Ahead of Donald Trump’s second term as US president, a rerun of his first trade war with China is firmly on the cards – and minerals key to the energy transition may end up in the crossfire.
The president-elect has threatened to raise tariffs on goods from China, as well as on other countries through which Chinese goods flow to the US.
While his overall stance towards China remains unclear, Trump has also pinpointed eliminating “dependence on China in all critical areas” as a priority.
Meanwhile, China has been developing a “versatile” policy toolkit to cope with rising trade tensions – including with the EU and Japan, as well as the US.
One notable recent example is China’s use of export controls, which it has placed on four minerals: germanium, gallium, graphite and antimony.
All of these minerals play important roles in low-carbon technologies, but also have other applications, including military uses.
Analysis by Carbon Brief and others shows that China’s initial export controls, introduced in summer 2023, did not have a sustained impact on critical-mineral supply chains.
However, an announcement in early December 2024 of stricter controls, specifically on exports to the US, has sparked debate over how impactful these might be.
In this article, Carbon Brief examines what US-China tensions over critical minerals could mean for the stability of their supply chains and for the transition to cleaner energy.
- Which minerals are important to the clean-energy transition?
- How has China’s ability to control its critical minerals evolved?
- How did the initial export bans affect critical mineral trade flows?
- Do the US-specific controls represent a significant change in China’s strategy?
- Could future US-China tensions exacerbate critical mineral controls?
Which minerals are important to the clean-energy transition?
Minerals are crucial to the development of several low-carbon technologies.
Indium and gallium are used in the coatings for solar panels, copper and “rare earth” metals are used in the conductors and permanent magnets in wind turbines, and a plethora of minerals from lithium to manganese are used in various types of batteries.
China holds a significant presence in the supply chains for many minerals – particularly in terms of processing. As seen in the table below, more than half of global extraction of graphite, rare-earth elements (REEs) and vanadium, as well as the majority of processing of aluminium, cobalt, graphite, indium, lithium, REEs and silicon, occurs in China, according to a study by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
A list of several minerals important for low-carbon technologies, plus the share that China holds in its reserves, extraction and processing industries. Source: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
However, not all of these materials are considered “critical minerals”, which is a political term used to describe those that play a role in strategically important sectors, with each country setting their own parameters for strategic importance.
The US lists 50 minerals as critical, while the EU has identified 34 critical minerals and an additional 16 “strategic raw materials”, while Japan has 35 minerals on its list.
Although China has not updated its official critical minerals list since 2016, a November 2023 post on the official WeChat account of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) revealed that it considers at least 31 minerals to be critical.
The post compares areas of overlap and divergence between the critical mineral listings of China (orange), and those in the EU (green) or the US (blue).
The minerals that are “on similar lists” for China and the EU and US are “where there's more competition” when it comes to sourcing, John Johnson, special advisor and former CEO for commodities consulting firm CRU Group’s China office, tells Carbon Brief.
However, despite some countries’ efforts to diversify their imports of critical minerals away from China, analysis by the International Energy Agency (IEA) found that, based on announced projects, the status quo for supply of minerals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt and graphite was unlikely to change between now and 2030.
The IEA analysis noted that, in some areas, such as battery cell manufacturing, “announced capacity additions in Europe and the US should be sufficient to meet the 2030 domestic deployment needs” – although it added that, globally, demand for a number of critical minerals is likely to far exceed supply.
However, Tony Alderson, a senior analyst focused on graphite at price reporting agency Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, is sceptical, telling Carbon Brief that “it's almost unheard of for a facility to be at 100% utilisation rates”. He adds that, for graphite, demand in the US and EU would likely outstrip supply well beyond 2030.
How has China’s ability to control its critical minerals evolved?
China has a well-documented history of using trade restrictions to achieve broader political aims.
The first trade war with the US between 2016 and 2020 saw China try to deescalate US tariffs on Chinese goods by imposing tariffs of its own, as well as non-tariff trade barriers.
The country has also used trade controls to affect non-trade-related political clashes.
Under the Biden administration, the US developed a “small yard, high fence” approach – meaning the US would “be selective in choosing technologies that need protecting, but be aggressive in safeguarding them”.
It placed a series of export controls on semiconductors and products used to make them, encouraging allies such as Japan and the Netherlands to do the same.
In response, China began limiting exports of some critical minerals, placing restrictions in August 2023 on exports of certain types of gallium and germanium, followed by similar restrictions on graphite from December 2023 and on antimony from September 2024.
