The year of 2023 was the second-warmest on record for the UK, narrowly behind the record set as recently as 2022.
It was also the warmest year on record for Wales and Northern Ireland, second-warmest for England and third-warmest for Scotland.
In this review, we look back at the UK’s climate in 2023, the significant climate events that shaped the year and how human-caused climate change influenced them. We find:
- Eight of the 12 months of the year were warmer than average.
- Somewhat unusually, the warmest periods were in June and September, with the high summer months of July and August generally cooler and wetter.
- June was the hottest month of the year for the first time since 1966 and was the hottest June on record by a large margin.
- Through a climate attribution analysis, we show that a year as warm as 2023 has been made around 150 times more likely due to human-caused climate change.
- We would expect to reach or exceed the 2023 annual temperature in around 33% of years in the current climate.
- 2023 was relatively wet with 1,290mm of rainfall, making it the UK’s 11th wettest year in a series going back to 1836.
- The few wintery cold spells of the year were relatively short-lived.
- 2023-24 has seen the most active start to the storm season since naming storms began in 2015.
(See our previous annual analysis for 2022, 2021, 2020, 2019 and 2018.)
The year in summary
The Met Office produces the HadUK-Grid dataset for monitoring the UK climate. Using geostatistical methods, we combine UK observational data from land-based stations across the country into a gridded, geographically complete dataset.
There is enough coverage of observational data in our digital archives for national coverage of monthly temperature since 1884, rainfall since 1836 and sunshine since 1910. These are used to define long-running climate series and climatological averages, which provide context for variability and change in the UK’s climate through time.
The maps below show the average anomalies compared to 1991-2020 for temperature (left), rainfall (middle) and sunshine duration (right) across the UK during 2023. The darkest shading shows the areas of the country that saw the warmest (red), driest (brown) and sunniest (yellow) conditions relative to the baseline climate.
The maps show that 2023 was, for most of the country, a warm and wet year compared to average, with close to average sunshine overall. The exception to this being western Scotland which saw drier and sunnier conditions.
The UK annual average temperature was 9.97C for 2023, which is just 0.06C below the record high of 10.03C in 2022. This continues an observed warming of the UK climate since the 1960s.
The hottest year in the UK during the whole of the 20th century was 1997, with an average temperature of 9.41C. So far in the 21st century, 13 years have exceeded this value, meaning that the majority of years so far in the 21st century have exceeded what was the hottest year of the 20th century.
In contrast, the coldest year of the 21st century so far was 2010 (7.94C) which was more than 0.5C warmer than the coldest year of the 20th century in 1963 (7.40C).
While 2010 is an extreme-cold year in the context of the current UK climate, it would have been much closer to the average for the late 19th and early 20th century. Climate change has significantly reduced the occurrence and severity of cooler conditions in the UK.
Looking regionally, the map below colour-codes UK counties by the ranking of annual average temperature.
The darkest shade of red identifies those counties that recorded their warmest year in 2023. It was the warmest year on record for all of Northern Ireland and Wales, and also for counties in western England and south-west Scotland.
The year 2022 retains the record for the majority of England and Scotland, with the exception of far north Scotland (for which the warmest year on record was 2014), Western Isles (2006), Orkney (2003) and Shetland (2014).
In addition, 2023 is also provisionally the warmest year on record for Ireland in the 124 year national series maintained by Met Eireann.
Central England Temperature record
The year of 2023 was also the second-warmest year in the Met Office Central England Temperature series (CET), marginally behind 2022. The CET represents a region bounded by Hertfordshire, Worcestershire and Lancashire.
The chart below compares the records for the CET (black) and whole UK (red) for annual average temperature.
While there are inevitable differences in the precise ranking and anomalies of individual years between UK and CET, the series show the strong overall level of agreement. It also highlights how unusual the temperature of 2022 and 2023 are in the context of more than 360 years of observational data.
Extremes and rainfall
The UK climate monitoring network records both daily maximum and daily minimum temperatures.
Last year was the record highest for the annual average daily minimum temperature for the UK, England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and fourth highest for Scotland.
It was the highest annual average daily maximum temperature for Northern Ireland, second-highest for the UK, England and Wales, and third-highest for Scotland.
