The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell by 3.6% in 2024 as coal use dropped to the lowest level since 1666, the year of the Great Fire of London, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.
Major contributions came from the closure of the UK’s last coal-fired power station in Nottinghamshire and one of its last blast furnaces at the Port Talbot steelworks in Wales.
Other factors include a nearly 40% rise in the number of electric vehicles (EVs) on the road, above-average temperatures and the UK’s electricity being the “cleanest ever” in 2024.
Carbon Brief’s analysis, based on preliminary government energy data, shows emissions fell to just 371m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2024, the lowest level since 1872.
Other key findings from the analysis include:
- The UK’s emissions are now 54% below 1990 levels, while GDP has grown by 84%.
- About half of the drop in emissions in 2024 was due to a 54% reduction in UK coal demand, which fell to just 2m tonnes – the lowest level since 1666.
- Another third of the drop in 2024 emissions was due to falling demand for oil and gas, with the remainder down to ongoing reductions in non-CO2 greenhouse gases.
- UK coal demand fell at power stations (one-third of the reduction overall) and at industrial sites (two-thirds). In 2024, the UK closed its last coal-fired power station, as well as the final blast furnace at the Port Talbot steelworks. Furnaces at Scunthorpe paused operations. Both sites are due to convert to electric-arc furnaces that do not rely on coal.
- Oil demand fell 1.4% despite increased road traffic, largely due to the rise in the number of EVs. The UK’s 1.4m EVs, 0.8m plug-in hybrids and 76,000 electric vans cut oil-related emissions by at least 5.9MtCO2e, Carbon Brief analysis finds, only slightly offset by around 0.5MtCO2e from higher electricity demand.
- The UK’s EV motorists each saved around £800, on average, in 2024 – some £1.7bn in total – relative to the cost of driving petrol or diesel vehicles.
- Gas demand for heating increased, despite warmer average temperatures than in 2023, as prices eased from the peaks seen after the global energy crisis.
- However, gas demand fell overall due to lower gas-fired electricity generation, thanks to higher electricity imports and increased output from low-carbon sources.
The UK would need to cut its emissions by a larger amount each year than it did in 2024, to reach its international climate goal for 2035, as well as its national target to reach net-zero by 2050.
The analysis is the latest in a decade-long series of annual estimates from Carbon Brief, covering emissions during 2023, 2022, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014.
Lowest since 1872
The UK’s territorial greenhouse gas emissions – those that occur within the country’s borders – have now fallen in 26 of the 35 years since 1990.
(Consumption-based emissions, including CO2 embedded in imported goods and services, were increasing until 2007, but have since fallen at a similar rate to territorial emissions.)
Apart from brief rebounds after the global financial crisis and the Covid-19 lockdowns, UK emissions have fallen every year for the past two decades.
The latest 14MtCO2e (3.6%) reduction takes UK emissions down to 371MtCO2e, according to Carbon Brief’s new analysis.
This is the lowest since 1872 and on par with 1926, when there was a general strike, as shown in the figure below. In 1872, Queen Victoria was on the throne and Wanderers beat Royal Engineers in the first-ever FA Cup final, held at Kennington Oval in south London.
The UK’s emissions are now definitively below the level reached only temporarily during the height of Covid in 2020, having fallen steadily in each of the past three years.
They are now at levels not seen consistently since Victorian times.
Coal collapse
The largest factor in emissions falling last year, accounting for around 7MtCO2e or two-thirds of the reduction overall, was a massive 54% drop in UK coal demand.
In percentage terms, this was the fastest annual reduction in UK coal demand on record, in figures going back to the 16th century. (In absolute terms, the 2.4Mt fall in coal use in 2024 is easily eclipsed by the 34Mt reduction seen during the 1984 miners’ strike.)
The UK used just 2.1Mt of coal in 2024. As shown in the figure below, this is the lowest amount since 1666, when the UK’s capital city was engulfed in the Great Fire of London.
Roughly one-third of the drop in coal use overall last year was due to the closure of the UK’s last coal-fired power station, at Ratcliffe-on-Soar in Nottinghamshire. (For more on how the UK became the first G7 country to phase out coal power, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth interactive feature.)
The plant supplied power to the grid for the last time in September 2024, bringing to an end a 142-year era of using coal to generate electricity in the UK.
The shift away from coal power towards low-carbon sources has been one of the driving forces of UK emissions cuts in recent years.
Indeed, in the period since the UK’s Climate Change Act was passed, the amount of coal used to generate electricity has dropped by 99%, from 48Mt in 2008 to less than 1Mt in 2024. This accounts for the large majority (84%) of the total reduction in coal use over the same period.
Steel slide
In 2024, however, two-thirds of the drop in UK coal consumption – and one-third of the drop in emissions overall – came from lower coal use by heavy industry.
This was largely due to lower steel production, which fell from 5.6Mt in 2023 to 4.0Mt in 2024, a reduction of 29%. This 1.6Mt drop in production was mostly offset by a 1.3Mt increase in imports.
