In 2024, the world is facing one of the most volatile geopolitical outlooks in decades.
More than 50 countries, accounting for half of the global population, are going to the polls, with high levels of political uncertainty across many of the world’s largest economies.
Additionally, ongoing conflicts, extreme weather events, trade disputes and resource competition are contributing to geopolitical volatility.
With the world nearly half way through a “critical decade” for climate action, overcoming geopolitical risks in order to start rapidly cutting emissions is paramount to limiting global warming.
Carbon Brief has asked a range of scientists, policy experts and campaigners from around the world what they think the biggest geopolitical risks to climate action will be in 2024.
These are their responses, first as sample quotes, then, below, in full:
- Prof Jason Bordoff: “We are currently at risk of a troubling downward spiral, in which today’s geopolitical conflicts are complicating and slowing the energy transition.”
- Olivia Lazard: “Structural and dynamic risks lead to grievances ripe for an economic, political and/or geo-politicised backlash against or away from climate action.”
- Faten Aggad: “From an African perspective, the key challenge is that the geopolitical tension between China and the US/EU will be used as an excuse this year to argue for a limited increase in climate finance.”
- Jennie King: Many are using “climate issue… as a gateway to undermine democratic life and norms.”
- Iskander Erzini Vernoit: “Development assistance and aid budgets are at risk of being slashed by shortsighted politicians.”
- Dr Dhanasree Jayaram: “The India-China conflict poses immense risks to transboundary climate and water cooperation.”
- Anna Ackermann: “Right-wing populism gaining visibility and votes in democracies means there is a risk of rising anti-climate sentiments.”
- Juan Pablo Medina Bickel: “The global discussion to protect the Amazonian rainforest requires incorporating a security angle.”
- Prof Sophia Kalantzakos: “The road to net-zero and global digitalisation have been subsumed by … power struggles, driven by Sino-American hyper-competition exacerbated further by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”
- Kate Logan: “Concerns over China’s [clean-tech] dominance have further entrenched protectionist policies in the US and EU especially, where climate action is increasingly intertwined with economic competitiveness and political support from domestic industrial bases.”
Jason Bordoff
Founding director
Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs
Today’s increasingly volatile and unstable geopolitical environment is one of the most powerful forces shaping the global energy transition and climate action. We are currently at risk of a troubling downward spiral, in which today’s geopolitical conflicts are complicating and slowing the energy transition, while the risks of a disorderly transition risk exacerbating some of today’s most troublesome geopolitical trends.
Increasingly fraught global conflicts are sapping resources and political will to address the climate crisis, from the Middle East to Russia’s unjustified aggression against Ukraine. Most recently, strikes by Israel and Iran directly against one another have inflamed tensions, escalating risks in a region critical to climate action that may also have ripple effects globally.
Additionally, great power competition between many of the countries needed to lead on climate action, notably the US and China, is rewriting the rules of the international economic order and complicating climate action further. The urgency of accelerating the deployment of clean energy technologies far more rapidly than is the case today risks being hampered by concerns about national security, economic competitiveness fueled by the rise of industrial policy, and supply chain resilience that could raise the costs of those technologies. A recent example of this concern was the Biden administration’s launching of a national security investigation into the risks posed by imported Chinese electric vehicles.
While there are real policy concerns to address with regard to China’s dominance in clean energy supply chains, there is also a real tension between limiting China’s market access and scaling clean energy technologies at the speed and scale needed for climate action.
Finally, there are signs of growing resentment and backlash by emerging and developing economies at the perceived unfairness in how the energy transition is unfolding. Leaders in the global south increasingly point to the inability of countries responsible for most of the cumulative emissions to mobilise capital for the transition in lower income countries, or what they see as hypocrisy in how wealthier countries approach fossil fuel investment at home versus in energy-poor countries, among other concerns. As a significant share of future emissions growth will come from emerging and developing economies and more than half of investment is needed in those countries by the early 2030s, ensuring they see the transition as proceeding in a just and equitable way is essential.
Olivia Lazard
Fellow
Carnegie Europe
The list is long! It is a year when a third of the world is going to the election polls, including in the EU and in the US. Needless to say, a radical right wave in the west would be disastrous for the coherence of climate trajectories. It would undermine the key message that democracies can deliver on social contracts and inter-generational stakes. In Europe, the radical right has been making progress on the back of economic and societal issues, but one should not underestimate two other factors that magnify the risks.
