Ahead of Donald Trump’s second term as US president, a rerun of his first trade war with China is firmly on the cards – and minerals key to the energy transition may end up in the crossfire.
The president-elect has threatened to raise tariffs on goods from China, as well as on other countries through which Chinese goods flow to the US.
While his overall stance towards China remains unclear, Trump has also pinpointed eliminating “dependence on China in all critical areas” as a priority.
Meanwhile, China has been developing a “versatile” policy toolkit to cope with rising trade tensions – including with the EU and Japan, as well as the US.
One notable recent example is China’s use of export controls, which it has placed on four minerals: germanium, gallium, graphite and antimony.
All of these minerals play important roles in low-carbon technologies, but also have other applications, including military uses.
Analysis by Carbon Brief and others shows that China’s initial export controls, introduced in summer 2023, did not have a sustained impact on critical-mineral supply chains.
However, an announcement in early December 2024 of stricter controls, specifically on exports to the US, has sparked debate over how impactful these might be.
In this article, Carbon Brief examines what US-China tensions over critical minerals could mean for the stability of their supply chains and for the transition to cleaner energy.
- Which minerals are important to the clean-energy transition?
- How has China’s ability to control its critical minerals evolved?
- How did the initial export bans affect critical mineral trade flows?
- Do the US-specific controls represent a significant change in China’s strategy?
- Could future US-China tensions exacerbate critical mineral controls?
Which minerals are important to the clean-energy transition?
Minerals are crucial to the development of several low-carbon technologies.
Indium and gallium are used in the coatings for solar panels, copper and “rare earth” metals are used in the conductors and permanent magnets in wind turbines, and a plethora of minerals from lithium to manganese are used in various types of batteries.
China holds a significant presence in the supply chains for many minerals – particularly in terms of processing. As seen in the table below, more than half of global extraction of graphite, rare-earth elements (REEs) and vanadium, as well as the majority of processing of aluminium, cobalt, graphite, indium, lithium, REEs and silicon, occurs in China, according to a study by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
A list of several minerals important for low-carbon technologies, plus the share that China holds in its reserves, extraction and processing industries. Source: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
However, not all of these materials are considered “critical minerals”, which is a political term used to describe those that play a role in strategically important sectors, with each country setting their own parameters for strategic importance.
The US lists 50 minerals as critical, while the EU has identified 34 critical minerals and an additional 16 “strategic raw materials”, while Japan has 35 minerals on its list.
Although China has not updated its official critical minerals list since 2016, a November 2023 post on the official WeChat account of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) revealed that it considers at least 31 minerals to be critical.
The post compares areas of overlap and divergence between the critical mineral listings of China (orange), and those in the EU (green) or the US (blue).
The minerals that are “on similar lists” for China and the EU and US are “where there's more competition” when it comes to sourcing, John Johnson, special advisor and former CEO for commodities consulting firm CRU Group’s China office, tells Carbon Brief.
However, despite some countries’ efforts to diversify their imports of critical minerals away from China, analysis by the International Energy Agency (IEA) found that, based on announced projects, the status quo for supply of minerals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt and graphite was unlikely to change between now and 2030.
The IEA analysis noted that, in some areas, such as battery cell manufacturing, “announced capacity additions in Europe and the US should be sufficient to meet the 2030 domestic deployment needs” – although it added that, globally, demand for a number of critical minerals is likely to far exceed supply.
However, Tony Alderson, a senior analyst focused on graphite at price reporting agency Benchmark Minerals Intelligence, is sceptical, telling Carbon Brief that “it's almost unheard of for a facility to be at 100% utilisation rates”. He adds that, for graphite, demand in the US and EU would likely outstrip supply well beyond 2030.
How has China’s ability to control its critical minerals evolved?
China has a well-documented history of using trade restrictions to achieve broader political aims.
The first trade war with the US between 2016 and 2020 saw China try to deescalate US tariffs on Chinese goods by imposing tariffs of its own, as well as non-tariff trade barriers.
The country has also used trade controls to affect non-trade-related political clashes.
Under the Biden administration, the US developed a “small yard, high fence” approach – meaning the US would “be selective in choosing technologies that need protecting, but be aggressive in safeguarding them”.
