Governments have, once again, failed to agree on a timeline for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) seventh assessment cycle (AR7), two years into the process.
Last week, more than 300 scientists and government officials from around the world met in Lima, Peru for the 63rd session of the IPCC (IPCC-63).
According to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), reporting exclusively from inside the four-day meeting, the closed-door talks were characterised by “fraught deliberations” where “once-routine” issues became “deeply controversial and time-consuming”.
Countries reached a compromise on the content of a methodology report on carbon dioxide removal technologies – a sticking point at the last IPCC meeting.
However, the meeting marked the fourth time in a row that delegates could not reach consensus on the timings of the IPCC’s influential three-part assessment report, after deadlocked talks in Hangzhou, China earlier this year and Sofia, Bulgaria and Istanbul, Turkey in 2024.
Observers told Carbon Brief of an atmosphere of “deepening mistrust” at the meeting, as emerging economies clashed with a coalition of small-island states and developed nations amid repeated accusations of “micromanagement”.
IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea reportedly lamented in his closing remarks that “as a category five hurricane [Hurricane Melissa] swept through the Carribean, IPCC-63 was deliberating on pronouns and footnotes”.
One former IPCC author tells Carbon Brief that certain countries’ opposition to agreeing a “deadline for AR7” was a “clear tactic for playing down the importance of IPCC climate science in decision-making on climate change”.
Historic splits
Each assessment cycle, the IPCC publishes three “working group” reports that focus on climate science (WG1), impacts and adaptation (WG2) and mitigation (WG3). It also publishes a small number of special reports and methodology reports.
The IPCC’s current assessment cycle has been underway since July 2023, with the authors for its three headline reports confirmed earlier this year.
It is atypical for the IPCC to have not yet agreed when these reports would be published so far into an assessment cycle. The workplans for AR5 and AR6 were “agreed with little difficulty”, the ENB notes in its summary of the event, adding:
“The debate about the timeline is unprecedented in the history of the IPCC.”
There are, broadly speaking, two camps in the debate around timelines for AR7.
The first wants a timeline that would align the publication of the IPCC’s three headline reports, plus special and methodology reports, with the second “global stocktake” (GST).
The GST is an appraisal of global progress on tackling climate change, which takes place every five years under the Paris Agreement. The second GST is scheduled to conclude at COP33 at the end of 2028, so that its findings can inform the fourth round of national climate pledges due a few years later.
Other countries, however, have advocated for a longer timeline. Among their concerns are the potential burden reviewing reports back-to-back could place on more resource-strapped countries, as well as whether the current schedule offers enough time for gaps in scientific literature to be filled.
As proceedings kicked off in Peru, the IPCC proposed a timeline for AR7 which would see all three of its headline reports published in 2028, with approval sessions earmarked for May, June and July of that year for the three working group reports.
WGI co-chair Dr Robert Vautard noted that the ongoing uncertainty on timelines was stressful for both the authors of reports, as well as for scientists wishing to submit research for the cycle, according to the ENB.
The delegation from Antigua and Barbuda, meanwhile, noted that agreement on the timeline is typically procedural and “not negotiated by governments”. It also said the proposed cycle length of around six-and-a-half years was consistent with the IPCC’s last two assessment cycles.
‘Compromise’ timeline
Throughout the four-day meeting, positions on both sides on the debate around AR7 remained “entrenched”, the ENB notes.
A “majority” of countries were in favour of a workplan which would align AR7 with the GST, the ENB says. However, this group was opposed by a “smaller, but growing” number of countries in favour of a less compressed timeline.
Early on in proceedings, for example, Kenya described a slower timeline as a “great equaliser” and said a more compressed timeline did not favour authors, nor the coordinating agencies, from developing countries, ENB says.
Meanwhile, India argued that the GST was “extraneous” to the IPCC and said there were no formal IPCC rules about aligning with the stocktaking exercise, according to ENB. Algeria, China, Libya, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa also reportedly voiced their opposition to the IPCC’s proposals.
