-to-date average (January-June) for each group.

Chart showing that the first half of 2026 was the third warmest on record
Annual global average surface temperatures from the six groups (lines), along with 2026 temperatures so far (January-June, coloured dots). Note that HadCRUT5 and ERA5 dots reflect January-May, as their June values were not yet published. Chart by Carbon Brief.

January 2026 was only the fourth- or fifth-warmest January on record, as lingering weak La Niña conditions suppressed temperatures. Since then, each month has climbed the rankings.

La Niña is the cool phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). It typically brings wetter conditions to Australia, Indonesia and equatorial South America and drier conditions to the southern US.

March was second-to-fourth warmest across datasets, April the third and both May and June were the second warmest ever recorded, behind only the corresponding months of 2024.

The chart below shows how June 2026 (thick red line) came in around 0.08C below the June record set in 2024 in the average of the six datasets.

Meanwhile, Copernicus reported that global sea surface temperatures over the ice-free oceans set a new June record.

Chart showing that 2026 saw the second-warmest June on record
Average global surface temperatures for each month from 1940 to June 2028 from six forecasting groups, with lines coloured by decade. Chart by Carbon Brief.

A record-breaking El Niño

ENSO is the largest source of year-to-year variability in global temperatures.

The most common way to assess the strength of an El Niño or La Niña event is by looking at the sea surface temperature anomaly in the “Niño3.4” region of the tropical Pacific.

El Niño and its sister La Niña occur when temperatures in the tropical Pacific are more than 0.5C (El Niño) or less than 0.5C (La Niña) below normal, where normal is defined by removing the effects of long-term climate change.

The thresholds for defining the strength of an El Niño or La Niña are above/below 1C for “moderate” events, 1.5C for “strong” events and 2C for “very strong” (or “super”) events.

After two years dominated by La Niña conditions, the tropical Pacific flipped decisively in April when the Niño3.4 index crossed the 0.5C El Niño threshold. It subsequently reached 1C in May and hit 1.6C in June, marking one of the fastest onsets in the observational record.

In the first few weeks of July, the index shot above 2C, significantly outpacing the speed at which any prior El Niño events developed.

Forecast models expect even more to come.

An analysis by Carbon Brief of the median of 667 model runs from 14 different modelling groups suggests that sea surface temperatures in theNiño3.4 region could peak at 3.59C between July and December.

More than 91% of runs predict the strongest El Niño event in the modern record. The previous record was set during the event of 2015-16, when temperatures peaked around 2.75C.

This is shown in the chart below, which features a histogram of the likelihood of different possible 2026 El Niño peaks across all the models on the top. The forest plot beneath shows the best estimate and range of outcomes predicted by each individual model.

Chart showing that El Niño is on track to set a new record in 2026
Top panel: Model-weighted distribution of each member’s peak Jul-Dec 2026 Niño3.4 anomaly (red bars), with the dotted yellow line indicating the weighted median (+3.6C) and the dotted blue line the prior record peak (2015-16, 2.75C). Bottom panel: median and 10th-90th percentile peak for each modelling group, with its typical peak month. The figure includes 667 model runs from 14 different modelling groups (from the CFS, NMME, C3S, CanSIPS and SINTEX-F systems). Chart by Carbon Brief.

The median forecast in every one of the 14 models suggests a peak that exceeds the 2C “super” El Niño threshold, with most models peaking in November or December.

Some caution here is warranted, however. Raw model Niño3.4 anomalies are measured against a fixed climatology. Because the entire tropical ocean has warmed due to human-caused greenhouse gas emissions, the models tend to overstate event strength relative to the historical record.

A cleaner comparison uses the relative Niño3.4 index (RONI), which subtracts the average tropical ocean warming.

This relative measure suggests the median forecast peak for El Niño in the latter half of 2026 is 3.1C. The prior record stands at a lower 2.69C, set in 1982-83.

Nevertheless, 77% of model runs still show a new record event occurring. This is shown in the chart below.

Chart showing that El Niño is on track to set a new record in 2026, even once warming is fully accounted for
Top panel: Model-weighted distribution of each member’s peak Jul-Dec 2026 RONI (red bars), with the dotted yellow line indicating the weighted median (+3.1C) and the dotted blue line the prior record peak (1982-83, 2.69C). Bottom panel: median and 10th-90th percentile peak for each modelling group, with its typical peak month. The figure includes 667 model runs from 14 different modelling groups (from the CFS, NMME, C3S, CanSIPS and SINTEX-F systems). Chart by Carbon Brief.

In summary, on both indexes, the central expectation is now for the strongest El Niño in the observational record.

Model forecasts made in the spring and early summer have historically shown some bias toward overpredicting event strength. However, forecasts made after the spring are considerably more reliable.

