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China’s climate ambition at this year’s “two sessions” (两会), which ended on 11 March, was relatively subdued, with analysts expecting economic concerns to trump climate action in the year ahead.

The “two sessions”, which takes place every spring, is a major political event held in Beijing that gives an indication of China’s broad policy direction for the year.

It covers every area of governance, including energy and climate policy.

In this article, Carbon Brief outlines key signals from the 2025 “two sessions”, including: a new energy target for 2025; clean-energy and climate priorities; the ongoing development of coal in a “supporting role”; and China’s response to “green trade barriers”.

This is an update of Carbon Brief’s 6 March China Briefing newsletter, expanded to cover developments during the last few days of the event.

A key meeting

The “two sessions” (两会) is the annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it ran from 4 to 11 March.

The gathering is attended by Chinese Communist party members, as well as members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures, known as delegates or deputies.

Its centrepiece is the “government work report”, a speech delivered by the premier – the head of China’s State Council, the top body of the country’s central government. This outlines the previous year’s achievements and priorities for the year ahead, including the annual GDP target.

At the meeting, China also releases a report by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the country’s top economic planning body, as well as a central and local government budget report.

In addition, the event allows thousands of delegates to meet and raise policy proposals with senior government officials.

Low energy target

China pledged to reduce energy intensity – a measure of energy consumption per unit of GDP – by 3% in 2025, the work report said. (This measure now excludes renewables and nuclear, meaning it only applies to fossil fuels.)

This target means China is “on track to miss its 14th five-year plan energy intensity target”, Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, tells Carbon Brief.

She adds that it was an “inconvenient truth” that China’s economy has not become much more energy efficient in recent years, “offset[ting]…the decarbonisation effects of renewable technology deployment”.

China is lagging behind on its 2026 targets for reducing both energy intensity and carbon intensity – the amount of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP. Analysis for Carbon Brief has shown that they would need to fall by 6% and 7% per year, respectively, to meet the targets.

In its report, the NDRC attributed the shortfall in China’s 2024 carbon-intensity reduction figures to “rapid growth in the energy consumption in industries and the civilian sector as a result of post-Covid economic recovery and frequent extreme weather events”.

Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), wrote on Bluesky that the low target “shows the government is not prioritising controlling carbon dioxide (CO2) at the moment”.

He also said the new methodology for calculating energy intensity would, in theory, allow fossil-fuel demand to grow by 1.9% in 2025, pushing CO2 emissions up by more than 2%. (He added that he did not think this would actually happen.)

The 14th five-year plan’s carbon-intensity target, which measures CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, will likely also be missed, according to the Carbon Brief analysis. China does not typically announce annual carbon-intensity targets in the government work report.

The targets that were announced underscored that “economic growth remains the top priority, with environmental goals taking a backseat”, Li Shuo, director of the China climate hub and senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), tells Carbon Brief.

The lack of an annual carbon-intensity target was “a further sign of carbon reduction being downplayed”, he adds.

Priorities in 2025

China’s climate and energy policy in 2025 will likely follow well-established priorities, such as balancing decarbonisation and energy security, based on the report’s language.

The state-run newspaper China Daily highlighted the report’s support of China’s “dual-carbon” goals on its frontpage, saying that China pledged to “diligently work” towards them.

According to the work report, China “will develop a package of major projects for climate change response and actively engage in and steer global environmental and climate governance”.

A number of climate measures were announced, but Li tells Carbon Brief that there were “no major surprises”, confirming his view that the “two sessions” has “increasingly become a platform to confirm pre-existing decisions rather than introduce new ones”.

Each year, the government work report lists a number of top priorities for the year ahead, as shown in the figure below.

For 2025, the report lowers the importance of high-quality development in favour of “expanding domestic demand”. The prioritisation of “low-carbon development” and other climate related tasks remained the same compared to 2024.

Ranking of key tasks in each government work report during the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025).

Ranking of key tasks in each government work report during the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025). Source: Xinhua publications of the government work reports for 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022 and 2021.

The report discusses China’s climate and environment efforts for 2025 under the title:

“Making coordinated efforts to cut carbon emissions, reduce pollution, pursue green development, and boost economic growth and accelerat[e] the green transition in all areas of economic and social development.”

This stands in stark contrast to the climate section’s title last year, which only highlighted “enhancing ecological conservation and promoting green and low-carbon development”.