It placed a series of export controls on semiconductors and products used to make them, encouraging allies such as Japan and the Netherlands to do the same.
In response, China began limiting exports of some critical minerals, placing restrictions in August 2023 on exports of certain types of gallium and germanium, followed by similar restrictions on graphite from December 2023 and on antimony from September 2024.
With the exception of antimony, these restrictions were enacted in a clear response to US moves to curb Chinese imports for use in its semiconductor sector.
At the same time, China began enhancing its export control regime, which unified and rationalised an existing constellation of export control policies into a single framework.
This included development of an “unreliable entity list”, an export control law, legislation to counter foreign sanctions and regulation of items that are considered “dual-use”, meaning they can be used for military as well as civilian purposes.
“Historically, [China’s] export control regime has been extremely piecemeal,” Cory Combs, head of critical mineral and supply chain research at consultancy Trivium China, tells Carbon Brief.
He adds that one of the recent policy push’s major aims was to improve compliance by “making sure everything's in one place and the rules are consistent – that you don't have slightly different standards for different types of controls”.
These efforts paved the way to restrictions on critical minerals being intensified in early December 2024, when China sharpened restrictions on exporting graphite and banned exports of gallium, germanium and antimony to the US “in principle”.
A spokesperson from China’s commerce ministry stated this was in response to the US “weaponising” its own export controls by imposing broad restrictions on the Chinese chip-making industry.
How did the initial export bans affect critical mineral trade flows?
Analysis of China’s initial export controls on gallium, graphite and germanium shows that trade largely continued to flow, despite the new rules.
As shown in the graphs compiled by Carbon Brief below, Chinese exports of restricted types of gallium and germanium stopped for two months after the August restrictions came into effect. However, exports resumed from October 2023, albeit at slightly lower levels.
Not all types of the targeted critical minerals seemed to have been affected by the two-month suspension, with flows of non-controlled products, such as germanium oxides, seeing no significant change.
For graphite, exports of major products remained relatively stable, with the exception of a spike in exports ahead of the restrictions coming into place, likely due to stockpiling. Average exports in 2024 were higher than in 2022.
Both Combs and Johnson both note that, anecdotally, they had not heard of any cases of exporters being unable to acquire licences to export products.
Alderson tells Carbon Brief that exporters, nevertheless, found that the approvals were particularly quick for South Korea and Japan, while it took “longer for [products destined for the] US and India to get licenses approved”.
Analysis by the US-based Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) similarly found that, for the US in particular, the export controls on gallium, germanium and graphite “haven’t radically altered the US-China trading relationship around these minerals and related products”, as shown in the graph below.
For graphite (the blue line in the chart), US imports from February to August 2024 were “only a hair lower than in the seven months preceding the announcement of export controls”, it found.
For germanium (black), in 10 months following the enactment of controls, exports were “down only one percentage point from the ten months preceding the ban”, it added. For gallium (red), while exports have fallen to zero, “the chart makes very clear [that] the US was never particularly reliant on China for sourcing in the first place”.
The PIIE analysis concluded in August 2024, ahead of the restrictions on antimony and US-specific controls.
This outcome was likely by design, due to the calculated nature of China’s export controls.
The goal of the initial export controls was to improve China’s visibility of how the minerals it processed were being used, Combs tells Carbon Brief, which is why the initial controls required exporters to apply for licences, rather than implementing a blanket ban on exports.
Alderson says that the new licences required companies to share more information about themselves, their products and their end users.
As such, cutting off supplies to other countries immediately was not the aim of the original announcements.
The initial controls on critical minerals broadly follow similar patterns to China’s previous non-tariff trade measures. With the exception of antimony, the critical mineral controls were imposed in response to perceived attempts to “undermine China’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests”, rather than being the first salvo of a trade dispute.
This is because, according to a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report, China is aware that outright export bans would accelerate other nations’ efforts to derisk and diversify supply chains, weakening its long-term position.
The RUSI report added that export controls must be examined to determine whether the move is meant to be a political signal or a more serious attempt at “economic coercion”.
Stringent export controls incur a domestic cost in China, impacting both industrial activity and broader economic growth. As such, export controls are likely to be calibrated to capture headlines without incurring as severe an economic impact as they imply, RUSI said.