With the exception of antimony, these restrictions were enacted in a clear response to US moves to curb Chinese imports for use in its semiconductor sector.
At the same time, China began enhancing its export control regime, which unified and rationalised an existing constellation of export control policies into a single framework.
This included development of an “unreliable entity list”, an export control law, legislation to counter foreign sanctions and regulation of items that are considered “dual-use”, meaning they can be used for military as well as civilian purposes.
“Historically, [China’s] export control regime has been extremely piecemeal,” Cory Combs, head of critical mineral and supply chain research at consultancy Trivium China, tells Carbon Brief.
He adds that one of the recent policy push’s major aims was to improve compliance by “making sure everything's in one place and the rules are consistent – that you don't have slightly different standards for different types of controls”.
These efforts paved the way to restrictions on critical minerals being intensified in early December 2024, when China sharpened restrictions on exporting graphite and banned exports of gallium, germanium and antimony to the US “in principle”.
A spokesperson from China’s commerce ministry stated this was in response to the US “weaponising” its own export controls by imposing broad restrictions on the Chinese chip-making industry.
How did the initial export bans affect critical mineral trade flows?
Analysis of China’s initial export controls on gallium, graphite and germanium shows that trade largely continued to flow, despite the new rules.
As shown in the graphs compiled by Carbon Brief below, Chinese exports of restricted types of gallium and germanium stopped for two months after the August restrictions came into effect. However, exports resumed from October 2023, albeit at slightly lower levels.
Not all types of the targeted critical minerals seemed to have been affected by the two-month suspension, with flows of non-controlled products, such as germanium oxides, seeing no significant change.
For graphite, exports of major products remained relatively stable, with the exception of a spike in exports ahead of the restrictions coming into place, likely due to stockpiling. Average exports in 2024 were higher than in 2022.
Both Combs and Johnson both note that, anecdotally, they had not heard of any cases of exporters being unable to acquire licences to export products.
Alderson tells Carbon Brief that exporters, nevertheless, found that the approvals were particularly quick for South Korea and Japan, while it took “longer for [products destined for the] US and India to get licenses approved”.
Analysis by the US-based Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) similarly found that, for the US in particular, the export controls on gallium, germanium and graphite “haven’t radically altered the US-China trading relationship around these minerals and related products”, as shown in the graph below.
For graphite (the blue line in the chart), US imports from February to August 2024 were “only a hair lower than in the seven months preceding the announcement of export controls”, it found.
For germanium (black), in 10 months following the enactment of controls, exports were “down only one percentage point from the ten months preceding the ban”, it added. For gallium (red), while exports have fallen to zero, “the chart makes very clear [that] the US was never particularly reliant on China for sourcing in the first place”.
The PIIE analysis concluded in August 2024, ahead of the restrictions on antimony and US-specific controls.
This outcome was likely by design, due to the calculated nature of China’s export controls.
The goal of the initial export controls was to improve China’s visibility of how the minerals it processed were being used, Combs tells Carbon Brief, which is why the initial controls required exporters to apply for licences, rather than implementing a blanket ban on exports.
Alderson says that the new licences required companies to share more information about themselves, their products and their end users.
As such, cutting off supplies to other countries immediately was not the aim of the original announcements.
The initial controls on critical minerals broadly follow similar patterns to China’s previous non-tariff trade measures. With the exception of antimony, the critical mineral controls were imposed in response to perceived attempts to “undermine China’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests”, rather than being the first salvo of a trade dispute.
This is because, according to a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report, China is aware that outright export bans would accelerate other nations’ efforts to derisk and diversify supply chains, weakening its long-term position.
The RUSI report added that export controls must be examined to determine whether the move is meant to be a political signal or a more serious attempt at “economic coercion”.
Stringent export controls incur a domestic cost in China, impacting both industrial activity and broader economic growth. As such, export controls are likely to be calibrated to capture headlines without incurring as severe an economic impact as they imply, RUSI said.
A government official involved in the design of the gallium and germanium controls said they were meant to be a “deterrent”, the Financial Times reported, quoting the official saying: “We had many options…This was not our most extreme move.”
An example of China “going for the throat” with export controls, Combs tells Carbon Brief before the US-specific controls were announced, would be placing controls on copper.
