President Donald Trump has signed an executive order to ramp up U.S. production of critical minerals. The order uses emergency powers under the Defense Production Act to increase financing, streamline permits, and encourage domestic mining and processing of minerals vital for national security and economic growth.
The goal is to cut down on dependence on foreign suppliers, especially China. China leads the global supply chain for key minerals. The order has raised worries about its effect on the environment and how it matches climate goals.
What Are The Key Aspects of the Executive Order?
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Defense Production Act for Critical Minerals
The executive order authorizes the use of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to provide financial support to U.S. mining and mineral processing projects. This includes loans and investments from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Department of Defense. The goal is to speed up the production of key minerals. This includes lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements, and maybe coal.
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Faster Permitting for Mining Projects
Trump’s order directs federal agencies to speed up the permitting process for new mining and processing facilities. The Department of the Interior has been tasked with prioritizing critical mineral production on federal lands. The administration wants to cut red tape. This will help private companies invest more in domestic mineral production.
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Expanding the Scope of Critical Minerals
The order lets the National Energy Dominance Council add uranium, copper, potash, and gold to the list of critical minerals. Additionally, there is speculation that coal could be included. This can potentially lead to increased production of fossil fuels under the guise of national security.
Why Is the U.S. Expanding Mineral Production?
The U.S. gets 70% of its rare earth minerals from China. This makes the supply chain weak for important industries like defense, electronics, and renewable energy. China has also imposed export controls on key materials like gallium and germanium. This further increases the urgency for the U.S. to secure its own resources.
Critical minerals are key for military use, particularly antimony. They support missile systems, fighter jets, and advanced communications technology. By expanding domestic production, the U.S. aims to strengthen its defense capabilities and reduce the risk of supply chain disruptions.
Lastly, lithium, cobalt, and nickel are crucial for battery storage, electric vehicles (EVs), and renewable energy infrastructure. Boosting local production of these materials can speed up the clean energy shift and cut down on fossil fuel use.
Global Market Trends and U.S. Critical Mineral Production and Consumption
The global demand for critical minerals has been on the rise, driven by the transition to clean energy technologies. In 2023, lithium demand surged by 30%, while nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements also saw significant increases.
Investment in critical mineral mining grew by 10% in 2023; however, this was a slowdown compared to the 30% growth observed in 2022. This is partly due to declining prices putting pressure on producers.

The United States has significant mineral resources but remains heavily dependent on imports for many critical minerals. According to the U.S. Geological Survey’s 2024 Mineral Commodity Summaries, the U.S. was 100% import-dependent for 15 nonfuel mineral commodities and over 50% import-dependent for 49 such commodities.

For instance, aluminum consumption in 2024 reached 4.3 million metric tons, underscoring the nation’s reliance on external sources. For other minerals, refer to the following table for US 2023 consumption and production per USGS report.

Trump’s recent executive order targets several critical minerals, including:
- Rare Earth Elements (REEs): Essential for electronics, defense systems, and renewable energy technologies.
- Lithium: Vital for battery production in electric vehicles and energy storage systems.
- Nickel: Used in stainless steel and battery manufacturing.
- Cobalt: Important for battery electrodes.
- Graphite: Used in batteries and fuel cells.
Economic, Environmental, and Climate Implications
The EO has a significant impact on mining companies. Shares of U.S. mining companies surged following the announcement.
MP Materials, a rare earth miner, saw its stock rise by 4.6%, while coal producer Peabody Energy gained more than 2%. However, Australian and Chinese mining companies experienced stock declines, reflecting concerns over reduced demand for imported minerals.
The decision also has the potential to spur international trade conflicts. China and other major mineral-exporting nations may view this policy shift as a direct threat to their economic interests. This could lead to trade tensions and potential retaliatory measures, further complicating global supply chains.
Environmental Concerns and Climate Impacts
Mining and processing critical minerals contribute about 8% of global carbon emissions. Copper production emits 4.6 tonnes of CO₂ per tonne, while nickel ranges between 12 and 78 tonnes per tonne. However, these emissions do not negate clean energy benefits—EVs still produce half the lifecycle emissions of gasoline cars. Using low-carbon electricity can further lower these emissions.
Coal’s potential inclusion as a critical mineral raises concerns. Fossil fuels from federal lands accounted for nearly 25% of U.S. CO₂ emissions over a decade. Expanding mining on public lands risks habitat destruction and toxic contamination, with 22,500 abandoned mine sites already leaking harmful chemicals.
Securing critical minerals is key for national security and clean energy. Yet, experts also stress the need for sustainable practices. This includes recycling, improved mining tech, and carbon-cutting ideas. For example, using CO₂ to weaken rocks could make mining carbon-negative.
The Biden administration used the Defense Production Act before. This was to boost the production of battery materials in the U.S. The goal is to cut emissions and support renewable energy. In contrast, Trump’s order may list coal and other fossil fuels as critical minerals. This could slow down efforts for net-zero emissions and hurt global climate leadership.
Expanding fossil fuel extraction on federal lands may worsen climate change, undermining progress toward emission reduction targets.
Conclusion: A Double-Edged Sword?
Trump’s executive order to boost critical mineral production is a significant policy shift that aims to reduce dependence on foreign sources, enhance national security, and support key industries. However, the inclusion of coal and the potential rollback of environmental safeguards raises concerns about its impact on climate goals.
As the U.S. moves forward with this strategy, it must find a balance between securing essential minerals and ensuring sustainable, environmentally responsible development. The outcome of this policy will shape not only the country’s economic future but also its role in global efforts to combat climate change.
The post Donald Trump Uses Emergency Powers to Boost U.S. Critical Mineral (and Coal?) Production appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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Carbon Footprint
Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions
Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?
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