The Port Talbot steelworks in Wales shut down its last two blast furnaces in April and September, with owner Tata blaming losses of £1m a day for the closures.
Since the site last made a profit in 2022, UK and global steel prices have fallen sharply, as shown in the figure below. US credit rating agency Fitch Ratings says the decline in prices, down to weak demand and high exports from China, is “putting pressure on producers’ margins”.
Many commentators have tried to blame climate policy or electricity prices for the steel sector’s problems. However, energy only makes up a tiny fraction of coal-based steel production costs.
Moreover, steelmakers around the world – from China to South Africa – are facing similar challenges, with prices falling as a result of supply being significantly greater than demand.
Industry group Eurofer says the European market is being “flooded by cheap foreign steel”. It adds that economic headwinds in China, including its real-estate slowdown, have seen “around 100m tonnes of Chinese steel…flooding major markets at dumping prices”.
As such, it is not at all clear that the UK steel sector would have fared differently – or that the Port Talbot blast furnaces would have remained open – in the absence of climate policy.
For example, the sector is part of the UK emissions trading scheme (UKETS), meaning it nominally faces a carbon price that imports from outside the EU would not have to pay.
Yet UK (and EU) steelmakers continue to receive free allowances to shield them from the risk of “leakage” due to competition from abroad. The Port Talbot steelworks received more than 21m free allowances to cover its emissions in the period 2021-2025, worth roughly £1bn. Similarly, the Scunthorpe steelworks received nearly 17m allowances worth around £0.8bn.
From 2027, the UK plans to follow the EU in shifting from free allowances to a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), under which importers must pay an equivalent carbon price.
The closure of the UK’s blast furnaces is not the end of the story for steelmaking in the country. Indeed, Tata has pledged an investment worth £1.25bn to reopen its Welsh site with electric arc furnaces, which do not rely on coal. This includes up to £0.5bn from the government. Tata says it will have the capacity to produce 3Mt of steel per year from late 2027 or early 2028.
Production also paused in 2024 at the Scunthorpe steelworks, run by the Chinese-owned British Steel, reportedly due to managers ordering the wrong type of coal. Its blast furnaces are now operating again, but it is also looking to shift to electric arc furnaces with government support.
The UK steel industry has welcomed the shift to electric arc furnaces, but has called for efforts to reduce electricity prices, including the 2024 “supercharger” scheme that exempts heavy industry from additional costs relating to renewable subsidies and electricity network charges.
The government’s February 2025 steel strategy looks at issues including “overcapacity in global markets” and the “influence of electricity prices on the competitiveness of the steel sector”.
Rise of EVs
After coal, the next-largest chunk of emissions cuts in 2024 came from lower demand for oil and gas, which accounted for around a third of the reduction overall.
The 1.4% drop in oil demand is particularly interesting, given that traffic on the UK’s roads has been increasing in recent years.
The number of miles driven on UK roads increased by more than 1% in 2024 and is now close to pre-pandemic levels. Yet UK demand for road-transport fuels fell by another 1.6% in 2024 and is now nearly 14% lower than it was in 2019, as shown in the figure below.
Along with improvements in fuel efficiency, the rise of EVs is a key part of this phenomenon.
The UK’s right-leaning newspapers have been busy finding new driving-related wordplay for what they have misleadingly described as a “stalling” market for EVs, which is apparently “going into reverse”.
The reality is that the number of EVs on the UK’s road rose from 1m in 2023 to 1.4m in 2024, an increase of 39% in just one year. The number of plug-in hybrids was up 28% to 0.8m.
Along with 76,000 electric vans, these EVs cut oil-related emissions by at least 5.9MtCO2e in 2024, Carbon Brief analysis finds, relative to similar vehicles burning petrol or diesel fuel.
These electrified vehicles have added around 4 terawatt hours to UK electricity demand in 2024, around 1% of the total. As such, the emissions associated with additional electricity generation, at around 0.5MtCO2e, offsets less than 10% of the savings from reduced oil use.
(On a lifecycle basis, EVs in the UK cut emissions by around 70% taking into account the emissions associated with manufacturing the cars, their batteries and fuelling them during use.)
Even more strikingly, the UK’s EV drivers saved around £1.7bn in lower fuel costs in 2024, Carbon Brief analysis finds, relative to petrol or diesel vehicles.
These savings, averaging roughly £800 per vehicle per year, conservatively assume that charging takes place at domestic retail electricity prices, rather than reduced-rate overnight tariffs.
Greenhouse gas emissions from burning gas also dipped in 2024, as demand for the fuel reached a record low. The roughly 2MtCO2e drop in emissions from gas made up around a sixth of the reduction in the UK overall and reflects the combined impact of competing trends.
Demand for heating in buildings (+3.8%) and offices (+0.6%) increased, despite temperatures being above average and higher than a year earlier. Industrial gas use also increased (+0.3%).
