At COP28 in Dubai last November, countries agreed specific global targets on adaptation for the first time.
This marked a significant step forward for the “global goal on adaptation” (GGA) work programme, which was established in 2015, but has seen little progress over the subsequent years.
The GGA framework agreed last year sets out targets that will act as a guide for nations in their efforts to protect their people and ecosystems from the impacts of climate change.
The agreement also saw the launch of the two-year UAE-Belém work programme, which will produce a set of indicators to track progress towards these targets by COP30 next year.
Recently, more than 5,000 potential indicators were submitted to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat by parties and non-party stakeholders, including UN bodies, specialised agencies and other relevant organisations.
This created a daunting challenge: how to select adaptation indicators that are meaningful, feasible and that do not cause undue reporting burden?
In this article, we look at a series of key considerations for developing effective indicators that track progress on adaptation.
What is the ‘global goal on adaptation’?
The GGA in the Paris Agreement aims to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, in the context of the goal to limit global average temperature increase to “well-below 2C”.
Until recently, progress towards the GGA becoming operational has been slow. But COP28 saw a significant step forwards, with countries agreeing a global framework known as the “United Arab Emirates framework for global climate resilience”.
The GGA framework includes 11 global targets to be achieved by 2030. Seven are targets for adaptation action in specific themes: water; health; biodiversity; food; infrastructure; poverty; and heritage. And the other four targets are for the adaptation cycle: climate risk and vulnerability assessments; planning; implementation and monitoring; and evaluation and learning.
Tracking progress towards these targets needs a set of indicators to measure against. Many are already available and used in other contexts, but this work involves identifying a set that can be applied globally under the GGA.
In June 2024 at the UN’s Bonn climate negotiations, countries agreed to begin this process by mapping existing indicators and identifying gaps. The graphic below shows the timeline for developing the indicators, which will culminate at COP30 in Belém, Brazil next year.

Timeline to develop indicators for the GGA framework, across the next two UN climate conferences – COP29 and COP30 – and the 60th (SB60) and 62nd (SB62) sessions of the subsidiary bodies to the UNFCCC under the Bonn Climate Change Conference. Source: Updated from Leiter (2024a), timeline by Carbon Brief.
Developing indicators is challenging because adaptation is context-specific, influenced by framing and value judgements, and is closely interlinked with sustainable development.
There is, therefore, no universal metric for adaptation akin to reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.
Developing adaptation indicators that apply to a broad range of actions across diverse contexts is particularly difficult. The compilation of indicators by the UNFCCC secretariat shows that there is a lack of indicators that can be aggregated to the global level.
Developing suitable indicators to track progress of the GGA targets requires time, expertise and resources – and a targeted process that combines technically sound inputs with political consultations.
Robust GGA indicators
Before forming the indicators themselves, it is critical to establish how the GGA targets can be tracked. We have identified nine key considerations that the UAE-Belem work programme will need to address.
First, each GGA target consists of multiple elements, so the first step towards developing suitable indicators must be to unpack each target, to identify the key elements and then guide development of the indicators based on these elements.
For example, the table below lists the key elements of the GGA’s water target and impact, vulnerability and risk assessment target.
The presence of multiple elements within each target means that each target requires multiple indicators if its scope is to be fully covered. Hence, at a minimum, several dozen indicators will be needed to measure progress towards the 11 targets.
(A breakdown of the key elements of each of the seven thematic targets and for the four targets around the iterative adaptation cycle are provided in recent UNFCCC submissions by LSE and the AGN.)
The second key consideration is how to secure ambitious interpretations of the targets.
Many elements of the targets require further clarification, as seen in the table above. This is especially important for the development of appropriate indicators that are to be used at the global level, as opposed to national or local level.
The way target elements are interpreted will influence the ambition level of the targets and how they are tracked through the indicators.
For example, the 2023 adaptation gap report found that 85% of countries already have a national adaptation plan or an equivalent planning document. Accordingly, further specifications – such as having the plan be informed by risk assessments or be regularly updated – will increase ambition.
It is important for the indicator work programme to consider the influence of the indicators and the associated calculation methods on the ambition of the targets.