The expanded wording signals a more “comprehensive design at the policy level” to “systematically enhance the integration of different sectors for tackling environmental problems”, Xu Song, a registered environment evaluator in China, wrote on his WeChat account.

The work report lists a number of climate initiatives for the year ahead, including: expanding pilot programmes for local governments to peak carbon emissions; building “zero-carbon industrial parks”; accelerating the shift from “dual-control” of energy to dual-control of carbon emissions; and including more industries in the national carbon market.

Most importantly, renewable energy buildouts will continue, with a particular focus on “new energy bases in desert areas, the Gobi and other arid areas”, as well as offshore wind. The report also recognises the need for China to upgrade its electricity grid to cope with vast renewables additions.

But the report also continues to commit to fossil-fuel infrastructure. It reiterates calls to “better ensure both development and security”, which for the energy sector means that China should pursue a low-carbon transition while ensuring sufficient energy supply by keeping some fossil-fuel capacity.

This year, it says China will launch “low-carbon upgrade trials” for coal-fired power plants, which are seen as necessary for energy security. (Recent analysis found that a “substantial amount” of new coal capacity will soon come online.)

The separate NDRC report also reinforces coal as having a “basic supporting role” , announcing that China will “continue to increase coal production”.

The table below compares the language used in relation to coal in government work reports from 2021-2025.

2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
While promoting the clean and efficient use of coal, we will make a major push to develop new energy sources, and take active and well-ordered steps to develop nuclear energy on the basis of
ensuring its safe use.
We will work to upgrade coal-fired power plants to conserve resources, reduce carbon emissions, make operations more flexible, and upgrade heating facilities. We leveraged the role of coal as a major source of energy, increased advanced coal production capacity and stepped up support for power plants and heat-supply enterprises to ensure energy supplies. We will see that coal and coal-fired power play their crucial role in ensuring energy supply and our energy supply meets the needs of economic and social development. Low-carbon upgrade trials will be launched in coal-fired power plants.

A table comparing the language used around coal in government work reports during the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025). Source: Xinhua publications of the government work reports for 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022 and 2021.

Ilaria Mazzocco, senior fellow with the trustee chair in Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), tells Carbon Brief that the signal that coal would only have a supporting role in the future energy system was a “good sign”, but that the language underscored that there is “little interest” in phasing out coal “for now”.

The NDRC also pledged to reduce steel output and to encourage oil refiners to produce more petrochemical products instead of fuel.

Consumption and ‘involution’

Boosting domestic consumption is seen as key to achieving China’s 2025 GDP target of 5%. Consequently, it replaces fostering innovation as the top priority for policymakers for the year, as shown in the chart above.

China’s approach to boosting growth includes a number of stimulus measures. The net impact of these measures on China’s emissions, such via the building of energy-intensive infrastructure, is currently unknown, however.

At this year’s meeting, the government stated that domestic consumption will be the “main engine” for economic growth in 2025.

“The big question mark is real estate and construction”, Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief. Real estate and construction have been the biggest driver of domestic consumption for decades.

However, Myllyvirta adds that the government would likely aim for stable growth in the sector, rather than stimulating it with rapid and energy-intensive growth.

In part, China is putting its hopes – and 300bn yuan ($41bn) – into a consumer trade-in programme, which will likely continue to allow drivers to swap combustion-engine cars for “new-energy” vehicles (NEVs, which refers to electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids).

The report also pledges to incentivise “eco-friendly consumption”.

While technological innovation remains a major priority, clean-energy technologies are not explicitly mentioned in the government work report in this context.

Last year’s government work report emphasised the need to “consolidate and enhance [China’s] leading position” in industries such as NEVs and hydrogen, as well as to “create new ways of storing energy”.

Nevertheless, according to power news outlet BJX News, this is not a signal that clean-energy technologies are out of favour, but rather a sign that they are already widely recognised as an essential part of China’s technology strategy.

Similarly, although hydrogen is not explicitly named as a “future industry” in the government work report, the NDRC confirmed it will receive support from a one trillion yuan ($138bn) fund that will be issued for “frontier fields”.

In its budget report, China’s Ministry of Finance pledges to “steadily promote” China’s climate action, such as by strengthening financial support for R&D for low-carbon technologies, enhancing the development of renewable energy, promoting NEVs and developing green finance standards and institutions.

This year’s government work report also emphasises the need to combat “rat-race competition” – a reference to what is described in China as “involution”. This term refers to the overcrowded markets and price wars plaguing some sectors, including NEVs and solar panels. The report states it will take “comprehensive” steps to address the problem.