This is likely the result of lower fuel prices, which have eased since the peaks seen during the early phase of the global energy crisis precipitated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
In contrast, gas demand for generating power fell by 13%, helping to make the UK’s electricity in 2024 the “cleanest ever”. This reduction was due to an increase in output from low-carbon sources, as well as an increase in the amount of cheap electricity imported from overseas.
A small, but still notable contributor to lower UK gas demand in 2024 came from reduced imports of liquified natural gas (LNG), which roughly halved compared with a year earlier.
Following Russia’s invasion, the UK had acted as an import hub for the rest of Europe, taking deliveries of LNG and then re-exporting the gas to the continent via pipelines. In 2024, however, European demand for gas eased and UK exports via the pipeline to Belgium also halved.
Import terminals use some of the gas they handle to “regasify” the supercooled LNG cargo that arrives by ship, turning it back into a gas that can be fed into pipelines. (The emissions associated with this process count towards the UK’s territorial total, even if the gas is burned overseas.)
In 2023, these terminals had used some 3TWh of gas, equivalent to the heating needs of half the homes in Birmingham. In 2024, LNG terminals used half this amount.
Emissions decoupling
While the UK’s emissions have fallen in most years since 1990, the baseline for the nation’s climate goals, the size of its economy has nearly doubled.
Specifically, emissions are “decoupling” from economic growth, having fallen to 54% below 1990 levels while GDP is up 84%, as shown in the figure below.
Taking an even longer view, the UK’s £2tn economy is now about 20 times larger than it was in 1872, after adjusting for inflation, whereas emissions are roughly the same.
Moreover, considering its population is now nearly 70 million people compared to 32m in 1872, the UK’s per-capita emissions have fallen two-fold, from 11.3tCO2e in 1872 to 5.4CO2e in 2024.
The 14MtCO2e drop in emissions in 2024 can be compared with the trajectory needed to reach the UK’s national and international climate pledges for 2035 and 2050.
If emissions fell by the same amount every year as they did in 2024, then the UK would miss both targets. It would need to cut emissions by 20MtCO2e each year to meet the 2035 target and by an average of 15MtCO2e per year to reach net-zero emissions by 2050.
In other words, annual emissions cuts would need to accelerate in the short- to medium-term, but could start to ease off later on. This is consistent with the cost-effective pathway to net-zero set out last month by the Climate Change Committee in its latest advice to the government.
Methodology
The starting point for Carbon Brief’s analysis of UK greenhouse gas emissions is preliminary government estimates of energy use by fuel. These are published quarterly, with the final quarter of each year appearing in figures published at the end of the following February. The same approach has accurately estimated year-to-year changes in emissions in previous years (see table, below).
| Year | Reported | Carbon Brief | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 0.2 |
| 2011 | -7.3 | -7.7 | -0.4 |
| 2012 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 0.7 |
| 2013 | -2.2 | -4.1 | -1.9 |
| 2014 | -7.5 | -7.5 | -0.0 |
| 2015 | -3.9 | -3.8 | 0.0 |
| 2016 | -5.2 | -5.7 | -0.4 |
| 2017 | -2.5 | -2.0 | 0.5 |
| 2018 | -1.5 | -1.8 | -0.3 |
| 2019 | -3.6 | -4.0 | -0.4 |
| 2020 | -8.8 | -8.9 | -0.0 |
| 2021 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 0.2 |
| 2022 | -4.2 | -3.5 | 0.7 |
| 2023 | -4.9 | -5.1 | -0.2 |
| 2024 | -3.6 |
Annual change in UK greenhouse gas emissions, %
One large source of uncertainty is the provisional energy use data, which is revised at the end of March each year and often again later on. Emissions data is also subject to revision in light of improvements in data collection and the methodology used, with major revisions in 2021.
The table above applies Carbon Brief’s emissions calculations to the comparable energy use and emissions figures, which may differ from those published previously.
Another source of uncertainty is the fact that Carbon Brief’s approach to estimating the annual change in emissions differs from the methodology used for the government’s own provisional estimates. The government has access to more granular data not available for public use.
Carbon Brief’s analysis takes figures on the amount of energy sourced from coal, oil and gas reported in Energy Trends 1.2. These figures are combined with conversion factors for the CO2 emissions per unit of energy, published annually by the UK government. Conversion factors are available for each fuel type, for example, petrol, diesel, gas and coal for electricity generation.
For oil, the analysis also draws on Energy Trends 3.13, which further breaks down demand according to the subtype of oil, for example, petrol, jet fuel and so on. Similarly, for coal, the analysis draws on Energy Trends 2.6, which breaks down solid fuel use by subtype.
Emissions from each fuel are then estimated from the energy use multiplied by the conversion factor, weighted by the relative proportions for each fuel subtype.
For example, the UK uses roughly 50m tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in the form of oil products, around half of which is from road diesel. So half the total energy use from oil is combined with the conversion factor for road diesel, another one-fifth for petrol and so on.