A government official involved in the design of the gallium and germanium controls said they were meant to be a “deterrent”, the Financial Times reported, quoting the official saying: “We had many options…This was not our most extreme move.”
An example of China “going for the throat” with export controls, Combs tells Carbon Brief before the US-specific controls were announced, would be placing controls on copper.
He explains this is because – although Chinese copper is a vital resource in global manufacturing, particularly in clean-energy technologies – the majority of copper smelted in China is consumed domestically. As a result, an export control on copper “would be a perfect case of hurting others without hurting itself too much”.
“Instead”, he says, the initial moves seemed to be saying “don’t test us”.
Do the US-specific controls represent a significant change in China’s strategy?
The measures announced in early December 2024 are a pointed escalation of China’s use of critical mineral export controls.
Under the new rules, gallium, germanium and antimony will “in principle” no longer be permitted to be shipped to the US and tighter controls will be placed on sales of graphite.
In an analysis, Combs and Trivium China co-founder Andrew Polk wrote that the restrictions are a signal that China is “ready to counter US moves much more aggressively”.
This was echoed by China’s former central bank governor Yi Gang, who the South China Morning Post quoted saying: “We all understand that, from an economics perspective, [retaliatory actions are] never a good choice…but there’s not much policymakers can do about that [in the face of domestic pressure].”
More time will be needed to see “how strict” implementation will be, Alderson says, adding that for graphite, it is not yet clear which products will be affected – the stricter controls could be limited to “the 99.999% [purity] which goes into military end-use materials”, rather than the lower-grade graphite used in electric vehicle batteries.
Trivium China’s assessment noted that the announcement suggested China would “close” loopholes that allowed for “export leakage”, adding that it is not clear “how far Beijing might go to investigate or punish third countries suspected of prohibited re-exports”.
Gerard di Pippo, senior geoeconomic analyst for Bloomberg Economics, was sceptical about the significance of the threat, writing that “China lacks the legal reach, export-control surveillance capabilities and alliance network” needed to enforce third-country compliance.
Other analysts told MIT Technology Review that, “for the most part, the bans won’t have major economic impacts”, due to existing US efforts to diversify its supply chains
Nevertheless, Alderson says, the current uncertainty underscores the fact that “localisation is critical” for those that rely on critical minerals.
Could future US-China tensions exacerbate critical mineral controls?
China’s motive for the most recent controls is unclear, Combs and Polk wrote. It could be to protest against the US move to restrict exports of particular chips and chip-making tools as well as the addition of 140 Chinese companies to a trade blacklist, they said, or to “warn the incoming Trump administration” against raising tensions.
It is broadly expected that US-China trade tensions will escalate after Donald Trump begins his second term as US president.
US concerns around the “threat” that China poses to its industrial capabilities have been notably bipartisan. However, where Biden’s approach was characterised by relatively nuanced policies, the second Trump administration – much like the first – could prioritise the use of broad tariffs to shrink the US’ trade deficit with China.
Combs tells Carbon Brief that Beijing’s goal is to “change US behaviour”, so it would “use terms that Trump understands”, such as broad trade tariffs, in trade disputes with the US, rather than the more nuanced controls it has used in response to the Biden administration. He explains:
“Most of the [trade volume and value of these] minerals are way too small to affect the trade balance…so purchases of beef, soy and similar items would make more sense as a retaliation mechanism [for China to use].”
It remains to be seen, he says, how much emphasis Trumps’ advisors, particularly new commerce secretary Howard Lutnick, will place on critical minerals. The issue could appear on the radar should Beijing use additional controls to pressure particular US companies to lobby the US government, he adds.
Johnson notes that China has reasons to avoid escalating the issue of critical mineral exports further, such as its dependency on the US for exports of a number of minerals, such as high purity quartz, iron ore and potash.
In addition, he says, the minerals that countries consider critical “change over time”, as new technologies create demand for new minerals and render other minerals obsolete.
Progress in developing recycling processes could also relieve pressure on supply chains. Scrap is already a small source for supply of gallium and germanium, while germanium can also be recovered from existing products.
According to the IEA, successful scaling-up of recycling could “lower the need for new mining activity by 25‑40% by 2050”, under a scenario that assumes governments will meet all of their climate goals on time and in full.
