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At COP28 in Dubai last November, countries agreed specific global targets on adaptation for the first time.

This marked a significant step forward for the “global goal on adaptation” (GGA) work programme, which was established in 2015, but has seen little progress over the subsequent years.

The GGA framework agreed last year sets out targets that will act as a guide for nations in their efforts to protect their people and ecosystems from the impacts of climate change.

The agreement also saw the launch of the two-year UAE-Belém work programme, which will produce a set of indicators to track progress towards these targets by COP30 next year.

Recently, more than 5,000 potential indicators were submitted to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat by parties and non-party stakeholders, including UN bodies, specialised agencies and other relevant organisations.

This created a daunting challenge: how to select adaptation indicators that are meaningful, feasible and that do not cause undue reporting burden?

In this article, we look at a series of key considerations for developing effective indicators that track progress on adaptation.

What is the ‘global goal on adaptation’?

The GGA in the Paris Agreement aims to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, in the context of the goal to limit global average temperature increase to “well-below 2C”.

Until recently, progress towards the GGA becoming operational has been slow. But COP28 saw a significant step forwards, with countries agreeing a global framework known as the “United Arab Emirates framework for global climate resilience”.

The GGA framework includes 11 global targets to be achieved by 2030. Seven are targets for adaptation action in specific themes: water; health; biodiversity; food; infrastructure; poverty; and heritage. And the other four targets are for the adaptation cycle: climate risk and vulnerability assessments; planning; implementation and monitoring; and evaluation and learning.

Tracking progress towards these targets needs a set of indicators to measure against. Many are already available and used in other contexts, but this work involves identifying a set that can be applied globally under the GGA.

In June 2024 at the UN’s Bonn climate negotiations, countries agreed to begin this process by mapping existing indicators and identifying gaps. The graphic below shows the timeline for developing the indicators, which will culminate at COP30 in Belém, Brazil next year.

Timeline to develop indicators for the GGA framework.

Timeline to develop indicators for the GGA framework, across the next two UN climate conferences – COP29 and COP30 – and the 60th (SB60) and 62nd (SB62) sessions of the subsidiary bodies to the UNFCCC under the Bonn Climate Change Conference. Source: Updated from Leiter (2024a), timeline by Carbon Brief.

Developing indicators is challenging because adaptation is context-specific, influenced by framing and value judgements, and is closely interlinked with sustainable development.

There is, therefore, no universal metric for adaptation akin to reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.

Developing adaptation indicators that apply to a broad range of actions across diverse contexts is particularly difficult. The compilation of indicators by the UNFCCC secretariat shows that there is a lack of indicators that can be aggregated to the global level.

Developing suitable indicators to track progress of the GGA targets requires time, expertise and resources – and a targeted process that combines technically sound inputs with political consultations.

Robust GGA indicators

Before forming the indicators themselves, it is critical to establish how the GGA targets can be tracked. We have identified nine key considerations that the UAE-Belem work programme will need to address.

First, each GGA target consists of multiple elements, so the first step towards developing suitable indicators must be to unpack each target, to identify the key elements and then guide development of the indicators based on these elements.

For example, the table below lists the key elements of the GGA’s water target and impact, vulnerability and risk assessment target.

The presence of multiple elements within each target means that each target requires multiple indicators if its scope is to be fully covered. Hence, at a minimum, several dozen indicators will be needed to measure progress towards the 11 targets.

(A breakdown of the key elements of each of the seven thematic targets and for the four targets around the iterative adaptation cycle are provided in recent UNFCCC submissions by LSE and the AGN.)

The second key consideration is how to secure ambitious interpretations of the targets.

Many elements of the targets require further clarification, as seen in the table above. This is especially important for the development of appropriate indicators that are to be used at the global level, as opposed to national or local level.

The way target elements are interpreted will influence the ambition level of the targets and how they are tracked through the indicators.

For example, the 2023 adaptation gap report found that 85% of countries already have a national adaptation plan or an equivalent planning document. Accordingly, further specifications – such as having the plan be informed by risk assessments or be regularly updated – will increase ambition.