The first one is disinformation and misinformation, especially the kinds piloted from Russia. The latter has perfected the art of fragmentation weaponisation in all its forms, including on the information and policy debate. Its tactics are both diffuse – via social media and digitalisation – and direct – co-opting and/or influencing political actors in Europe to serve its own interests.
The second one is Europe’s own geopolitical blindspots, lack of foresight and, therefore, lack of strategic communication to European citizens. As opposed to what [European Commission] president [Ursula] von der Leyen said, the world is not going through a series of “crises”, which require weathering through. The world is in a state of biospheric, economic and power transitions, which require adaptation and transformation. Europe did not anticipate the paradigm shifts which are now unfolding. Political extremes are, however, riding the wave of this lack of anticipation to come to power and cement a more protectionist approach. The latter will break trust that Europe needs to deliver legally-binding climate action, and more largely, that Europe needs to exist.
Underpinning election-related risks is inflation. 2023 was indeed a record-breaking year from a climate perspective. Global temperature average overshot past the 1.5C threshold compared to pre-industrial levels on a few occasions. Marine and pole temperatures broke records that indicate tipping points may activate sooner than later. El Nino contributed to dramatic impacts on various forms of agriculture. These global trends may seem abstract, but they indicate that the world is indeed headed towards more impactful forms of “natural” hazards – which translate in economic shocks at various levels – combined with more structural forms of scarcity and shortages, particularly with regards to water and food.
These combined dynamic forms of economic stress will have different effects: disruption of agricultural and industrial, energy sources and trade passage points; inflation levels will remain a growing concern in the global economic system. This will have direct purchasing power impacts on vulnerable populations in all countries alike, with potential for active breakdown of social contracts in some countries, and change in political tides in others – including pushing a swell of radical parties in Europe. On a more macro-economic level, it will keep straining relationships between countries of the global north and global south, with detrimental effects on debt-relief conversations. Yet, the latter are absolutely crucial to enhance global adaptation and [emissions] mitigation capacity.
All of these structural and dynamic risks lead to grievances ripe for an economic, political and/or geo-politicised backlash against or away from climate action. Considering that we’re in the pivot years towards a world past the 1.5C threshold, to say that this would be disastrous is an understatement.
Faten Aggad
CEO
African Future Policies Hub
All eyes are on the US presidential election and what [candidate Donald] Trump will do.
From an African perspective, the key challenge is that the geopolitical tension between China and the US/EU will be used as an excuse this year to argue for a limited increase in climate finance. We are likely to see this play out during COP29 [in Baku] when the discussion on the new financing goal is due to be discussed – [including the] insistence of western countries on a contributor base that includes China – as well as the replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA).
The insistence on financing through specific frameworks – rather than net flows to developing countries – is not constructive and risks poisoning discussions around international commitments for climate finance.
While it is clear that the quantum needs to be increased and that contributions need to come from all high polluters, any attempts to capture the discussion by adding these geopolitical tensions will be seen as a lack of commitment by developing countries. Understandably, these countries can only commit to decarbonisation – and to more ambitious NDCs next year – if they have a sense that there is serious consideration for their argument on financial flows.
Also, internationally, the major risk is emission increase due to the issues on the Red Sea shipping route (estimated at [being an increase in emissions up to] 11%), as well as announced increase in weapon manufacturing due to increased demands. Considering that the defence sector estimated carbon footprint stands at 5.5% of global emissions, this is concerning.
Jennie King
Director of climate research and policy
Institute for Strategic Dialogue
It’s generally assumed that mis- and disinformation in this space has a clear policy goal: weaken the public mandate for action, slow down the legislative process and, ultimately, maintain the status quo of the carbon economy. By confusing the public, actors can delay progress and prevent us from achieving a sustainable, decarbonised future.
That remains true in many cases, but I think there is a bigger or parallel game at play: climate issues are also being used as a gateway to undermine democratic life and norms. Nowadays, the aim of much content is not just to delay net-zero, but rather weaken trust in political systems and institutions writ large. Framing climate action as an elite conspiracy or inherently undemocratic, and feeding into wider anti-establishment sentiment, has proven very successful.
