The year ahead in 2026 is an important period for China’s climate policy, amid hints that its emissions could peak and as the government publishes targets for the next five years.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows the country’s emissions have been “flat or falling” for more than 18 months, but the timing of a peak remains uncertain.
In March 2026, the government is expected to publish a series of energy and climate targets for 2030 as part of its 15th five-year plan.
These targets could boost – or moderate – the pace of its energy transition.
A number of policy mechanisms that are already due to fully come into effect this year – such as non-binding total emissions targets and the expansion of carbon market coverage to more sectors – could also help decarbonise the country’s economy.
Meanwhile, the rise in extreme weather events intensified by human-caused climate change makes adaptation as important as ever, while also adding to the challenge of advancing clean energy.
Finally, as the US turns even further away from climate action and towards fossil-fuel expansion in 2026 – notably with Venezuelan oil – China’s climate diplomacy could send a strong signal for sustained global climate action.
Carbon Brief asked 11 leading experts on China what energy and climate developments they are watching for in 2026. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity.
Director of the China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute
After decades of the rapid growth that made China the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, independent analyses suggest China’s CO2 emissions may have plateaued or even begun to decline in 2025.
Strong growth in renewable power has, for the first time outside economic contraction, outpaced rising electricity demand, pushing power-sector emissions down and contributing to an overall modest drop in total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This latest trend was picked up by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), as something that should continue over the next five years, marking an official nod to a peak in energy-related CO2 emissions years ahead of the 2030 timeline Beijing previously set.
The transition from emissions growth to stabilisation and early decline will be the key watch point for 2026 and will be shaped by the forthcoming 15th five-year plan. [This plan will set key economic goals, including energy and climate targets, for 2030.] Early policy signals suggest that the plan will introduce more explicit controls on total emissions alongside China’s traditional reliance on intensity-based targets.
However, the precise timing, scale and enforceability of these absolute emissions control measures remain under active debate. Chinese experts broadly agree that if the 2021-2025 period was characterised by continued emissions growth, and 2031-2035 is expected to deliver a clear decline, then 2026-2030 will serve as a critical “bridge” between the two.
The central questions are what this transitional period will look like in practice, how it will lay the groundwork for a sustained and timely emissions decline and whether meaningful reductions can be achieved before the end of the decade.
China team lead and researcher, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air
In 2026, I’ll be closely watching whether China moves beyond high-level industrial decarbonisation targets and begins to address the domestic, structural constraints that have slowed progress so far.
In heavy industry, particularly steel, the main barriers are not technological readiness, but persistent blast furnace overcapacity and the lack of clear economic incentives for low-carbon production pathways, which continue to lock in emissions-intensive assets.
Against this backdrop, carbon-related trade measures, such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), will make 2026 an important test of how China balances export competitiveness with climate commitments. In addition, we will see whether growing international scrutiny accelerates more substantive demand-side and policy reform in industry, rather than prolonging a reliance on incremental efficiency gains.
Director and co-founder, Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress
Of course, I’ll be tracking all the critical energy and climate targets under the 15th five-year plan.
More importantly, I’m watching whether a coherent package of measures can truly take hold to unlock green electricity on the demand side – not just expand renewable capacity – and translate policy intent into a genuine market pull for renewable electricity, especially from the manufacturing sector.
Given the challenge of balancing rapidly growing electricity demand with the pace of grid decarbonisation, progress on this front will be decisive for the long-term trajectory of emissions.
I’m also watching how provincial and municipal governments translate the dual-carbon goals into concrete targets and sectoral implementation. Subnational action – through overarching dual-carbon plans and sector-specific measures – will be fundamental to achieving national objectives. It will be critical to ensure that the subnational momentum around zero-emission industrial parks and clean-tech manufacturing competition results in measurable, additional emissions reductions.
Energy Analyst for Asia, Ember
2026 marks the first year of China’s 15th five-year plan, the planning cycle that ends with China’s target year of 2030 for carbon peaking. China’s fossil-fuel use in power generation is seeing an early sign of peaking and the upcoming years will be crucial in driving the plateau into an absolute decline.
As renewables expand, system flexibility and stability will increasingly become the priorities. By 2027, China aims to retrofit its existing coal-power fleet “as much as possible” and deploy more than 180 gigawatts (GW) of battery energy storage. Development in coal retrofit and further policies to support battery development will both be important to watch in 2026.