It is important for the indicator work programme to consider the influence of the indicators and the associated calculation methods on the ambition of the targets.

Countries could also agree to additional specifications that are not mentioned in the targets that would further increase ambition. For example, in addition to policies and plans, countries could be tracked for the establishment of legal instruments that foster adaptation.

Adaptation-relevant indicators

The third key consideration is ensuring that indicators are relevant to adaptation.

Given the thousands of existing indicators developed for different purposes, defining what counts as adaptation-relevant is key for mapping and for the development of suitable GGA indicators.

However, many existing indicators were not developed to directly track climate adaptation actions as described in the GGA targets. If they are to be adopted under the GGA, it needs to be demonstrated how these indicators measure adaptation specifically – distinguishing them from other general development indicators – and how they will track GGA targets.

For example, indicators should at least be able to measure one of the key elements that define climate adaptation: changes in vulnerability; exposure; adaptive capacity; resilience; risks; and impacts from climate change. Additionally, outcome-based targets should be tracked with outcome-based indicators.

The fourth key consideration is understanding which elements in the GGA targets can be tracked with existing adaptation-relevant indicators – with or without modification – and where new indicators are required.

We completed a rapid assessment of the indicators available from existing global frameworks and UN climate funding mechanisms. As the table below shows, many existing indicators are insufficient for tracking GGA targets.

For example, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction has a series of indicators, including those covering the number of countries that have multi-hazard early warning systems and the number of countries that have multi-hazard monitoring and forecasting systems (see G1-4 here).

While these could be adopted for the early warning systems element under the impacts, vulnerability and risk target, the majority of the Sendai indicators cannot be adopted without significant modification.

Table 2: Mapping and gap analysis showing sufficiency of existing indicators in multilateral frameworks for GGA targets: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Sendai Framework (SF), and Convention on Biological Diversity Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (CBD); the UN climate funding mechanism: Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Adaptation Fund (AF); and Adaptation Gap Report (AGR). Sufficiency was assessed based on adaptation relevance of the indicators to effectively track the key element of the target.

Best-available science and data

The fifth key consideration is that the indicators will need to cover the support of adaptation, not just the actions themselves. This means tracking the means of implementation – that is, adaptation finance, technology transfer and capacity building – to enhance adaptation action and support.

Sixth is ensuring that indicators are robust and based on best-available science. This requires them to be accompanied by clear calculation methods and definitions.

For example, tracking progress towards the GGA infrastructure target requires determining how to measure “climate-related impacts on infrastructure”. Without clear guidance for countries, the indicator values would not be comparable and could not be used for global aggregation.

The seventh key consideration is exploring innovative data sources and methods. Ideally, this would involve indicators using multiple data sources, with technology offering the potential to fill data gaps and support high-quality data.

For example, remote sensing, artificial intelligence and digital tools – such as mobile phones – can offer cost-effective alternatives to traditional data gathering at the national level.

The eighth key consideration is including technical experts. Due to the technical complexity of the indicator work programme, it is crucial that technical experts receive clear guidelines and detailed procedures. This includes work organisation, timelines, inputs and outputs, with balanced regional representation to ensure contextual relevance.

Finally, the last consideration is agreeing on the remaining UAE-Belem work programme details in 2024.

The COP29 summit in Baku, Azerbaijan is pivotal for achieving consensus on the GGA indicator work programme regarding any outstanding issues. Parties are expected to conclude at the talks with consensus on the programme's implementation, including clarifying processes, scope of work, roles and deliverables for 2025.

Given the limited time to complete the work before COP30 in Belém, such consensus could be crucial.

The post Guest post: How to track progress towards the ‘global goal on adaptation’? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Guest post: How to track progress towards the ‘global goal on adaptation’?

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Coles, Woolworths failing on deforestation commitments 

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SYDNEY, Wednesday 26 August 2026 — New 2026 Sustainability Reports released by supermarket giants Coles and Woolworths this week demonstrate the retailers are failing on their commitments to end deforestation in their supply chains.

