This week, the international court of justice (ICJ) opened two weeks of hearings on states’ climate-related legal obligations – and the consequences, if “significant harm” is caused.
The case stems from a unanimous UN general assembly (UNGA) request for an “advisory opinion” from the ICJ.
It is taking place against a backdrop of rapidly escalating climate impacts. Emissions continue to rise, rather than falling rapidly, as needed to avoid dangerous levels of global warming.
It is the ICJ’s largest ever case, with more than 100 countries and international organisations making interventions, deploying a wide variety of legal arguments.
Ralph Regenvanu, climate envoy for Vanuatu, which led the campaign for the ICJ hearings, said in his opening address: “[T]his may well be the most consequential case in the history of humanity.”
Below, Carbon Brief interviews leading international law scholar Prof Philippe Sands – who drafted the pleadings for Mauritius, but is speaking here in a personal capacity – to find out more about the legal issues at stake and the wider significance of the ICJ case.
- On the significance of the case: “It’s the first time the ICJ has been called upon to address legal issues relating to climate change.”
- On the key legal arguments: “There’s just a huge number of issues that are coming up.”
- On climate obligations under the UN: “Will the court open the door to the situation that the 1992 [UN climate] convention … [is] not the be all and end all?”
- On where outcomes could come from: “Essentially, it’s the whole of international law!”
- On the responsibility of states: “The question at the beating heart of this case, really, is the consequences of emissions over time.”
- On historical emissions: “The big issue is, are you liable for the continuing consequences of your past emissions?”
- On applying international law: “When drafting the climate treaty regime, [did] states…exclude the application of general international law?”
- On expectations for the case: “What I’m interested in, really, is an advisory opinion that is capable of having hard, practical application.”
- On the state of the science: “A procedure in which the judges hear privately from any person…is unusual. It’s unorthodox.”
- On the significance of the submissions: “The oral phase is very important, because it basically concentrates the issues down to the most significant and narrow set of issues.”
- On the question of the UN or wider law: “It’s a tough situation for the judges.”
Carbon Brief: Would you be able to start by just situating this case in its wider legal context and explaining why it could be so consequential?
Philippe Sands: Well, it’s the first time the international court of justice has been called upon to address legal issues relating to climate change. The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and, although the advisory opinion that it hands down will not be binding on states, it is binding on all UN bodies. The determinations that the court makes will have consequences that go very far and that will have a particular authority, in legal and political terms. Of course, everything turns on what the court actually says.
CB: Would you be able to summarise the key legal arguments that are being fought over in this case?
PS: No! I mean, there’s just a huge number of issues that are coming up. But, essentially, the court has been asked two questions by the UN General Assembly – the first time, I believe, that a request from the General Assembly has been consensual, with no objections. The two questions are, firstly, what are the obligations for states under international law to protect the climate system? And, secondly, what are the legal consequences under these obligations, where, by their acts and emissions, [states] cause significant harm to the climate system? So, there are two distinct questions – and about 100 states and international organisations of various kinds have made submissions on the vast range of issues that are raised by these two questions. The questions are very, very broad and that signals to me that the court’s response may be quite general. But, for me, the crucial issues are, firstly, what the court says about the state of the science: is it established, or is there any room for doubt? Secondly, what are the obligations of states having regard to the clarity of the science? Thirdly, are there legal obligations on states in relation to the climate system that exist and arise outside of the treaty regime – the 1992 [UN Framework] convention [on climate change], the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and so on and so forth. And, related to that, fourthly – this is the most intense, legally interesting aspect – what are the responsibilities of states for historic emissions under general international law? And, in particular, are the biggest contributors liable under international law to make good any damages that may arise from their historic actions? But, I mean, there’s just such a vast array of questions that are addressed, it’s impossible to summarise briefly.
CB: This is the challenge I found when I was trying to write questions!
PS: To be honest, the questions [put by the UN General Assembly] are rather general, so I have concerns about the burden that has been imposed on the court. My general approach has been that, with advisory opinions, the best questions are those which require a yes or no answer. But the moment you have questions of such generality, you impose on the 15 judges an especially onerous burden, because the questions are open to interpretation.

CB: Some countries are arguing, effectively, that states’ climate obligations start and finish with the UN climate regime, as you’ve already mentioned.