Widespread record warmth and a massive European heatwave

The map below shows the temperature anomaly for the first half of 2026 in the ERA5 dataset, relative to a 1981-2010 baseline period.

Global map showing global mean surface temperatures for January-June 2026 compared to a 1981-2010 baseline, using data from ERA5.
Global mean surface temperatures for January-June 2026 compared to a 1981-2010 baseline, using data from ERA5.

It shows how the largest warm anomalies were found across the Arctic – particularly north of Scandinavia and Svalbard – as well as western Europe, the western US, northern Mexico, central Asia, western China, eastern Russia and the Antarctic Peninsula region.

The developing El Niño is clearly visible as a tongue of warm anomalies stretching along the equatorial eastern Pacific. Only a few regions – central Canada, Alaska and parts of the Southern Ocean – saw temperatures below the 1981-2010 average.

Where 2026 ranks against history is even more striking. The map below shows where the period of January-June 2026 ranked among all 87 years in the ERA5 record, which stretches from 1940 to 2026. Grid cells marked in red saw temperatures in the first half of the year that were in the top-five warmest years.

Global map showing January-June 2026 per-gridcell ranks in ERA5.
January-June 2026 per-gridcell ranks in ERA5. 30% of the global surface saw a top-five warmest first half of the year; 7.1% saw record warmth. No areas (0.0%) saw top-five cold.

More than 30% of the global surface had a top-five warmest start to the year and 7.1% saw its warmest on record, including much of western Europe, the eastern equatorial Pacific and the seas around Japan.

Not a single grid cell had a top-five coolest start to the year. In June alone, 8.9% of the world’s surface saw record warmth for the month. This is illustrated in the map below, where grid cells marked in red saw temperatures that were in the top-five warmest years and grid cells in blue in the top-five coolest.

Global map showing June 2026 per-gridcell ranks in ERA5.
June 2026 per-gridcell ranks in ERA5.

The standout regional temperature event was a heatwave that struck Europe in late June.

Western Europe had its hottest June on record, recording an average temperature of 3.05C above the 1991-2020 average and beating the record set only a year earlier, according to Copernicus. A heat dome over 22-30 June broke 10 all-time national heat records and around 400 long-record station records.

France set a new June national record of 44.3C, while the UK broke its June record on three consecutive days, reaching 37.3C. The humid heat drove a death toll estimated in the thousands.

A separate heat dome also brought record June temperatures to parts of North America in late June.

On track to be second warmest, but a real chance at first

Carbon Brief’s updated projection for 2026 as a whole combines the observed January-June temperatures with the latest El Niño forecast. It uses a statistical model trained on the historical relationship between the first half of the year, ENSO conditions and annual temperatures observed over 1950-2025, excluding major volcanic eruption years.

Carbon Brief estimates that 2026 will be around 1.51C above pre-industrial levels, with a 90% range of 1.45C to 1.57C, shown by the yellow dot in the chart below.

This is up from 1.47C in the projection set out in April – and is notably more certain now that half the year has passed.

This central estimate would make 2026 the second-warmest year on record, just below 2024 (1.52C) and ahead of 2023 (1.43C) and 2025 (1.41C).

Chart showing that 2026 is on track to be the warmest or second-warmest year
Annual composite temperatures over 1970-2025, the 2026 year-to-date value (January-June, red dot), and Carbon Brief’s 2026 annual estimate (yellow dot with the 5th to 95th percentile range). Chart by Carbon Brief.

Carbon Brief’s modelling puts the chance that 2026 beats 2024 as the warmest year on record at 35%, using the average of the six different surface temperature records assessed. It puts the chance that 2026 comes in above 1.5C at around 63%.

If it does, 2026 would be the second calendar year – after 2024 – where warming averaged above 1.5C, in a further sign that the world is rapidly approaching the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit.

A single year above 1.5C does not by itself constitute a breach of the goal, which refers to the longer term average temperature of the planet. This is defined as the midpoint of a 20-year period by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

These likelihood of a record have been climbing rapidly throughout 2026.

Global temperatures so far throughout the year have run well below the record-setting levels of 2024 – around 0.13C cooler over the first six months.

On their own, temperatures observed so far in 2026 would make a new annual record unlikely.

However, rerunning the projection using only the data available at the end of each month since March – including both the year-to-date observations and the El Niño forecast issued that month – shows a shifting picture.

Using March data, 2026 had just a 7% chance of setting a new record. That rose to 16% in April, 24% in May, 27% in June and 35% using the latest data in mid-July.

This is shown in the chart below.

Chart showing that the chances of a record-warm 2026 have risen five-fold since March
Columns show the probability that 2026 exceeds 2024 as the warmest year on record, based on data available at the end of each month; the line shows the corresponding forecast of July-December ENSO conditions (relative Niño3.4 index). Chart by Carbon Brief.