Meanwhile, other regions seem to be treading cautiously. The Washington Post notes that pushback from the Japanese and Dutch governments led to a “delay” in the launch of the most recent US semiconductor export controls, which were watered down to “accommodate” their concerns.
Combs tells Carbon Brief that he does not see any flashpoints significant enough to trigger export controls on critical minerals to the EU.
“[Restricting China’s ability to buy from] ASML was the single most impactful [move against China by the EU],” he says, adding that there are few, if any, remaining political disputes where Europe would willingly trigger “significant retaliation” from China.
The post Q&A: What could a US-China trade war mean for the energy transition? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What could a US-China trade war mean for the energy transition?
Antarctic sea ice has recorded its third-smallest winter peak extent since satellite records began 48 years ago, new data reveals.
Provisional data from the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) shows that Antarctic sea ice hit its annual winter peak on 14 September, with an extent of 17.59m square kilometres (km2).
The organisation notes that the data is still preliminary, adding that “large fluctuations in extent are typical of Antarctic sea ice near the seasonal maximum”.
One expert tells Carbon Brief that it is “concerning to see these low values persisting”, but says that scientists need more time to determine whether this represents a “structural shift” in Antarctic sea ice extent.
Meanwhile, at the Earth’s other pole, Arctic sea ice reached its annual minimum on 12 September, ranking as the joint-10th lowest in the satellite record.
The NSIDC notes that the last 20 years have seen the lowest 20 Arctic sea ice extents in the satellite record.
Antarctic peak
Dr Lettie Roach, a polar climate scientist at the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany, tells Carbon Brief that this year’s Antarctic sea ice maximum was “well below average for the season”. She warns that, “after several decades of stable or increasing winter Antarctic sea ice conditions, it is concerning to see these low values persisting”.
She adds:
“Compared with the Arctic, it’s less clear how recent changes in Antarctic sea ice are attributable to human-caused warming vs natural variability. We need more years of observations to better understand whether this is truly a structural shift.”
Dr Clare Eayrs, a postdoctoral researcher at the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), tells Carbon Brief that, since recording a “near-average February minimum” extent, Antarctic sea ice has “returned to unusually low winter coverage”.
She notes that Antarctic sea ice extent in July and August this year were the fifth and fourth lowest on record, respectively, adding that “all five of the lowest July extents have occurred since 2022 and all four of the lowest August extents since 2023”.
The chart below shows Antarctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2023 (mid blue), the year of the smallest winter sea-ice maximum on record.
Eayrs tells Carbon Brief that the regional pattern of Antarctic sea ice cover “changed substantially during the growth season”.
For example, she says that “in April, the Bellingshausen Sea remained almost entirely ice-free, while the neighbouring Amundsen Sea had more ice than usual”.
However, by late August, changes in atmospheric pressure and wind meant that “the Bellingshausen deficit had largely recovered, while ice was unusually scarce in the Amundsen Sea and across much of East Antarctica”.
Arctic minimum
Meanwhile, the Arctic recorded its minimum summer sea ice extent on 12 September. At 4.60m km2, this year ties with 2025, 2010 and 2008 as the 10th-lowest sea ice extent on record.
The chart below shows Arctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2012 (mid blue), the year of the smallest summer sea-ice minimum on record.
Roach tells Carbon Brief that although this minimum is not “record setting”, it is still “lower than any sea ice minimum before 2007”. She adds:
“Human-caused climate change has reduced Arctic sea ice cover and thickness, so the region is fundamentally different compared to a few decades ago.”
Scientists have been tracking Arctic sea ice thickness using a reanalysis produced called the Pan-Arctic Ice Ocean Modeling and Assimilation System (PIOMAS) since 1979.
In March 2026, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) terminated a global dataset of air pressure that scientists relied upon to produce PIOMAS, forcing both datasets to stop publishing updates.
The PIOMAS website says it will take “considerable effort and time” to find alternative data to use in their reanalysis. It adds that “we don’t yet have a good sense if that’s possible with available funds and if so, when we will be able to resume production of a new PIOMAS timeseries”.
Roach also notes that August saw record-breaking heat sweep across much of the world, explaining that high temperatures “extended into Arctic coastal regions, close to regions with substantial sea ice loss – particularly the Barents-Kara and East Siberian seas”.