Energy use from each fossil fuel subtype is mapped onto the appropriate emissions conversion factor. In some cases, there is no direct read-across, in which case the nearest appropriate substitute is used. For example, energy use listed as “bitumen” is mapped to “processed fuel oils – residual oil”. Similarly, solid fuel used by “other conversion industries” is mapped to “petroleum coke”, and “other” solid fuel use is mapped to “coal (domestic)”.
The energy use figures are calculated on an inland consumption basis, meaning they include bunkers consumed in the UK for international transport by air and sea. In contrast, national emissions inventories exclude international aviation and shipping.
The analysis, therefore, estimates and removes the part of oil use that is due to the UK’s share of international aviation. It draws on the UK’s final greenhouse gas emissions inventory, which breaks emissions down by sector and reports the total for domestic aviation.
This domestic emissions figure is compared with the estimated emissions due to jet fuel use overall, based on the appropriate conversion factor. The analysis assumes that domestic aviation’s share of emissions is equivalent to its share of jet fuel energy use.
In addition to estimating CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, Carbon Brief assumes that CO2 emissions from non-fuel sources, such as land-use change and forestry, are the same as a year earlier. The remaining greenhouse gas emissions are assumed to change in line with the latest government energy and emissions projections.
These assumptions are based on the UK government’s own methodology for preliminary greenhouse gas emissions estimates, published in 2019.
Note that the figures in this article are for emissions within the UK measured according to international guidelines. This means they exclude emissions associated with imported goods, including imported biomass, as well as the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping.
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has published detailed comparisons between various different approaches to calculating UK emissions, on a territorial, consumption, environmental accounts or international accounting basis.
The UK’s consumption-based CO2 emissions increased between 1990 and 2007. Since then, however, they have fallen by a similar number of tonnes as emissions within the UK.
Bioenergy is a significant source of renewable energy in the UK and its climate benefits are disputed. Contrary to public perception, however, only around one-quarter of bioenergy is imported.
International aviation is considered part of the UK’s carbon budgets and faces the prospect of tighter limits on its CO2 emissions. The international shipping sector has a target to at least halve its emissions by 2050, relative to 2008 levels.
The post Analysis: UK emissions fall 3.6% in 2024 as coal use drops to lowest since 1666 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: UK emissions fall 3.6% in 2024 as coal use drops to lowest since 1666
Climate Change
DeBriefed 3 July 2026: US faces scorching Independence Day | Record ocean temperatures | Vietnam’s EV surge
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Heating up
NOT FREE FROM HEAT: “Dangerous, record-breaking” heat altered plans for 4 July celebrations across the US this weekend, reported the Associated Press. New York and Boston hit 100F (37.8C) on Thursday, said the newswire. CNBC reported that temperatures of up to 105F (40.5C) are forecast in central and eastern parts of the country, with “daily, monthly and all-time records possible”.
TEMPERATURES SOAR: Heat that hit western Europe last week spread east to “scorch” Germany, Hungary, Romania, Poland and others, said Bloomberg. Red warnings for extreme heat were issued in a number of nations, noted the outlet, adding that the heat “underscores how climate change is transforming summers in the world’s fastest-warming continent”. The Independent said last month was confirmed to be England’s hottest June on record.
HEAT DEATHS: June’s extreme temperatures caused more than 2,000 excess deaths in Spain and France, reported the Guardian. The countries are bracing for further heat that “could bring temperatures of 44C (111F) over the coming days”, said the newspaper. Deaths in France rose almost 30% at the heatwave “peak” on the week of 22 June, according to Le Monde. Last week’s conditions also led to around 480 excess deaths in the Netherlands, reported Reuters.
BOILING: Global ocean temperatures reached record levels for this time of year, reported NBC News, “fuelling fears of more dangerous heatwaves this summer and fanning concerns over the escalating global climate crisis”. Scientists told the Financial Times that this could lead the world towards “uncharted territory”. The newspaper said global average sea surface temperatures reached 20.96C on 21 June, exceeding June records for 2023 and 2024.
Around the world
- GOAL DROPPED: The World Bank will “abandon” its goal to devote 45% of annual lending resources to climate-related projects, reported Reuters. Carbon Brief explored what it could mean for global climate action.
- FIVE-YEAR PLAN: China plans to invest more than 20tn yuan ($2.9tn) in “key energy projects and new business models” over the next five years, according to International Energy Net.
- DRILLING: The Guardian said UK Labour politicians “urged” the likely next prime minister Andy Burnham to ignore “deluded” calls to develop the Rosebank oil field located in the Atlantic north of Scotland.
- PLASTIC TALKS: Countries and activists feared key issues could be sidelined at “critical” talks on a global treaty to curb plastic pollution in Kenya, said Climate Home News. A treaty could have “important implications” for climate change, reported Carbon Brief in 2024.
- CANADA PIPELINE: Canadian prime minister Mark Carney announced plans to build an oil pipeline to supply Asia with up to 1m barrels per day, reported the Financial Times. Earlier this week, Carney called the previous government’s climate plans “expensive” and “divisive”, said CBC News.