PS: Exactly. Well, that’s a central aspect of what’s coming up. Will the court open the door to the situation that the 1992 [UN climate] convention and the subsequent agreements [Kyoto, Paris] are not the be all and end all, and that the rules of general international law [also] apply? And, if so, what are those rules? And what are the consequences of breaching those rules? Some states say there can’t be any liability under general international law because the whole matter is governed by the treaty regime. Other states say that’s not right, that, although the treaty regime is a distinct “lex specialis” – a specialised area of law – that does not preclude the application of the general principles of international law. So that may be a really interesting issue for the court to determine.
CB: Could you say a bit more about the other areas of international law, where obligations could come from, whether it’s human rights, or customary law, or whatever it might be?
PS: The difficulty, if you look at the first part of the question [put to the court]…the drafters of the question invite the court to have regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the duty of due diligence, human rights law, the principle of prevention, and the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment. That is a vast array of international legal obligations and it’s not exhaustive. It says, having particular regard to, so, essentially, it’s the whole of international law! So the court is being asked to address the application of the whole of international law to the issue of climate change and, in particular, issues of legal consequences, and in particular, the issues of state responsibility. So, it’s vast, vast.
CB: Another set of arguments that I’ve seen…is around the idea of the “responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts”, which might lead to a requirement for cessation of the acts and reparation of the harm done. Can you just say a bit more about what that idea means and where it comes from?
PS: There’s an area of international law called the law of state responsibility. That law of state responsibility says that when you have committed a wrongful act and violated a rule of international law, you are liable for all of the consequences. That rule has not been incorporated, as such, or at all, into the treaty regime [on climate change]. So, essentially, by raising those issues, there are a number of legal issues that arise – but there are two of particular interest. Firstly, in relation to damage that is caused by climate change, are those states most responsible, liable for the consequences of that damage in, let us say, for example, in financial terms? And, secondly – and this relates to something called the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” – does the fact that certain states have historic emissions going back 200 years mean that their entitlement to the remaining “carbon budget” is reduced. So, the question, I think, at the beating heart of this case, really, is the consequences of emissions over time, looking back and looking forward. That’s one aspect the court may have at the forefront of its mind.
CB: Historical greenhouse gas emissions, but also the rights of future generations, have both come up quite a lot in some of the submissions. Can you just say a bit more about the legal arguments around these?
PS: The big issue is: are you liable for the continuing consequences of your past emissions? And does the nature and extent of your past emissions affect your ability to generate emissions in the future? Those are really the two issues and the treaty regime does not, as such, explicitly address [them]. The practicalities are that islands are disappearing with sea level rise. Are historic polluters of greenhouse gases responsible for the consequences of those disappearances? Or, if states are required to build sea walls to protect themselves, can they bring a case against the biggest polluters for the consequences of sea level rise? That’s the kind of complex issue the court may have in the back of its mind, because that’s essentially what’s being asked.
CB: In terms of how they will decide whether these other potential areas of law could give rise to obligations on states – and, therefore, potentially further consequences – how are they going to decide? To decide whether those [areas of law] do apply, or whether it is only the UN climate regime that gives rise to obligations.
PS: They are going to have to address whether, when drafting the climate treaty regime, states intended to, or did as a necessary consequence, exclude the application of general international law. That is an issue that they will do by looking at the climate regime and determining whether, by adopting it, there was an intention to exclude the application of general international law. So, that is a classical job for lawyers, for judges: to interpret the law, to interpret what the drafters of the treaty regime have done and what they intended, and to then form a view in applying the general rules of international law, whether a space is left which allows those general rules to apply. That’s classically what international judges will do.
CB: You’ve already said a little bit about this, but what would your expectations be for this advisory opinion, which I gather is expected next year?
PS: Normally, it takes six months from after they’ve done the hearings for an advisory opinion to come up. I don’t really have any expectations. There’s been a previous advisory opinion in relation to the Law of the Sea proceedings. The Tribunal for the Law of the Sea came up with an advisory opinion which, in a sense, was rather general. What I’m interested in, really, is an advisory opinion that is capable of having hard, practical application, as happened, for example, in the advisory opinion on the Chagos Archipelago, where the court was asked two questions, essentially, “yes/no” questions, and the court gave a very clear advisory opinion, which has had significant political and legal consequences. The difficulty with asking very general questions is you get very general answers, and very general answers are less easily capable of practical application. So, the best-case scenario for me, is that the court comes up with an advisory opinion of sufficient clarity on the facts, which is basically the state of the science and on the applicable legal principles, which then allows other courts and, in particular, national courts, to take the advisory opinion, in interpreting and applying domestic law, which is, ultimately, going to be where the rubber hits the road. So my expectations turn on the nature and generality of the opinion that the court is able to give. But where the questions posed are so general, I would be concerned that the answers may also be rather general and that limits my expectations.