The NDRC report notes that the government will take steps to “promote orderly development” of the NEV, lithium-ion battery and solar industries, underscoring government concerns about the sector.

Nevertheless, the government does recognise the importance of clean-energy technologies to economic growth, Mazzocco tells Carbon Brief. She explains:

“Energy is now seen as a tool to ensure the economy can grow rapidly and is meant to support technological transformation…Climate per se is not a goal that the Chinese government wants to prioritise over economic growth and international competition.”

Geopolitics

Trade tensions that underpinned the political atmosphere during last year’s two sessions have been exacerbated by a number of developments since then – particularly around export controls and tariffs.

This is reflected in the work report, which notes that “increasingly complex and severe” geopolitical tensions may “exert a greater impact on China in areas such as trade, science and technology”.

In response, the government will “take active steps to respond to green trade barriers” – pointing to the trade measures above as well as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) – the report says.

However, in a press conference at the event, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi said that he believed China and the EU had the “capacity and wisdom” to resolve disagreements through consultations.

China will also continue to help African nations develop in “green sectors”, Wang said, building on language in the government work report that pledges to continue with “high-quality” projects in Belt and Road Initiative partner countries.

Extreme weather

There was continued recognition of the drag of “natural disasters” on China’s economic growth, with the work report pledging to “better guard against and respond” to floods, droughts, typhoons and other extreme weather events.

The report notes that floods “occurred frequently in some parts of China” last year. This was not explicitly linked to climate change.

However, the NDRC report attributes China’s failure to meet its energy-intensity goal in 2024 to, in part, “frequent extreme weather events”.

A recent Carbon Brief analysis found that, of 114 attribution studies for Chinese extreme weather events, 88 had their “severity or likelihood” increased by climate change.

Around the two sessions

Apart from the ministers and senior officials delivering work reports, side meetings between central leaders and local officials at the “two sessions” also send out political signals.

This year, President Xi Jinping met with a delegation from Jiangsu – an eastern province that is known for its affluent economy, manufacturing, strength in exports and technological innovation.

At the meeting, Xi emphasised the “need to upgrade traditional sectors and foster future sources of innovation”, although he also warned against creating industry “bubbles”, reports the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.

He added that policymakers should “actively promote high-end, intelligent and green development of industries”.

Meanwhile, MEE head Huang Runqiu emphasised the importance of low-carbon development, both in a meeting with a delegation from the northern Heilongjiang province and in a “minister’s corridor” press conference.

Delegates raised more than 700 policy proposals on “ecological civilisation” at this year’s meetings, energy news outlet BJX News reports, covering areas including addressing China’s industrial energy transition and developing the carbon market.

Among these, the US-based NPC Observer newsletter says, were two bills proposing the enactment of a “climate change response law” that would develop a legislative scheme for reducing carbon emissions.

Finally, as the meetings came to a close, NPC head Zhao Leji confirmed that the legislative body will continue to work on China’s environment and ecology code, according to news reports, as well as the atomic energy law in the year ahead.

The post Explainer: What does China’s ‘two sessions’ mean for climate policy in 2025? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Explainer: What does China’s ‘two sessions’ mean for climate policy in 2025?

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DeBriefed 3 July 2026: US faces scorching Independence Day | Record ocean temperatures | Vietnam’s EV surge

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed. 
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Heating up

NOT FREE FROM HEAT: “Dangerous, record-breaking” heat altered plans for 4 July celebrations across the US this weekend, reported the Associated Press. New York and Boston hit 100F (37.8C) on Thursday, said the newswire. CNBC reported that temperatures of up to 105F (40.5C) are forecast in central and eastern parts of the country, with “daily, monthly and all-time records possible”.

TEMPERATURES SOAR: Heat that hit western Europe last week spread east to “scorch” Germany, Hungary, Romania, Poland and others, said Bloomberg. Red warnings for extreme heat were issued in a number of nations, noted the outlet, adding that the heat “underscores how climate change is transforming summers in the world’s fastest-warming continent”. The Independent said last month was confirmed to be England’s hottest June on record.

HEAT DEATHS: June’s extreme temperatures caused more than 2,000 excess deaths in Spain and France, reported the Guardian. The countries are bracing for further heat that “could bring temperatures of 44C (111F) over the coming days”, said the newspaper. Deaths in France rose almost 30% at the heatwave “peak” on the week of 22 June, according to Le Monde. Last week’s conditions also led to around 480 excess deaths in the Netherlands, reported Reuters.