Inclusivity concerns were also cited by countries in favour of the IPCC’s timeline. For example, the small-island state of Vanuatu reportedly said that delaying the reports would deprive countries of important scientific information ahead of key international meetings.
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, the Bahamas, France, the Gambia, Korea and Nepal were among the countries to speak up in favour of the IPCC’s proposed timeline, according to ENB.
Simon Steill, executive director of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), urged countries to agree on a timeline which aligned AR7 with the GST. In his opening address to the Lima meeting, he said:
“Taken together, the reports will be indispensable and I will continue to urge all countries to agree on timelines that ensure all three assessments inform the second global stocktake.
“Because the stocktake is not just a technical exercise. It is a crucial moment for the world to recognise the state of play, reaffirm its commitment to Paris and respond with action and support at the pace and scale that science demands.”
The ENB reports that a contact group was set up on Monday to work through the issue, co-chaired by Brazil and Denmark.
On Tuesday, a revised timeline for AR7 was presented by WG1 co-chair Dr Xiaoye Zhang and WG2 co-chair Dr Bart Van den Hurk, which took into account deliberations from the contact group, the ENB says. It set out a number of changes to the initial timeline, concentrated at the end of the cycle so as to address government concerns while limiting impacts on report authors.
This included spacing out approval sessions – where the final reports are signed off line by line – so that WG2 would be held in July 2028 (instead of June) and WG3 in September (instead of July). It also set out an extension of expert and government review periods for report drafts.
Discussion of the revised schedule was deferred until Wednesday at the request of Ghana, Kenya, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia.
As talks resumed, a number of emerging-economy countries spoke out against the updated timeline, including Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Zimbabwe, ENB notes.
Russia said that aligning the work of the IPCC with the UNFCCC would send a “negative signal”, ENB says, whereas China suggested that the timeline would put “pressure” on developing countries. South Africa similarly argued that the timeline would “harm” the inclusivity and geographic representativeness of the reports, according to ENB.
Among the countries in favour of the revised timeline were small-island developing states Haiti, Jamaica, Sao Tome and Principe and Vanuatu, as well developed economies Australia, Finland, Italy, Ireland, New Zealand and the UK, ENB says.
Grenada is quoted by ENB as describing the new timeline constituted a “compromise of a compromise”. The country also emphasised that it was supported by a majority of countries across regions and development levels, ENB says.
At the request of certain members of the contact group, WG1’s Vautard presented a visualisation of the new timeline for all three reports and the special report on cities on Wednesday evening. The graphic – seen by Carbon Brief – plots the timeline for “first-order” draft review (by experts), “second-order” draft review (by governments and experts), final government review and panel approval for each report.
Vautard noted that first-order draft reviews of the WG1 and WG2 reports overlapped “intentionally”, to allow experts to see both drafts at once.
(The request for a visualisation prompted accusations – not for the first time at the meeting – that certain countries were drawing the IPCC process into “micromanagement”, the ENB notes.)
The visualisation was followed by a new wave of objections from countries, who argued against a timeline where review periods for different reports overlapped with each other and UNFCCC meetings, according to ENB.
Among them were Russia and China, who argued that AR7 should be extended to 2029, ENB says. (Russia reportedly said it would “consider a plan” to deliver the overarching synthesis report by December 2029 – if its concerns were addressed.)
On the other hand, Antigua and Barbuda argued that avoiding any overlaps would not be feasible and expressed concerns that certain countries’ interventions seemed to be aimed “more at delay than progress”, the ENB notes.
Skea said he “struggled to see” why consecutive and overlapping reviews were a problem, according to the ENB. He noted that the IPCC rulebook states that panel and working group sessions should be scheduled to coordinate with, “to the extent possible, with other related international meetings”.