Adele Chasson, Nature Policy Lead at Greenpeace Australia Pacific said:

“These so-called sustainability reports are revealing. Despite their public commitments in 2024 and 2025, neither Coles nor Woolworths have taken deforestation-linked beef off their shelves. Meanwhile, bulldozers continue to tear up forests and bushland, pushing wildlife closer to extinction and causing mass toxic runoff to flow into the Great Barrier Reef. Millions of native animals like koalas are losing their homes to beef pastures each year, while the big supermarkets put off action.

“Australians would be shocked to know that beef on the shelves of our biggest supermarkets could be pushing threatened species to the brink of extinction. Collectively Coles and Woolworths have made more than $2 billion in profits in the last year, profiting from the destruction of wildlife and precious Australian nature. Coles and Woolworths owe it to shoppers to deliver on their promises and end deforestation in their supply chains now.

“As big beef buyers, Coles and Woolworths have an essential role to play in keeping Australia’s unique forests standing. They can help stop the Great Barrier Reef from being poisoned by runoff and protect iconic forest wildlife by taking deforestation off their shelves. It’s time these big companies put their money where their mouths are and follow through on their promise of sourcing and supplying deforestation-free beef.”

Coles, Woolworths failing on deforestation commitments 

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New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation

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New Zealand’s parliament has adopted a controversial new law blocking a whole avenue of climate litigation and shutting down its most advanced corporate lawsuit, which has been blamed by the government for shaking business confidence and investment.

The Climate Change Response (Tort Liability) Amendment Bill, expected to take effect in the coming days after it is formally signed by the Governor-General, prevents all current and future civil claims for climate loss or harm under tort law.

Justice minister Paul Goldsmith said last week that the aim was to give businesses “certainty around their climate change obligations”, noting it would not alter the government’s responsibilities under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 nor business obligations under the Emissions Trading Scheme.

“Our response to climate change is best managed by the Government at a national level and not through piece-meal litigation in the courts,” he added in a statement.

Such litigation, he said, “risks developing a new regime that contradicts the framework Parliament has already enacted” to tackle climate change.

    Goldsmith singled out a key domestic climate lawsuit brought by Northland iwi leader and activist Mike Smith against six big companies: dairy firms Fonterra and Dairy Holdings, energy firms Genesis Energy and Z Energy, New Zealand Steel and coal mining firm BT Mining. A seventh original defendant, Channel Infrastructure, was dropped after it permanently decommissioned its Marsden Point oil refinery.

    Smith argued that these companies had caused him harm under public nuisance and negligence law, as well as a third breach of a duty to cease contributing to climate change that has yet to be tested domestically. He did not seek financial compensation, instead asking for the companies to immediately stop emitting or contributing to net greenhouse gas emissions.

    In one of the most advanced corporate climate accountability lawsuits in the world, a trial had been scheduled for April 2027 after the Supreme Court unanimously allowed the case to continue.

    Corporate lobbying in the shadows

    Smith described the passing of the bill as “deeply concerning”, particularly as it coincided with the Supreme Court hearing another of his climate lawsuits. In that case, Smith v Attorney-General, he argues that the government’s response to climate change and its impacts on Māori communities in particular breaches rights to life and culture.

    “That timing raises profound questions about the separation of powers and the rule of law,” said Smith. “Whatever one’s view of the merits of these cases, it is deeply troubling when parliament intervenes to remove a legal pathway while the courts are actively considering fundamental questions about climate responsibility, rights and the crown’s obligations.”

    The bill – which says that no person (including the government) can be found liable in tort for emissions-related climate change effects – followed major lobbying efforts by the companies defending themselves in Smith’s lawsuit. They outlined a proposed legal amendment in a briefing note to the government in 2024.

    The centre-right government has been fiercely criticised over its lack of transparency in relation to this lobbying activity. The national ombudsman recently found that the Prime Minister’s Office effectively withheld information requested by the Environmental Law Initiative about meetings, discussions and conversations regarding Smith’s case.