He explains this is because – although Chinese copper is a vital resource in global manufacturing, particularly in clean-energy technologies – the majority of copper smelted in China is consumed domestically. As a result, an export control on copper “would be a perfect case of hurting others without hurting itself too much”.
“Instead”, he says, the initial moves seemed to be saying “don’t test us”.
Do the US-specific controls represent a significant change in China’s strategy?
The measures announced in early December 2024 are a pointed escalation of China’s use of critical mineral export controls.
Under the new rules, gallium, germanium and antimony will “in principle” no longer be permitted to be shipped to the US and tighter controls will be placed on sales of graphite.
In an analysis, Combs and Trivium China co-founder Andrew Polk wrote that the restrictions are a signal that China is “ready to counter US moves much more aggressively”.
This was echoed by China’s former central bank governor Yi Gang, who the South China Morning Post quoted saying: “We all understand that, from an economics perspective, [retaliatory actions are] never a good choice…but there’s not much policymakers can do about that [in the face of domestic pressure].”
More time will be needed to see “how strict” implementation will be, Alderson says, adding that for graphite, it is not yet clear which products will be affected – the stricter controls could be limited to “the 99.999% [purity] which goes into military end-use materials”, rather than the lower-grade graphite used in electric vehicle batteries.
Trivium China’s assessment noted that the announcement suggested China would “close” loopholes that allowed for “export leakage”, adding that it is not clear “how far Beijing might go to investigate or punish third countries suspected of prohibited re-exports”.
Gerard di Pippo, senior geoeconomic analyst for Bloomberg Economics, was sceptical about the significance of the threat, writing that “China lacks the legal reach, export-control surveillance capabilities and alliance network” needed to enforce third-country compliance.
Other analysts told MIT Technology Review that, “for the most part, the bans won’t have major economic impacts”, due to existing US efforts to diversify its supply chains
Nevertheless, Alderson says, the current uncertainty underscores the fact that “localisation is critical” for those that rely on critical minerals.
Could future US-China tensions exacerbate critical mineral controls?
China’s motive for the most recent controls is unclear, Combs and Polk wrote. It could be to protest against the US move to restrict exports of particular chips and chip-making tools as well as the addition of 140 Chinese companies to a trade blacklist, they said, or to “warn the incoming Trump administration” against raising tensions.
It is broadly expected that US-China trade tensions will escalate after Donald Trump begins his second term as US president.
US concerns around the “threat” that China poses to its industrial capabilities have been notably bipartisan. However, where Biden’s approach was characterised by relatively nuanced policies, the second Trump administration – much like the first – could prioritise the use of broad tariffs to shrink the US’ trade deficit with China.
Combs tells Carbon Brief that Beijing’s goal is to “change US behaviour”, so it would “use terms that Trump understands”, such as broad trade tariffs, in trade disputes with the US, rather than the more nuanced controls it has used in response to the Biden administration. He explains:
“Most of the [trade volume and value of these] minerals are way too small to affect the trade balance…so purchases of beef, soy and similar items would make more sense as a retaliation mechanism [for China to use].”
It remains to be seen, he says, how much emphasis Trumps’ advisors, particularly new commerce secretary Howard Lutnick, will place on critical minerals. The issue could appear on the radar should Beijing use additional controls to pressure particular US companies to lobby the US government, he adds.
Johnson notes that China has reasons to avoid escalating the issue of critical mineral exports further, such as its dependency on the US for exports of a number of minerals, such as high purity quartz, iron ore and potash.
In addition, he says, the minerals that countries consider critical “change over time”, as new technologies create demand for new minerals and render other minerals obsolete.
Progress in developing recycling processes could also relieve pressure on supply chains. Scrap is already a small source for supply of gallium and germanium, while germanium can also be recovered from existing products.
According to the IEA, successful scaling-up of recycling could “lower the need for new mining activity by 25‑40% by 2050”, under a scenario that assumes governments will meet all of their climate goals on time and in full.
Meanwhile, other regions seem to be treading cautiously. The Washington Post notes that pushback from the Japanese and Dutch governments led to a “delay” in the launch of the most recent US semiconductor export controls, which were watered down to “accommodate” their concerns.
Combs tells Carbon Brief that he does not see any flashpoints significant enough to trigger export controls on critical minerals to the EU.
“[Restricting China’s ability to buy from] ASML was the single most impactful [move against China by the EU],” he says, adding that there are few, if any, remaining political disputes where Europe would willingly trigger “significant retaliation” from China.