Dr Zack Labe, a scientist at Climate Central, tells Carbon Brief that the absence of a new record does not mean that ice cover is becoming more “resilient”. He says:
“Local weather patterns across the Arctic play a really important role in year-to-year sea-ice extent, even as the long-term trend is clearly downward.”
Labe tells Carbon Brief that weather in the Arctic this summer was “influenced mainly by lower pressure toward the central Arctic, which brought cloudier and cooler conditions that limited surface melt and delayed the start of the melt season”.
He explains that this “was most obvious across parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas, where the melt season didn’t really kick off until after early July, which was more than two weeks later than normal”.
In contrast, he says, the Atlantic side of the Arctic “had a much more extreme summer”, with sea ice in the Barents Sea recording its “earliest melt-out on record”.
This was partly due to “unusually warm air and ocean temperatures”, Labe says. He notes, for example, that parts of western Siberia saw unusually persistent temperatures more than 5C above the 1981-2010 average for much of the summer, which extended out over the Kara Sea and contributed to substantial ice melt in this area”.
Labe tells Carbon Brief that, going forward, scientists need “more data and observations of other sea-ice metrics, like ice thickness, which may give us better insight into the overall condition of the ice pack, especially during years like 2026 when it is very fragmented”.
(In March 2026, Arctic sea ice reached its peak extent for this winter, clocking in as the joint-smallest in a satellite record going back almost half a century.)
Related
Guest post: Climate change has caused one-fifth of Pine Island glacier retreat
‘Very alarming’ winter sees Arctic sea ice hit record-low for second year running
Q&A: How Trump is threatening climate science in Earth’s polar regions
Limiting warming to 2C is ‘crucial’ to protect pristine Antarctic Peninsula
The post ‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak appeared first on Carbon Brief.
‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak
Participants at COP31 in Antalya will have a “duty” not to interfere in Türkiye’s internal affairs under the country’s hosting deal with the UN, reviving a clause dropped for last year’s climate summit in Brazil that human rights groups warn could put activists at risk.
Türkiye has faced growing criticism from human rights groups over the jailing of opposition figures, journalists and activists and imposed a blanket protest ban around July’s summit of the NATO military alliance in Ankara.
The contested provision is included in the binding agreement between the UN climate secretariat and the Turkish government that sets out responsibilities over logistical arrangements and details participants’ rights and obligations.
The document, signed in June but only made public on Wednesday, gives accredited COP31 attendees immunity from legal action over what they say, write or do in connection with the conference. Climate Home News understands that this safeguard can be applied to what takes place both inside and, in certain circumstances, outside of the UN-controlled COP “Blue Zone”. For the first time, this protection explicitly continues after the summit ends.
But participants enjoying these “privileges and immunities” also have a duty to respect Türkiye’s laws and regulations and not to interfere in its internal affairs, the agreement states. Rights groups fear its wide-ranging formulation could be used to discourage criticism of the host government.
Climate Home News understands that whether an action is covered by the immunity or infringes on the host’s internal affairs would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with close coordination between the country’s authorities and the UN climate change body.
A separate provision states that immunity shall be waived where the UN believes it would “impede the course of justice”.
‘Chilling effect’
Those same provisions featured in the host country agreements for COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and COP29 in Azerbaijan, both regarded as authoritarian regimes, before being dropped for COP30 in Brazil.
Ann Harrison, climate justice policy advisor at Amnesty International, said it is “extremely disappointing” that the COP31 agreement re-introduced clauses that could “hinder the ability of human rights defenders and civil society organisations to conduct their work safely”.
COP31 electrification pledge leaves out clean power commitment
She added the provisions could have a “wider chilling effect” on rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, given concerns over the human rights situation in Türkiye, including laws that “have shrunk civic space” and their “abusive” implementation by authorities.
The UN climate change body declined to comment.
Rights groups have documented blanket protest bans, unlawful use of force by the police and prosecutions of journalists, human rights defenders and lawyers across Türkiye in the last year.
Arrests and protest bans
Last July, environmental activist Esra Işık was sentenced to more than two years for “resisting” a public official over what Amnesty International described as a peaceful protest against an urgent expropriation order linked to the expansion of coal mining in south-western Türkiye. She is appealing the conviction.