CB: You mentioned the state of the science as being very important. We know that the court met with a delegation of IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] authors and I gather there’s some sort of question mark about the procedure used to do that?
PS: The normal process is that if scientists are going to provide information to the judges, it would be in the form of submissions made in writing, or in open court, publicly and transparently. A procedure in which the judges hear privately from any person, however authoritative – and the IPCC is authoritative – is unusual. It’s unorthodox. It does raise questions. We don’t know who attended. We don’t know what they said. We don’t know what the exchanges were with the judges. I have to assume that it was done by the judges, at their request, as a way of informing themselves on the state of science, which is understandable. But the more usual way for this to happen would be, as I said, in written submissions made to the court and in open submissions made already in the courtroom. So it is unusual.
CB: You mentioned already, there’s more than 100 submissions from countries and international organisations. And we’ve obviously got these two weeks of hearings, with some of those same entities making oral statements. How significant are those submissions in terms of shaping the advisory opinion of the court?
PS: My experience before the court, having been involved in a number of cases involving advisory opinions and contentious cases, is that the written pleadings are very important in setting out the generality of the arguments and the totality of the arguments. And, essentially, what you see is a narrowing down. There are essentially three rounds. The first round is the first written statement of the participating states and international organisations. Then they have a second written round, which tends to narrow down the issues and be responsive to the first round of others. And then you’ve got the oral arguments, which are limited, of course, to half an hour for each participant. And so it’s a real narrowing down and homing in. Essentially, what the oral arguments are doing is signaling to the judges what the states participating think are the most significant issues. That’s why the oral phase is very important, because it basically concentrates the issues down to the most significant and narrow set of issues. And so it gives the judges a sense of what states think are the most important issues to be addressed. Secondly, it provides states with an opportunity to hear what responses each state has made to the written submissions of other states. So the oral phase is significant.
CB: If you were going to make a bet, which way would you say the court would go on that key question of whether it’s just the [UN] climate regime that gives rise to obligations [on states], or whether there could be obligations from other parts of the law?
PS: I think the court will proceed very carefully. I don’t think it will want to close the door to the application of other rules of international law. Rather, as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea did, which opened the door to the application of the Law of the Sea Convention to the issue of climate change – and opened it quite widely. I don’t know precisely where the court will go. But I would be surprised if they said general international law does not govern issues related to climate change.
The interesting area to read, in what they say, will be the relationship between the general rules and the treaty rules. I mean, the broader issue here is that, essentially, the legislative system has broken down. The states have been unable to legislate effectively and efficiently to address the issues related to climate change. And so what has happened is that a group of states have essentially gone to the General Assembly and said: “The legislative system is broken down. Let’s now ask the judges to step in and tell us what the applicable principles and rules are.” The difficulty that that poses for the judges, who will be conscious that the legislative system has not delivered, is that it’s not the function of judges to legislate. The function of judges is limited to interpreting the law and applying it to the facts, to identify the existence of rules and then applying them to the facts. So I would have thought the instinct of the judges will be to do something, but not to want to overstep the proper boundaries on the judicial function. And that’s a difficult challenge for the judges that they find themselves in.
[It is] a very delicate and difficult situation in the face of, on the one hand, the urgent need for action, and, on the other hand, the failure of states, essentially, to deal with the situation and act as the scientists tell us is needed. I don’t know whether you’ve been through all the different pleadings. I drafted the pleadings for Mauritius – I’m speaking here in a personal capacity. Mauritius decided not to participate in the oral hearings, but you can go on to the Mauritius statement and, if you look at the second Mauritius statement filed in August, you’ll find attached to it as an annex, a report by Prof James Hansen, one of the world’s leading scientists. And that really indicates, with crystal clarity, the urgency of the situation. He’s one of the world’s leading scientists on this issue and that’s the kind of submission that could concentrate the minds of the judges and, I think, impel them to want to go as far as they can. But they’ll be acutely conscious of the limits of judicial function. And, of course, you know, some countries like the UK are basically saying, butt out, leave it to the treaty negotiators, leave it to the treaty system. And the US has said essentially the same thing yesterday. So, it’s a tough situation for the judges.