Lindsey Fielder-Cook, interim deputy director and the representative for climate change at the Quaker UN Office, was an observer to the talks. She tells Carbon Brief that “blocking” governments had “serious and genuine concerns” around the lack of equity inclusion in climate modelling and a failure of co-chairs to “sufficiently engage” with their proposals.
However, she says these countries also cited “structural” concerns around timing and capacity that “could be overcome” and speculated that these were “used to cover [for] what the countries do not say publicly”. She adds:
“For example, concerns include capacity and vacation times during [report] review times – which were not a concern raised by small-island developing states and many least-developed countries with even less capacity, [as well as concerns about] developing country scientific input, which the IPCC has made genuine efforts to improve.”
On Thursday evening, the facilitators of the contact group reported that no consensus had been reached, the ENB notes. Consequently, the IPCC agreed to – once again – defer decisions on the rest of the workplan to a future session.
Countries agreed that working groups should press on with activities and author meetings detailed in the 2026 budget.
(This outcome – where the IPCC plans in annual increments – had been described earlier in the week by Skea as the “worst option”. Nepal, meanwhile, said this result would “harm the IPCC’s legitimacy”.)
Routine issues ‘have become controversial’
This is now the fourth meeting in a row – following Istanbul, Sofia and Hangzhou – where the timeline for producing, reviewing and publishing the IPCC’s reports in AR7 has not been agreed.
In its analysis of the “fraught negotiations” in Lima, the ENB notes that “deep divisions” on the timeline and other procedural issues have “plagued the IPCC during the first two years of its seventh assessment cycle”. It added:
“Issues that were once routine have become deeply controversial and time-consuming.”
The failure to approve the timeline for AR7 was not the only issue on which countries were unable to agree. Approval of the official summaries of the two preceding IPCC meetings was also deferred, after certain countries said they could not sign off on the drafts.
After the previous IPCC meeting in Hangzhou, Skea told Carbon Brief that negotiations over just the outlines of the three AR7 working group reports “had some of the quality of an approval session”, where a finished report is scrutinised line by line.
In Lima, Skea “remarked that these disagreements [over the timeline] are unprecedented so early in an assessment cycle”, the ENB reports.
Throughout the meeting, the ENB records multiple instances of countries voicing their concerns about the implications for the work of the IPCC.
In its analysis of the meeting, the ENB says these concerns reflect “growing tensions within the panel, as “delegates expressed increasing frustration with what they see as inflexible positions”.
The ENB also notes:
“References made in this session to disrespectful interactions among delegates are atypical in the IPCC context and raise concerns that trust the basis for compromise and flexibility may be dwindling in some parts of the IPCC.”
(The IPCC has not responded to Carbon Brief’s multiple interview requests.)
In her observations, Fielder-Cook tells Carbon Brief that the meeting was “actually more relaxed” than recent IPCC sessions. This was “in part due to the gentle and generous hosting of Peru and in part to a sense of resignation on the timeline”.
Nonetheless, she says, the mood in the room was of “concern for the IPCC and its reputation, for its ability to protect science from intensifying political influence”, as well as “concern over the increasing political efforts to influence the scientific output”. She adds:
“While the work will continue, IPCC authors working voluntarily have no clear timeline on their voluntary commitment.”
Prof Lisa Schipper, a professor of development geography at the University of Bonn and IPCC AR6 author, tells Carbon Brief:
“Some countries refusing to set a deadline for the AR7 is a clear tactic for playing down the importance of IPCC climate science in decision-making on climate change. And this will be a problem if the report is done and cannot be approved and used by governments.”
Nonetheless, she adds, “there is plenty of good science being produced and governments are not in any way restricted from using this science in their decision-making”.
Ultimately, though, “we do need a decision on the AR7 timeline”, she says:
“No other single report provides the same evaluation and assessment of this collected knowledge or is able to give an authoritative overview of what we know, what we don’t know, and which future is more likely under different conditions.”
Consensus on CDR
Earlier this year in Hangzhou, governments failed to reach consensus on the outline for a methodology report on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) technologies, which is slated for publication in 2027.