Countries could also agree to additional specifications that are not mentioned in the targets that would further increase ambition. For example, in addition to policies and plans, countries could be tracked for the establishment of legal instruments that foster adaptation.
Adaptation-relevant indicators
The third key consideration is ensuring that indicators are relevant to adaptation.
Given the thousands of existing indicators developed for different purposes, defining what counts as adaptation-relevant is key for mapping and for the development of suitable GGA indicators.
However, many existing indicators were not developed to directly track climate adaptation actions as described in the GGA targets. If they are to be adopted under the GGA, it needs to be demonstrated how these indicators measure adaptation specifically – distinguishing them from other general development indicators – and how they will track GGA targets.
For example, indicators should at least be able to measure one of the key elements that define climate adaptation: changes in vulnerability; exposure; adaptive capacity; resilience; risks; and impacts from climate change. Additionally, outcome-based targets should be tracked with outcome-based indicators.
The fourth key consideration is understanding which elements in the GGA targets can be tracked with existing adaptation-relevant indicators – with or without modification – and where new indicators are required.
We completed a rapid assessment of the indicators available from existing global frameworks and UN climate funding mechanisms. As the table below shows, many existing indicators are insufficient for tracking GGA targets.
For example, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction has a series of indicators, including those covering the number of countries that have multi-hazard early warning systems and the number of countries that have multi-hazard monitoring and forecasting systems (see G1-4 here).
While these could be adopted for the early warning systems element under the impacts, vulnerability and risk target, the majority of the Sendai indicators cannot be adopted without significant modification.
Table 2: Mapping and gap analysis showing sufficiency of existing indicators in multilateral frameworks for GGA targets: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Sendai Framework (SF), and Convention on Biological Diversity Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (CBD); the UN climate funding mechanism: Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Adaptation Fund (AF); and Adaptation Gap Report (AGR). Sufficiency was assessed based on adaptation relevance of the indicators to effectively track the key element of the target.
Best-available science and data
The fifth key consideration is that the indicators will need to cover the support of adaptation, not just the actions themselves. This means tracking the means of implementation – that is, adaptation finance, technology transfer and capacity building – to enhance adaptation action and support.
Sixth is ensuring that indicators are robust and based on best-available science. This requires them to be accompanied by clear calculation methods and definitions.
For example, tracking progress towards the GGA infrastructure target requires determining how to measure “climate-related impacts on infrastructure”. Without clear guidance for countries, the indicator values would not be comparable and could not be used for global aggregation.
The seventh key consideration is exploring innovative data sources and methods. Ideally, this would involve indicators using multiple data sources, with technology offering the potential to fill data gaps and support high-quality data.
For example, remote sensing, artificial intelligence and digital tools – such as mobile phones – can offer cost-effective alternatives to traditional data gathering at the national level.
The eighth key consideration is including technical experts. Due to the technical complexity of the indicator work programme, it is crucial that technical experts receive clear guidelines and detailed procedures. This includes work organisation, timelines, inputs and outputs, with balanced regional representation to ensure contextual relevance.
Finally, the last consideration is agreeing on the remaining UAE-Belem work programme details in 2024.
The COP29 summit in Baku, Azerbaijan is pivotal for achieving consensus on the GGA indicator work programme regarding any outstanding issues. Parties are expected to conclude at the talks with consensus on the programme's implementation, including clarifying processes, scope of work, roles and deliverables for 2025.
Given the limited time to complete the work before COP30 in Belém, such consensus could be crucial.
The post Guest post: How to track progress towards the ‘global goal on adaptation’? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How to track progress towards the ‘global goal on adaptation’?
Climate Change
Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change
A federal election is taking place in Germany on 23 February, following the collapse of the coalition government at the end of last year.
Germans will vote to elect 630 members of the nation’s parliament.
Polling suggests there will be a political shift to the right, with the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the lead and far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) set to make significant gains.
A “traffic light” coalition of parties has ruled since 2021, led by the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), alongside the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).
However, successive crises led to its breakup at the end of 2024, when the liberal, free market-oriented FDP split from the rest.
This prompted a vote of no confidence by the German parliament, which, in turn, triggered a snap election several months earlier than previously scheduled.