On the other hand, maximising flexibility potential will rely on continued reforms in the power market and system operations, following the milestone year of 2025, which saw substantial policy development in China’s ambition to establish a unified national power market.
Principal analyst, ClearBlue Markets
In 2026, I am monitoring three pivotal developments in China.
First, the 15th five-year plan inaugurates the “dual control of carbon” system. This year marks the first time industries and local governments face binding caps on total emissions, not just intensity. Watching how these national constraints cascade down to the local level will be critical.
Second, the national carbon market is aggressively tightening. With the inclusion of steel, cement and aluminum this year, regulators are executing a “market reset” – de-weighting older [emissions] allowances and enforcing stricter benchmarks to bolster prices ahead of the EU CBAM’s full rollout.
Finally, expect a surge in zero-carbon industrial parks. Following the NDRC’s announcement of 52 pilot sites, new guidelines now mandate 60% on-site renewable consumption. These “green microgrids” are becoming the primary vehicle for reducing grid reliance and certifying low-carbon exports.
Senior China counsel, Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development
2026 marks China’s first year of advancing a comprehensive shift from “dual control” of energy consumption to “dual control” of carbon emissions. At the policy level, it will be essential to track how this transition strengthens the governance architecture for controlling non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly methane.
Key developments to watch for may include efforts to strengthen measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems that enable facility- and company-level accountability.
It will also be essential to monitor progress on the voluntary GHG emission trading scheme, and the extent to which methane and other non-CO2 GHG controls are embedded in broader policy frameworks, including the environmental impact assessment system.
Finally, it will be critical to understand how non-CO2 GHG data collection and management requirements are incorporated into industry policy developments, including those addressing supply chains and product carbon-footprint initiatives.
Managing director, Sino Auto Insights
China’s electric vehicle (EV) industry has been the primary force pushing the global passenger vehicle market toward clean energy. Its domestic market has already crossed a more than 50% new-energy vehicle (NEV) retail take rate, while exports surged 86% year-on-year to around 2.4m units [in 2025]. That momentum should continue – especially as US legacy automakers pull back from EV investment in 2026.
As China’s domestic demand cools this year, export pressure will intensify. But a growing headwind has emerged: tariffs. Mexico, Brazil, Europe and the US are just a few of the countries raising barriers, complicating the next phase of global NEV expansion.
At the same time, 2026 looks like a prove-it year for next-generation battery technologies. Longer life, lower volatility and new chemistries could unlock more range, broader use cases and wider adoption – including in tougher markets like the US.
One new wildcard: the US now effectively controls Venezuelan oil. If that meaningfully impacts global oil prices, it could either slow – or unexpectedly accelerate – the shift toward clean-energy vehicles.
Climate and energy program manager, Greenovation Hub
In 2026, a key focus will be how China translates its 2035 “climate-adaptive society” goal into inclusive action. Finance for adaptation is a critical enabler, requiring both policy guidance and scalable financing models. As climate risks increase, financing resilience in sectors such as energy, transportation, infrastructure and public health is paramount. While China’s green finance taxonomy already includes some climate-adaptive activities, clear labeling and expanded coverage are important next steps.
Additionally, the global goal on adaptation (GGA) indicators can help measure project impact and inform policy. We have observed good practices already in motion, such as integrating meteorological technology with finance to enhance agricultural resilience.
Looking forward, expanding these innovative models to other sectors and regions is a key step, as these pilots can enhance policymaking and be replicated. In this process, identifying and managing risks for vulnerable groups, such as women and children, in public health and education is essential for an inclusive transition.
Practice professor of political science and director of China Programs and Strategic Initiatives, University of Pennsylvania
First and foremost, I’ll be looking for details on climate and energy targets in China’s next five-year plan cycle, which we expect to be approved as usual in March. This will essentially operationalise China’s recent nationally determined contribution and its longstanding commitment to peak emissions before 2030.
It will also give us a sign of the tempo we can expect for non-fossil energy capacity growth and whether China will be aiming for the high end of its stated emissions-reduction range. One area I’m especially focused on is the promised expansion of China’s emissions trading system.
