China’s thinking around the energy transition shifted drastically in 2020 after president Xi Jinping pledged to reach carbon neutrality before 2060.
Despite a series of major policy developments since then, however, it is still not clear what the new energy system will look like and which pathways are the most efficient for China to reach its carbon neutrality goal.
Our latest research models three scenarios for China’s energy transition: one in which China develops a net-zero emissions energy system before 2055; one in which it achieves this around 2055; and a baseline scenario that extrapolates current development trends.
We find that a combination of energy efficiency measures, electrification of end-use consumption and a low-carbon power supply based on various renewable energy sources – such as solar and wind – can greatly help the country to achieve its decarbonisation goals by 2055.
In the most ambitious scenario, China’s power sector will be fossil fuel-free by 2055, while some industries will continue to use a small amount of coal and gas. However, this will be balanced by negative emissions from biomass power plants fitted with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).
- How the dual carbon targets changed the game
- Three scenarios for China’s energy transformation
- Three phases in China’s energy transformation
- Coal power plants become flexibility providers
- Managing a grid dominated by variable wind and solar
- Visions for the future
How the dual carbon targets changed the game
When Xi began his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2020, few had expected him to deliver such a ground-breaking announcement.
In his words: “We aim to have CO2 [carbon dioxide] emissions peak before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.”
This policy is now more commonly known as the “dual carbon” goals.
That one sentence changed the whole understanding of the energy transformation in China.
Until then, China’s target was to “promote a revolution in energy production and consumption, and build an energy sector that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient”, as Xi had said at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in China (CPC) in October 2017.
Xi’s 2020 speech shifted China’s priorities from reaching “low-carbon” to reaching “carbon neutrality”, from an energy sector that includes at least some fossil fuel consumption, to an energy sector which leaves little room for coal, oil and gas once carbon neutrality is reached.
The difference required a genuine change of mindset throughout China’s political system and stakeholders within the energy system, such as major power producers.
China started this immediately after the announcement: the State Council, China’s top administrative body, introduced the 1+N policy strategy, which is comprised of an overarching guideline for reaching the “dual carbon” goals (the “1”) and a number of more concrete guidelines and regulations to implement the strategy (the “N”).
So far, the policies have mainly focused on reaching the carbon peak before 2030 – but the long-term goal of carbon neutrality by 2060 is ever-present.
The National Energy Administration (NEA) has launched a blueprint for a new type of power system. At a broader level, several government departments have outlined efforts to transform the entire energy system, as opposed to just the power system, in the effort to reach carbon neutrality.
Hence, the foundation for China’s energy transformation is much more solid and precise today than it was before Xi’s announcement. The question now is: what will the new type of energy system look like and how will China reach it?
Three scenarios for China’s energy transformation
To answer these questions, our programme modelled three scenarios for China’s energy transformation: one in which China develops a net-zero emissions energy system before 2055; one in which it achieves this around 2055; and a baseline scenario that extrapolates current development trends.
The analysis is based on a detailed bottom-up modelling approach, while, at the same time, using visions for a “Beautiful China” – an official initiative for “the nation’s green and high-quality growth” – as guidelines for the transformation.
In our modelling, the overarching strategy for the energy transformation consists of three intertwined actions:
- Increase energy efficiency throughout the supply chain.
- Electrify the end-use sectors as much as possible.
- Transform the power sector into a “green”, fossil-free sector with solar and wind power as the backbone of the system.
(The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s latest assessment report showed that these are key elements of all global pathways that limit warming to 1.5C or 2C.)
A consequence of following this strategy would be that the Chinese energy system would be able to provide energy for sustainable economic growth in China with net-zero carbon emissions, improved air quality and a high level of energy security.
In the most ambitious scenario, the Chinese power system would be carbon-neutral from 2045 – and the whole energy system before 2055.
Compared to today, total primary energy consumption would be lower in 2060 despite economic growth. Moreover, coal, oil and gas would be practically phased out of the system – and dependence on imported fossil fuels would be eliminated.
The figure below shows the energy flowing through China’s economy in 2021 (upper panel) compared with the energy flow in 2060 under this most ambitious scenario (lower panel).
On the left, each panel shows sources of primary energy flowing into the economy such as coal (black), gas (pink), oil (shades of grey) and non-fossil fuels such as nuclear (brown), hydro (dark blue), wind (light blue) and solar (yellow).
The centre of each panel illustrates the transformation of primary energy into more useful forms, such as electricity or refined oil products. Much of the primary energy contained in fossil fuels is wasted at this stage (“losses”) in the form of waste heat.