This was largely due to disagreements around chapter seven in the proposed outline, a section that would focus on carbon removals from oceans, lakes and rivers.
On the first day in Lima, Takeshi Enoki – a co-chair of the IPCC task force on national greenhouse gas inventories (TFI), which is responsible for producing the report – introduced the outline and workplan for the methodology report.
Enoki explained that discussions about the report would focus on the table of contents and “particularly the proposed volume seven on the direct removal of CO2 from waterbodies”, according to ENB.
Fielder-Cook – the observer from the Quaker UN Office – tells Carbon Brief there was “significant concern” across a “range of developed and developing countries” over language in the initial methodology report outline that “could allow harmful marine geoengineering”.
Antigua and Barbuda, France and Germany were among the countries who opposed the inclusion of a seventh chapter. They cited concerns related to the “effectiveness, scalability, legality and environmental impacts” of marine CDR, the ENB notes.
Some of these countries suggested that the IPCC adopt the outline for “volumes one to six”, “with the possibility of adding to these volumes later”, the ENB says.
However, Saudi Arabia said that all “expert-recognised CDR and CCUS technologies, including marine-based technologies, must be considered”. It called for an outline that “encompasses the full spectrum of these technologies”.
ENB notes that the “point of contention” was whether the IPCC should develop methodologies for measuring and assessing the impacts of all CDR technologies. Some countries argued that the report should be limited to technologies that are “environmentally safe”, while others argued that it is “not the responsibility of a TFI methodology report to make that judgment”.
Skea set up a contact group on the first day of the meeting, facilitated by China and Turkey, to work on the outline of the report.
The following days saw “significant discussion” within the contact group, before delegates reconvened in plenary on Thursday to continue discussing the report, according to the ENB.
Delegates were eventually able to reach a compromise on the outline by agreeing to remove the chapter on direct removal of CO2 from waterbodies from the plan, the ENB reports.
Meanwhile, delegates agreed to hold an expert meeting on alkalinity enhancement – the addition of alkaline substances to seawater, which allows the ocean to take in more carbon from the atmosphere – and direct ocean capture. This meeting will be co-organised by the TFI and the three IPCC working groups.
Funding ‘shortfall’
At the Lima meeting, countries approved the IPCC’s budgets for 2025 and 2026, but also noted “with concern the significantly reduced cash balance” of the IPCC trust fund and the “accelerating decline” in the level of annual voluntary contributions from countries and other organisations, says the ENB.
The IPCC is funded by its parent organisations, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UN Environment Programme (UNEP), along with voluntary contributions from member governments and the UNFCCC.
These contributions feed into the IPCC “trust fund”, which is used to pay for the work of the IPCC. In addition, member countries provide “in-kind” support, such as offering facilities for meetings and hosting the “technical support units” for each working group.
By the end of June, contributions in 2025 amounted to 1.2m Swiss francs (£1.1m) – significantly down compared to the annual totals of previous years. Compared to spending of 2.9m Swiss francs (£2.8m), this leaves a shortfall of around 1.7m Swiss francs (£1.6m) for 2025.
At the start of this year, the balance of the trust fund stood at 17.8m Swiss francs (£16.9m).
The chart below shows the direct contributions from countries and organisations throughout the IPCC’s history and up to the end of June this year.
Chart showing the largest direct contributors to the IPCC since its inception in 1988, with the US (red bars), European Union (dark blue) and UNFCCC/WMO/UNEP (mid blue) highlighted. Grey bars show all other contributors combined. Figures for 2025 are January to June inclusive. Figures for 1988-2003 are reported per two years, so these totals have been divided equally between each year. Source: IPCC (2025) and (2010). Contributions have been adjusted, as per IPCC footnotes, so they appear in the year they are received, rather than pledged.