The year of 2023 was relatively wet with 1,290mm of rainfall, equivalent to 111% of UK average rainfall and putting it just outside the top 10 as the 11th wettest year in a series going back to 1836.
It was the sixth wettest March and July, seventh wettest October and ninth wettest December. In addition, 2023 is the only year that has four individual months within the top 10 wettest on record for the respective month.
The wet spells of March and July followed dry spells during February and June, but it was the higher-than-average rainfall through the autumn and into December that pushed up the annual accumulation for the year overall.
As the chart below shows, there has been an observed increase in UK annual rainfall over recent decades, with 2023 joining a cluster of notably wet years that have occurred since the late 1990s.
The lines show the annual rainfall (dark blue) and trend (black dashes), along with the 1991-2020 average (pink), 2023 total (brown) and the highest (red dashes) and lowest (blue dashes) annual totals on record.
The drivers of annual rainfall trends are complex as the annual total masks distribution of rainfall throughout the year and will respond to a multitude of factors, which will include human-caused climate change but also contributions from natural climate variability.
Attribution of UK annual mean temperature in 2023
Met Office scientists conducted an attribution study to quantify the influence of human-caused climate change on the likelihood of reaching a UK annual average temperature at or above that recorded in 2023.
The method uses an established Met Office system for rapid attribution of extreme events. The analysis uses observed values of the UK annual temperature and temperature data for the UK drawn from 14 climate model simulations from the sixth – and most recent – phase of the global Coupled Model Intercomparison Project.
The models are evaluated against the observational data across the period 1884-2014 using approaches commonly adopted for attribution studies. This determines whether they are suitable for use in the assessment and provide adequate representations of UK annual average temperature trends and variability.
One set of model simulations uses only natural climate forcings (“NAT”) for the period 1850-2020, while another set uses all natural and human-caused forcings (“ALL”) for the historical period and the SSP2-4.5 emissions scenario, often described as a “medium” emissions scenario, out to 2100.
These simulations are then able to provide estimates of the likelihood of the UK annual temperature exceeding the observed 2023 value for the following scenarios:
- A natural climate without human-caused greenhouse gases.
- The current climate taken as a 20-year period centred on 2023.
- An end-of-century climate under a medium emissions scenario taken as the period 2081-2100.
A reference baseline for all the experiments is the period 1901-30.
The estimated return period for a UK annual average temperature exceeding 9.97C in the NAT simulations is once every 460 years (with a range of 82 to 587). For the ALL simulations in the present day, this drops to once every three years (with a range of 2.86 to 3.17). For the ALL simulations in the future, this falls further and could see temperatures warmer than 2023 being exceeded more frequently than every other year.
Human-caused climate change is, therefore, estimated to have increased the likelihood of a year as warm as 2023 by a factor of more than 150.
These results are, unsurprisingly, very similar to an equivalent study conducted a year ago in relation to the record-breaking annual mean temperature of 10.03C set in 2022. Regarding that study, we stated:
“A warming climate means that an event that would have been exceptionally unlikely in the past has become one that we will increasingly see in the coming decades.”
Importantly, this analysis also indicates that 2022 and 2023 are not necessarily that extreme in the context of our current climate. This means that there is the potential for a far higher UK annual average temperature extreme even in the present-day climate. In addition, by the end of the 21st century, most years will be warmer than 2023.
Weather through the year
Temperature
The chart below tracks UK average temperatures through the year, with orange highlighting periods that were warmer than the 1991-2020 average for the time of year and blue were cooler than average.
Overall, 66% of days (240 days) were warmer than the 1991-2020 average for the time of year and 34% (125 days) were colder. The most notable warm spells were in June, September and December.
The highest maximum temperature of the year was 33.5C at Faversham (Kent) on 10 September, which is only the fifth time a highest maximum has been recorded in September. This is equal to the 1991-2020 average annual maximum temperature, so it is close to what we would expect as the highest UK temperature for a typical year. However, it is 2.3C higher than the average maximum during the earlier period of 1961-90 (31.2C).
In September, there was also a run of seven consecutive days with temperatures somewhere in the UK exceeding 30C, which is the longest such run in September on record.