Climate is by no means the only victim of that trend, which has also impacted issues like racial justice, sexual and reproductive health, civil rights and electoral integrity. But I think what makes it uniquely vulnerable is how holistic the problem is and how every pocket of society has to be involved in the transition moving forward.
By its very nature, climate is a problem that requires not only big government solutions, but multilateral cooperation. We are living in a time where people have lost faith or patience in either of those things. Citizens are suspicious of government and sceptical that policymaking can actually yield results. At the same time, nativism and isolationism are on the rise. That means the idea of doing things collaboratively with other countries – potentially even hostile states – and the global community rallying together around a shared crisis is an easy one to exploit and turn people against.
When we think about the problem in this huge election year – the so-called “year of democracy” – and beyond, I see those as the two parallel challenges: one, ongoing and coordinated efforts to thwart climate action, often funded by billions of corporate dollars; second, the way that climate is being weaponised to increase social division and embed the idea that democracy doesn’t work. We cannot address one without the other.
Iskander Erzini Vernoit
Director
IMAL Initiative for Climate & Development
The most significant question to be addressed within the multilateral climate regime – in 2024 – is that of international climate finance. The new collective quantified goal (“NCQG”) on climate finance in the UNFCCC, mandated [as part of the Paris Agreement] to be agreed before 2025, is to exceed and replace the goal of $100bn per year originally agreed in Copenhagen.
This will be enormously consequential to the future of climate action, as a time-limited window for governments to start, essentially for the first time, having responsible conversations about the magnitude of climate finance required to deliver the Paris Agreement. Climate change mitigation, including but not limited to energy transition, adaptation and loss and damage entail financing needs for poorer countries in the trillions of dollars per annum (in terms of overall nominal public/private sums required), of which at least hundreds of billions are needed in public finance support (in grant-equivalent terms).
One great risk in 2024 is that geopolitical rivalries between the so-called superpowers distract from the urgent need to scale up finance from the world’s richer countries to the world’s poorer countries, amid widespread sovereign debt distress and a shrinking window to deliver the Paris Agreement and UN Sustainable Development Goals.
Despite the historical examples of the highest peaks in development spending being motivated by geopolitical rivalries, development assistance and aid budgets are at risk of being slashed by shortsighted politicians precisely when an increase is needed.
Dr Dhanasree Jayaram
Assistant professor at the department of geopolitics and international relations, and co-coordinator of Centre for Climate Studies (CCS)
Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Karnataka, India
South Asia is fraught with multiple crises, including political instability, socio-economic uncertainty, ecological fragility and resource inaccessibility. Both internal and transboundary challenges impede much-needed climate action to protect the most vulnerable populations in the region. The region is not immune to global developments such as the wars in Ukraine and Middle East either, as they have had adverse impacts on the countries’ energy and food security – making them less climate-resilient.
The governance gap is exacerbated by regional geopolitical tensions too. For example, the India-China conflict poses immense risks to transboundary climate and water cooperation. In fact, border infrastructure expansion and troop buildup could increase fossil fuel dependencies and socio-ecological vulnerabilities, especially in the Hindu Kush Himalayan region that sustains major ecosystems and river basins of South Asia.
More importantly, the lack of trust and robust institutional arrangements, despite common/shared challenges, hampers regional cooperation. While many transboundary ecological concerns in the region such as climate migration, fisheries management and air pollution lack governance mechanisms, many mutually beneficial opportunities are not being capitalised on, such as cross-border renewable energy trade.
Anna Ackermann
Policy analyst at the International Institute for Sustainable Development
Board member at the Centre for Environmental Initiatives “Ecoaction”
Global movement to advance climate action requires sustainable peace, opportunities for development of the green economy around the world and a fair contribution from all countries responsible for historically high shares of greenhouse gas emissions. More people should be living in democracies to ensure their rights are protected, including the right to a clean environment and climate protection. Unfortunately, the world is becoming more complicated, with higher geopolitical risks and many uncertainties.
The ongoing military conflicts are likely to continue or escalate. Having moved from authoritarianism to totalitarianism, Russia keeps running the economy and financing its war against Ukraine – the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II – with fossil fuels. Russia is gaining billions of dollars weekly from its oil and gas exports, while increasing military spending to the record $110bn this year. As Ukraine struggles to protect itself without sufficient international support and an unstable situation with the upcoming US elections, European countries boost their defence preparedness. This sets security on top of the agenda both on national level and globally – during most world leader meetings.