63
The number of UK newspaper editorials calling for more oil and gas extraction in the North Sea so far in 2026, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Latest climate research
- Including emissions from permafrost thaw raises the likelihood of the Arctic becoming a net-carbon source by more than 50% at 2C of warming | Earth System Dynamics
- Net-zero scenarios relying less on carbon dioxide removals lead to fewer residual emissions, which offers greater health improvements for “non-white and low-income groups” in particular | Nature Climate Change
- Agricultural plots of land in sub-Saharan Africa owned by women face heat impacts 2-2.5 times higher than those owned by men | Nature Sustainability
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
Wind and solar were the world’s largest source of new energy in 2025, according to Carbon Brief analysis of the latest Energy Institute statistical review of world energy. Wind and solar also saw the fastest growth, up by 18% in 2025. Nevertheless, every source of energy – including coal, oil, gas, nuclear and hydro – also reached global all-time highs last year.
Spotlight
Vietnam’s EV surge
Carbon Brief explores the reasons behind soaring electric-vehicle sales in Vietnam.
Motorbikes are a constant fixture on streets across Vietnam. They pollute the air in cities and make crossing the road a feat of endurance.
But, increasingly, people are moving away from petrol-powered vehicles to save money and reduce air pollution.
Sales of electric motorbikes, scooters and mopeds more than doubled in Vietnam last year, according to a recent report from the International Energy Agency (IEA).
This identified that Vietnam has the largest electric vehicle (EV) market in south-east Asia.
Nearly one-in-five of the two-wheeled vehicles sold last year were electric, it noted, in a nation with 102 million people and 77m motorbikes.
This is “particularly impactful” given they are the main mode of transport in Vietnam, said Lam Pham, Asia energy analyst at thinktank Ember. He told Carbon Brief:
“Electrifying road transport is essential for Vietnam to achieve its net-zero target by 2050. Road transport accounted for around 86% of transport-sector emissions in 2022.”
The nation has just 6.8m cars, but this number is also climbing, partly due to EVs, with nearly 40% of new car sales being electric.
This is “above levels seen in most European countries”, noted the IEA. (The UK’s figure is around 30%.)
EV incentives
Fuel costs surged in south-east Asian countries earlier this year after the energy crisis caused by the US-Israel war on Iran.
This “accelerated” discussions from “why use EVs” to “why keep paying more for fuel”, said Dr Tham Nguyen, a lecturer at the Ho Chi Minh City campus of Australia’s Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, who has researched Vietnamese public attitudes to EVs.
But the surge is “not driven by fuel prices alone”, noted Pham.
Increased EV sales can also be attributed to a “convergence of affordability, convenience and sustainability”, Nguyen said:
“Vietnamese consumers buy EVs because they see real value with immediate personal benefits, such as cost savings and energy security, alongside long-term environmental gains.”
Government policies have also incentivised sales through registration fee exemptions and tax cuts for EVs.
Another factor is affordable EVs sold by Chinese companies and Vinfast, a Vietnamese manufacturer. The IEA report noted that Vietnam is the only country in south-east Asia with “sizeable” domestic production of accessible EVs.
Vinfast reported a 219% year-on-year increase in orders for electric motorbikes and e-bikes in the first quarter of 2026, but the company has yet to turn a profit.
Pham noted that “growing public awareness of air pollution” has also “dramatically strengthened” public support for EVs.
Future plans
Vietnam’s major cities also have plans to get drivers to go electric or turn to public transport.
The capital city Hanoi announced that it would ban fossil-fuel-powered motorbikes from a central zone this month, but this has been postponed until 2028.
Ho Chi Minh City, the nation’s largest city with more than 9.5 million people, intends to introduce low-emission zones and swap 400,000 petrol-powered motorbikes to electric by 2028.
The city’s green transport plans focus on metro lines, electric buses and e-bikes, explained RMIT associate professor Catherine Earl. She noted that walking and cycling are currently “not popular, accessible or safe for many residents in Ho Chi Minh City’s hot and humid climate”.
Looking ahead, Pham said Vietnam could focus on “purchase subsidies, financing schemes and adequate charging or battery-swapping infrastructure, to ensure lower-income riders, including delivery and ride-hailing drivers, are not negatively affected”.
Watch, read, listen
‘JUST 1%’ OF EMISSIONS: The Guardian debunked arguments that climate actions from smaller countries are “insignificant”.
DRILLING RISKS: Mongabay reported on the possible impacts oil drilling in the Amazon could have on a “little-known reef”.
HEATING UP: The BBC Climate Question podcast discussed the weather pattern El Niño and its links to climate change.
Coming up
- 7-10 July: AI for good global summit, Geneva, Switzerland
- 7-15 July: UN high-level political forum on sustainable development, New York
- 8-10 July: Ninth meeting of the board of the fund for responding to loss and damage, Manila, Philippines
Pick of the jobs
- Green Alliance, senior partnerships officer | Salary: £42,748-£47,346. Location: London
- World Vision, environment and climate action senior adviser | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kenya
- Nature Energy, interim associate or senior editor | Salary: Unknown. Location: London or Milan
- Climate Analytics, senior communications manager – climate policy (maternity cover) | Salary €60,605-€66,880. Location: Berlin
- Carbon Exchange, researcher | Salary: Unknown. Location: Hong Kong
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 3 July 2026: US faces scorching Independence Day | Record ocean temperatures | Vietnam’s EV surge appeared first on Carbon Brief.