    Green groups fail to stop bill

    The bill sparked huge concern among environmental campaigners in New Zealand and elsewhere. Greenpeace Aotearoa called it a “shocking abuse of executive power” and the vast majority of submissions to a parliamentary inquiry said it should be rejected.

    But in the end, it was adopted with little resistance, moving relatively smoothly through parliament, passing its third reading by 67 votes to 53. Sam Bookman, climate law lecturer at Melbourne Law School, told Climate Home News he was not surprised by this, given that the coalition government has a secure majority.

    A complaint has been made to the UN special rapporteur on climate change and human rights by Smith, the National Iwi Chairs Forum Pou Tikanga and youth coalition Climate Clinic Aotearoa over what they see as the government’s heavy-handed approach. Smith is also challenging the new law in yet another lawsuit.

    “Pathetic”: New Zealand plans to barely cut emissions between 2030 and 2035

    Bookman thinks it “very unlikely” that such a challenge will succeed, noting that New Zealand’s constitution is firmly anchored in parliamentary sovereignty.

    But the expert in climate law does not see the bill as the end of legal action in the country, noting that New Zealand has a “sophisticated climate litigation landscape with a growing number of specialist and experienced lawyers and NGOs”.

    The country is also approaching its next general election in November, and some opposition parties have pledged to restore access to the courts if elected.

    Amanda Larsson, global project lead on agriculture for Greenpeace International, said: “This law deserves to be tested, and I strongly encourage the international climate litigation community to unite and help defend New Zealanders’ fundamental right to hold polluters accountable before this becomes a global blueprint.”

    Copycat legislation on the rise

    New Zealand’s move is part of a small but growing legislative effort to shut down climate litigation around the world.

    In the US, Republican politicians introduced legislation in the House and Senate in April that would shield fossil fuel firms from climate liability lawsuits. Similar laws have already been passed at state level in Tennessee, Utah, Iowa and Louisiana.

    The German state of Bavaria has put forward a similar proposal to the Federal Council, aiming to block private climate claims as well as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments imposing such liability. There are also proposals to limit available remedies and actions in the Netherlands and Belgium.

    UN General Assembly backs “climate obligations” set by world’s top court

    Bookman said he expects more efforts to counter climate damages litigation and advised plaintiffs to think about how to respond, including drawing on broader support in opposing them.

    “Even though it’s very hard for plaintiffs to win these types of cases, companies are very eager to avoid the expense, embarrassment and political accountability that come even with unsuccessful lawsuits,” he said.

    The post New Zealand moves to protect business with law curtailing climate litigation appeared first on Climate Home News.

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    Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry 

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    Bhima Yudhistira Adhinegara is the Executive Director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS), an Indonesia-based economic think tank. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the China-Indonesia desk at CELIOS. 

    Indonesia produces around 60% of the world’s nickel, a metal used to manufacture batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) – more than any other country in the world. But in 2026, the government sharply reduced how much of its nickel can be extracted from the ground.

    Production quotas were reduced by around 40% this year compared to 2025. Weda Bay, the largest nickel mine on Earth, had its allowance cut by more than 70% and exhausted its full-year quota by the end of May, halting mining entirely; it cannot resume large-scale extraction until next year unless regulators grant an extension.

    The policy has sparked a vivid debate in Indonesian policy circles: how can the country shift its strategy from a decade of mining vast quantities of cheap nickel to producing a high-value and low-carbon material that the rest of the world wants for EV batteries.

    The cuts aren’t a silver bullet to clean up Indonesia’s nickel industry, whose smelters are powered by coal – the most polluting fossil fuels. But alongside stricter enforcement of environmental rules, it is one side of efforts to produce more sustainable nickel for a premium.

    Restricting Indonesia’s nickel output

    Production quotas were introduced to stop the collapse of nickel prices because of oversupply in the market. Prices had fallen more than 40% in 2023 alone and kept sliding as Indonesian supply kept growing, hitting a four-year low of around $13,900 a ton in late 2025.