BOILING: Global ocean temperatures reached record levels for this time of year, reported NBC News, “fuelling fears of more dangerous heatwaves this summer and fanning concerns over the escalating global climate crisis”. Scientists told the Financial Times that this could lead the world towards “uncharted territory”. The newspaper said global average sea surface temperatures reached 20.96C on 21 June, exceeding June records for 2023 and 2024.

Around the world

  • GOAL DROPPED: The World Bank will “abandon” its goal to devote 45% of annual lending resources to climate-related projects, reported Reuters. Carbon Brief explored what it could mean for global climate action.
  • FIVE-YEAR PLAN: China plans to invest more than 20tn yuan ($2.9tn) in “key energy projects and new business models” over the next five years, according to International Energy Net.
  • DRILLING: The Guardian said UK Labour politicians “urged” the likely next prime minister Andy Burnham to ignore “deluded” calls to develop the Rosebank oil field located in the Atlantic north of Scotland.
  • PLASTIC TALKS: Countries and activists feared key issues could be sidelined at “critical” talks on a global treaty to curb plastic pollution in Kenya, said Climate Home News. A treaty could have “important implications” for climate change, reported Carbon Brief in 2024. 
  • CANADA PIPELINE: Canadian prime minister Mark Carney announced plans to build an oil pipeline to supply Asia with up to 1m barrels per day, reported the Financial Times. Earlier this week, Carney called the previous government’s climate plans “expensive” and “divisive”, said CBC News

63

The number of UK newspaper editorials calling for more oil and gas extraction in the North Sea so far in 2026, according to Carbon Brief analysis. 


Latest climate research

  • Including emissions from permafrost thaw raises the likelihood of the Arctic becoming a net-carbon source by more than 50% at 2C of warming | Earth System Dynamics
  • Net-zero scenarios relying less on carbon dioxide removals lead to fewer residual emissions, which offers greater health improvements for “non-white and low-income groups” in particular | Nature Climate Change 
  • Agricultural plots of land in sub-Saharan Africa owned by women face heat impacts 2-2.5 times higher than those owned by men | Nature Sustainability

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

Wind and solar were the world’s largest source of new energy in 2025

Wind and solar were the world’s largest source of new energy in 2025, according to Carbon Brief analysis of the latest Energy Institute statistical review of world energy. Wind and solar also saw the fastest growth, up by 18% in 2025. Nevertheless, every source of energy – including coal, oil, gas, nuclear and hydro – also reached global all-time highs last year.

Spotlight

Vietnam’s EV surge

Carbon Brief explores the reasons behind soaring electric-vehicle sales in Vietnam.

Motorbikes are a constant fixture on streets across Vietnam. They pollute the air in cities and make crossing the road a feat of endurance.

But, increasingly, people are moving away from petrol-powered vehicles to save money and reduce air pollution.

Sales of electric motorbikes, scooters and mopeds more than doubled in Vietnam last year, according to a recent report from the International Energy Agency (IEA).

This identified that Vietnam has the largest electric vehicle (EV) market in south-east Asia.

Nearly one-in-five of the two-wheeled vehicles sold last year were electric, it noted, in a nation with 102 million people and 77m motorbikes.

This is “particularly impactful” given they are the main mode of transport in Vietnam, said Lam Pham, Asia energy analyst at thinktank Ember. He told Carbon Brief:

“Electrifying road transport is essential for Vietnam to achieve its net-zero target by 2050. Road transport accounted for around 86% of transport-sector emissions in 2022.”

The nation has just 6.8m cars, but this number is also climbing, partly due to EVs, with nearly 40% of new car sales being electric.

An electric sightseeing bus, motorcycles and cars in central Hanoi, Vietnam.
An electric sightseeing bus, motorcycles and cars in central Hanoi, Vietnam. Credit: Andy Soloman / Alamy Stock Photo

This is “above levels seen in most European countries”, noted the IEA. (The UK’s figure is around 30%.)

EV incentives

Fuel costs surged in south-east Asian countries earlier this year after the energy crisis caused by the US-Israel war on Iran.

This “accelerated” discussions from “why use EVs” to “why keep paying more for fuel”, said Dr Tham Nguyen, a lecturer at the Ho Chi Minh City campus of Australia’s Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, who has researched Vietnamese public attitudes to EVs.