The World Bank has abandoned a target for 45% of the funding it gives developing countries to be “climate finance”, following months of pressure from the Trump administration in the US.
However, a concerted effort by developed- and developing-country shareholders has seen the bank hold onto its “action plan” for tackling climate change.
The multilateral development bank (MDB) – which is headquartered in Washington DC – is the single largest provider of climate finance globally, distributing $39.2bn in 2025 alone, primarily as loans.
Amid widespread aid cuts by developed countries, the World Bank and other MDBs have previously pledged to significantly scale up their climate finance over the next decade.
Despite scrapping its central target, the bank says it will continue to support the demands of its “clients”, many of which have explicitly stated their need for climate-related investment.
Here, Carbon Brief looks at the likely impact of the World Bank’s policy shift and whether it is – as one expert puts it – “mostly a symbolic victory” for the US.
- How does the World Bank support climate action?
- Why has the World Bank abandoned its climate-finance target?
- Why is the World Bank important for international climate finance?
- How will these changes affect global climate action?
How does the World Bank support climate action?
The World Bank is the oldest and largest MDB. It is tasked by its 189 member governments – the bank’s shareholders – with supporting development projects around the world.
The US is the bank’s largest shareholder, followed, in order, by Japan, China, Germany, France and the UK.
Every year, the bank provides billions of dollars – predominantly as loans – to developing countries.
(One part of the World Bank, the International Development Association – IDA – specifically distributes grants to lower-income nations, as well as lower-interest loans.)
Through its financing, the World Bank also has an important role in “mobilising” private investments in developing countries.
In recent years, the bank has increasingly focused on helping developing countries to cut emissions and adapt their economies for climate change.
The World Bank provided $164bn in what it calls financing with climate “co-benefits” between 2020 and 2025.
The largest share of this funding – roughly one-fifth – went to clean energy and electricity access projects. Smaller shares went to areas such as public transport, water supply and sustainable farming.
As the map below shows, the largest recipients of the bank’s climate funds since 2020 have been emerging economies, such as Turkey ($10.3bn), India ($9bn) and Nigeria ($6.3bn).
Among the largest World Bank projects in recent years are two extensive programmes in India, totalling nearly $3bn, supporting renewables and green hydrogen.
Others include $1.7bn for a Pakistan hydropower project, $926m for Iraq’s railways and $803m to boost “green development” in Colombia.
Despite the bank’s major role in providing climate finance to developing countries, it has faced heavy scrutiny from climate advocates.
In particular, they have noted the dominance of loans that push developing countries further into debt. The World Bank has also been criticised for a lack of transparency around how it classifies projects as “climate-related”, as well as “over-reporting” of climate finance.
Why has the World Bank abandoned its climate-finance target?
When World Bank president Ajay Banga – nominated by former US president Joe Biden – took over the institution in 2023, there were widespread calls for MDB reform.
Many of the bank’s shareholders wanted to see billions more dollars being channelled to support climate action. Later that year, Banga announced that the bank would ensure that 45% of the bank’s funding was climate finance by 2025.
This replaced an existing target of 35% for climate finance between 2021 and 2025, which had been set out in the bank’s second climate change action plan (CCAP).
The CCAP is intended to “mainstream” climate action in the bank’s work. With it in place, the World Bank’s climate finance more than doubled from $17.2bn in 2020 to $39.2bn in 2025.
As the chart below shows, this meant the World Bank exceeded its 2025 goal, with climate-related projects making up a 48% share of total funding that year.
When Biden was replaced by Donald Trump as president in 2025, the US administration turned against international cooperation, including climate finance.
However, the US did not walk away from the World Bank, where it exerts considerable power as the largest shareholder.
With the CCAP due to expire in July 2026, the US has spent months pressuring the bank and its shareholders to weaken or abandon the plan altogether.
US Treasury secretary Scott Bessent issued a statement during the 2026 World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) spring meetings in April 2026, in which he called for “jettisoning” the 45% climate-finance target. More broadly, he said:
“We welcome the coming expiration of the CCAP and…expect the bank to immediately shift its myopic focus on climate and financing volumes to one that emphasises high-quality, durable projects.”
This vision involves a push for the World Bank to finance more fossil-fuel projects, including drilling for new gas. (The bank has committed since 2019 to stop funding upstream oil and gas projects.)
The decision on whether to continue with the CCAP was negotiated behind closed doors by the board of directors – representing national shareholders. There were reports of “deep divides”.
A joint statement from 19 of the 25 directors last year affirmed the need for both a plan and a target. The US, Russia, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all declined to sign up, while Japan and India abstained, according to Reuters.