Ahead of a summit of the NATO alliance in the capital Ankara in July, authorities put in place a 13-day blanket ban on demonstrations, citing “national security”, and arrested over 200 people. Human Rights Watch said the crackdown showed Türkiye’s “ruthless intolerance of freedom of speech and assembly”.
Earlier this month, Turkish police detained dozens of people as part of what rights groups described as the government’s widening crackdown on LGBTQ+ activists and venues.
Questioned by media as to how he would guarantee the right to protest at COP31, Kurum said earlier in September that his team would “try to meet” any request they receive from civil society and give them “a free space to express themselves”.
“Don’t worry, thinking you will not be able to voice your opinions or really share your thoughts,” he said in an attempt to reassure campaigners, adding that he had put former deputy environment minister Mehmet Birpinar in charge of liaising with civil society.
Civic space needed
Camilla Pollera, human rights and climate change campaigner at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), said meaningful participation at COP31 is fundamental to the legitimacy of climate action.
“At a climate summit, civil society participation necessarily includes being present, speaking out, scrutinising governments’ decisions and climate policies, and advocating for communities most vulnerable to climate change,” she added.
At last year’s COP30 summit, thousands of Indigenous people and climate activists peacefully marched through the Amazonian city of Belém in the first major demonstration outside the UN venue in four years. Smaller-scale demonstrations were largely confined to the “Blue Zone” at COP27 in Egypt, COP28 in the UAE and COP29 in Azerbaijan.
In two other separate incidents in Belém, members of the Munduruku tribe blocked access to the conference centre for hours, demanding an end to development projects in their ancestral land, and protesters stormed through the venue clashing with UN security officials.
The COP31 hosting agreement keeps some of the safeguards previously hailed by civil society groups. The government and the UN secretariat commit to upholding “the fundamental human rights” of all participants in the agreement’s preamble.
Under the deal, Türkiye also needs to ensure that security personnel follow “the highest ethical and professional standards and are expected to behave with integrity and respect”.
The post COP31 attendees told not to interfere in Türkiye’s “internal affairs” appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP31 attendees told not to interfere in Türkiye’s “internal affairs”
As rising seas submerge growing swathes of land, countries that lose territory should still keep their national boundaries, sovereign rights and UN membership, according to a political declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly in New York on Thursday.
The declaration, which was championed by climate-vulnerable small island states, affirms “the presumption in favour of continued statehood” in the face of sea level rise fuelled by climate change, and urges countries to work together to assist communities affected by encroaching oceans.
Speaking at a high-level UN meeting to address the existential threats posed by sea level rise, Cabo Verde’s Prime Minister Francisco Carvalho, one of the initiative’s co-facilitators along with Australia, said the adoption of the text by consensus sends “a message of hope”.
“This declaration has a very special meaning. For us, sea level rise is neither a distant threat nor a theoretical concern,” he said, adding that rising seas put at risk key infrastructure, water resources and economic growth in small island states.
In the Pacific, sea levels have risen at twice the global rate, dramatically increasing coastal flooding events from two to 20 a year in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and from zero to 102 events per year in American Samoa, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).
Surangel Whipps Jr., president of the Pacific island of Palau, said the summit in New York represents a “moment of international solidarity”, and highlighted that small island states will remain permanent members of the UN.
-
Push for cooking to be part of COP31’s electrification agenda
The President of Kenya and the British climate envoy said Africa should use the global electrification push to roll out clean cooking -
Germany unveils plan to end use of fossil fuels in energy sector by 2045
Germany became the third country to publish a roadmap to phase out fossil fuels after France and the Netherlands, as the UN chief calls on all governments to follow -
UN Climate Summit: UN chief says world has tools to end fossil fuel age
At the UN Secretary-General’s climate summit in New York, countries shared their energy transition plans while Nepal and island nations advocated for more international support
Declaration recognises statehood
An advisory opinion by the world’s top maritime court, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), first upheld in 2024 that countries do not have to shrink their maritime borders even if they lose land territory due to sea level rise. This was reiterated by the International Court of Justice in last year’s landmark ruling on the climate obligations of states.