On the right, the users of final energy are broken down by sector.
Most notably, fossil fuels – particularly coal – are the largest sources of energy in 2021, whereas in the ambitious 2060 scenario, below, low-carbon sources dominate.
Three phases in China’s energy transformation
Our study suggests the transformation pathway will have three main phases. The first phase is the peaking phase until 2030.
During this period, the deployment of wind and solar power would continue to increase, while electrification of the industry and transport sectors would gain momentum.
However, coal and oil would remain the dominant energy sources in terms of total primary energy consumption.
Next is the “energy revolution” phase, from 2030 to 2050. During this phase, solar and wind power would become the main energy sources for electricity supply, and the electrification of the end-use sectors would be substantial.
The shift away from fossil fuels minimises the loss of waste heat in electricity generation and refining. Meanwhile, “green hydrogen” made from renewable power would become increasingly important in the industrial sectors.
The third phase is the consolidation phase, from 2050 to 2060. Decarbonisation occurs in sub-sectors that are challenging to electrify, such as the steel and chemicals industries, the old solar and wind power plants are replaced by new solar and wind power, and remaining fossil fuels in the energy mix are nearly phased out.
Coal power plants become flexibility providers
Although the Chinese government plans to “phase down” coal from 2025, based on the current policy guidelines and market situation, we estimate that coal power capacity would not be rapidly removed in any of our three scenarios.
Instead, coal power plants would gradually become providers of energy security and capacity to meet peaks in electricity demand, and not generate large amounts of electricity.
By the time they reach the end of their expected lifetime of around 30 years, the plants would be shut down and not replaced with new coal capacity. In our most ambitious scenario, the last coal power plants are closed in 2055, as shown in the figure below.
The upper panel in the figure shows the installed capacity of coal power plants and the lower panel their electricity production from 2021 to 2060.
Meanwhile, gas does not play a significant role in the power sector in our scenarios, as solar and wind can provide cheaper electricity while existing coal power plants – together with scaled-up expansion of energy storage and demand-side response facilities – can provide sufficient flexibility and peak-load capacity.
Managing a grid dominated by variable wind and solar
An energy system that relies on solar and wind power as main suppliers of power requires special flexibility measures to match production and demand.
The figure below shows a modelled example of an hourly electricity balance in a week in the summer of 2060 under our more ambitious scenario of achieving carbon neutrality before 2055.
The top panel shows electricity production on the supply side. In the daytime solar power (yellow) dominates the production of electricity, while wind power plants (light blue) have a more stable output throughout the 24-hour period.
In the evening and at night, electricity storage is discharged (purple) and hydropower production (dark blue) is higher than in the daytime.
The lower panel shows electricity use on the demand side. Storage (purple) is charged in the daytime and electric vehicle (EV) smart charging (blue) provides flexibility throughout the week.
As a backup, vehicle-to-grid supply plays an important role – not necessarily as a significant energy provider but as a last-resort capacity that can be activated if necessary, when wind and solar output is low. This solution is a cheap and efficient way to ensure sufficient capacity in the power system.
Before 2055, coal power plants could be equally reliable and affordable providers of capacity for the power system, even though they would not generate much electricity on average, as mentioned earlier.
This way of creating flexibility might seem complicated to manage in terms of daily dispatch (the process of managing supply and demand). However, an efficient and well-functioning electricity market, including consumers and producers, can do the job.
Removing the barriers to electricity trading among provinces and constructing a unified national electricity market would be a key enabler of this.
Visions for the future
The scenarios from our China Energy Transformation Outlook give a range of quantified visions of the long-term future in a net-zero energy system.
Our detailed model of the power system and other energy end-use sectors make it possible to link the development of this new energy system with policy measures that could bring about this transformation.
One key insight from our work relates to the timing of the different phases of China’s energy transformation, mentioned above. Our modelling suggests that successful coordination of these phases will be crucial, in order to maintain energy security while avoiding unnecessary investments in energy infrastructure.
Other key enablers in our scenarios are the investments needed to expand the electricity grid, the development of a national electricity market and support for energy system flexibility.
Even with the best visions, and insights from pathways such as ours, there will be many challenges and barriers ahead to overcome if China is to reach its 2060 goal.
Our scenarios show, however, that there are feasible and cost-efficient pathways which can be implemented without waiting for new technological breakthroughs.