Second, given my particular interest in and focus on geopolitics, I’m looking for signs of how the geopolitical disruption we’ve seen in Venezuela, Iran and other regions might affect China’s energy policy – in particular, in terms of long-term contracts for liquified natural gas.
Finally, I’m looking for signs of changes to China’s climate diplomacy following the US withdrawal from both the Paris Agreement and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This leaves a big hole in global climate governance and many countries will be looking increasingly to China for leadership – and funding – in this area.
Senior policy advisor for industry and trade, ECCO
China’s solar manufacturing overcapacity is prompting Beijing’s first serious consolidation efforts. The government is introducing stricter licensing requirements and tighter energy-consumption caps for polysilicon facilities, while export-tax rebates for solar products will be abolished.
At the same time, China’s offshore wind technology is advancing rapidly. In early 2026, China installed the world’s first 20 megawatt (MW) offshore wind turbine and plans mass production of 50MW dual-rotor designs, with deployment expected from 2027-2028. MingYang’s £1.5bn announced investment in Scotland signals that Chinese wind companies are pursuing entry into European markets through local production, mirroring strategies adopted by battery manufacturers.
Together, these dynamics suggest that the next phase of cleantech competition will be shaped less by trade defense alone and more by the interaction between Chinese supply-side reforms and global market-absorption capacity.
Meanwhile, following a first wave of rare-earth restrictions in April 2025, Beijing announced controls in October that extended licensing requirements to additional rare earths and introduced unprecedented extraterritorial provisions. While China suspended the October controls for one year, the April controls on seven heavy rare earths remain fully operational.
This creates persistent procurement risk for European cleantech supply chains reliant on Chinese-processed rare earths, although China has begun issuing general export licenses, providing some operational predictability.
Senior lecturer in international development, University of Bath
The biggest question is obviously the emission peak, because it’s essential to confirm if China’s carbon and greenhouse gas emissions are actually flattening or even falling. I really hope China has already reached its peak and the net-zero transition is underway.
Another important area is the evolution of China’s cleantech industries, which have become a new pillar of the country’s economy in recent years. In 2026, it is critical to see if this momentum can be sustained in China.
Given fierce competition and the gradual saturation of the domestic market, I’m also watching how Chinese cleantech companies expand their global footprint through investments in overseas manufacturing, especially as a growing number of countries want Chinese investors to create more “green jobs” and transfer cutting-edge technologies.
The post Experts: What to expect from China on energy and climate action in 2026 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Experts: What to expect from China on energy and climate action in 2026
Scientists have vowed to keep working on the next flagship set of reports for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), after a political row over the timeline for their release saw its latest session suspended on Friday evening without agreement.
During the weekend, government officials and scientists alike expressed disappointment over the inability to reach a compromise before some delegates from developing countries and small island states had to leave the week-long meeting in Ethiopia to catch flights home.
The disagreement – which has persisted since early 2024 – turns on whether the three key parts of the AR7 assessment should all be published before the conclusion of the UN’s next Global Stocktake of global climate action, which is due to be completed in late 2028.
The IPCC issued a statement after the close of the session, saying that “key agenda items” – the timelines for the three AR7 reports, as well as the IPCC budget – remain open and under discussion. It said the IPCC’s plenary session and its deliberations on the pending agenda “will resume at the earliest opportunity”, giving no further details of when.
IPCC Chair Jim Skea told delegates in closing remarks that recent months had been some of the most turbulent for the climate science panel and that, if there were stronger words than “profound disappointment” he would use them, according to a summary published by the Earth Negotiators Bulletin (ENB). IPCC discussions happen behind closed doors.
IPCC scientists remained committed
In an open letter, issued on Monday, a group of nearly 120 scientists – from a total of 664 AR7 authors – said they “stand committed to continue working to deliver the AR7 reports in a manner that is rigorous, timely and inclusive, in line with our mandate to be policy-relevant”.
“An assessment that arrives after the decisions it is meant to inform cannot serve its purpose,” they emphasised. “The second Global Stocktake in 2028 is such a decision point, and the world should not have to face it without the IPCCʼs latest assessment.”
Europe, small islands and the least developed countries, plus many Latin American and developed nations, want the IPCC to meet this deadline, arguing that the findings from the UN climate science body are irreplaceable in the UN climate policy-making process.