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Q&A: What could a US-China trade war mean for the energy transition?
After a five-year long legal battle, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has blocked Shell and local partner Impact Africa’s permit to explore for oil and gas off the country’s East Coast, in a landmark victory for local communities and civil society.
“Today’s judgment makes me feel very happy and proud that the ocean is not for profit for mining companies,” said East Coast resident and environmental campaigner Siyabonga Ndovela.
The verdict culminates a years-long process in which non-profits Sustaining the Wild Coast, Natural Justice, Greenpeace Africa, and others took legal action against Shell, Impact Africa and the South African government for failing to consult affected communities – a legal requirement in the country.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Shell and Impact Africa had not complied with resource governance law, had failed to meaningfully conduct public consultation and had failed to consider the impact on climate change, cultural rights, livelihoods and ecological harm.
The ruling references last year’s landmark advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, which states that countries have a legal duty to prevent and repair damage to the climate system. The South African judges argued climate change “transcends borders” and that states’ obligations “must be understood within the broader framework of international law.”
“This case must also be understood against the backdrop of well-documented struggles by coastal communities to protect their land, marine resources and ways of life in the face of extractive activities that they believe threaten their very existence,” wrote Justice Narandran Kollapen.
The Constitutional Court found that the exploration right had been unlawfully granted by the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources.The ruling upholds a 2022 regional court decision against Shell and overturns a 2024 appeal that allowed the company to conduct fresh public consultations under the original exploration right. Today’s decision means the right, initially granted in 2014, must be set aside.
Celebrating the decision, Sherelee Odyar, oil and gas campaigner at Greenpeace Africa, told Climate Home News that the court confirmed “serious failures” in the awarding of exploration rights to Shell and Impact Africa, which “can not simply be corrected later”.
The Wild Coast is a biodiversity hotspot which has been conserved over generations by coastal communities who rely on the ocean and land. “Our land and sea are central to our livelihoods and our way of life. Over generations we have conserved them, and they have conserved us,” reads the founding statement in the case.
A Shell spokesperson said it noted the ruling, responding that “we are committed to responsible offshore exploration, meaningful stakeholder engagement and environmental stewardship.”
The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources did not respond to requests for comment at the time of publication.
“Renewed strength” for communities
The ruling adds to a series of legal challenges brought by civil society groups against oil companies and the government as South Africa has expanded oil and gas development since 2014 under Operation Phakisa, a plan aimed at “unlocking the economic potential of the oceans”.
On the West Coast, Walter Steenkamp, Chair of Aukotowa Fisheries Cooperative, which is involved in a separate ongoing legal action against TotalEnergies, said that “today’s court case gave me renewed strength.”
The case could also set a precedent for future oil developments, said Alessandro Mazzi, legal governance researcher at the University of Wageningen. He added that the verdict “sends a strong signal to investors that where projects affect people’s land, livelihoods and environment, meaningful consultation and genuine ecological assessment are an integral part of responsible investment”.
Janet Solomon, coordinator of advocacy group Oceans not Oil, said that the Court’s emphasis on democratic participation, culture, livelihoods and the health of future generations in handing down the verdict signals a shift in jurisprudence on environmental governance, saying that this focus “may prove to be the judgment’s most enduring legacy.”
The post South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right appeared first on Climate Home News.
South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right
China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.
The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.
This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.
Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.
However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.
It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.
But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.
Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.
Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.
Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.
What does the plan say about peaking coal?
Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.
The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.
Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.
The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:
“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”
However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.
The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.
Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.
Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.
But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.
The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.
In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.
It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.
The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.
The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.
The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:
- Peaking coal consumption;
- “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
- Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
- Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
- “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
- Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
- Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
- Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.
The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.
“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.
A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.
This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”
However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.
State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.
“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.
While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.
Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.
“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.
What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.
The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.
The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.
Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.
Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.
“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.
Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.
It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.
This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.
New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.
This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.
The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.
What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.
The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.
Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.
In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.
It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.
This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.
Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.
Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.
China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.
Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.
It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]
The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.
At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.
In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.
Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.
In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.
However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.
She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.
How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?
Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.
As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.
Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.
A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.
But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.
China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.
The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”
The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.
Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.
Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:
“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”
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The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?
The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.
A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.
The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.
In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.
This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.
This Australian coal community is co-designing its own green future
Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.
Openings down, pipeline up
But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.
“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.
The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.
Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.
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The post New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus appeared first on Climate Home News.
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