Notably, this rise has little to do with observed temperatures. The year-to-date anomaly has actually drifted slightly down, from 1.41C after March to 1.39C after June.

Observed temperatures and fewer remaining months of the year contributed only around four percentage points of the 28-point rise in the likelihood; the remaining ~84% of the change comes from successive upward revisions to the El Niño forecast for late 2026.

However, whether 2026 ends up becoming the warmest year on record may end up depending on which dataset is used.

Running the same projection gives odds of a 2026 record of around two-in-three for Berkeley Earth (66%) and NASA GISTEMP (65%), but only 35% for HadCRUT5, 24% for NOAA and just 13% and 9% for the ERA5 and JRA-3Q reanalyses, respectively.

This is shown below.

Six charts showing observed annual temperatures for 2026 and the projections for each dataset
Observed annual temperatures since 1990, with each dataset’s own 2024 record (dashed line) and the 2026 projection (median, 25-75% bar and 5-95% whisker), with the per-dataset chance of a 2026 record in each panel’s title. Chart by Carbon Brief.

The divergence between projections mostly reflects how exceptional each dataset’s 2024 was.

The reanalysis approaches recorded a particularly warm 2024, leaving 2026 more ground to make up. GISTEMP and Berkeley, on the other hand, project 2026 modestly above their 2024 values.

A repeat of the situation in 2015 where different groups disagreed on record rankings is a real possibility. Headlines in January 2027 may hinge on choices of dataset.

2027 likely to be the warmest year in human history

The biggest climate story of the developing super El Niño may not be 2026 at all.

Global temperatures typically lag in the tropical Pacific by around three months. So, an El Niño event peaking in November and December 2026 will have its largest warming influence on 2027.

We saw this same pattern occur in 1997-98, 2015-16 and 2023-24 – where the year in which the El Niño developed was warm, but the following year was record-smashing.

Carbon Brief has extended its projection into 2027 by using the historical relationship between year-over-year temperature changes and ENSO conditions in the preceding autumn.

This yields a best estimate for 2027 of around 1.71C above pre-industrial levels, with a 90% range of 1.49C to 1.93C. This is shown by a yellow square on the chart below.

Chart showing that 2027 is likely to set a new global temperature record
Observed annual composite temperatures 1970-2025 and Carbon Brief’s projections for 2026 and 2027 (medians and 5th to 95th percentile ranges). Chart by Carbon Brief.

That would give 2027 a 92% chance of setting a new global temperature record and a 94% chance of exceeding 1.5C.

Taking 2026 and 2027 together, there is a 93% chance that at least one of the two years sets a new record.

The 2027 estimate is more uncertain than the 2026 one. As with 2026, there are uncertainties in the projection due to unknowns around exactly how strong the El Niño peak proves to be and how quickly it decays.

However, even the low end of the 2027 range would put it among the warmest years on record and the central estimate of 1.71C would exceed 2024 by nearly 0.2C.

If these projections bear out, the 2020s will have delivered new global temperature records in 2023, 2024 and 2027 – and potentially 2026 too – with a number of individual years well above the 1.5C threshold.

The long-term warming trend, driven by human emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, has increased from around 0.18C per decade in the early 2000s to around 0.27C per decade today. El Niño and La Niña play a big role in determining which years along that rising path stand out as records.

Arctic sea ice at record lows

Arctic sea ice has spent much of 2026 in record-low territory.

Following the joint-lowest winter maximum in the satellite record in mid-March, daily extent has set or tied record lows for the date on 39 days so far this year, including extended spells in mid-to-late March and in early-to-mid June.

The most recent record-low days were in early July.

The chart below shows how Arctic sea ice in 2026 (dark red line) has been below the historical range (shaded red).

It also shows how Antarctic sea ice (dark blue), meanwhile, has remained below the 1979-2010 range for almost all of 2026 to date.

Chart showing that Arctic sea ice has been at a record low for most of 2026
Daily 2026 sea ice extent (bold lines) compared to the 1979-2010 historical range (shaded) and the record daily low from any prior year (dotted). Chart by Carbon Brief using data from NSIDC

As of mid-July, Arctic extent is a bit below the 1979-2010 historical range for the date, though it remains around 0.6m square kilometres (km2) larger than the record low for the date set during 2020’s exceptional summer melt season.

The trajectory over the coming two months will determine whether 2026 challenges 2012’s record September minimum. Early-summer conditions are a poor predictor of the September minimum, which depends heavily on summer weather.

Antarctic sea ice, meanwhile, is currently around 300,000km2 below the historical envelope, but has stayed well clear of the record lows set in 2023 and has not set any new daily records yet this year.

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