The lowest temperature of the year was -16.0C, recorded at Altnaharra (Sutherland) on 9 March during a spell of wintry weather. This is 0.5C below the 1991-2020 average (-15.5C), but 3C above the 1961-90 average (-19.0C) for the year’s coldest day.
In 2023, both the hottest and coldest weather of the year occurred outside of the climatological summer and winter season, a reminder of the variable nature of the UK climate.
Both the highest maximum and lowest minimum temperature of the year for the UK have been increasing at a faster rate than the UK average temperature, reflecting that heat extremes are becoming more severe while cold extremes are becoming less severe in our warming climate.
Rainfall
For rainfall, the wettest periods were seen in March, July, October and December.
In the chart below, the rainfall accumulation is tracked through the course of the year. The solid black line is the 1991-2020 average, the grey shading reflects the variability across years with the red and blue marking the highest and lowest on record. Brown shading highlights points in the year where the total rainfall since the start of the year was below average, and blue regions are where it is above average.
The chart highlights that a dry spell in February was compensated by the wet March, and the dry spell through May and June was followed by a wet July, returning the year to near-average by the start of autumn.
Western Scotland was an exception to this rainfall pattern, with a somewhat drier autumn in particular, although wetter conditions in the east, including some extreme rainfall such as during storm Babet in October, meant that Scotland overall was still wetter than average. For England it was the sixth wettest year on record, third wettest for Northern Ireland, 12th for Wales and 32nd for Scotland.
Storms
The Met Office storm naming, first launched in 2015, provides a storm name list for the period from 1 September to 31 August each year in collaboration with Met Eireann and KNMI, the Irish and Dutch national weather services, respectively.
The 2022-23 storm season was rather notable for the relative absence of storms, with the only storms to be named under this scheme both occurring right at the end of the season in August – storms Antoni (5 August) and Betty (18-19 August).
In contrast, the 2023-24 season has experienced a much more active start with seven named storms from September to December, and the eighth (storm Henk) in early January 2024, which is the most active start to the named storm season since its inception in 2015.
| Storm Name | Dates affected UK | Maximum wind gust | Number of observing sites recording wind gusts over 50 knots |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-23 names | |||
| Otto | 17 February (named by Danish Meteorological Service) | 72 Kt (83mph) Inverbervie, Kincardineshire | 31 |
| Noa | 12 April (named by Meteo-France) | 83 Kt (96mph) Needles, Isle of Wight | 25 |
| Antoni | 5 August | 68 Kt (78mph) Berry Head, Devon | 2 |
| Betty | 18-19 August | 57 Kt (66mph) Capel Curig, Conwy | 5 |
| 2023-24 names | |||
| Agnes | 27-28 September | 73 Kt (84mph) Capel Curig, Conwy | 15 |
| Babet | 18-21 October | 67 Kt (77mph) Inverbervie, Kincardineshire | 16 |
| Ciarán | 1-2 November | 68 Kt (77mph) Langdon Bay, Kent | 11 |
| Debi | 13 November | 67 Kt (77mph) Aberdaron, Gwynedd | 21 |
| Elin | 9 December | 70 Kt (81mph) Capel Curig, Conwy | 13 |
| Fergus | 10 December | 64 Kt (74mph) Aberdaron, Gwynedd | 11 |
| Gerrit | 27-28 December | 77 Kt (89mph) Fair Isle, Shetland | 42 |
| Henk | 2 January 2024 | 82 Kt (94mph) Needles, Isle of Wight | 35 |
List of named storms for the 2022-23 and 2023-24 storm seasons
Overall, 2023 was calmer than average. This reflects a long-term decline in average wind speed, as illustrated in the chart below. This shows average UK wind speeds for each year since 1969 (dark blue line), the trend (black dashes), 1991-2020 average (pink), 2023 total (brown) and the highest (red dashes) and lowest (blue dashes) annual averages on record.
This long-term trend should be interpreted with some caution as it is possible that changes in instrumentation and exposure of the observing network through time may influence these trends. However, the decline is consistent with a widespread global slowdown termed “global stilling”.
More recently, global and UK data have shown that since 2010 the decline has stopped or even reversed.