There were reports of European nations championing a climate plan, bolstered by support from the developing countries that would stand to receive climate finance. The US call to drop the 45% target entirely was reportedly backed by Saudi Arabia and Russia.
Ultimately, the day before the CCAP was due to lapse, the World Bank announced what appeared to be a middle ground. It would drop both the 45% target and the 35% goal it had replaced, while also “extend[ing]” the CCAP.
UK development minister Jenny Chapman told a committee hearing in the House of Commons the next day that this marked a “compromise”. She said:
“It wasn’t clear we were going to get a CCAP at all and a bank without an action plan on climate is a problem for us – so that’s a good outcome.”
Supportive shareholders had been pushing for a one-year extension of the plan. While the World Bank did not initially define the length, Chapman confirmed on LinkedIn that the plan had, in fact, been extended “indefinitely”.
The bank said it would also engage an “independent evaluation group” to assess the CCAP, in line with a board request.
Gaia Larsen, director of climate finance at the World Resources Institute (WRI), tells Carbon Brief that this evaluation will likely be “relatively free from political ideology” and could be “focused on how to make the CCAP more effective”.
Why is the World Bank important for international climate finance?
Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries – including major World Bank shareholders in Europe and elsewhere – are obliged to provide climate finance for developing countries.
This includes a target of $300bn a year by 2035, which is expected to largely come from developed countries. One significant way these nations can contribute to this goal is via their support for MDBs, particularly the World Bank.
The World Bank has described itself as “by far the largest provider of climate finance to developing countries”. Each year, it oversees half of all climate finance from MDBs and far more than any single donor country.
Many developed countries have, therefore, enthusiastically backed the World Bank’s climate efforts, as well as a “bigger” role for MDBs in development more broadly. The bank can lend sums that far exceed the amount of new public finance that individual nations are willing to commit.
This is particularly significant, given many of these nations, including the UK, Germany and France, have announced large cuts to their aid budgets in recent years.
Carbon Brief analysis suggests that roughly a fifth of the international climate finance provided and “mobilised” by developed countries in recent years can be attributed to their World Bank contributions, as the chart below shows.
(This only accounts for the World Bank financing that can be linked to developed-country shares in the bank. Developing countries, such as China, also have significant shares, which are not included in the chart below.)
MDBs – including the World Bank – have committed to providing $120bn in climate finance to developing countries by 2030.
This was set to come from greater shareholder contributions, combined with a programme of reforms to free up capital.
If the World Bank continued to provide half of the MDB total, it would need to increase its climate finance by around 50%, from $39.2bn today to $60bn in 2030.
Therefore, experts see a “key” role for the World Bank in achieving not only the $300bn target, but also the more aspirational $1.3n target that countries agreed as part of the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) on climate finance at COP29 in 2024. This includes the private capital it could “unlock” through its lending.
Joe Thwaites, international climate finance director at Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), tells Carbon Brief that these “NCQG politics” are “quite important”. He says:
“The maths of the $300bn does not work if the MDBs pull back and so I think that’s why you’re seeing developed countries taking a stand.”
How will these changes affect global climate action?
To date, the World Bank has only released minimal details about its new climate plans. As such, experts say the impact on future climate finance remains uncertain.
Jon Sward, environment project manager at the Bretton Woods Project, tells Carbon Brief:
“They have said they are going to retain all the same processes about climate-finance reporting. So, of course, there is a world in which, actually, climate finance continues to increase like it has been.”
Some of the World Bank’s internal organisations will, in fact, keep their climate-finance goals for the time being. For example, the IDA’s largely grant-based funding retains a 45% target for its current round, which will last until 2028 – the year of the next US presidential election.
However, WRI’s Larsen tells Carbon Brief that the changes, from a bank that was previously a “champion for climate action”, remain significant:
“This reality, reinforced by the elimination of the 45% goal, means that it would not be surprising to see a reduction in climate investments.”
In a statement, the World Bank said its “work on climate is and will remain firmly client driven”, noting that it supports nations undertaking their Paris Agreement climate plans.
Therefore, its climate focus may come down to whether there is demand for climate action from “client” countries receiving finance.
At an April event in discussion with the climate sceptic Bjørn Lomborg, Bessent said that global financial institutions should focus on growth, characterising climate action as an “elite belief”.
The implication from the US Treasury secretary was that recipient countries are not interested in climate action. However, as reported by Devex, a group of World Bank shareholders representing nearly 100 developing countries, wrote a letter that appeared to push back against this framing.
This “G11+” group, led by Brazil and China, said the bank “must remain firmly client-driven”, noting that countries are “following nationally determined pathways toward climate action”. NRDC’s Thwaites tells Carbon Brief:
“It’s one thing for the Europeans to talk about climate…This was the client countries [100 developing countries] saying: ‘No, we want this.’”
Recent research by the ODI thinktank found that 79% of developing-country officials polled wanted to see MDB investment in solar projects, 54% wanted hydropower and 47% wanted wind power. Only 13% wanted investment in gas-power plants.