The coalition government has been plagued by ideological differences, particularly between the FDP and its two centre-left partners.
Climate policies were at the heart of many of the disputes.
The centre-left SPD and Greens have broadly favoured more public spending on climate issues, while the FDP is opposed to state intervention of any sort.
In the interactive grid below, Carbon Brief tracks the commitments made by each of the main parties in their election manifestos, across a range of issues related to climate and energy.
The parties covered are:
- Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU): The centre-right CDU and its regional Bavarian “sister party”, CSU, has been the dominant political force in modern Germany and is currently polling highest ahead of the election.
- Social Democratic Party (SPD): The centre-left SPD has led the ruling coalition in Germany since the last election in 2021 and has traditionally been the other dominant party in the nation’s politics.
- Green Party: The centre-left and environmentalist Greens have been part of the coalition government since 2021.
- Free Democratic Party (FDP): The FDP is an economically liberal party that prioritises free markets and privatisation. It was part of the coalition government, but its departure at the end of 2024 ultimately triggered the federal election.
- Left Party: In recent years, this left-wing, democratic-socialist party has lost much of its support base in the east of the country.
- Alternative for Germany (AfD): The far-right party has become a major force in the country’s politics over the past decade, particularly in eastern Germany.
- Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW): The party was only founded last year, as an offshoot of the Left Party, but it has rapidly risen in popularity with a left-wing economic message and a conservative approach to some social and cultural issues.
Each entry in the grid represents a direct quote from a manifesto document.
Net-zero and climate framing
Climate action has become a divisive topic in German politics.
This is evident in the major parties’ manifestos, which range from supporting more ambitious net-zero goals to outright climate scepticism.
Germany is currently aiming to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, with interim targets including a 65% cut by 2030.
Government climate advisors on the Council of Experts on Climate Change have stated that the nation is on track to miss the 2030 target.
Despite starting out with ambitious aims, the coalition’s climate progress has faltered, with the FDP successfully pushing for weaker climate policies. Moreover, a major court ruling curtailed the government’s climate spending by enforcing Germany’s limit on debt.
Amid these wider tensions, Germany’s two traditionally dominant parties still want to retain the nation’s headline climate target. The CDU, which is leading the polls in the run-up to election day, commits to meeting the Paris Agreement goals in its manifesto, saying its sights are “firmly set” on net-zero by 2045.
The SPD, which is currently third in the polls and likely to end up in coalition with the CDU, also supports the 2045 net-zero target, as well as the interim goals.
However, the two parties differ substantially in their approach to meeting the 2045 target. The CDU prioritises carbon pricing and rejects the tougher policies to decarbonise heating and transport favoured by the SPD. (See: Heating dispute and Combustion engine phaseout.)
Meanwhile, the AfD manifesto repeatedly questions the “supposed scientific consensus” on “man-made climate change”. The party, which is currently second in the polls, “therefore rejects every policy and every tax that is related to alleged climate protection”.
Mainstream German parties across the spectrum have long agreed to a “firewall” against far-right groups, meaning they will not form coalitions with the AfD. However, the CDU recently sparked controversy when it backed an anti-immigration policy with the AfD.
The Green Party also supports the 2045 net-zero target in its manifesto, emphasising Germany’s status as the EU member state with the highest emissions. The Left Party goes further, calling for a 2040 net-zero goal.
As for the FDP, its manifesto argues for the 2045 net-zero goal to be pushed back to 2050, stating that this would align Germany with the EU target. Prior to exiting the coalition government last year, the party had demanded this policy change, claiming that it would be a way to boost the German economy.
(Germany already revised its net-zero target, bringing it forward by five years, following a supreme court ruling in 2021 that its 2050 goal was insufficient. Moreover, even with a later goal, Germany would still need to align with wider EU targets, meaning its climate policies may not change much due to its “effort sharing” obligations.)
Finally, the BSW is not specific about when the net-zero goal should be achieved, but pushes for a “departure from the wishful thinking of quickly achieving complete climate neutrality”.
It does not reject climate policies outright, stating that climate change should be “taken seriously”. However, it frames many climate policies as being “extremely expensive and often unrealistic”.