Winter
After a notably wet spell at the start of the year – resulting in flooding across south Wales and Midlands on the 12 January – the late winter period was characterised by a very sunny January and very dry February overall.
It was the driest February since 1993 with much of central and southern England, which received less than 20% of the normal monthly rainfall.
The climatological winter season (1 December 2022 to 28 February 2023) was drier than average and – as discussed above – relatively calm with just one named storm (Otto) occurring in an otherwise dry February.
The chart below depicts UK winter rainfall per year (dark blue line) since 1836. While 2023 was relatively, but not exceptionally, dry in the context of recent decades, it is closer to the average for earlier in the series. The winter of 2022-23 had 83% of the 1991-2020 average rainfall, but 94% compared to the earlier period of 1961-90.
Comparing 1991-2020 to 1961-90, winter rainfall for the UK has risen by 14%. The increase is not uniform across the UK, however, with the greatest increases in excess of 20% across north and west Scotland, and smaller rises below 10% for central and southern England.
It is notable that, in a series stretching back to 1836, the five wettest winters have all occurred since 1990. The record wettest winter of 2013-14 had approximately double the rainfall of 2023, highlighting the large interannual variability in UK rainfall.
In contrast, at the time of writing, wet weather through the first half of the 2023-24 winter has resulted in widespread flooding across the country.
Climate variability is a critical driver in recent extremes of winter rainfall, while the emerging climate change signal resulting from increased moisture in the atmosphere is an important secondary factor contributing to the risk of wetter winters.
UK climate projections indicate a clear shift to higher probability of wet winters over the UK. This is caused by an increase in the number of wet days, an increase in intensity of rainfall, and a decrease in the proportion of winter precipitation falling as snow.
Spring
The first half of March was generally cold and resulted in some of the lowest temperatures of the year.
By the middle of the month, the situation became milder and wetter. March was exceptionally wet for many regions except for northern Scotland. It was the sixth-wettest March for the UK, third-wettest for England and Northern Ireland and fifth-wettest for Wales.
April saw temperature and rainfall statistics near-average, although Storm Noa was one of the most significant April storms since 2013, with hundreds of homes across south-west England and Wales left without power.
A maximum wind gust of 83 Kt (96mph) at Needles on the Isle of Wight was the highest wind gust on record for England during the month of April. This particular site is located at the top of a cliff exposed to westerly winds so is representative of a very exposed coastal location. Inland winds were lower, but still sufficient to cause some disruption.
May was warmer and drier overall, although heavy thunderstorms over 7-11 May caused surface-water flooding across parts of southern and eastern England. Drier weather from the middle of the month, however, resulted in a shift to wildfire reports across parts of Wales, the south-west and west Yorkshire by the end of the month.
Summer
It was the warmest June on record for the UK with an average temperature of 15.8C, beating the previous record of 14.9C that was set in the Junes of 1940 and 1976 by 0.9C. Previously, the top three warmest Junes were separated by just 0.1C.
The highest daily temperature reached in the month was 32.2C (on 10 and 25 June), which did not challenge the June temperature record of 35.6C, recorded on 28 June 1976. What was unusual about June 2023 was the persistence of the warmth rather than its severity. Temperatures exceeded 25C for at least a fortnight with peaks in excess of 30C.
A long-standing curious statistical quirk of UK climatology was that 13 June was the only June date that had never previously recorded temperatures in excess of 30C in meteorological records spanning over 100 years. This quirky fact was finally broken this year, reaching 30.8C on 13 June.
The chart below shows a comparison of the 2023 June heatwave with 1976, the previous joint record warmest June. This shows the UK-average daily maximum temperature through June and July for 1976 (dotted line and grey shading) and 2023 (blue line and orange shading).
The 1976 heatwave was certainly more severe than 2023, but occurred slightly later in the season, peaking in early July. In contrast, the persistent warmth in 2023 fell within the calendar month of June.
A significant contributing factor to the exceptional and persistent warmth was a major North Atlantic marine heatwave, which brought record-breaking temperatures in the North Atlantic and around the UK. A severe marine heatwave was declared in mid-June, which further amplified temperatures over the UK land.