The post Guest post: How China’s energy system can reach carbon neutrality before 2055 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How China’s energy system can reach carbon neutrality before 2055
It has been a week since I pedaled into Tallahassee after 8 days of bikepacking along the Gulf Coast and through the Florida panhandle. I am still reflecting deeply on the experience.
I flew to New Orleans excited to talk to folks along the route about how climate change was impacting their lives. Instead, I experienced days full of stark contrasts. I cycled through beautiful vistas offset by shoulders and ditches full of dumped debris. I marveled at houses on stilts, built two stories in the air to adapt to storm surges and flooding, and saw more styrofoam and single-use plastics than I have seen in years. I stood on a dune preservation project on a barrier island and looked out at the natural gas drilling platforms peppering the gulf waters. I felt my legs grow stronger as I tackled the rolling hills of the panhandle, only to spend 45 minutes on a gas station bench recuperating from heat exhaustion after the thermometer hit 103 degrees F. I rode past hurricane evacuation route signs every day and witnessed enormous disparities of wealth – huge mansions looking out over the coast and dilapidated trailers on back roads – that left me wondering who actually has the resources to evacuate.
And I found lots of folks – gas station attendants, servers in restaurants, motel clerks, full-time campground residents, Warm Showers Network hosts – who could tell stories about their experiences with severe storms, hurricanes, and flooding, but not a single one was connecting that experience to climate change. Literally, the tone of the conversation shifted when I mentioned climate change.
I learned again that a bicycle laden with panniers, packs, and gear is a welcome sign, an invitation to come on over and have a conversation. So many people approached us, curious to know where we were from, where we had ridden from, and where we were headed. So many people expressed wishing they could do something like this too. So many people wished us well, ‘You’all be safe out there!’. Southern hospitality and kindness is real.
I have been thinking about change, about social change, and how much more effective activation is in the context of a trusted relationship. If I had had the time and space to continue to engage with each of those individuals, would we have gotten to a place where we could talk honestly about climate change? I’d like to think so.
As usual, I feel called to find balance. Balance between the urgency of the climate crisis and the time it takes to build relationships and bring new people into our movement to save the planet. I turn to the wisdom of the Zapatistas:
“We walk to make the road better, we must listen as we walk, and we must walk at the pace of the slowest”
We have work to do, my friends. I am even more committed to the importance of our mission and our work here at Climate Generation, and convinced it will take all of us. We need your support to build awareness, dispel disinformation, and help individuals and communities find a path to climate action. Make a gift today to support climate change education and action!
Susan Phillips
Executive Director
The post We have work to do appeared first on Climate Generation.
A month ago, ahead of the mid-year UN climate talks, the Brazilian COP30 Presidency warned governments against “introducing potentially contentious new agenda items that could further burden the process or detract from agreed priorities”.
But two such items – submitted by Bolivia on behalf of the Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC) which includes China and Saudi Arabia – have proved highly contentious and prevented the negotiations in Bonn from beginning as planned today.
Two weeks ago, Bolivia proposed an agenda item on implementation of the part of the Paris Agreement (Article 9.1) which states that developed countries “shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties”.
A senior negotiator from one LMDC country told Climate Home today that the discussion on proper implementation of this article is definitely not on the current agenda in Bonn and should be included.
On the same day, Bolivia proposed another item on “promoting international cooperation and addressing the concerns with climate change-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures”.
This targets the EU’s tax on the carbon emissions of certain imported products and similar proposed measures from the UK and Canada, arguing that they have been introduced “under the guise of climate objectives” and “increase the cost of worldwide climate action”.
Similar attempts were made to get this issue onto the agendas of COP28 and COP29 but both attempts were unsuccessful due to opposition from the developed countries whose policies are criticised by the proposal.
With the two sides at loggerheads, the Bonn opening plenary – which was scheduled to start at 10am local time has yet to begin. “Whole day almost wasted,” said one developing country negotiator, adding “the developed parties don’t want to see our issues”.
Brazil seeks early deals on two stalled issues at Bonn climate talks
While waiting for the plenary to start, some representatives from civil society recalled that most developing countries left COP29 in Baku really disappointed with the new climate finance goal – the famous NCQG – agreed there. Today in Bonn, finance is – yet again – the reason for tense discussions between countries.
Ironically, the agenda row is actually holding up much-needed discussions on finance. Today, the COP30 Presidency was supposed to be listening to governments’ views on the Baku-Belém roadmap on how to expand developed countries’ COP29 promise of $300 billion a year in climate finance to the $1.3 trillion developing countries want by bringing in other sources. That meeting has been suspended until further notice.