Rishikesh Ram Bhandary, a senior development researcher at Boston University, has stressed the need for an “enhanced CCAP”, which could be supported by the bank’s new independent evaluation. Among other things, he tells Carbon Brief:
“The bank needs to make a more convincing case about how climate change is being integrated into development priorities rather than competing with them.”
Thwaites says he is hopeful that the outcome is “mostly a symbolic victory for the US”.
However, he says major shareholders from Europe and elsewhere should make it clear to the bank that it is not “the only game in town” when it comes to climate finance. He says:
“If [the World Bank] are going to cave into one shareholder, when the vast majority of the other shareholders are supportive of continuing climate action, they can take their money elsewhere.”
The post Q&A: How will the World Bank’s abandoned finance goal affect climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: How will the World Bank’s abandoned finance goal affect climate action?
Rich Wilson is CEO of the Iswe Foundation and co-founder of the Global Citizens’ Assembly.
The numbers are stark. According to the 2026 Global Report on Food Crises, 266 million people across 47 countries experienced high levels of acute food insecurity last year, nearly double the figure recorded a decade ago.
Meanwhile, disruptions to oil, gas and fertiliser flows through the Strait of Hormuz drove a 46% month-on-month spike in urea prices early this year, sending agricultural price indices up 8% and raising the spectre of a global affordability crisis.
This is not a blip. It is a new baseline. The EAT-Lancet Commission concluded that food systems now account for roughly 30% of total greenhouse gas emissions and are the largest single contributor to the climate crisis. The science has been clear for years.
Now some of the solutions to the problem are becoming socially acceptable too.
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Earlier this year, people from more than 60 countries and territories, selected not by vested interest, but by lottery, spent seven weeks examining the evidence on food and climate for the latest Global Citizens’ Assembly. They heard from scientists, farmers and industry. They worked through 42 hours of structured deliberation, engaging with some difficult trade-offs.
They were not asked to endorse a predetermined conclusion. They were asked an open question: what changes, if any, should we make to how we grow, share and eat food, so that everyone has enough to nourish themselves while tackling the causes and impacts of climate change?
Phase down industrial animal farming
Their answer was unambiguous. They voted to protect forests. They voted to phase down industrial animal food production. They voted for supply chain reform and corporate accountability, explicitly rejecting the idea that the burden of change should fall on individual consumers. All 22 of their Calls to Action passed with over 85% support, a super-majority of randomly selected people from every region of the world, in agreement.
Consider what the assembly was actually being asked to decide. Industrial animal food production is the primary driver of tropical deforestation. Protecting more land as forest and ecosystem means less land available for the expansion of industrial production. That is a real trade-off, with real consequences for real livelihoods. Politicians have spent years avoiding it.
These randomly selected people looked at the evidence, deliberated across time zones and cultures, and chose the forests, with 64% in strong support and a further 20% in favour. People from livestock farming communities voted for change. Not because they were told to. Because deliberation led them there.
We estimate there have now been more than 7,000 citizen participation initiatives worldwide in the last decade. They have been organised because, as our 2025 report: People in the Lead demonstrated, people are now consistently and significantly ahead of politicians on issues ranging from climate to AI governance.
The people know best
What the research consistently shows is that ordinary people, given proper evidence and time, produce recommendations that are more effective and more aligned with public values than what emerges from elected legislatures. The gap in global governance is no longer primarily between science and the public. It is between citizens and their political leaders.
That gap matters for more than procedural reasons. When policy treats people as passive recipients rather than active participants, it leaves out the very actors whose behaviour, trust and consent the transition depends on. Institutions that speak only to other institutions, and negotiate only with state actors and industry lobbies, are missing out on the trust and energy of the people they are supposed to serve.
Governments, left to their own devices, are not moving fast enough to prove that argument wrong. At COP30 in Belém last November, countries failed to agree on a fossil fuel phaseout roadmap, and even full implementation of every submitted national climate plan still leaves the world on course for 2.3 to 2.8C of warming.
Citizens’ track at COP
But the Brazilian presidency grasped something important. Among the conference’s more significant outcomes was the formal launch of a Citizens’ Track within the UNFCCC process, a mechanism for connecting the global participation field to intergovernmental climate negotiations. Türkiye and Australia, who together hold the COP31 presidency in Antalya this November, now have the opportunity to strengthen and institutionalise what Brazil began.
In Guatemala, Indigenous women build climate resilience with old and new farming methods
The question before us is no longer whether citizens can contribute to solving these problems. Across the world, in local food networks, in community assemblies and in participatory planning processes, they already are, quietly generating more ambitious and more legitimate solutions than those emerging from formal diplomatic channels.
What is required now is the political courage to connect people to power. Not to consult citizens and file the results. Not to invite them to observe while the real decisions are made elsewhere. But to recognise the public as partners in perhaps the most consequential governance challenge of our time.
The post As food shocks spread, citizens are showing more leadership than governments appeared first on Climate Home News.
As food shocks spread, citizens are showing more leadership than governments
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