An abridged version of this interview was published in DeBriefed, Carbon Brief’s weekly email newsletter. Sign up for free.
The interview was conducted by Simon Evans via phone on 5 December 2024.
The post Interview: Prof Philippe Sands on UN court’s landmark climate-change hearing appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Interview: Prof Philippe Sands on UN court’s landmark climate-change hearing
Climate Change
‘COP-out’: COP31 fails to deliver the ambition needed to phase out fossil fuels and address climate breakdown
Antalya, Türkiye, Sunday 22 November 2026 — The COP31 climate summit in Antalya has ended in disappointment and anger, as the final COP31 outcome failed to deliver on critical issues like overshooting the 1.5°C limit, fossil fuel phase out and climate finance. Greenpeace Australia Pacific says that Australia did not deliver the deal that the world needed in a time of escalating climate breakdown.
In Antalya, Dr Susie Byers, Head of Advocacy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “We need to call this COP outcome what it is: a COP-out that has failed to deliver what the world urgently needs given the scale of the crisis we’re facing. It’s a colossal lost opportunity, and one that the world won’t easily forget.
“Coming out of Belém there was momentum to phase out fossil fuels, but COP31 wasn’t able to harness that energy and drive the world forward. The failure to adopt the Cover Decision means there’s now no acknowledgement of, let alone response to, 1.5°C overshoot — the survival line for Pacific nations. Electrification, defence of science, protection for the oceans, and advances on climate finance were all casualties of cynical attempts to derail climate action with dangerous distractions like CCUS.
“Australia knew how hard this task would be and put their hand up anyway. In the end, they didn’t get it done. This outcome validates exactly why so many countries are looking towards parallel tracks like the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion and national transition roadmaps, where we’ve seen microdiplomacy and Pacific leadership again lead the way. This spirit of multilateralism and collaboration is how we will move beyond rhetoric to concrete actions, and end the fossil fuel chokehold.”
Also in Antalya, Shiva Gounden, Head of Pacific at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “They called this an ‘implementation’ COP, but implementation means nothing when the foundation is broken. The frontline communities leading this fight came to Antalya demanding the urgent, definitive action required to confront the sickening realities of 1.5°C overshoot. Instead, developed countries turned their backs on their historical responsibilities, held climate finance hostage, and treated the debt they owe as a cheap bargaining chip.
“At the exact same time, Parties and negotiating blocs deliberately blocked the bold action the world needed on mitigation, peddled toxic distractions like CCUS, and intentionally scrubbed the words ‘fossil fuels’ from the final text. A strong Presidency that understood the urgency of the situation would not have let this happen; Australia failed to deliver what it promised the Pacific.
“Billions of people across the world are fiercely defending their lives, their homes, their cultures, and their livelihoods, and we came here with their voices demanding real action. By choking off the money and refusing to name the root cause of this collapse, polluting nations made a calculated choice to protect their own interests over our shared future. The Pacific will increasingly look towards parallel paths like the ICJ climate advisory opinion, and the Santa Marta process, to continue finding solutions because that is what our people need.”
ENDS
COP31 images and video available here in Greenpeace Media Library
Media contact: Kate O’Callaghan in Antalya (GMT+3) on +61 406 231 892 (Whatsapp/Signal)
Climate Change
COP31 Bulletin Day 13: New draft retains electrification goal but delays adaptation finance and science decisions
After an evening of tense discussions, a new version of the cover text was finally released at around 2am on Sunday morning. But, with many delegates flying home, it is unclear if – and for how long – there will be the two-thirds of governments present needed to legally adopt a decision.
The latest draft, which is – as of 9.30 – scheduled to be put to a plenary session for approval at 10am – retains a goal to boost electrification and links it more strongly with clean energy and storage. It does not, however, include language on transitioning away from fossil fuels as many countries had called for.