    Critics called the recent tightening of production quotas proof that Indonesia’s nickel strategy has failed, arguing that the industry shouldn’t need to throttle its own output to survive. But when assessed against what the policy was supposed to do – push up nickel prices – it has worked. Prices jumped to $20,000 a ton in May, the highest since 2024.

      Chinese industry groups representing companies that have invested billions to mine and refine the country’s nickel were furious, warning Indonesia’s president Prabowo Subianto that the cuts put $50 billion worth of investment at risk. But much of that Chinese capital is sunk into smelters and processing plants built specifically to run on Indonesian ore, and cannot simply be moved elsewhere. That gives Jakarta more room to hold its ground than the warning suggests.

      Stronger environmental enforcement

      Since the start of the year, Indonesia’s forestry task force has seized more than four million hectares of land from mines and plantations operating illegally in protected forests, collecting over two trillion rupiah ($113 million) in fines.

      This included 148 hectares seized from Weda Bay for lacking a forestry permit. The share of nickel produced from illegal small-scale mining also fell from about a quarter in 2022 to roughly 10% by 2024.

      The crackdown responds to serious environmental damages in the nickel industry. On Obi Island, a waste pond collapsed after heavy rain in June 2025, flooding three villages and killing a resident. Internal company tests found chromium-6 – a carcinogen – in the water, in quantities far above the legal limit. The footprint of another mine near Raja Ampat, which is home to some of the world’s richest coral reefs, grew 60-fold in just eight years.

      A coastal village is wedged between the sea and a large nickel mine in Indonesia
      The fishing villages of Tapunggaya in Sulawesi, Indonesia, are squeezed between the sea and an expanding nickel mine (Photo by Garry Lotulung/NurPhoto)

      The market is responding to early cleanup efforts. Low-carbon nickel now sells for a real premium, roughly $18,800 to $19,300 a ton compared with $17,900 to $18,300 otherwise, as carmakers seek to source cleaner materials to comply with the European Union’s new emissions rules for imports.

      In turn, this is incentivising the industry to do more to green its operations. Vale Indonesia’s smelter in South Sulawesi now runs almost entirely on hydropower, for example.

      None of this addresses coal use, however. Major Indonesian nickel producers still emitted an estimated 15 million metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2023. Indonesia may be cracking down on illegal mining and rewarding cleaner producers but it is still running its mines on the dirtiest fuel available.

      Unequal benefits

      For Indonesia to truly benefit from producing cleaner and high-value nickel, it needs to reap the economic benefits too. Although the industry has boosted the country’s economic growth, the reality on the ground tells a different story.

      Konawe in Southeast Sulawesi is home to a major smelting complex. Growth in the district jumped from 6% to 22% between 2015 and 2023, driven almost entirely by the nickel industry, according to a study by the Lowy Institute study. At the same time, poverty levels increased slightly and unemployment remained unchanged.

        In Halmahera, another epicentre of the nickel industry, spending by the poorest fifth grew just 5% between 2019 and 2022, compared with 28% for the wealthiest fifth, according to a separate study.

        Part of the reason for this inequality is the system for transferring mining royalties to district authorities where the mines are located. In theory, they are entitled to the largest share. But in practice, payments are delayed, companies routinely dispute what they owe and royalties are pooled and distributed across a larger area.

        The Natural Resource Governance Institute has found that decentralisation handed local governments power to approve new mines faster than they could build their capacity to manage them. Higher output raises national income on paper, but local governments remain constrained by fiscal rules and infrastructure costs that scale with mining.

        None of this makes the 2026 quota cuts a mistake. Indonesia has every right to defend its pricing power over a resource it controls. But limiting extraction isn’t going to fix underlying issues around environmental enforcement and revenue-sharing. That requires rules that are consistently enforced, royalties that reach communities living by the mines, and a plan to wean smelters off coal.

        The post Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry  appeared first on Climate Home News.

        Indonesia’s nickel production cuts are not enough to create a sustainable industry 

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