The new declaration endorsed by all governments at the UN General Assembly stresses that sea level rise “is not a distant scenario but a real and lived experience for many”, and notes that international law must be implemented in global responses to rising seas.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the “milestone must now be translated into action”, adding that the declaration should encourage an “ongoing dialogue” at the “highest possible level” leading to practical outcomes. Pacific islands have proposed an international treaty on sea level rise that would provide more legal certainty.
“Those on the frontlines must be front and centre on every decision. We cannot allow countries and cultures to vanish beneath the waves,” he said. “The SOS has gone out. The world must answer.”
At regional summit, Pacific islands ask for COP31 support for clean energy and finance
Goodwin Friday, prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, said measures to protect vulnerable states will require adequate finance. “Investing in resilience now is more cost-effective than paying the far greater price for loss and damage later,” he added.
Championed by Australia’s COP31 co-presidency, Pacific islands have sought to put adaptation to sea level rise and ocean conservation at the top of the political agenda by inviting world leaders to attend the pre-COP31 summit co-hosted by Fiji and Tuvalu in October.
Tuvalu will also host the second global fossil fuel phase-out summit in April 2027, after around 60 governments met this year in Santa Marta, Colombia, to discuss ending their dependence on coal, oil and gas.
“Our coastlines, our reefs and our communities are living with the consequences of fossil fuel dependence every day, and our people have earned the right to help shape the way forward,” Lynda Tabuya, Fiji’s climate minister, said in a statement announcing details of the conference.
Ocean monitoring gets a boost in New York
Amid record-breaking marine heat and seas rising at unprecedented speed, governments in New York announced new commitments to protect the world’s ocean, as efforts to bolster marine ecosystems and coastal communities rise up the political agenda.
On Wednesday, the EU and Canada announced more funding for a new Europe-led ocean monitoring system called OceanEye, launched in the aftermath of a failed attempt by the Trump administration to dismantle the largest existing network of deep-sea observatories.
During an event at UN headquarters in New York, EU President Ursula von der Leyen and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced around $163 million in new funding for the initiative, with the EU pledging €92 million ($105m) on top of existing seed funding and Canada pledging C$82 million (US$58m) over five years.
According to an EU statement, while OceanEye will collaborate with the Global Ocean Observing System, that network “remains vulnerable to financial shortfalls and geopolitical disruptions”. A group of 30 countries from Europe, Africa and the Americas joined an international initiative in support of OceanEye, including large coastal nations like Brazil, Namibia and Mexico.
Von der Leyen said OceanEye “can make us the leading ocean data provider in a matter of years”, including by launching new satellites and installing new observatories in the deep ocean. “From outer space to the deepest ocean, our funding helps us keep watch beneath the waves,” she added.
Carney said the initiative would help protect Canada’s Arctic region with real-time monitoring operating year-round. “We can’t protect what we can’t see,” he said, also highlighting that Canada had expanded conservation of its ocean territory from 1% a decade ago to 15% now.
In New York, a group of 19 countries said they are either developing or implementing plans to sustainably manage all of their ocean territory, with 12 new nations joining the initiative. In a joint communiqué, they called on more countries to sign up ahead of COP31.
Warnings of El Niño-fuelled extreme heat
Scientists and world leaders have raised the alarm over this year’s record-breaking marine temperatures, which have persisted above historical peaks for more than 100 days as the naturally occurring El Niño phenomenon intensifies in the Pacific.
Extreme ocean heat could become a threat to coastal ecosystems and communities, experts fear. Water temperatures 1.5C above normal levels have also rapidly fuelled a strong hurricane in the Pacific in recent days.
Despite scientific calls for additional ocean conservation efforts, a report launched this week in New York warned that efforts to protect ocean ecosystems are lagging behind, with only 10% of the global ocean covered by conservation areas and just 3.5% designated as “effectively protected”.
The post Threatened by rising seas, small islands secure right to keep their statehood appeared first on Climate Home News.
Threatened by rising seas, small islands secure right to keep their statehood
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Renewable Energy11 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
嘉宾来稿：探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测
-
Climate Change2 years agoAnalysis: China’s CO2 falls 1% in Q2 2024 in first quarterly drop since Covid-19