As half of the world will be voting in 2024, we see worrying trends of democratic backsliding and autocratisation of countries around the globe. We tend to focus criticism for the lack of climate action on democracies (often fairly enough). Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes do not allow criticism as such, preferring civil society’s silence or absence, and use of harmful disinformation tactics at home and abroad. Right-wing populism gaining visibility and votes in democracies means there is a risk of rising anti-climate sentiments. As we saw in recent years, this may well translate into shockwaves to international climate policies and COP outcomes.
Juan Pablo Medina Bickel
Research associate
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Tackling deforestation in the Amazonian rainforest, the world’s largest tropical forest, also known as the planet’s lungs for its carbon-sinking characteristics, is key for the global climate action agenda.
The protection of this rainforest requires addressing multiple drivers of forest loss, including the expansion of transnational drug trafficking and related environmental crime linked to illegal mining, logging and cattle ranching. Yet, the discussion of security and armed conflict risks across the Amazon in global fora is limited. The current international security agenda is largely focused on the Russian-Ukraine war, the Israel-Palestinian Territories armed conflict, and the Red Sea crisis. Moreover, the Venezuelan displacement emergency with over seven million refugees and migrants, the worst humanitarian crisis in the western hemisphere in decades, has taken centre stage in diplomatic, developmental assistance and security cooperation talks in the Americas. In particular, the record level of irregular Venezuelan migration into the US across the Mexican border has become a priority for US foreign relations with the region.
All in all, in 2024 the global discussion to protect the Amazonian rainforest requires incorporating a security angle.
Prof Sophia Kalantzakos
Global distinguished professor, environmental studies and public policy
New York University Abu Dhabi
The road to net-zero and global digitalisation have been subsumed by realist power struggles, driven by Sino-American hyper-competition exacerbated further by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Supply chains and the fourth industrial revolution have become securitised, and a world of “clubs” and “fences” has emerged undermining ties of interdependence. Moreover, the race for critical minerals and the chip wars raise fears of a scramble: for inputs, “geopolitically engineered” supply chains and the building up of tech and knowledge barriers that produce new exclusions and inequities.
This is why I have argued that global climate leadership should not be driven by the US and China. Their relationship is unstable and acrimonious and has proven that climate is readily sacrificed on the altar of their wider rivalries. While ideologically framed as a fight between democracy and autocracy, they struggle to ensure primacy in the green energy and industrial shifts – and more importantly to control the “tech imperium”. To add to the current instability, a Trump victory in November 2024 will pull the US out of the [global] climate regime. While the Biden administration has made extraordinary efforts to transform the US economy, a Trump White House will wreak further havoc in the global order and undermine climate resolve.
Kate Logan
Associate director of climate
Asia Society Policy Institute, Asia Society
With major armed conflicts continuing to divert attention and financial flows, there is no shortage of geopolitical risk to climate action in 2024. From a mitigation perspective especially, the role of China – as both the world’s largest emitter, and the largest producer of decarbonisation technologies – looms large over prospects for progress.
China’s large-scale production of clean energy technologies, such as solar panels, electric vehicles and batteries has brought down the cost of these critical products and spurred their uptake. But concerns over China’s dominance have further entrenched protectionist policies in the US and EU, especially, where climate action is increasingly intertwined with economic competitiveness and political support from domestic industrial bases.
Analysis by Wood Mackenzie indicates that excluding Chinese cleantech from global markets would raise the cost of the energy transition 20% by 2050, or $6tn. While supply chain diversification is important, how the world navigates these tensions will pose major implications for the speed and cost of emissions reductions – including in developing countries that don’t necessarily want to choose between the US and China.
Domestically in China, political support for new coal power continues in the name of energy security. How soon the country can peak its emissions and bring them into structural decline will largely depend on power sector reforms and whether massive deployment of renewables can dampen coal power utilisation.
The entire world is also watching the US presidential election. A Trump victory would remove US pressure on China and other major emitters to cut their domestic emissions faster and introduce a new source of instability that may push countries to further prioritise security. Regardless, under either administration, trade tensions threaten to persist, with proposed legislation on carbon border adjustments receiving bipartisan support in the US Congress.