But the surge is “not driven by fuel prices alone”, noted Pham.

Increased EV sales can also be attributed to a “convergence of affordability, convenience and sustainability”, Nguyen said:

“Vietnamese consumers buy EVs because they see real value with immediate personal benefits, such as cost savings and energy security, alongside long-term environmental gains.”

Government policies have also incentivised sales through registration fee exemptions and tax cuts for EVs.

Another factor is affordable EVs sold by Chinese companies and Vinfast, a Vietnamese manufacturer. The IEA report noted that Vietnam is the only country in south-east Asia with “sizeable” domestic production of accessible EVs.

Vinfast reported a 219% year-on-year increase in orders for electric motorbikes and e-bikes in the first quarter of 2026, but the company has yet to turn a profit.

Pham noted that “growing public awareness of air pollution” has also “dramatically strengthened” public support for EVs.

Future plans

Vietnam’s major cities also have plans to get drivers to go electric or turn to public transport.

The capital city Hanoi announced that it would ban fossil-fuel-powered motorbikes from a central zone this month, but this has been postponed until 2028.

Ho Chi Minh City, the nation’s largest city with more than 9.5 million people, intends to introduce low-emission zones and swap 400,000 petrol-powered motorbikes to electric by 2028.

The city’s green transport plans focus on metro lines, electric buses and e-bikes, explained RMIT associate professor Catherine Earl. She noted that walking and cycling are currently “not popular, accessible or safe for many residents in Ho Chi Minh City’s hot and humid climate”.

Looking ahead, Pham said Vietnam could focus on “purchase subsidies, financing schemes and adequate charging or battery-swapping infrastructure, to ensure lower-income riders, including delivery and ride-hailing drivers, are not negatively affected”.

Watch, read, listen

‘JUST 1%’ OF EMISSIONS: The Guardian debunked arguments that climate actions from smaller countries are “insignificant”.

DRILLING RISKS: Mongabay reported on the possible impacts oil drilling in the Amazon could have on a “little-known reef”.

HEATING UP: The BBC Climate Question podcast discussed the weather pattern El Niño and its links to climate change.

Coming up

Pick of the jobs

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 3 July 2026: US faces scorching Independence Day | Record ocean temperatures | Vietnam’s EV surge appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 3 July 2026: US faces scorching Independence Day | Record ocean temperatures | Vietnam’s EV surge

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Q&A: How will the World Bank’s abandoned finance goal affect climate action?

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The World Bank has abandoned a target for 45% of the funding it gives developing countries to be “climate finance”, following months of pressure from the Trump administration in the US.

However, a concerted effort by developed- and developing-country shareholders has seen the bank hold onto its “action plan” for tackling climate change.

The multilateral development bank (MDB) – which is headquartered in Washington DC – is the single largest provider of climate finance globally, distributing $39.2bn in 2025 alone, primarily as loans.

Amid widespread aid cuts by developed countries, the World Bank and other MDBs have previously pledged to significantly scale up their climate finance over the next decade.

Despite scrapping its central target, the bank says it will continue to support the demands of its “clients”, many of which have explicitly stated their need for climate-related investment.

Here, Carbon Brief looks at the likely impact of the World Bank’s policy shift and whether it is – as one expert puts it – “mostly a symbolic victory” for the US.

How does the World Bank support climate action?

The World Bank is the oldest and largest MDB. It is tasked by its 189 member governments – the bank’s shareholders – with supporting development projects around the world.

The US is the bank’s largest shareholder, followed, in order, by Japan, China, Germany, France and the UK.

Every year, the bank provides billions of dollars – predominantly as loans – to developing countries.

(One part of the World Bank, the International Development Association – IDA – specifically distributes grants to lower-income nations, as well as lower-interest loans.)

Through its financing, the World Bank also has an important role in “mobilising” private investments in developing countries.

In recent years, the bank has increasingly focused on helping developing countries to cut emissions and adapt their economies for climate change.

The World Bank provided $164bn in what it calls financing with climate “co-benefits” between 2020 and 2025.

The largest share of this funding – roughly one-fifth – went to clean energy and electricity access projects. Smaller shares went to areas such as public transport, water supply and sustainable farming.

As the map below shows, the largest recipients of the bank’s climate funds since 2020 have been emerging economies, such as Turkey ($10.3bn), India ($9bn) and Nigeria ($6.3bn).

