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CORSIA Carbon Credit Demand To Be 14x Larger Than Supply

The surplus of CORSIA-eligible carbon credits is projected to turn negative by 2030 unless new supplies become available, according to an analysis by Abatable.

Currently, the aviation sector contributes about 3% of global emissions. As a sector that’s difficult to decarbonize, it’s exploring direct low-carbon technological solutions like sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) and electrification. However, these solutions face cost and technological hurdles and will take time to become widespread.

The Challenge of Decarbonizing Aviation

To mitigate emissions in the meantime, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) launched the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) in 2016. CORSIA aims to offset any growth in aviation emissions above 85% of 2019 levels.

CORSIA entered its first phase in January this year, after a pilot period from 2021 to 2023. Phase 1, which runs from 2024 to 2026, is voluntary for participating states, while Phase 2 will be mandatory starting in 2027.

  • To comply, airlines can purchase SAF, enhance fleet efficiency, or buy CORSIA-eligible carbon credits.

However, the rollout has been challenging. In March, major carbon credit issuers Verra, Gold Standard, and Climate Action Reserve (CAR) were only conditionally approved by ICAO’s Technical Advisory Body. This status will be reconsidered in September following a resubmission process completed in April 2024.

Currently, CORSIA Phase 1 credits can only be acquired through the American Carbon Registry (ACR) and ART TREES standards. Additionally, CORSIA credits require Letters of Authorization from host countries, further limiting the supply.

As of now, the only recent issuance eligible for the scheme is 7.1 million Guyana ART credits. The ICAO Technical Advisory Body’s decision suggests that this limited supply situation may persist throughout 2024.

Demand to Outpace Supply by 2030

Abatable’s analysis indicates that, under current market conditions and without new supplies, demand for CORSIA credits will exceed supply by 2030. In Phase 2 of the scheme, demand is projected to outpace supply between 2029 and 2030.

In a conservative scenario, CORSIA demand does not exceed 100 million credits until after 2034. However, supply peaks in 2025 and can only meet demand until 2029. Without new projects, demand in Phase 2 could be 14x  larger than supply.

CORSIA carbon credit demand, supply, conservative scenario

In an optimistic scenario, aviation emissions return to 85% of 2019 levels this year, with CORSIA demand surpassing 100 million carbon credits in 2027. Supply, bolstered by projects likely to receive corresponding adjustments, meets demand until 2030. Without new projects, demand in Phase 2 could be 7x larger than supply.

CORSIA demand, supply, optimistic scenario

Abatable’s projections include existing projects expected to meet the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market’s Core Carbon Principles and likely to receive corresponding adjustments. Supply from Verra, Gold Standard, and CAR is expected from 2025.

CORSIA’s design interfaces with the Paris Agreement’s Article 6, allowing countries to trade emissions reductions to meet Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Corresponding adjustments ensure accurate progress toward NDCs and prevent double counting. These adjustments are required for CORSIA credits, allowing them to be transferred internationally.

However, delays in implementing Article 6 mechanisms could affect CORSIA. While details are being developed, projects receiving Letters of Authorization can list on voluntary market registries as Article 6 compliant. Biennial UN reports will confirm national accounting and the application of corresponding adjustments.

A significant challenge is the liability for the revocation of authorized credits. ICAO’s Technical Advisory Body suggests that standards or project proponents should assume liability, while standards argue it should lie with the revoking country. COP29 decisions may influence this issue, potentially causing even more delays.

Market Response and Developments

The market is reacting to these developments. New commercial structures and carbon insurance products are under conception to mitigate risks and encourage trading activity. These products aim to provide confidence to market participants and enhance liquidity, especially given the current market uncertainties.

So, what’s next for this development in CORSIA carbon credits?

Verra, Gold Standard, and CAR have re-submitted their applications, and the Technical Advisory Board will reassess these in September 2024. If they fail, new supply sources will be delayed until 2025, extending beyond current projections.

To mitigate supply issues, standards should work toward approval while also building capacity to help countries develop market infrastructure and governance for authorizing credits with corresponding adjustments. Large CORSIA participants might invest in upstream projects, although this would require market understanding and time to generate a credit stream and gain necessary adjustments.

Airlines are not required to purchase credits until Phase 1 concludes in January 2028. However, some may buy and retire credits in advance, based on projected obligations from historical emissions data. Final emissions reports and audits will be completed in 2027, indicating that the total credits needed, leading to an increase in credit retirements.

The availability of credits post-2027 will depend on decisions by ICAO, Article 6 negotiators, and governments, as well as the emergence of new supply sources. The actions taken in the interim will be crucial for ensuring there are enough carbon credits to meet future demand.

The future of the CORSIA carbon credit market hinges on increasing the supply of eligible credits. Abatable’s analysis underscores the need for new projects and corresponding adjustments to meet the rising demand by 2030. While pursuing low-carbon technologies, the aviation sector must rely on carbon offsets in the interim. 

The post CORSIA Carbon Credit Demand To Be 14x Larger Than Supply appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Carbon Footprint

Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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