The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has announced a major funding initiative aimed at strengthening domestic battery supply chains and reducing reliance on foreign sources of critical minerals. The department introduced a Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) worth up to $500 million to expand U.S. capabilities in mineral processing, battery materials manufacturing, and recycling.
Significantly, these investments target industries such as grid storage, transportation, manufacturing, and national defense. At the same time, the initiative reflects growing concerns about supply chain vulnerabilities for minerals that power modern energy technologies.
According to Chris Wright, the United States has relied for too long on foreign suppliers to provide and process key materials used in battery manufacturing. Strengthening domestic supply chains, he explained, will help the country meet rising energy demand while maintaining economic and technological leadership.
Strengthening the Domestic Battery Supply Chain
The DOE’s new funding program focuses on boosting the United States’ ability to process, recycle, and manufacture battery materials domestically. Currently, many minerals used in advanced batteries are mined globally but processed overseas before reaching U.S. manufacturers.

This dependency creates supply risks and exposes the economy to geopolitical disruptions. As a result, the new funding program aims to build a more resilient supply chain across several stages of battery production. Explained in detail below:
Critical Mineral Processing
First, the program seeks to expand domestic processing of critical minerals. Many essential battery materials—including lithium, nickel, graphite, copper, and aluminum—require complex refining processes before they can be used in batteries. By investing in new processing facilities, the United States hopes to reduce reliance on foreign refining capacity and ensure a stable supply of materials for domestic industries.
Battery Recycling Technologies
Second, the initiative emphasizes recycling technologies. Recovering valuable metals from used batteries and manufacturing scrap can significantly reduce the need for new mining while improving supply security. Recycling also lowers environmental impacts by reducing waste and conserving natural resources.

Battery Manufacturing Capacity
Finally, the program aims to expand manufacturing capacity for battery materials and components within the United States. Increasing domestic production of battery precursors, cathode materials, and other key components will help support the entire North American battery supply chain.
The funding is supported by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which allocated billions of dollars to strengthen energy infrastructure and domestic manufacturing across the country.
Battery Storage Becomes a Major U.S. Energy Technology
The urgency behind these investments reflects the rapid growth of battery storage across the United States. In recent years, battery systems have emerged as a critical technology for managing modern power grids.
In fact, batteries became the largest form of energy storage in the country in 2024, surpassing traditional pumped hydro storage for the first time. This shift marks a significant milestone in the evolution of the U.S. electricity system.
At the same time, the number of battery projects expanded rapidly. Nearly 1,000 storage projects were either operating or under development across the country. Many of these projects are located in California and Texas, where large-scale renewable energy installations require flexible storage solutions to stabilize the electricity supply.
One notable example is the Moss Landing Energy Storage Facility, one of the largest battery installations in the United States. Located in California, the facility pairs a natural gas power plant with massive battery storage systems that can deliver electricity when demand peaks.
As renewable energy capacity continues to grow, battery storage will play an increasingly important role in maintaining grid reliability and balancing intermittent energy sources such as solar and wind.
EV Battery Manufacturing Market Continues to Grow
The electric vehicle industry is another major driver behind rising battery demand. As EV adoption accelerates globally, automakers and battery companies are investing heavily in new manufacturing facilities.
In the United States, the electric vehicle battery manufacturing market is projected to grow steadily over the coming years. Industry estimates suggest the market will reach approximately $17.94 billion in 2026, increasing from $16.36 billion in 2025.
Looking further ahead, the sector is expected to expand significantly. By 2031, the market could reach around $28.46 billion, reflecting a compound annual growth rate of nearly 9.7 percent.

Multiple factors fuel this growth. Federal incentives for clean energy technologies, rising consumer demand for electric vehicles, and large-scale investments in domestic manufacturing are all contributing to the expansion of the U.S. battery industry.
However, sustaining this growth will require reliable access to the minerals that power advanced batteries.
America’s Critical Mineral Supply Remains a Concern
To address supply risks, the U.S. Geological Survey expanded its official list of critical minerals in 2025. The updated list now includes 60 minerals, up from 50 identified in 2022.
Several new minerals were added due to their growing importance for the economy and national security. These additions include boron, copper, lead, metallurgical coal, phosphate, potash, rhenium, silicon, silver, and uranium.
Despite these efforts, the United States remains heavily dependent on imports for many critical minerals. As of 2024, the country relied entirely on foreign suppliers for twelve critical minerals. Meanwhile, more than half of the domestic demand for twenty-nine minerals came from imports.
Rare earth elements represent one of the most significant vulnerabilities because global supply chains remain highly concentrated. China continues to dominate the production and processing of these materials, raising concerns about potential supply disruptions.
As a result, U.S. policymakers are increasingly focused on strengthening domestic mining, processing, and recycling capabilities.
Global Demand for Energy Minerals Is Rising Fast
The push to secure mineral supply chains also reflects rapidly growing global demand for energy materials. According to the IEA, demand for key minerals used in clean energy technologies is expected to increase dramatically in the coming decades.
Lithium demand, for example, could grow fivefold by 2040 under current policy scenarios. Copper will likely remain the largest mineral market by value, while other materials such as nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements will also see strong growth.

Overall, the combined market value for six key energy minerals—copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements—could reach approximately $500 billion by 2040. This surge reflects the rapid expansion of electric vehicles, renewable power systems, battery storage, and other clean energy technologies.
Consequently, governments around the world are competing to secure reliable access to these strategic resources.
Against this backdrop, the DOE’s $500 million funding initiative represents an important step toward strengthening America’s position in the global battery economy. By expanding domestic processing, recycling, and manufacturing capacity, the United States aims to reduce supply risks while supporting the technologies that will power the future energy system.
- READ MORE: Unlocking the Power of Critical Minerals with US DOE’s $45 Million Investment: A Focus on Antimony
The post DOE Launches $500M Funding Drive to Strengthen U.S. Battery Supply Chains and Critical Minerals Processing appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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