The largest direct contributions to the IPCC trust fund so far this year have come from Norway (244,000 Swiss francs, or £230,000), the UNFCCC (230,000 Swiss francs, or £220,000), Canada (210,000 Swiss francs, or £200,000) and the WMO (125,000 Swiss francs, or £118,000).
Other countries to contribute this year include Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, South Korea, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and 213 Swiss francs (£200) from Cambodia.
The US – which has provided 30% of the IPCC’s direct contributions throughout its history – has not made a contribution so far this year.
In its final decision, the panel invited “member countries to make their annual voluntary contributions to the IPCC trust fund and, if possible, to increase [them]”, says the ENB.
Member countries also discussed a proposal from the WMO for the IPCC to pay 300,000 Swiss francs (£280,000) for administrative support that was previously provided as an in-kind contribution.
Given the “deteriorating financial situation” of the IPCC, the ENB reports that a decision on this proposal was deferred – not to the next meeting, but the one after that.
Progress reports and next steps
The Lima meeting was also an opportunity for each IPCC working group to update the rest of the delegates on progress since the last meeting.
All working groups discussed the process of selecting authors for the IPCC’s upcoming seventh assessment, highlighting their efforts to be “inclusive”.
For example, the WG3 co-chair said 52% of the selected WG3 authors are from developing countries, 40% are female and 59% are new to the IPCC.
A WG2 co-chair also reported that six chapter scientists had been selected from more than 1,320 applications for the special report on cities slated for publication in March 2027.
In addition, the WG1 co-chairs outlined their preparations for the first joint-lead author meeting for their assessment report, which will be held in December 2025.
They also laid out plans for a cross-working group “expert meeting” on “Earth system high impact events, tipping points and their consequences”, co-sponsored by the World Climate Research Programme (WCPR).
The meeting also granted “observer status” to 20 new organisations, allowing them to attend IPCC sessions and nominate experts as authors or workshop leads.
The IPCC confirmed that its next meeting will be held in Bangkok, Thailand over 24-27 March 2026.
Skea announced that workshops on “diverse knowledge systems and methods of assessment” will be held in February 2026 at the University of Reading in the UK.
Skea also proposed an expert meeting to “support the transition from conceptual design to technical implementation” of the AR7 WG1 and WG2 interactive atlases.
The atlases are interactive online tools that allow users to explore much of the data underpinning the working group reports.
The meeting was approved, subject to agreement on the budget. It is slated to take place between April and June 2026.
The post Ongoing failure to agree AR7 timeline is ‘unprecedented’ in IPCC history appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Ongoing failure to agree AR7 timeline is ‘unprecedented’ in IPCC history
After a five-year long legal battle, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has blocked Shell and local partner Impact Africa’s permit to explore for oil and gas off the country’s East Coast, in a landmark victory for local communities and civil society.
“Today’s judgment makes me feel very happy and proud that the ocean is not for profit for mining companies,” said East Coast resident and environmental campaigner Siyabonga Ndovela.
The verdict culminates a years-long process in which non-profits Sustaining the Wild Coast, Natural Justice, Greenpeace Africa, and others took legal action against Shell, Impact Africa and the South African government for failing to consult affected communities – a legal requirement in the country.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Shell and Impact Africa had not complied with resource governance law, had failed to meaningfully conduct public consultation and had failed to consider the impact on climate change, cultural rights, livelihoods and ecological harm.
The ruling references last year’s landmark advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, which states that countries have a legal duty to prevent and repair damage to the climate system. The South African judges argued climate change “transcends borders” and that states’ obligations “must be understood within the broader framework of international law.”
“This case must also be understood against the backdrop of well-documented struggles by coastal communities to protect their land, marine resources and ways of life in the face of extractive activities that they believe threaten their very existence,” wrote Justice Narandran Kollapen.
The Constitutional Court found that the exploration right had been unlawfully granted by the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources.The ruling upholds a 2022 regional court decision against Shell and overturns a 2024 appeal that allowed the company to conduct fresh public consultations under the original exploration right. Today’s decision means the right, initially granted in 2014, must be set aside.