An attribution study by the Met Office found that the likelihood of beating the UK land June temperature record had at least doubled compared to when it was first set in 1940. We estimated there was around a 3% chance of beating the record in a 1991-2020 climate and, by the 2050s, a record could be occurring around every other year on average under a high-emissions scenario.
Unsurprisingly, the June warmth was associated with a persistent high-pressure system resulting in plenty of clear skies and dry conditions. The month was, therefore, also the fourth sunniest June on record, and the sunniest June since 1957, but not as sunny as the exceptionally sunny month of May 2020.
Some more unsettled weather at the end of the month meant that while recording only around 68% of average rainfall, June was not dry enough to trouble any records.
A more unsettled situation then took over for the remainder of the summer, with conditions turning cooler, duller and windier.
It was the sixth-wettest July on record with 140.1mm and the wettest since 2009 (145.5mm). It was the wettest July on record for Northern Ireland and for parts of north-west England including Merseyside, Lancashire and Greater Manchester.
August continued the unsettled theme with a distinct lack of summery weather – however, it was not as wet as July.
A key driver of the wet high summer was a displacement in the jet stream to a more southerly track across the UK. The map below shows anomalies in wind speed at 250hPa, relative to a 1991-2020 average. (250hPa is a level of equal pressure and is equivalent to a height of around 10.5km.)
The purple regions show where the wind is stronger than average and orange they are weaker – highlighting a strengthening of the upper-level wind across southern England and a weakening in the more typical summer jet stream to the north of Scotland. This resulted in low-pressure weather systems from the Atlantic being directed on a more southerly track over the UK.
Despite being relatively wet during the high summer (July through August), the average temperature averaged across July (14.9C) and August (15.3C) was 15.1C. This was cooler than June (15.8C), but close to the 1991-2020 average for Jul-Aug (15.2C).
Another indicator of the influence of climate change on UK climate is that a wet summer such as that of 2023 is approximately 1C warmer than equivalently wet summers from the past.
Autumn (and December)
In early September, the jet stream shifted north and high pressure returned. Consequently, the UK experienced another heatwave bringing some of the hottest weather of the year, peaking at 33.5C at Faversham, Kent on 10 September.
A new high-temperature record was also set for the month for Northern Ireland with 28C at Castlederg, County Tyrone on the 8 September.
It was the longest run of days reaching 30C somewhere in the country during September on record at seven consecutive days (4-10 September). It is only the fourth time on record that the highest temperature of the year has occurred in September, with the other years being 2016, 1954, 1949 and 1919. High temperatures were not confined to the daytime and some locations also recorded “tropical nights” when the minimum temperatures do not drop below 20C.
The month concluded with Storm Agnes kicking off the 2023-24 storm season. But the early warmth contributed to it becoming the joint-warmest September on record for the UK (with 2006). An average temperature of 15.2C was warmer than July and only marginally behind August.
A rapid attribution conducted at the time showed that a September this warm would be exceptionally unlikely in a natural climate, but in our current climate there is approximately a 3% chance of reaching or exceeding it. A September this warm does still require the right combination of factors, but climate change is making such late-season warmth more likely.
The remainder of the autumn season and December continued the generally mild, wet and – at times – stormy theme, with the joint-sixth wettest October and joint-eighth wettest December on record. It was the sixth-warmest autumn for the UK and third-warmest for both England and Wales.
Reviewing 2023 demonstrates how the UK is subject to the combined influences of the variability in the weather, but also the influence of human-caused climate change. This is affecting both our climate statistics and also the likelihood of some types of extreme events.
The post Met Office: A review of the UK’s climate in 2023 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
After a five-year long legal battle, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has blocked Shell and local partner Impact Africa’s permit to explore for oil and gas off the country’s East Coast, in a landmark victory for local communities and civil society.
“Today’s judgment makes me feel very happy and proud that the ocean is not for profit for mining companies,” said East Coast resident and environmental campaigner Siyabonga Ndovela.
The verdict culminates a years-long process in which non-profits Sustaining the Wild Coast, Natural Justice, Greenpeace Africa, and others took legal action against Shell, Impact Africa and the South African government for failing to consult affected communities – a legal requirement in the country.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Shell and Impact Africa had not complied with resource governance law, had failed to meaningfully conduct public consultation and had failed to consider the impact on climate change, cultural rights, livelihoods and ecological harm.