At 6pm in Bonn, a delegate told Climate Home: “There is still no resolution on these two items of the agenda”. Shortly afterwards, in the corridors, we asked UN climate chief Simon Stiell if the official opening was likely to happen in Monday, to which he replied: “So much work still in progress.”
The room where the plenary will be held is available only until 10pm German time. So time is running out in more ways than one!
Climate-unfriendly US absent from Bonn
After starting the process of withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement in January, Donald Trump’s administration decided for the first time not to send a delegation to the preparatory meetings for COP30, which got off to a slow start today in Bonn.
“It’s no surprise that the US isn’t represented here,” Alden Meyer, senior associate at E3G, told Climate Home. “They have dismantled the office in the State Department that was responsible for coordinating US strategy in the negotiations. So it’s not even clear who they would have sent if they decided to send someone.”
The country will technically be out of the Paris Agreement as of January 27, 2026. “They are also still part of the [UN Climate] Convention. So, they could go to Belém and try to change the negotiations dynamics if they decide it’s in their interest to do so,” Meyer added.
The US-based We Are Still In coalition is, however, participating in the Bonn session, the veteran negotiations expert confirmed. This initiative of subnational states, cities and businesses has been trying to fulfill America’s climate commitments since the gap left by Trump’s first term.
Argentina’s one-woman team
As of last Friday, there was no official information or response to Climate Home’s questions regarding whether Argentina would participate in the meetings in Bonn.
Last November, Javier Milei’s government surprised everyone in Baku by deciding to withdraw the Argentine delegation from COP29.
Although Argentina has repeatedly stated it’s considering pulling out of the Paris Agreement, the South American country hasn’t yet decided to do so, possibly because a potential withdrawal would likely harm ties with its main trading partners – Brazil, China, and the European Union.
Comment: ‘Hectic’ in high heels? Women still face gender hurdles at UN climate talks
As we were able to verify, Milei’s government has sent just one delegate to Bonn: the current director of environmental affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eliana Saissac.
It’s notoriously difficult for countries with small delegations to engage in a packed talks agenda with several simultaneous meetings – so it’s unclear how Argentina plans to negotiate meaningfully with just one representative or where her efforts will be focused.
The post Bonn Bulletin: Climate talks delayed by agenda fight appeared first on Climate Home News.
Climate Change
Analysis: Reform-led councils threaten 6GW of solar and battery schemes across England
Reform UK’s local-election victories in May 2025 could put 6 gigawatts (GW) of new clean-energy capacity at risk, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
The hard-right populist party took control of 10 English councils in last month’s local elections and has said it will use “every lever” to block new wind, solar and battery projects.
Those 10 areas have jurisdiction over 5,076 megawatts (MW) of battery schemes, 786MW of solar and 56MW of wind, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis of industry data.
While Reform has also pledged to “ban” battery systems, councils do not have direct control over these projects, which are determined by local planning authorities.
It could still influence local planning decisions, planning experts tell Carbon Brief.
However, this is likely to prove a “nuisance” with “limited effect” in terms of the government’s targets for clean power overall, according to one planning lawyer.
Opposing net-zero
Reform UK’s leaders are openly sceptical about the causes and consequences of human-caused climate change. The party is also explicitly opposed to the UK’s net-zero target, which, at a global level, is the only way to stop warming from getting worse, according to scientists.
The party has pledged to “scrap net-zero” if it ever takes power at the national level, falsely asserting that this would free up billions of pounds of public money for tax cuts and welfare programmes.
(Its assertions ignore the fact that the large majority of the investments needed to reach net-zero are expected to come from the private sector, rather than government funds. They also do not account for the economic benefits of lower fossil fuel use or avoided climate impacts. The party’s misleading claims have been widely dismissed by economists.)
Reform UK has also said it would “ban” battery storage projects and impose new taxes on solar and wind power installations.
As it stands, the party only has five MPs in parliament. However, its success in the recent English local elections and favourable polling numbers have raised its profile in UK politics and given it new powers in some areas.
To assess the potential impact of these new powers on clean-energy expansion, Carbon Brief looked at data for 10 local councils where Reform UK won overall control, shown in the map below, including Durham, Kent and Derbyshire, as well as two mayoralties.
(The analysis does not include Warwickshire, where no party gained a majority in the elections. However, a subsequent vote saw the party’s local head selected to lead the county council. He has announced plans to “dumb down” net-zero initiatives in the county.)
Following the election, Richard Tice, Reform MP and deputy leader, said the party would use “every lever” available to block new renewable-energy projects in the areas it now controls.