The post Experts: What are the biggest geopolitical risks to climate action in 2024? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Experts: What are the biggest geopolitical risks to climate action in 2024?
The Senate makes some improvements, but our defense work continues
By Flannery Winchester
On Monday, the Senate Finance Committee released its portion of the big budget bill that’s working its way through Congress.
After the House passed a version of this bill that drastically cuts America’s clean energy tax credits, we’ve been pushing hard on the Senate — and the Senate Finance Committee in particular — to do a better job protecting these important measures.
So, how did this Senate committee do? Indeed, a bit better than the House!
As Heatmap reported, “Senate Republicans widened the aperture slightly compared to the House version of the bill, extending tax credits for geothermal energy, batteries, and hydropower, and preserving ‘transferability’ — a crucial rule that allows companies to sell their tax credits for cash — for years to come.”
These shifts are worth acknowledging and appreciating. These shifts mean that our advocacy work to defend these tax credits is making a meaningful difference in what members of Congress are willing to support. Our engagement is leading to better outcomes for climate and clean energy than there would be if we weren’t engaging on this.
We’re grateful to all of our volunteers who sent emails, made calls, and published local media over the last few weeks as we pushed hard to show Senators the value of these tax credits.
‘Better’ still isn’t ‘best’
Now, that said — even with these improvements from the House version of the bill, the Senate’s bill “would still slash many of the signature programs of the Inflation Reduction Act,” Heatmap reports.
We still prefer the clean energy tax credits to be left intact. CCL doesn’t endorse this bill and won’t encourage members of Congress to vote for it.
But we’re proud of all the ways we’ve helped push for a better outcome than full repeal of these clean energy tax credits, which many Republican lawmakers campaigned on last fall.
And, crucially, our defense work is not over yet. The chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Sen. Mike Crapo (R-ID), recently told Politico that Republicans are “not done writing the bill” and there are “all kinds of issues that are still being evaluated.”
That means we have another window to continue to advocate for better protection of the clean energy tax credits as negotiations continue. That’s why today we launched a new action for CCLers to email their Republican Senators with a message tailored to this moment, using data that we know makes an impact on these lawmakers. If you’re represented by at least one Republican Senator, send them a message today.
After you’ve contacted your Republican Senators, the next best opportunity to make a difference on this issue is to plan to join us in D.C. for our Summer Conference and Lobby Day next month. Negotiations are ongoing, and we’ll be pushing for the best results possible for climate and clean energy every step of the way. Learn more and register now to secure your lobby spot and bring the discussion from your hometown right to Capitol Hill.
The post The Senate makes some improvements, but our defense work continues appeared first on Citizens' Climate Lobby.
The Senate makes some improvements, but our defense work continues
Greenhouse Gases
Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon
The perception of how the land surface releases carbon dioxide (CO2) typically conjures up images of large-scale deforestation or farmers churning up the soil.
However, there is an intriguing – and underappreciated – role played by the world’s rivers.
Right now, plants and soils absorb about one-third of the CO2 released by human activity, similar to how much the oceans take up.
Over thousands to millions of years, some of this land-fixed carbon can end up being buried in sediments, where it eventually forms rocks.
The waters that feed rivers flow through plants, soils and rocks in landscapes, picking up and releasing carbon as they go.
This process is generally considered to be a sideways “leakage” of the carbon that is being taken up by recent plant growth.
However, the age of this carbon – how long it resided in plants and soils before it made it into rivers and then to the atmosphere – has remained a mystery.
If the carbon being released by rivers is young, then it can be considered a component of relatively quick carbon cycling.
However, if the carbon is old, then it is coming from landscape carbon stores that we thought were stable – and, therefore, represents a way these old carbon stores can be destabilised.
In our new study, published in Nature, we show that almost 60% of the carbon being released to the atmosphere by rivers is from these older sources.
In total, this means the world’s rivers emit more than 7bn tonnes of CO2 to the atmosphere each year – more than the annual fossil-fuel emissions from North America.
This means that there is a significant leak of carbon from old stores that we thought were safely locked away.
Previous work has shown that local land-use change, such as deforestation and climate-driven permafrost thaw, will directly release old carbon into rivers. Whether this is happening at the global scale remains a significant unknown for now.
Who are you calling old?