However, around a dozen developing countries plus Russia have argued that the reports should come later in order to allow for greater research input from the Global South – something that, in their view, would make the findings fairer. They also claim that a shorter timeline would put excessive pressure on experts.
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Who shapes climate science? The equity question facing the IPCC
Early completion of the next global climate science assessment reports risks excluding research from the Global South, which is key to ensuring the findings are fair -
Governments that support climate science must stand firm against naysayers
The IPCC is meeting to decide the timing of its next major report, as some countries try to delay it and weaken the case for faster emissions cuts
The most vocal of this group at last week’s meeting were India and Saudi Arabia, according to the ENB summary and a developed country diplomat. Critics see this push for a longer timeline as an excuse to deprive government decision-makers of the latest science and ease pressure on emerging economies to raise their ambition, particularly on cutting emissions.
Commenting on last week’s meeting, France’s ambassador for climate negotiations Benoît Faraco said a broad coalition of developed and developing countries from all five continents, “united in their support for science and the timeline proposed by scientists”, had withstood pressure “from a few countries” seeking to slow down the process of adopting the IPCC reports.
He added that France would not back down and would “continue to fight tirelessly for science, protect the integrity of information, and convince our partners that without the best available scientific data, we will be less effective in tackling climate change and protecting our populations”.
Inclusivity proposal stalled
In a bid to unlock a solution for the AR7 timeline, countries discussed ways to improve the inclusivity of the IPCC’s work. One option put on the table was for the IPCC to expand its funding for delegates from developing countries to attend some or all of its sessions from one to two participants, according to the ENB summary and a delegate speaking to Climate Home News.
That would increase the costs for the IPCC to complete AR7 by up to a quarter, according to an assessment shared by the secretariat. The panel’s budget is under severe strain and its officials have warned that, without additional voluntary contributions, it risks running out of money before it can deliver on this assessment cycle.
Climate Home News understands that some of the IPCC’s traditional donors – which mainly include European countries, Japan and Australia – indicated a willingness to support funding for an additional developing country participant. But without an agreement over the budget or the timeline for the reports, that option was ultimately not adopted.
‘Disappointed and worried’
The three reports are managed by working groups that collate and draw overall findings from the latest scientific studies and data on the physical effects of global warming around the world, how to adapt to it, and pathways for cutting planet-heating emissions in order to meet the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement.
Winston Chow, an urban climate professor at Singapore Management University who co-chairs Working Group II on adaptation, wrote in a LinkedIn post that he was “disappointed and worried” for the IPCC authors who have worked “extraordinarily hard” to assess the relevant climate science over the past two years.
He said he shared their concern that “the rigour, time and goodwill they’ve invested are now being put at risk by the Panel’s stalemate”.
As science comes under attack at UN talks, climate movement splits over how to respond
For Working Group II, a meeting for 250 experts writing that report is scheduled for January 2027, followed by the approval of a special report on cities and climate change in Singapore next March.
But because the IPCC’s budget has not been confirmed due to uncertainty about the AR7 schedule, travel support for those researchers is at risk, wrote Chow. “If they cannot participate, our assessments will lose vital expertise, perspectives and scientific breadth, and the collective effort of our authors will be undermined,” he warned.
Scientific work continues
Despite the political holdups, he – together with French climate scientist Robert Vautard, co-chair of Working Group 1 – agreed with IPCC head Skea who told the IPCC’s closing session on Friday: “The engine room of the IPCC is working, and it’s healthy.”
Vautard commented in a separate post on LinkedIn after it ended: “The boat is at full steam.” Working groups I and II are due to start revising the first drafts of their reports, while Working Group III on reducing emissions is finalising its first draft which will be out soon, he wrote.
“The most exciting two years of the cycle are ahead, for the authors. The momentum in the engine room is here and now. Trust the engine room!” he added.
The IPCC and some scientists report that progress has been made towards achieving an equitable balance of authors from the Global North and the Global South.
The group of researchers who signed the open letter on Monday noted that “inclusivity is at the heart of how we work”, with author teams bringing together experts from developed and developing countries with diverse backgrounds and at different stages of their careers.
Plea to overcome political differences
The signatories include several scientists from some of the countries opposed to the alignment of all IPCC reports with the Global Stocktake.
“We are committed to an assessment in which the knowledge, experience and priorities of every region are fully reflected, a commitment we share with the