On September 20, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced over $3 billion in funding for 25 projects across 14 states. These initiatives are a part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s Investing in America agenda, which aims to boost domestic production of advanced batteries and essential materials like lithium.
Unlocking DOE’s $3B Boost for a Stronger U.S. Battery Industry
Notably, this effort builds on the administration’s previous commitment of nearly $35 billion to strengthen U.S. critical minerals and battery supply chains. The $3 billion in grants for these new projects will help expand EV and energy storage production while reducing reliance on foreign supply chains, particularly China’s.
Furthermore, the selected projects will be administered by the U.S. DOE’s Office of Manufacturing and Energy Supply Chains (MESC). The main goals of the funding are:
- Build a robust domestic battery supply chain, including the production of key battery components like cathodes, anodes, and electrolyte materials. These elements are crucial for both current and next-generation battery technologies.
- Focus on constructing, expanding, and retrofitting facilities for battery production, recycling, and the processing of critical minerals, such as lithium, graphite, and manganese.
U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm emphasized the importance of this initiative, stating,
“We’re witnessing a manufacturing revival in America, thanks to the Investing in America agenda. By establishing the U.S. as a leader in battery manufacturing, we’re not only creating high-paying jobs but also securing our energy future and strengthening our global leadership.”
Battery manufacturing investment in the United States from 1st quarter 2022 to 2nd quarter 2024

Source: Statista
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Key Projects in Lithium Extraction and Recycling, A S&P Global Report
Arkansas and Texas
Among the new projects, the DOE awarded the two largest grants—$225 million each—for direct lithium extraction (DLE) initiatives. These projects will be based in Arkansas and Texas, both part of the Smackover Formation. SWA Lithium LLC, a joint venture of Standard Lithium Ltd. and Norway’s Equinor ASA, is one of the recipients. Their Arkansas-based project aims to produce 45,000 metric tons of battery-grade lithium carbonate per year.
The DOE also selected Terravolta Resources LLC for another $225 million grant for a DLE project located in the Texarkana region. This project will focus on producing 25,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate annually.
Another significant investment includes a $200 million grant to Cirba Solutions US Inc., which plans to build a lithium-ion battery recycling facility in Columbia, SC. The plant will recycle batteries from EVs, energy storage systems, and consumer electronics, processing up to 60,000 metric tons per year.
South Carolina and Michigan
The Cirba Solutions project is one of five selected facilities in South Carolina. It is joined by a $198.7 million grant awarded to EnerSys Advanced Systems Inc. to establish a new lithium-ion battery cell plant in Piedmont, SC, set to begin production in 2028 with an initial capacity of 5 GWh.
In Michigan, four projects were highlighted, including a $145 million grant for Revex Technologies Inc. to collaborate with Eagle Mine LLC, a subsidiary of Canada’s Lundin Mining Corp., on the REV Nickel Project. This initiative aims to process Eagle Mine waste and spent batteries to recover valuable materials.
Additionally, Mitra Future Technologies Inc. received a $100 million federal grant for a facility in Muskegon, focused on producing lithium iron phosphate cathode materials for electric vehicles, energy storage, and defense applications.
On the West Coast
The DOE also selected Group14 Technologies Inc. to negotiate a $200 million award for a silane production facility in Moses Lake, Washington. This facility will manufacture silicon-based anode materials. Furthermore, Form Energy Inc. received a $150 million grant to support its production of iron-air battery storage systems at a factory in Weirton, West Virginia.
Meanwhile, Reuters reported Albemarle is slated to receive $67 million for a project in North Carolina aimed at producing commercial quantities of anode material for next-generation lithium-ion batteries. Additionally, Honeywell will be awarded $126.6 million to build a commercial-scale facility in Louisiana that will produce a key electrolyte salt essential for lithium batteries.
The media agency also noted that DOE intends to grant DOW Chemical Company $100 million to manufacture battery-grade carbonate solvents for lithium-ion battery electrolytes. Others in the pipeline include Clarios Circular Solutions, in partnership with SK ON and Cosmo Chemical will receive $150 million for a project in South Carolina to recycle lithium-ion battery production scrap materials from SK ON, the battery division of SK Innovation.

A Bold Step Toward Economic and Energy Security
John Podesta, Senior Advisor to President Biden for International Climate Policy, remarked on the importance of securing EV and battery supply chains.
“The administration is using every tool available to onshore and ‘friend-shore’ supply chains. This will boost national security, strengthen our economy, and help combat the climate crisis,”
The press release mentions, the battery sector will see a total investment of $16 billion, which includes contributions from private companies. However, a significant purpose of the selected projects is job creation. Considering this, more than half of the 25 projects have committed to labor agreements and can potentially create 8,000 construction jobs and over 4,000 long-term operating jobs.
The next step for these projects involves a negotiation process with the DOE before funding is finalized. Environmental reviews will also be completed during this time. This groundbreaking investment boosts domestic battery manufacturing and strengthens the country’s leadership in the global clean energy transition.
Shifting Dynamics in the U.S. Battery Market
Batteries are crucial to enhancing the U.S. energy grid, powering homes and businesses, and supporting EVs. It’s a known fact that China has dominated the battery market, controlling key minerals like lithium, and rare earth elements. However, U.S. production is rising.
S&P Global forecasts suggest that domestic battery capacity will surge to 603 GWh by 2027 and 1,169 GWh by 2030, boosting the U.S. share of global battery capacity to 16%. In contrast, China’s share is expected to fall from 78% in 2023 to 58% by 2030.

The market research firm also noted, that China, which is the prime hub for big lithium-ion battery makers such as CATL and BYD, accounted for 82.2% of US battery imports in the second quarter of 2024.
The U.S. is intensifying efforts to boost domestic battery manufacturing by implementing robust measures to protect its interests. Furthermore, The Biden administration is introducing new tariffs on Chinese products, including lithium-ion batteries and EVs.
Lael Brainard remarked to S&P Global that these “tough, targeted measures” aim to counter unfair trade practices by China, enhancing the resilience of the U.S. supply chain. In response, China’s government criticized the tariffs, labeling them as a reflection of U.S. protectionism.
This effort not only propels the US battery industry forward but also drives innovation and minimizes dependence on foreign suppliers. All in all, it would position the country as a leader in clean energy, ensuring access to crucial materials, mainly lithium remains domestic.
The post DOE Supercharges the U.S. Battery and Critical Minerals Industry with $3 Billion Boost appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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