At the heart of this commitment is Lincolnshire, the location of Tice’s own constituency, Boston and Skegness, which now also has a Reform-run council and a Reform mayor.
The rural county is the site of several large-scale solar project proposals, which have faced a strong backlash from some local people.
This mirrors a wider trend of opposition to solar and battery projects by campaigners, who say they are concerned about, what they allege, could be the impact on the local countryside and farmers.
However, such views are not the norm. Survey data shows overwhelming public support for solar and other renewables across the UK, even if projects are built in people’s local areas.
Analysis by thinktank the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit also noted that by rejecting net-zero-related projects, Reform UK could threaten thousands of jobs and millions of pounds of investment in areas such as Lincolnshire.
Capacity at risk
In total, some 5,862MW of solar and storage capacity is currently seeking local planning authority planning approval across the 10 Reform-controlled councils, Carbon Brief’s analysis shows. This is broken down by council area in the figure below.
This includes a series of smaller proposed solar farms, each with a capacity of less than 50MW, meaning they need local planning approval.
(The threshold for local planning approval, currently 50MW, is set to rise to 100MW in 2026.)
Solar farms above this capacity threshold go through the “nationally significant infrastructure planning” (NSIP) process. These large-scale projects are then assessed by energy secretary Ed Miliband, who can grant or deny a development consent order.
Local planning authorities (LPAs) are guided by the national planning policy framework (NPPF), rather than the politics of the county councils under which they sit.
However, the Reform-controlled councils overseeing these authorities will likely attempt to assert influence over approvals.
Gareth Phillips, partner at Pinsent Masons law firm and specialist in renewable energy planning and project development, tells Carbon Brief that, while county councils are not responsible for determining planning applications, they do have influence over the outcome.
He tells Carbon Brief:
“[Councils are an] important consultee, required to respond to statutory consultation…which gives the opportunity for county-council members to influence the planning decision…In the case of Reform, it is possible that its elected members may seek to rally support for opposing planning applications, perhaps leading campaigns against the proposals. The risk here is that it may give the perception of credence to opposing views.”
Phillips says that in addition to influencing planning authority decisions, county councils could issue new strategic planning guidelines for their areas. He explains:
“It will be for the LPA to decide what, if any, weight to place on the county council’s views, when determining the planning application. Over time, it’s possible that Reform-led county councils may propose so-called ‘core strategies’, i.e. planning documents setting out strategic level requirements and policy applicable to development proposals in its jurisdiction. Similarly, that policy would be a matter for the LPA to consider and decide how much weight to apply when determining planning applications.”
This risk is mitigated to some extent by the core strategies within the NPPF and the “national policy statements” for energy, he notes.
As such, while local planning authorities will be required to determine the approval or rejection of an application on the basis of wider policy considerations, Reform-led councils could still affect the decision. “Reform-led county councils would have a voice and opportunity to influence planning decisions,” says Philips.
Stand-alone battery energy-storage projects do not have a capacity cap for being processed by local planning authorities, following changes to the regulations in 2020.
However, a number of storage projects that are co-located with solar will be judged under the NSIP process, meaning councils will be unable to block their construction.
Solar strife
Carbon Brief’s analysis looks at projects that have submitted planning permission requests in the 10 Reform-controlled counties, using Solar Energy UK’s SolarPulse database for solar and storage.
The analysis also covers relevant onshore wind projects, based on data from the government’s renewable energy planning database.
(Solar Energy UK notes that the SolarPulse database does not include solar projects with a capacity of less than 5MW.)
The analysis shows that there is 1,866MW of proposed solar capacity awaiting planning permission in Lincolnshire, by far the largest pipeline, as shown in the chart below.
The majority of this capacity is subject to national-level approval as it is above the NSIP threshold. Nevertheless, the county still has the most solar-power projects awaiting permission from the local planning authority, some 166MW.
(A key reason Lincolnshire dominates this picture for solar power development is due to grid capacity. The county was home to several large-scale coal-fired power plants, such as West Burton, which have shuttered in recent years as part of the UK’s transition away from coal. This means there is more capacity for new generators to connect to the grid in the county than in many others, where the system is currently more constrained.)
Overall, the bulk of the proposed capacity at risk is battery storage, which has seen a surge in applications and installations in recent years.
There was 5,013MW of battery storage capacity in operation as of December 2025 and another 5,115MW under construction, according to trade association RenewableUK. It says an additional 40,223MW had planning approval and a further 77,354MW was under development.