Map showing total climate-related finance received,$bn, between 2020-2025. Source: World Bank and Carbon Brief analysis.

Among the largest World Bank projects in recent years are two extensive programmes in India, totalling nearly $3bn, supporting renewables and green hydrogen.

Others include $1.7bn for a Pakistan hydropower project, $926m for Iraq’s railways and $803m to boost “green development” in Colombia.

Despite the bank’s major role in providing climate finance to developing countries, it has faced heavy scrutiny from climate advocates.

In particular, they have noted the dominance of loans that push developing countries further into debt. The World Bank has also been criticised for a lack of transparency around how it classifies projects as “climate-related”, as well as “over-reporting” of climate finance.

Why has the World Bank abandoned its climate-finance target?

When World Bank president Ajay Banga – nominated by former US president Joe Biden – took over the institution in 2023, there were widespread calls for MDB reform.

Many of the bank’s shareholders wanted to see billions more dollars being channelled to support climate action. Later that year, Banga announced that the bank would ensure that 45% of the bank’s funding was climate finance by 2025.

This replaced an existing target of 35% for climate finance between 2021 and 2025, which had been set out in the bank’s second climate change action plan (CCAP).

The CCAP is intended to “mainstream” climate action in the bank’s work. With it in place, the World Bank’s climate finance more than doubled from $17.2bn in 2020 to $39.2bn in 2025.

As the chart below shows, this meant the World Bank exceeded its 2025 goal, with climate-related projects making up a 48% share of total funding that year.

Chart showing that the World Bank has surpassed its 45% climate finance target
Share of World Bank finance with climate “co-benefits”, 2020-2025. Source: World Bank.

When Biden was replaced by Donald Trump as president in 2025, the US administration turned against international cooperation, including climate finance.

However, the US did not walk away from the World Bank, where it exerts considerable power as the largest shareholder.

With the CCAP due to expire in July 2026, the US has spent months pressuring the bank and its shareholders to weaken or abandon the plan altogether.

US Treasury secretary Scott Bessent issued a statement during the 2026 World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) spring meetings in April 2026, in which he called for “jettisoning” the 45% climate-finance target. More broadly, he said:

“We welcome the coming expiration of the CCAP and…expect the bank to immediately shift its myopic focus on climate and financing volumes to one that emphasises high-quality, durable projects.”

This vision involves a push for the World Bank to finance more fossil-fuel projects, including drilling for new gas. (The bank has committed since 2019 to stop funding upstream oil and gas projects.)

The decision on whether to continue with the CCAP was negotiated behind closed doors by the board of directors – representing national shareholders. There were reports of “deep divides”.

A joint statement from 19 of the 25 directors last year affirmed the need for both a plan and a target. The US, Russia, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all declined to sign up, while Japan and India abstained, according to Reuters.

There were reports of European nations championing a climate plan, bolstered by support from the developing countries that would stand to receive climate finance. The US call to drop the 45% target entirely was reportedly backed by Saudi Arabia and Russia.

Ultimately, the day before the CCAP was due to lapse, the World Bank announced what appeared to be a middle ground. It would drop both the 45% target and the 35% goal it had replaced, while also “extend[ing]” the CCAP.

UK development minister Jenny Chapman told a committee hearing in the House of Commons the next day that this marked a “compromise”. She said:

“It wasn’t clear we were going to get a CCAP at all and a bank without an action plan on climate is a problem for us – so that’s a good outcome.”

Supportive shareholders had been pushing for a one-year extension of the plan. While the World Bank did not initially define the length, Chapman confirmed on LinkedIn that the plan had, in fact, been extended “indefinitely”.

The bank said it would also engage an “independent evaluation group” to assess the CCAP, in line with a board request.

Gaia Larsen, director of climate finance at the World Resources Institute (WRI), tells Carbon Brief that this evaluation will likely be “relatively free from political ideology” and could be “focused on how to make the CCAP more effective”.

Why is the World Bank important for international climate finance?

Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries – including major World Bank shareholders in Europe and elsewhere – are obliged to provide climate finance for developing countries.

This includes a target of $300bn a year by 2035, which is expected to largely come from developed countries. One significant way these nations can contribute to this goal is via their support for MDBs, particularly the World Bank.

The World Bank has described itself as “by far the largest provider of climate finance to developing countries”. Each year, it oversees half of all climate finance from MDBs and far more than any single donor country.

