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According to DNV’s 2025 Energy Transition Outlook, North America is on a slow but steady path toward a low-carbon future. The forecast shows fossil fuels will fall from 72% of final energy demand in 2024 to 45% by 2050, and further to 31% by 2060.

While the U.S. has seen policy shifts and slower progress due to changing political priorities, Canada’s energy policies remain relatively stable. Together, the two nations continue to move toward decarbonization, driven by clean technology investments and rising public support for sustainable energy.

fossil fuel North America
Source: DNV report

U.S. Faces Fuel Security and Supply Chain Hurdles

The U.S. nuclear sector faces a different challenge — fuel dependency. As of 2023, the U.S. imported 99% of its uranium, with nearly one-third sourced from Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan — countries with complicated diplomatic relations.

Developing a domestic nuclear fuel production capability has become a priority. The DOE is investing in research to expand uranium mining, enrichment, and HALEU production. These efforts are crucial for the future success of the SMR program and national energy security.

Until SMRs become commercially viable in the early 2030s, U.S. nuclear capacity growth will primarily come from reactor life extensions and the reopening of mothballed plants, such as Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania.

Nuclear Power Boost and Support Across the Continent

In this backdrop, nuclear power is enjoying its strongest public and political backing in a decade. In both the U.S. and Canada, nuclear energy is being recognized for its reliability and role in achieving net-zero targets.

In Canada, nuclear is the second-largest source of non-emitting electricity and contributes significantly to reducing carbon emissions. Ontario leads the way, with nuclear supplying nearly 60% of its total electricity. The province continues to invest in maintaining and extending reactor lifespans to ensure energy security and meet climate goals.

Despite this renewed interest, DNV notes that nuclear power’s near-term growth will be modest. However, its long-term outlook is strong, with nuclear capacity projected to increase from 115 gigawatts (GW) today to 232 GW by 2060. Most of this growth will come after 2045, primarily from Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).

nuclear smr canada
Source: DNV report

SMRs: The Future of North American Nuclear Energy

Large-scale nuclear projects have struggled in recent decades with cost overruns, construction delays, and public opposition. Even with continued policy incentives under the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, big reactors are costly, slow to build, and difficult to integrate with flexible renewable grids. These challenges make new large-scale reactors (LSNs) impractical for the short term.

Modern energy systems increasingly require power sources that can ramp up and down quickly to complement solar and wind. Large reactors lack this agility. SMRs, by contrast, can operate flexibly, be built faster, and support grid stability in renewable-heavy systems.

  • Each SMR unit typically produces around 100 MW, making financing and construction more manageable than billion-dollar LSN projects.

DNV forecasts that SMRs will reach cost parity with large reactors by around 2045. Their modular design reduces construction risks, while their operational flexibility allows them to ramp up or down quickly — a crucial feature for grids with high solar and wind penetration.

Though still in the development phase, SMRs are advancing rapidly. Strong backing from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Canadian government is accelerating research and demonstration projects.

SMR canada
Source: DNV report

Canada’s SMR Leadership and the Darlington Advantage

Canada is emerging as the North American frontrunner in SMR technology. The Darlington SMR project in Ontario, led by Ontario Power Generation (OPG) and funded partly by the Canada Infrastructure Bank, is on track to become the first grid-scale SMR in North America by 2030.

This milestone could position Canada as a global leader in modular nuclear deployment. However, challenges remain. Canada currently lacks the facilities to produce HALEU (High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium), the fuel needed for most SMR designs.

While Canada has strong uranium reserves and manufactures fuel for its traditional CANDU reactors, it must still develop a domestic HALEU supply chain to maintain its early-mover advantage in SMR deployment.

Key Projects and Timelines

CANADA NUCLEAR

Maritime Nuclear: A New Frontier for Clean Energy

Beyond the grid, DNV forecasts that nuclear energy could power up to 10% of North America’s maritime and near-shore energy demand by 2060 — up from an estimated 3.5% by 2050.

The maritime sector faces mounting pressure to decarbonize under the International Maritime Organization’s Net Zero by 2050 goals. SMRs could provide a solution, offering a zero-emission, high-density energy source for shipping and port operations.

Some developers are exploring floating SMR concepts capable of supplying clean power to docked vessels, reducing local air pollution, and protecting coastal ecosystems.

However, nuclear adoption in maritime transport faces high capital costs, complex financing models, and regulatory barriers. Nuclear-powered ships would require new rules and safety frameworks, particularly in countries with stringent oversight like the U.S. and Canada.

Still, advocates argue that the combination of energy density, low emissions, and efficiency makes nuclear an attractive option for a future low-carbon shipping industry.

Policy, Regulation, and Competitiveness

Regulatory complexity remains a major obstacle for both land-based and maritime nuclear expansion. Compared to countries like China, North America’s safety and environmental regulations add significant costs and time to nuclear construction.

A recent bipartisan push in the U.S. to revitalize domestic shipbuilding for national defense could help reduce barriers and provide incentives for SMR integration into shipyards. Yet, to compete globally, U.S. manufacturers will need to improve both shipbuilding capacity and SMR cost efficiency — a difficult combination to achieve in the near term.

The Long Road to 2060

DNV’s analysis paints a realistic, not overly optimistic, picture. The energy transition is happening, but slowly. Fossil fuels remain dominant in the near term, but nuclear, renewables, and clean fuels will take an expanding share of the mix.

By 2060, North America could see a fully integrated clean energy system, with flexible SMRs supporting renewables, new fuels decarbonizing industry and transport, and fossil fuels pushed to the margins.

The message is clear: the energy transition is inevitable but uneven. Governments, investors, and innovators that act early on SMRs and clean technologies will define the region’s next industrial wave.

The post From Now to 2060: How Canada’s SMRs and Maritime Nuclear Power Will Drive a Net-Zero Future appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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