Heating dispute
Home heating has become a major political issue in Germany. Along with transport, buildings make up one of the key German sectors that have repeatedly missed their decarbonisation goals, prompting the coalition government to take action.
Towards the end of 2023, the German parliament passed an amendment to the Building Energy Act, meaning that newly installed heating systems had to be powered by at least 65% renewable energy.
This covered heat pumps, “hydrogen-ready” gas boilers and other low-carbon systems. There are caveats to ensure the law is phased in gradually in different areas and types of homes, starting with new builds.
The amendment had been watered down compared to the coalition’s initial proposal, with allowances for people to keep gas boilers for longer. This followed relentless campaigning by the AfD and the right-leaning tabloid newspaper Bild, which dubbed the policy the “heizhammer” – or “heating hammer”.
There were also attacks from within the coalition, with the FDP criticising the law proposed by its partners in the Greens and SDP. Opponents framed the policy as an excessive burden on consumers.
These disputes are reflected in the election manifestos, with many parties outright rejecting the amended law. The CDU, FDP and AfD all say they would abolish it, as does the populist left BSW.
Meanwhile, the Green Party pledges to provide more government support for the installation of new heating systems by covering up to 70% of the price. The Left Party commits to covering 100% of the cost for low-income households.
(The current law covers 30% of the cost as a starting subsidy, with more available for low-income households and people who replace their boilers before 2028.)
Combustion engine phaseout
Several German political parties are pushing back against the EU-wide ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars, which is set to come into effect in 2035.
The CDU says the “ban on combustion engines must be reversed”, while the AfD says the “one-sided preference for electromobility must be stopped immediately”.
(EVs are “likely crucial” for tackling transport emissions, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].)
The FDP and the BSW also argue that the 2035 phaseout date should be dropped, with less focus on the transition to electric cars. (This is in spite of Germany being the second-biggest manufacturer of electric cars in the world.)
These parties also favour getting rid of supposed “anti-car” policies. For example, they oppose speed limits on the German “autobahns” and support funding for alternative fuels, such as synthetic fuels.
The issue with ending the 2035 ban on new combustion-engine cars is that this policy is set at the EU level. Far-right and centre-right coalitions within the EU, including German parties, have been pushing hard to weaken the ban across the bloc.
However, the centre-left parties that may end up forming a coalition with the CDU, notably the SPD, stand by the 2035 phaseout date.
There is growing pressure on Germany’s car industry, linked to global competition and slow economic growth. Some German industry figures have stressed the need for consistent policy signals from the government, regarding the transition to electric vehicles.
Clean energy and fossil fuels
Broadly speaking, German parties on the left tend to be more supportive of renewables, while strongly opposing nuclear power. Those on the right are generally more open to nuclear and in some cases coal power.
Germany, which uses more coal than any other EU member state, has a coal power phaseout date of 2038. This is supported by the CDU and the FDP, but the Greens and the Left Party want a quicker phaseout by 2030.
(When the coalition government formed in 2021, the parties agreed to “ideally” move the coal phaseout date to 2030, but this has not happened formally. The SPD manifesto does not include any mention of coal power,)
Only the AfD advocates for the construction of new coal power plants, framing them as filling a gap until new nuclear plants are built.
Last year, Germany closed down its final nuclear reactors, bringing an end to a long-term plan to phase out the power source. However, nuclear power continues to be a politicised topic, with some arguing that its continued use is necessary to ensure the nation’s energy security.
Notably, the CDU suggests in its manifesto that it is open to reviving nuclear power in the future. It proposes an “expert review” around restarting closed plants and advocates for research on advanced nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors.
Despite this wording, CDU leader Friedrich Merz has conceded that it is unlikely any old reactors will be restarted. This echoes views expressed by German utility companies and energy experts.
Both the CDU and the SPD support the expansion of renewables in their manifestos. The Greens include a specific target to achieve a net-zero electricity grid by 2035. By contrast, the AfD calls for an end to wind power expansion, in favour of other technologies.
Finally, both the far-right AfD and the BSW say the German government should repair the damaged Nord Stream pipelines in order to import what the BSW refers to as “cheap” gas from Russia. (The Baltic Sea pipelines were blown up in 2022 under mysterious circumstances.)