Many developed countries have, therefore, enthusiastically backed the World Bank’s climate efforts, as well as a “bigger” role for MDBs in development more broadly. The bank can lend sums that far exceed the amount of new public finance that individual nations are willing to commit.

This is particularly significant, given many of these nations, including the UK, Germany and France, have announced large cuts to their aid budgets in recent years.

Carbon Brief analysis suggests that roughly a fifth of the international climate finance provided and “mobilised” by developed countries in recent years can be attributed to their World Bank contributions, as the chart below shows.

(This only accounts for the World Bank financing that can be linked to developed-country shares in the bank. Developing countries, such as China, also have significant shares, which are not included in the chart below.)

Chart showing that around a fifth of climate finance provided by developed countries is channelled via the World Bank
Developed-country climate finance provided and mobilised for developing countries. The share of World Bank finance that can be attributed to developed countries (blue), is calculated based on the collective shares in the bank held by developed countries. Source: World Bank, OECD, Carbon brief analysis.

MDBs – including the World Bank – have committed to providing $120bn in climate finance to developing countries by 2030.

This was set to come from greater shareholder contributions, combined with a programme of reforms to free up capital.

If the World Bank continued to provide half of the MDB total, it would need to increase its climate finance by around 50%, from $39.2bn today to $60bn in 2030.

Therefore, experts see a “key” role for the World Bank in achieving not only the $300bn target, but also the more aspirational $1.3n target that countries agreed as part of the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) on climate finance at COP29 in 2024. This includes the private capital it could “unlock” through its lending.

Joe Thwaites, international climate finance director at Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), tells Carbon Brief that these “NCQG politics” are “quite important”. He says:

“The maths of the $300bn does not work if the MDBs pull back and so I think that’s why you’re seeing developed countries taking a stand.”

How will these changes affect global climate action?

To date, the World Bank has only released minimal details about its new climate plans. As such, experts say the impact on future climate finance remains uncertain.

Jon Sward, environment project manager at the Bretton Woods Project, tells Carbon Brief:

“They have said they are going to retain all the same processes about climate-finance reporting. So, of course, there is a world in which, actually, climate finance continues to increase like it has been.”

Some of the World Bank’s internal organisations will, in fact, keep their climate-finance goals for the time being. For example, the IDA’s largely grant-based funding retains a 45% target for its current round, which will last until 2028 – the year of the next US presidential election.

However, WRI’s Larsen tells Carbon Brief that the changes, from a bank that was previously a “champion for climate action”, remain significant:

“This reality, reinforced by the elimination of the 45% goal, means that it would not be surprising to see a reduction in climate investments.”

In a statement, the World Bank said its “work on climate is and will remain firmly client driven”, noting that it supports nations undertaking their Paris Agreement climate plans.

Therefore, its climate focus may come down to whether there is demand for climate action from “client” countries receiving finance.

At an April event in discussion with the climate sceptic Bjørn Lomborg, Bessent said that global financial institutions should focus on growth, characterising climate action as an “elite belief”.

The implication from the US Treasury secretary was that recipient countries are not interested in climate action. However, as reported by Devex, a group of World Bank shareholders representing nearly 100 developing countries, wrote a letter that appeared to push back against this framing.

This “G11+” group, led by Brazil and China, said the bank “must remain firmly client-driven”, noting that countries are “following nationally determined pathways toward climate action”. NRDC’s Thwaites tells Carbon Brief:

“It’s one thing for the Europeans to talk about climate…This was the client countries [100 developing countries] saying: ‘No, we want this.’”

Recent research by the ODI thinktank found that 79% of developing-country officials polled wanted to see MDB investment in solar projects, 54% wanted hydropower and 47% wanted wind power. Only 13% wanted investment in gas-power plants.

Rishikesh Ram Bhandary, a senior development researcher at Boston University, has stressed the need for an “enhanced CCAP”, which could be supported by the bank’s new independent evaluation. Among other things, he tells Carbon Brief:

“The bank needs to make a more convincing case about how climate change is being integrated into development priorities rather than competing with them.”

Thwaites says he is hopeful that the outcome is “mostly a symbolic victory for the US”.

However, he says major shareholders from Europe and elsewhere should make it clear to the bank that it is not “the only game in town” when it comes to climate finance. He says:

“If [the World Bank] are going to cave into one shareholder, when the vast majority of the other shareholders are supportive of continuing climate action, they can take their money elsewhere.”

The post Q&A: How will the World Bank’s abandoned finance goal affect climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: How will the World Bank’s abandoned finance goal affect climate action?