It ditches a specific numerical target for carbon capture, use and storage (CCUS), a controversial technology that is favoured by fossil fuel producers, which is now only an aim “to achieve gigatonne scale globally by 2035 as a collective global aspiration”. The previous version had two alternative targets, a weaker one of 0.5Gt “working towards” 1.3-2.5Gt and a stronger one of 2.5Gt.
The draft cover decision has strong language on responding to an almost certain overshoot of the 1.5C warming limit, recognising that it will increase loss and damage and result “in increasingly adverse, and in some cases irreversible, impacts and risks to human and natural systems”. As President of Negotiations Chris Bowen has repeatedly drawn attention to, this is the first COP held since the UN acknowledged that overshoot is inevitable.
In pursuing efforts to limit any overshoot, the decision recognises the need for “deep, rapid and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.5 °C pathways” – which is a push towards greater ambition.
The text also resolves to close adaptation gaps and boost action and support to help countries and communities to better cope with adverse climate impacts. But it does not put a figure to a goal agreed at COP30 last year to triple adaptation finance by 2035.
The goal did not specify a baseline year and African nations, least-developed countries and small island states had pushed for it to be a later and higher baseline and therefore a larger target number of $120 bn a year. Instead, the text launches a “roadmap” on adaptation finance to be considered at COP32.
Loss and damage finance has been cut from the roadmap’s scope, as have references to about half the money pledged to the loss and damage fund having yet to be sent to the fund’s bank account and the gap between the $2.8 billion of loss and damage funding requested by developing countries in the fund’s start-up stage and the $0.342 billion allocated to fund these projects. “Erasing the shortfall doesn’t make it disappear for families who have lost everything”, said Harjeet Singh, global convenor of Fill the Fund.
The new text drops its invitation to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to publish all of its next three reports in time for the 2028 global stocktake of climate progress. Instead, it just invites them to “continue to provide policy-relevant information as input to the UNFCCC processes, including outputs from the seventh assessment cycle to the next global stocktake”. It no longer specifies that all their reports, including the third on reducing emissions, are published. The IPCC will have an online meeting in December to discuss this issue but COP31 guidance will be influential in its decision.
As Climate Home News entered the venue around 7.30am, tired-looking negotiators from Saudi Arabia and from the Alliance of Small Island Developing States were seen entering the area which houses the Presidency’s offices, as others dozed on sofas. A source close to the German delegation said that negotiations had been intense and were not necessarily resolved.
If the Presidency does not think it can get agreement on a cover text, then it can withdraw it or it can issue it a Presidency declaration, which does not have much weight. Some of its provisions could be added into other agenda items and adopted seperately. Governments could also decide to reconvene COP31 at a later date – known as a bis – as happened at COP6.
The post COP31 Bulletin Day 13: New draft retains electrification goal but delays adaptation finance and science decisions appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP31 Bulletin Day 13: Germany rejects text moments before plenary meeting
Climate Change
COP31 Bulletin Day 12: ‘Don’t ignore us,’ Panama warns as COP31 runs into overtime
On Friday night, COP31 approved a series of less controversial agenda items and then COP President Murat Kurum told governments to hang around the venue until midnight in case his team wanted to consult them on the cover text, which is still Thursday’s version.
If you don’t hear from us, Kurum said, go home and get some rest and don’t bother coming in before 9am. Governments appear to have taken his advice. Around 10am, the conference centre was ghostly and there was still no sign of a new draft cover text.
COP31 Bulletin Day 11: Countries decry cover text for omitting fossil fuels
Friday night’s plenary did offer a few moments of drama. An activist was ushered out of the room by security after holding a rope around his neck and shouting “you keep doing nothing, nothing at all” and “you are killing the future, just kill me now” to a smattering of applause.


Panama’s environment minister Juan Carlos Navarro urged Kurum to ensure full respect of the rules of procedure when gavelling decisions through this weekend. Given he has led threats to object to the cover text if it is not ambitious enough, this sounded like a warning to Kurum not to ignore objections, as previous COP presidents have been accused of doing.
Another significant development on Friday night was a joint statement from Australia and China which, among other things, expressed China’s backing for the 35×35 electrification goal. More on that here.
The post COP31 Bulletin Day 12: ‘Don’t ignore us,’ Panama warns as COP31 runs into overtime appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP31 Bulletin Day 12: ‘Don’t ignore us,’ Panama warns as COP31 runs into overtime
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