How do you tell how old carbon is? We employ the same technique that is used to determine the age of an archaeological relic or to verify the age of a vintage wine – that is, radiocarbon dating.
Radiocarbon is the radioactive isotope of carbon, which decays at a known rate. This enables us to determine the age of carbon-based materials dating back to a maximum age of about 60,000 years old.
We know that some of the carbon that rivers release is very young, a product of recent CO2 uptake by plants.
We also know that rivers can receive carbon from much older sources, such as the decomposition of deep soils by microbes and soil organisms or the weathering and erosion of ancient carbon in rocks.
Soil decomposition can release carbon ranging from a few years to tens of thousands of years. An example of very old soil carbon release is from thawing permafrost.
Rock weathering and erosion releases carbon that is millions of years old. This is sometimes referred to as “radiocarbon-dead” because it is so old all the radiocarbon has decayed.
Rivers are emitting old carbon
In our new study, we compile new and existing radiocarbon dates of the CO2 emissions from around 700 stretches of river around the world.
We find that almost 60% of the carbon being released to the atmosphere by rivers is from older sources (hundreds to thousands of years old, or older), such as old soil and ancient rock carbon.
In the figure below, we suggest how different processes taking place within a landscape can release carbon of different ages into rivers, driving its direct emission to the atmosphere.
So, while rivers are leaking some modern carbon from plants and soils as part of the landscape processes that remove CO2 from the atmosphere, rivers are also leaking carbon from much older landscape carbon stores.
One major implication of this finding is that modern plants and soils are leaking less carbon back to the atmosphere than previously thought, making them more important for mitigating human-caused climate change.
We find that the proportion of old carbon contributing to river emissions varies across different ecosystems and the underlying geology of the landscapes they drain.
In the figure below, we show that landscapes underlain by sedimentary rocks, which are the most likely to contain substantial ancient (or “petrogenic”) carbon, also had the oldest river emissions. We also show that the type of ecosystem (biome) was also important, although the patterns were less clear.
What is obvious is that at least some old carbon was common across most of the rivers we observed, regardless of size and location.
We provide evidence that there is a geological control on river emissions. And the variability in the ecosystem also indicates important controlling factors, such as soil characteristics, vegetation type and climate – especially rainfall patterns and temperature which are known to impact the rate of carbon release from soils and rock weathering.
Are old carbon stores stable?
Long-term carbon storage in soils and rocks is an important process regulating global climate.
For example, the UK’s peatlands are important for regulating climate because they can store carbon for thousands of years. That is why restoring peatlands is such a great climate solution.
Rivers emit more than 7bn tonnes of CO2 to the atmosphere each year – that’s equivalent to about 10-20% of the global emissions from fossil fuel burning annually.
If 60% of river carbon emissions are coming from old carbon stores, then this constitutes a significant leak of carbon from old stores we thought were safely locked away.
Another major implication of our study is that these old carbon stores can be mobilised and routed directly to the atmosphere by rivers, which would exacerbate climate change if these stores are further destabilised.
As can be seen in the figure below, we found that river carbon emissions appeared to be getting older since measurements first began in the 1990s (lower F14Catm means older radiocarbon ages).
We found that river carbon emissions appeared to be getting older since measurements first began in the 1990s.
While there are several caveats to interpreting this trend, it is a warning sign that human activities, especially climate change, could intensify the release of carbon to the atmosphere via rivers.
Given the strong link between soil carbon and river emissions, if this trend is a sign of human activity disturbing the global carbon cycle, it is likely due to landscape disturbance mobilising soil carbon.
Using rivers to monitor global soil carbon storage
Rivers collect waters from across the landscapes they flow through and therefore provide a tool to track processes happening out of sight.
A drop of water landing in a landscape travels through soils and rock before reaching the river, and its chemistry, including its radiocarbon age, reflects the processes occurring within the landscape.
Monitoring the age of carbon in rivers can therefore tell you a lot about whether their landscapes are storing or releasing carbon.
This has been shown to help identify carbon loss in degraded tropical peatlands, thawing Arctic permafrost and due to deforestation.
River radiocarbon is sensitive to environmental change and could therefore be a powerful monitoring tool for detecting the onset of climate tipping points or the success of landscape restoration projects, for example.