The ruling references last year’s landmark advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, which states that countries have a legal duty to prevent and repair damage to the climate system. The South African judges argued climate change “transcends borders” and that states’ obligations “must be understood within the broader framework of international law.”
“This case must also be understood against the backdrop of well-documented struggles by coastal communities to protect their land, marine resources and ways of life in the face of extractive activities that they believe threaten their very existence,” wrote Justice Narandran Kollapen.
The Constitutional Court found that the exploration right had been unlawfully granted by the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources.The ruling upholds a 2022 regional court decision against Shell and overturns a 2024 appeal that allowed the company to conduct fresh public consultations under the original exploration right. Today’s decision means the right, initially granted in 2014, must be set aside.
Celebrating the decision, Sherelee Odyar, oil and gas campaigner at Greenpeace Africa, told Climate Home News that the court confirmed “serious failures” in the awarding of exploration rights to Shell and Impact Africa, which “can not simply be corrected later”.
The Wild Coast is a biodiversity hotspot which has been conserved over generations by coastal communities who rely on the ocean and land. “Our land and sea are central to our livelihoods and our way of life. Over generations we have conserved them, and they have conserved us,” reads the founding statement in the case.
A Shell spokesperson said it noted the ruling, responding that “we are committed to responsible offshore exploration, meaningful stakeholder engagement and environmental stewardship.”
The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources did not respond to requests for comment at the time of publication.
“Renewed strength” for communities
The ruling adds to a series of legal challenges brought by civil society groups against oil companies and the government as South Africa has expanded oil and gas development since 2014 under Operation Phakisa, a plan aimed at “unlocking the economic potential of the oceans”.
On the West Coast, Walter Steenkamp, Chair of Aukotowa Fisheries Cooperative, which is involved in a separate ongoing legal action against TotalEnergies, said that “today’s court case gave me renewed strength.”
The case could also set a precedent for future oil developments, said Alessandro Mazzi, legal governance researcher at the University of Wageningen. He added that the verdict “sends a strong signal to investors that where projects affect people’s land, livelihoods and environment, meaningful consultation and genuine ecological assessment are an integral part of responsible investment”.
Janet Solomon, coordinator of advocacy group Oceans not Oil, said that the Court’s emphasis on democratic participation, culture, livelihoods and the health of future generations in handing down the verdict signals a shift in jurisprudence on environmental governance, saying that this focus “may prove to be the judgment’s most enduring legacy.”
The post South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right appeared first on Climate Home News.
South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right
China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.
The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.
This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.
Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.
However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.
It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.
But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.
Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.
Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.
Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.
What does the plan say about peaking coal?
Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.
The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.
Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.
The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:
“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”
However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.
The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.
Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.
Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.
But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.
The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.
In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.
It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.
The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.
The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.
The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:
- Peaking coal consumption;
- “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
- Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
- Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
- “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
- Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
- Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
- Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.
The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.
“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.
A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.
This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”
However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.
State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.
“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.
While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.
Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.
“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.
What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.
The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.
The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.
Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.
Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.
“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.
Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.
It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.
This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.
New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.
This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.
The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.
What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.
The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.
Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.
In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.
It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.
This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.
Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.
Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.
China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.
Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.
It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]
The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.
At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.
In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.
Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.
In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.
However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.
She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.
How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?
Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.
As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.
Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.
A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.
But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.
China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.
The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”
The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.
Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.
Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:
“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”
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The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?
The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.
A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.
The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.
In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.
This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.
This Australian coal community is co-designing its own green future
Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.
Openings down, pipeline up
But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.
“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.
The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.
Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.
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China’s coal-chemicals boom risks repeating the mistakes of the past
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Nations agreed at COP26 five years ago to “phase down” coal power – a commitment that China and India successfully pushed to weaken from “phase out”. At COP28 in 2023, governments agreed to transition away from all fossil fuels in energy systems.
Since then, wealthy nations have partnered with coal-producing countries like South Africa, Vietnam and Indonesia on plans to transition from coal to clean energy. But, after preliminary talks, India and these governments did not agree a JETP.
The post New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus appeared first on Climate Home News.
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