Germany has tried to wean itself off Russian gas since the country’s invasion of Ukraine, with considerable success. However, both the AfD and the BSW are more open to cooperating with Russia, and less supportive of Ukraine, than mainstream German parties.
The post Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change
Climate Change
Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica
“Atmospheric rivers” are bringing rain to the frozen slopes of the West Antarctic ice sheet, hitting the ice shelves that play a major role in holding back rapidly retreating glaciers.
In a new study, my colleagues and I show how rain is occurring in sub-zero temperatures due to these “rivers in the sky” – long, narrow plumes of air which transport heat and moisture from the tropics to the mid-latitudes and poles.
Rain in Antarctica is significant, not only because it is a stark indicator of climate change, but because it remains an under-studied phenomenon which could impact ice shelves.
Ice shelves in Antarctica are important gatekeepers of sea level rise.
They act as a buffer for glaciers that flow off the vast ice sheet, slowing the rate at which ice is released into the ocean.
In the study, we explore the causes of rain falling on ice shelves in the Amundsen Sea embayment region, which stand in front of the critically important Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers.
Researchers have warned the collapse of ice shelves in this region could trigger the loss of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet over several centuries.
Rivers in the sky
Atmospheric rivers are typically associated with bringing extreme rainfall to the mid-latitudes, but, in the frigid Antarctic, they can deliver metres of snow in just a few days.
In West Antarctica, atmospheric rivers deliver a disproportionate quantity of the year’s snowfall. Research shows they account for around 13% of annual snowfall totals, despite occurring on just a few days per year.
But what makes atmospheric rivers in Antarctica so interesting is that snow is only part of the story. In extreme cases, they can also bring rain.
To explore how extreme precipitation affects the Amundsen Sea embayment region, we focused on two events associated with atmospheric rivers in 2020. The summer case took place over a week in February and the winter case over six days in June.
We used three regional climate models to simulate the two extreme weather events around the Thwaites and Pine Island ice shelves, then compared the results with snowfall observations.
During both the winter and summer cases, we find that atmospheric rivers dumped tens of metres of snow over the course of a week or so.
Meanwhile, the quantities of rain driven by these events were not insignificant. We observed up to 30mm of rain on parts of the Thwaites ice shelf in summer and up to 9mm in winter.

A mountain to climb
Antarctica’s cold climate and steep, icy topography make it unique. It also makes the region prone to rain in sub-zero temperatures.
The first reason for this is the foehn effect, which is when air forced over a mountain range warms as it descends on the downward slope.
Commonly observed across Antarctica, it is an important cause of melting over ice shelves on the Antarctic peninsula, the northernmost point of the continent.
When air passes over the mountainous terrain of the West Antarctic ice sheet during atmospheric river events, temperatures near the surface of the ice shelves can climb above the melting point of 0C.
This can accentuate the formation of rain and drizzle that stays liquid below 0C – also known as “supercooled drizzle”.
Another factor which leads to liquid drizzle, rather than snow, in sub-zero conditions is a lack of dust and dirt – particles which are usually needed to trigger the formation of ice crystals in clouds.
In the pristine Antarctic, these particles – which act as “ice nuclei” – are few and far between. That means that pure liquid water can exist even when temperatures are below 0C.
The origins of rain over ice shelves
It is easy to assume that rain that reaches the surface in Antarctica is just snow that has melted after falling through a warm layer of air caused by the foehn effect. Indeed, this is what we initially supposed.
But our research shows that more rain reaches the surface of Antarctica when the air near the ground is within a few degrees of freezing.
At times when the foehn effect is strongest, there is often little or no rainfall, because it evaporates before it gets a chance to reach the surface.
However, we saw rain falling well above the warm layer of air near the surface, where temperatures were universally below 0C – and, in some cases, as low as -11C.
Rare rain
Rain in Antarctica is a rare occurrence. The region’s normally frigid temperatures mean that most precipitation over the continent falls as snow.
However, exactly how rare rain is in the region remains relatively unknown, because there are virtually zero measurements of rainfall in Antarctica.