Celebrating the decision, Sherelee Odyar, oil and gas campaigner at Greenpeace Africa, told Climate Home News that the court confirmed “serious failures” in the awarding of exploration rights to Shell and Impact Africa, which “can not simply be corrected later”.
The Wild Coast is a biodiversity hotspot which has been conserved over generations by coastal communities who rely on the ocean and land. “Our land and sea are central to our livelihoods and our way of life. Over generations we have conserved them, and they have conserved us,” reads the founding statement in the case.
A Shell spokesperson said it noted the ruling, responding that “we are committed to responsible offshore exploration, meaningful stakeholder engagement and environmental stewardship.”
The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources did not respond to requests for comment at the time of publication.
“Renewed strength” for communities
The ruling adds to a series of legal challenges brought by civil society groups against oil companies and the government as South Africa has expanded oil and gas development since 2014 under Operation Phakisa, a plan aimed at “unlocking the economic potential of the oceans”.
On the West Coast, Walter Steenkamp, Chair of Aukotowa Fisheries Cooperative, which is involved in a separate ongoing legal action against TotalEnergies, said that “today’s court case gave me renewed strength.”
The case could also set a precedent for future oil developments, said Alessandro Mazzi, legal governance researcher at the University of Wageningen. He added that the verdict “sends a strong signal to investors that where projects affect people’s land, livelihoods and environment, meaningful consultation and genuine ecological assessment are an integral part of responsible investment”.
Janet Solomon, coordinator of advocacy group Oceans not Oil, said that the Court’s emphasis on democratic participation, culture, livelihoods and the health of future generations in handing down the verdict signals a shift in jurisprudence on environmental governance, saying that this focus “may prove to be the judgment’s most enduring legacy.”
The post South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right appeared first on Climate Home News.
South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right
China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.
The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.
This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.
Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.
However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.
It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.
But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.
Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.
Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.
Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.
What does the plan say about peaking coal?
Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.
The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.
Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.
The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:
“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”
However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.
The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.
Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.
Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.
But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.
The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.
In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.
It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.
The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.
The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.
The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:
- Peaking coal consumption;
- “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
- Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
- Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
- “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
- Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
- Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
- Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.
The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.
“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.
A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.
This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”
However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.
State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.
“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.
While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.
Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.
“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.
What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.
The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.
The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.
Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.
Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.
“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.
Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.
It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.
This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.
New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.
This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.
The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.
What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.
The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.
Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.
In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.
It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.
This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.
Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.
Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.
China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.
Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.
It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]
The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.
At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.
In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.
Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.
In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.
However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.
She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.
How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?
Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.
As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.
Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.
A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.
But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.
China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.
The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”
The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.
Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.
Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:
“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”
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The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?
The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.
A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.
The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.
In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.
This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.
This Australian coal community is co-designing its own green future
Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.
Openings down, pipeline up
But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.
“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.
The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.
Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.
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China’s coal-chemicals boom risks repeating the mistakes of the past
By reviving the problematic industry in the name of energy security, China runs the risk of higher emissions, stranded assets and setting back its ambitions as a clean energy leader -
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Two court cases against oil majors TotalEnergies and Shell could derail South Africa’s plan to expand offshore fossil fuels -
Quarter of countries still missing UN climate plans 18 months after deadline
Egypt, Vietnam, Argentina and the Philippines are among the 45 nations that have breached the Paris Agreement by not submitting a new NDC to the UN
Nations agreed at COP26 five years ago to “phase down” coal power – a commitment that China and India successfully pushed to weaken from “phase out”. At COP28 in 2023, governments agreed to transition away from all fossil fuels in energy systems.
Since then, wealthy nations have partnered with coal-producing countries like South Africa, Vietnam and Indonesia on plans to transition from coal to clean energy. But, after preliminary talks, India and these governments did not agree a JETP.
The post New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus appeared first on Climate Home News.
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