While we present data spread out across the world, there are quite a few gaps for important regions, notably where glacier change is happening and others where droughts and flood frequencies are changing.
These include areas with low amounts of data in Greenland, the African continent, the Arctic and Boreal zones, the Middle East, eastern Europe, western Russia, Central Asia, Australasia and South America outside of the Amazon.
All these regions have the potential to store carbon in the long-term and we do not yet know if these carbon stores are stable or not under present and future climate change.
River radiocarbon offers a powerful method to keep tabs on the health of global ecosystems both now and into the future.
The post Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon
Human-caused greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2024 continued to drive global warming to record levels.
This is the stark picture that emerges in the third edition of the “Indicators of Global Climate Change” (IGCC) report, published in Earth System Science Data.
IGCC tracks changes in the climate system between Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) science reports.
In doing so, the IGCC fills the gap between the IPCC’s sixth assessment (AR6) in 2021 and the seventh assessment, expected in 2028.
Following IPCC methods, this year’s assessment brings together a team of over 60 international scientists, including former IPCC authors and curators of vital global datasets.
As in previous years, it is accompanied by a user-friendly data dashboard focusing on the main policy-relevant climate indicators, including GHG emissions, human-caused warming, the rate of temperature change and the remaining global carbon budget.
Below, we explain this year’s findings, highlighting the role that humans are playing in some of the fundamental changes the global climate has seen in recent years.
(For previous IGCC reports, see Carbon Brief’s detailed coverage in 2023 and 2024.)
An ‘unexceptional’ record high
Last year likely saw global average surface temperatures hit at least 1.5C above pre-industrial levels. This aligns with other major assessments of the Earth’s climate.
Our best estimate is a rise of 1.52C (with a range of 1.39-1.65C), of which human activity contributed around 1.36C. The rest is the result of natural variability in the climate system, which also plays a role in shaping global temperatures from one year to the next.
Our estimate of 1.52C differs slightly from the 1.55C given by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) state of the global climate 2024 report, published earlier this year. This is because they make slightly different selections on which of the available global land and ocean temperature datasets to include. (The warming estimate has varied by similar amounts in past years and future work will aim to harmonise the approaches.)
The height of 2024’s temperatures, while unprecedented in at least the last 2,000 years, is not surprising. Given the high level of human-induced warming, we might currently expect to see annual temperatures above 1.5C on average one year in six.
However, with 2024 following an El Niño year, waters in the North Atlantic were warmer than average. These conditions raise this likelihood to an expectation that 1.5C is surpassed every other year.
From now on, we should regard 2024’s observed temperatures as unexceptional. Temperature records will continue to be broken as human-caused temperature rise also increases.
Longer-term temperature change
Despite observed global temperatures likely rising by more than 1.5C in 2024, this does not equate to a breach of the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal, which refers to long-term temperature change caused by human activity.
IGCC also looks at how temperatures are changing over the most recent decade, in line with IPCC assessments.
Over 2015-24, global average temperatures were 1.24C higher than pre-industrial levels. Of this, 1.22C was caused by human activity. So, essentially, all the global warming seen over the past decade was caused by humans.
Observed global average temperatures over 2015-24 were also 0.31C warmer than the previous decade (2005-14). This is unsurprising given the high rates of human-caused warming over the same period, reaching a best estimate of 0.27C per decade.
This rate of warming is large and unprecedented. Over land, where people live, temperatures are rising even faster than the global average, leading to record extreme temperatures.
But every fraction of a degree matters, increasing climate impacts and loss and damage that is already affecting billions of people.
Driven by emissions
Undoubtedly, these changes are being caused by GHG emissions remaining at an all-time high.
Over the last decade, human activities have released, on average, the equivalent of around 53bn tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere each year. (The figure of 53bn tonnes expresses the total warming effect of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide, using CO2 as a reference point.)
Emissions have shown no sign of the peak by 2025 and rapid decline to net-zero required to limit global warming to 1.5C with no or limited “overshoot”.
Most of these emissions were from fossil fuels and industry. There are signs that energy use and emissions are rising due to air conditioning use during summer heatwaves. Last year also saw high levels of emissions from tropical deforestation due to forest fires, partly related to dry conditions caused by El Niño.
Notably, emissions from international aviation – the sector with the steepest drop in emissions during the Covid-19 pandemic – returned to pre-pandemic levels.