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As food shocks spread, citizens are showing more leadership than governments 

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Rich Wilson is CEO of the Iswe Foundation and co-founder of the Global Citizens’ Assembly.

The numbers are stark. According to the 2026 Global Report on Food Crises, 266 million people across 47 countries experienced high levels of acute food insecurity last year, nearly double the figure recorded a decade ago.

Meanwhile, disruptions to oil, gas and fertiliser flows through the Strait of Hormuz drove a 46% month-on-month spike in urea prices early this year, sending agricultural price indices up 8% and raising the spectre of a global affordability crisis.

This is not a blip. It is a new baseline. The EAT-Lancet Commission concluded that food systems now account for roughly 30% of total greenhouse gas emissions and are the largest single contributor to the climate crisis. The science has been clear for years.

Now some of the solutions to the problem are becoming socially acceptable too.

    Earlier this year, people from more than 60 countries and territories, selected not by vested interest, but by lottery, spent seven weeks examining the evidence on food and climate for the latest Global Citizens’ Assembly. They heard from scientists, farmers and industry. They worked through 42 hours of structured deliberation, engaging with some difficult trade-offs. 

    They were not asked to endorse a predetermined conclusion. They were asked an open question: what changes, if any, should we make to how we grow, share and eat food, so that everyone has enough to nourish themselves while tackling the causes and impacts of climate change?

    Phase down industrial animal farming

    Their answer was unambiguous. They voted to protect forests. They voted to phase down industrial animal food production. They voted for supply chain reform and corporate accountability, explicitly rejecting the idea that the burden of change should fall on individual consumers. All 22 of their Calls to Action passed with over 85% support, a super-majority of randomly selected people from every region of the world, in agreement.

    Consider what the assembly was actually being asked to decide. Industrial animal food production is the primary driver of tropical deforestation. Protecting more land as forest and ecosystem means less land available for the expansion of industrial production. That is a real trade-off, with real consequences for real livelihoods. Politicians have spent years avoiding it.

    Food systems are the missing ingredient from the COP30 menu

    These randomly selected people looked at the evidence, deliberated across time zones and cultures, and chose the forests, with 64% in strong support and a further 20% in favour. People from livestock farming communities voted for change. Not because they were told to. Because deliberation led them there.

    We estimate there have now been more than 7,000 citizen participation initiatives worldwide in the last decade. They have been organised because, as our 2025 report: People in the Lead demonstrated, people are now consistently and significantly ahead of politicians on issues ranging from climate to AI governance.

    The people know best

    What the research consistently shows is that ordinary people, given proper evidence and time, produce recommendations that are more effective and more aligned with public values than what emerges from elected legislatures. The gap in global governance is no longer primarily between science and the public. It is between citizens and their political leaders.

    That gap matters for more than procedural reasons. When policy treats people as passive recipients rather than active participants, it leaves out the very actors whose behaviour, trust and consent the transition depends on. Institutions that speak only to other institutions, and negotiate only with state actors and industry lobbies, are missing out on the trust and energy of the people they are supposed to serve.

    Governments, left to their own devices, are not moving fast enough to prove that argument wrong. At COP30 in Belém last November, countries failed to agree on a fossil fuel phaseout roadmap, and even full implementation of every submitted national climate plan still leaves the world on course for 2.3 to 2.8C of warming.

    Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025. Photo: Artyc Studio

    Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025. Photo: Artyc Studio

    Citizens’ track at COP

    But the Brazilian presidency grasped something important. Among the conference’s more significant outcomes was the formal launch of a Citizens’ Track within the UNFCCC process, a mechanism for connecting the global participation field to intergovernmental climate negotiations. Türkiye and Australia, who together hold the COP31 presidency in Antalya this November, now have the opportunity to strengthen and institutionalise what Brazil began.

    In Guatemala, Indigenous women build climate resilience with old and new farming methods

    The question before us is no longer whether citizens can contribute to solving these problems. Across the world, in local food networks, in community assemblies and in participatory planning processes, they already are, quietly generating more ambitious and more legitimate solutions than those emerging from formal diplomatic channels.

    What is required now is the political courage to connect people to power. Not to consult citizens and file the results. Not to invite them to observe while the real decisions are made elsewhere. But to recognise the public as partners in perhaps the most consequential governance challenge of our time.

    The post As food shocks spread, citizens are showing more leadership than governments  appeared first on Climate Home News.

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