There are a number of reasons for this – rain falls infrequently, and it is very difficult to measure in the hostile Antarctic environment.
Our results show that extreme events such as atmospheric rivers can bring rain. And it is likely that rain will become a more common occurrence in the future as temperatures rise and extreme weather events occur more frequently.
However, until rain starts being measured in Antarctica, scientists will have to rely entirely on models to predict rain, as we did in this research.
It is also not yet known exactly how rain could impact ice in Antarctica.
We do know that rain falling on snow darkens the surface, which can enhance melting, leading to greater ice losses. Meanwhile, rain that refreezes in the snowpack or trickles to the base of the ice can change the way that glaciers flow, impacting the resilience of ice shelves to fracture.
So, if we want to understand the future of the frozen continent, we need to start thinking about rain too. Because while rain may be rare now, it may not be for long.
The post Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica
Climate Change
Colombia’s COP16 presidency in suspense as minister resigns
Susana Muhamad, Colombia’s minister of environment since 2022 and president of the COP16 UN biodiversity negotiations, has announced she will step down from government, but has asked President Gustavo Petro to let her stay in her post to conclude the UN nature talks later in February.
In her resignation letter, addressed to the president and dated February 8, Muhamad said she was quitting as a minister but urged him to consider “the need to conclude COP16” – the summit left unfinished in Colombia last year and now scheduled to resume from February 25 to 27 in Rome.
“I’ve led the complex negotiations in progress and I exercise the role of president (of the COP). Therefore, if you so decide, this resignation could be made effective from March 3,” the letter reads.
Buenos días, para clarificar cualquier malentendido, presento renuncia irrevocable al cargo de Ministra de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible. Por lo tanto, publico la carta que radiqué en el DAPRE el 8 de febrero, que es una carta motivada, no protocolaria. pic.twitter.com/71quT3CEdJ
— Susana Muhamad (@susanamuhamad) February 10, 2025
Muhamad has been one of the most vocal opponents of the recent appointment of former senator Armando Benedetti as Petro’s chief of staff. Benedetti has faced allegations of domestic abuse and corruption, and was previously fired as ambassador to Venezuela by Petro himself.
In a televised session of the council of ministers held last week, Muhamad heavily opposed Benedetti’s appointment and threatened to resign if he remained in the cabinet. “As a feminist and as a woman, I cannot sit at this table of our progressive project with Armando Benedetti,” she told Petro.
According to Oscar Soria, veteran biodiversity campaigner and CEO of think-tank The Common Initiative, the Colombian government is likely to keep Muhamad as COP president, but her resignation could have a negative impact on the talks.
“To have a good result in Rome, proactive and energetic diplomatic work by the presidency was needed in the last months. However, some key issues have not been discussed recently. The internal political crisis (in Colombia) has likely been a great distraction,” Soria told Climate Home.
Since Muhamad’s announcement, several other ministers have also resigned, leading Petro to place all of his cabinet on hold and asking for “protocolary resignations” from every member.
“It’s not clear how much support from the president and ministers (Muhamad) can count on when her counterparts from other countries need to be approached by the Colombian foreign service,” Soria added.
Upcoming nature talks
The COP16 biodiversity negotiations are set to resume later this month, with important decisions coming up on finance for nature and a monitoring framework to track progress on nature restoration. These decisions were left pending after negotiators ran out of time in Cali, Colombia, last year.
One of the most pressing issues is the future of the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF), which currently sits under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) until 2030. Some developing countries have called for the creation of a new fund, citing barriers at the GEF to access the funds.
Observers said COP16 could play an important role in the future of biodiversity finance, especially as the new US president, Donald Trump, cuts development funding for climate and nature projects.
“In Rome, countries must give a firm response to the measures and visions promoted by the Trump administration, reaffirming [their] commitment to protecting biodiversity,” said Karla Maas, campaigner at Climate Action Network (CAN) Latin America.
“This implies guaranteeing public resources for conservation instead of depending on the will of private actors or philanthropy,” Maas added.
(Reporting by Sebastian Rodriguez; editing by Megan Rowling)
The post Colombia’s COP16 presidency in suspense as minister resigns appeared first on Climate Home News.
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