The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, alongside the other major GHGs of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), is continuing to build up to record levels. Their concentrations have increased by 3.1, 3.4 and 1.7%, respectively, since the 2019 values reported in the last IPCC assessment.
At the same time, aerosol emissions, which have a cooling effect, are continuing to fall as a result of important efforts to tackle air pollution. This is currently adding to the rate of GHG warming.
Notably, cutting CH4 emissions, which are also short-lived in the atmosphere, could offset this rise. But, again, there is no real sign of a fall – despite major initiatives such as the Global Methane Pledge.
The effect of all human drivers of climate change on the Earth’s energy balance is measured as “radiative forcing”. Our estimate of this radiative forcing in 2024 is 2.97 Watts per square metre (W/m2), 9% above the value recorded in 2019 that was quoted in the last IPCC assessment.
This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates the percentage change in an array of climate indicators since the data update given in the last IPCC climate science report.
Continued emissions and rising temperatures are meanwhile rapidly eating into the remaining carbon budget, the total amount of CO2 that can be emitted if global warming is to be kept below 1.5C.
Our central estimate of the remaining carbon budget from the start of 2025 is 130bn tonnes of CO2.
This has fallen by almost three-quarters since the start of 2020. It would be exhausted in a little more than three years of global emissions, at current levels.
However, given the uncertainties involved in calculating the remaining carbon budget, the actual value could lie between 30 and 320bn tonnes, meaning that it could also be exhausted sooner – or later than expected.
Beyond global temperatures
Our assessment also shows how surplus heat is accumulating in the Earth’s system at an accelerating rate, becoming increasingly out of balance and driving changes around the world.
The data and their changes are displayed on a dedicated Climate Change Tracker platform, shown below.
The radiative forcing of 2.97 W/m2 adds heat to the climate system. As the world warms in response, much of this excess heat radiates to space, until a new balance is restored. The residual level of heating is termed the Earth’s “energy imbalance” and is an indication of how far out of balance the climate system is and the warming still to come.
This residual rate of heat entering the Earth system has now approximately doubled from levels seen in the 1970s and 1980s, to around 1W/m2 on average during the period 2012-24.
Although the ocean is storing an estimated 91% of this excess heat, mitigating some of the warming we would otherwise see at the Earth’s surface, it brings other impacts, including sea level rise and marine heatwaves.
Global average sea level rise, from both the melting of ice sheets and thermal expansion due to deep ocean warming, is included in the IGCC assessment for the first time.
We find that it has increased by around 26mm over the last six years (2019-24), more than double the long-term rate. This is the indicator that shows the clearest evidence of an acceleration.
Sea level rise is making storm surges more damaging and causing more coastal erosion, having the greatest impact on low-lying coastal areas. The 2019 IPCC special report on the oceans and cryosphere estimated that more than one billion people would be living in such low-lying coastal zones by 2050.
Multiple indicators
Overall, our indicators provide multiple lines of evidence all pointing in the same direction to provide a clear and consistent – but unsurprising and worsening – picture of the climate system.
It is also now inevitable that global temperatures will reach 1.5C of long-term warming in the next few years unless society takes drastic, transformative action – both in cutting GHG emissions and stopping deforestation.
Every year of delay brings reaching 1.5C – or even higher temperatures – closer.
This year, countries are unveiling new “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), the national climate commitments aimed at collectively reducing GHG emissions and tackling climate change in line with the Paris Agreement.
While the plans put forward so far represent a step in the right direction, they still fall far short of what is needed to significantly reduce, let alone stop, the rate of warming.
At the same time, evidence-based decision-making relies on international expertise, collaboration and global datasets.
Our annual update relies on data from NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and input from many of their highly respected scientists. It is this type of collaboration that allows scientists to generate well-calibrated global datasets that can be used to produce trusted data on changes in the Earth system.
It would not be possible to maintain the consistent long-term datasets employed in our study if their work is interrupted.
At a time when the planet is changing at the fastest rate since records began, we are at risk of failing to track key indicators – such as greenhouse gas concentrations or deep ocean temperatures – and losing core expertise that is vital for understanding the data.
The post Guest post: Why 2024’s global temperatures were unprecedented, but not surprising appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: Why 2024’s global temperatures were unprecedented, but not surprising
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