Impact of rejection
Overall, even if local planning authorities under the 10 Reform UK-run councils were to reject all of the nearly 6GW of proposed solar and storage capacity in their areas, it would have a limited impact on the UK’s wider solar, storage and wind targets.
If built, the 786MW of proposed solar would generate 757 gigawatt hours (GWh) of electricity. On average, a household in the UK uses 2,700 kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity each year, meaning these solar farms would be able to power the equivalent of around 280,000 homes – some 1% of the national total.
If all of this proposed solar were rejected and the electricity were generated from gas-fired power stations instead, it would result in an extra 0.3m tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per year. (This is equivalent to less than a tenth of 1% of the UK’s annual total.)
In total, the potential 757GWh of solar power could help displace around £60m of gas per year, based on wholesale prices in 2025 to date.
Private investment could also be impacted. Each 1MW of solar would attract around £1m of investment, meaning the 786MW of capacity would bring roughly £786m into the Reform-led counties. This would have an impact on local supply chains and “community benefit” schemes.
Similarly, battery schemes with four hours of storage capacity also require around £1m of investment per megawatt. This means another £5bn of investment – some 5,076MW of capacity – could be at risk under Reform-led councils.
The total investment at risk for solar and storage is, therefore, close to £6bn.
While a large amount of potential new solar and storage capacity is being proposed in the Reform-led council areas and some could be put at risk as a result, it is also the case that some of these developments could fail for other reasons.
According to research from consultancy Cornwall Insight in February, the current battery storage “connection queue” is double the grid’s requirement for 2030. This means there are many more projects in the queue to gain access to the electricity network than needed.
The government’s plan for reaching its target of “clean power 2030” sets a guideline of 27GW of storage capacity by the end of this decade, whereas some 61GW of battery projects are seeking a grid connection over the same period.
This means the UK would have enough options to meet its 2030 storage requirements even if some proposed battery projects fail due to Reform-led councils, says Ed Porter, global director of industry for battery analysts Modo Energy. He tells Carbon Brief:
“With more than 50GW of battery projects with planning consent, projects could be targeted in Reform areas, but the UK would still have sufficient options to meet clean-power 2030 targets, subject to the achievable build out rate of storage projects.”
The main outcome of Reform-led refusals would be to block profitable projects that could reduce consumer costs and cut CO2 emissions, Porter adds.
Still, there is no guarantee that all of these projects – and the solar proposals – would have received planning permission if Reform UK had not been elected in the relevant areas.
According to figures from Solar Media Market Research, the local authority refusal rate for proposed solar-power projects rose to almost 25% in 2024, the highest on record. This is up from 15% in 2022 and 20% in 2023.
However, the majority of projects that are refused by local authorities still end up being approved. Over the past five years, some 80% of projects that went to appeal were subsequently approved, according to Solar Media. All 12 of the solar projects that have gone to appeal in 2025 to date have been approved.
Battery energy-storage refusals hit a high of 22% in 2024, according to Solar Media. However, in 2025 so far, this has dropped to 9%.
Connections challenge
Even if Reform UK-led councils are unable to block clean-energy developments outright, the party’s pledge to “fight [developers] every step of the way” could still make the process more challenging.
One key way this could hamper the development of renewable energy technologies is by forcing them to go through the appeals process, extending the time it takes to gain planning permission by as much as a year.
Following changes to the grid connections queue, new connection agreements include strict delivery deadlines for obtaining planning permission.
As such, if a project ends up going to appeal – and is, therefore, delayed – it could risk missing deadlines and having its grid connection agreement terminated.
Additionally, with the capacity limit for NSIPs set to change in December, more projects – solar projects between 50MW and 100MW – will go to local planning authorities for approval. This will increase the number that could be threatened by Reform UK’s influence.
Ultimately, though, there is limited renewable-energy capacity seeking planning permission in Reform-controlled counties, more than enough capacity in planning nationally to meet targets, plus the role of the council in what is – or is not – approved is limited.
Planning lawyer Philips concludes that Reform-led councils are only likely to cause a “nuisance”, with “limited effect”. He says:
“In summary, there is the potential for Reform-led county councils to cause a nuisance for renewable energy projects in the planning process, but this will be limited in effect.
“I’m not concerned about this because of the weight of policy support there is for those projects, which should serve to mitigate the influence Reform could otherwise have.”
The post Analysis: Reform-led councils threaten 6GW of solar and battery schemes across England appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Reform-led councils threaten 6GW of solar and battery schemes across England
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