As demand for nickel rises, the Philippines can strengthen its role in the EV supply chain. However, a proposed ban on raw mineral exports could reshape its industry. At the same time, global trade tensions are adding uncertainty. New US tariffs on nickel imports, combined with an ongoing supply surplus, are keeping prices volatile.
While some experts predict that the long-term nickel price might increase as demand outpaces supply, near-term challenges remain. Can the Philippines capitalize on this shift, or will market instability hinder progress?
Nickel and Copper Demand Soars – Can the Philippines Capitalize?
The Philippines is the world’s second-largest producer of mined nickel. Copper and nickel both are essential for lithium-ion batteries used in electric vehicles (EVs). With the demand for these metals rising, the Philippines has a unique opportunity to become a key supplier in the EV supply chain.
But on February 3, Senate President Francis Chiz G. Escudero approved the measure to ban the export of raw minerals.
He said,
“What we are looking at is to shift our policy from merely exporting raw minerals that will be utilized by other countries to produce higher value products, to developing our processing capabilities. This will result in added value for our minerals-related exports, provide a much-needed boost to our economy and generate employment for our people.”
Boosting Domestic Nickel Refining
If enacted, the ban will take effect in five years, giving mining companies time to establish processing plants. This policy shift is especially significant for key energy metals like nickel, which play a crucial role in the global battery and renewable energy sectors.
Escudero highlighted Indonesia’s 2020 ban on nickel ore exports as a successful example. He hopes that by processing nickel and copper within the country, the Philippines can become a major supplier of battery materials and a key player in the global EV industry.
He also believes that building a strong refining industry will create jobs, reduce dependence on raw material exports, and boost the economy. In the future, this could even help the Philippines manufacture its electric vehicles.
Challenges in Implementation
Mining groups are against a proposed export ban on ore, saying it will hurt the country’s mineral sector.
The Chamber of Mines of the Philippines (COMP) and the Philippine Nickel Industry Association (PNIA) support Senate Bill (SB) 2826 but disagree with the ban. The bill introduces a new tax system based on profits, but the groups believe stopping ore exports will cause problems.
They argue that mining companies cannot build processing plants within five years because of high power costs, poor transport systems, and conflicting local rules. The Philippines also has some of the highest electricity prices in Asia, making local processing too expensive.
They said, “Unless these issues are fixed, processing minerals locally will remain just a dream. There are no shortcuts.”
To make this plan work, the government must improve infrastructure, cut energy costs, and help mining companies build processing plants. Without these steps, the export ban could hurt the industries it aims to support.
Supply Surplus and Investment Risks
Even though the Philippines wants to boost its nickel industry, the global market already has too much supply. Big companies have secured their nickel resources, and experts at the Shanghai Metals Market (SMM) predict this surplus will grow even more in 2025 and beyond.
As this decision takes shape, the Philippines may face challenges in developing a strong local processing industry. With too much nickel already available, demand may not be high enough to make processing profitable. This could make it hard to attract big investors, slowing down the country’s plans to move from raw ore exports to processed nickel products.
Impact on China’s Nickel Supply
According to SMM, the Philippines exported 54 million metric tons of nickel ore in 2024. Out of this, 43.5 million mt went to China, while 10.35 million mt was sent to Indonesia.
If the Philippines decides to ban ore exports, China could face serious supply disruptions. The country relies heavily on Philippine nickel, especially after Indonesia tightened its mining quotas in 2024. A ban would likely create shortages, pushing China to look for other suppliers or invest in processing facilities within the Philippines to secure its supply.
A Short-Lived Rally for Nickel Prices
So, what happened to nickel prices after the Philippine government’s announcement of considering banning nickel ore exports? Well, as reported by S&P Global, this news sparked optimism in the nickel market, helping prices climb back to $15,811 per ton on February 6.
However, further gains were limited. Between February 7 and February 21, prices remained within the $15,400 to $15,800 range, and fears of worsening trade tensions loomed large.
The Larger Picture: How the U.S Tariff War is Shaping Nickel Prices?
S&P Global has provided deeper insights into how U.S. tariffs could affect nickel prices and the broader American nickel market. In January, the White House announced new tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China. Following this, nickel prices tumbled to a one-month low of $15,210 per ton.
In early February, President Trump signed executive orders imposing a 10% tariff on imports from China and an even higher 25% tariff on goods from Canada and Mexico. These tariffs took effect on February 4, keeping nickel prices on the London Metal Exchange (LME) below $16,000 per ton throughout the month. As trade tensions escalated, market uncertainty overshadowed concerns about a possible nickel ore export ban in the Philippines.
Canada quickly responded. Trudeau announced a 25% tariff on $155 billion worth of US goods, set to take effect the same day. But just before the deadline, the US government delayed tariffs on Canada and Mexico by 30 days, temporarily easing market concerns.
Will it Backfire on the US EV Industry?
If the US moves forward with a 10% tariff on nickel imports from Canada after the 30-day delay, it could drive up costs for American industries. Canada supplied nearly one-third of the US’s primary nickel imports in 2024, making it the country’s largest source.
The bigger challenge? The US produces very little nickel. The only nickel-producing mine is Lundin Mining’s Eagle Mine in Michigan. It contributed just 0.21% of global output in 2024 and is set to close before the decade ends. On top of that, the US lacks refining capacity for class 1 nickel, a key material for EV batteries.
If tariffs on Canadian nickel remain in place, it could become harder for US manufacturers to access affordable supplies, especially for the EV and stainless-steel industries. The US had expected to depend on Canada to meet its rising demand for battery-grade nickel.
However, trade restrictions might create challenges for this plan. It can also affect the competitiveness of domestic EV companies in the global market.
The Bottom Line
At present, the global nickel market remains volatile, affected by trade tensions, excessive supply, and evolving policies. All these factors are driving prices down. However, this dim nickel environment is expected to shift in the future.
With a declining market balance and reduced oversupply, nickel prices are forecasted to rise. By 2030 and beyond, demand is projected to exceed supply, leading to a further price increase.
The post Philippines’ Nickel Export Ban and U.S. Tariffs: What’s Happening in the Nickel Market Now? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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