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A record surge of clean energy kept China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions below the previous year’s levels in the last 10 months of 2024.

However, the new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and commercial data, shows the tail end of China’s rebound from zero-Covid in January and February, combined with abnormally high growth in energy demand, stopped CO2 emissions falling in 2024 overall.

While China’s CO2 output in 2024 grew by an estimated 0.8% year-on-year, emissions were lower than in the 12 months to February 2024.

Other key findings of the analysis include:

  • China’s CO2 emissions grew 0.6% year-on-year in the fourth quarter, as hopes of stimulus measures pushed up industrial coal use and oil demand.
  • In addition, wind and solar fell short of expected levels in the final quarter of 2024, likely as a result of being denied grid access in favour of coal power, which was flat year-on-year.
  • Clean-energy capacity growth will accelerate in 2025 as largescale wind, solar and nuclear projects race to finish before the 14th five-year plan period comes to an end.
  • Industrial electricity demand growth has slowed since summer 2024 and total energy demand growth eased in the fourth quarter of the year.
  • These factors would be expected to push China’s coal-power output into decline in 2025, which would have international significance for energy markets and emissions.
  • However, another period of industrial demand growth driven by government stimulus efforts could change this picture, particularly if the real-estate slump turns around.

As ever, the latest analysis shows that policy decisions made in 2025 will strongly affect China’s emissions trajectory in the coming years. In particular, both China’s new commitments under the Paris Agreement and the country’s next five-year plan are being prepared in 2025.In particular, both China’s new commitments under the Paris Agreement and the country’s next five-year plan are being prepared in 2025.

Emissions have plateaued since February 2024

China’s re-opening from zero-Covid began in earnest in March 2023, leading to rapid energy demand growth year-on-year until February 2024.

This resulted in a 3.8% rise in China’s CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2024.

Emissions stabilised in March-December 2024 as clean electricity supply growth covered all of the growth in electricity demand, while emissions from cement and steel production fell due to contracting demand for construction materials. This is shown in the figure below.

China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals.

China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

After February 2024, oil consumption growth also stabilised. Coal use in the chemical industry and coal and gas use in other industrial sectors continued to grow, offsetting the fall in emissions from the construction materials industry.

Contributions to the emissions plateau during the final 10 months of 2024 are shown in the figure below, broken down by fuel and by sector, where data is available.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period March-December 2024

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period March-December 2024 when emissions have remained stable, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

The growth in power generation from non-fossil sources set a new record, growing more than 500 terawatt hours (TWh) compared with 2023, which had already been a record year.

This is more than the total power generation of Germany in 2023. Solar power generation was responsible for half of the increase in clean power supply.

Emissions inched up in the fourth quarter

After rising in the first quarter of 2024, China’s CO2 emissions started to decline in March, falling 1% in the second quarter of the year and levelling off in the third quarter.

While power-sector emissions remained stable in the fourth quarter, industrial emissions outside the power sector swung into an increase. There was no reduction in power-sector emissions to offset that growth, resulting in an estimated 0.6% increase in overall emissions.

The largest factor was a rebound in oil and gas demand outside the power sector, indicated by the large bars under “All Sectors” and “Other Sectors” in the figure below.

Preliminary numbers from the National Bureau of Statistics indicate gas and oil demand rose 10% and 3% year-on-year, respectively, in the fourth quarter of 2024.

The supply of refined oil products fell 1.5%, so the increase in oil demand apparently came entirely from crude oil consumption in the chemical industry.

Year-on-year change in China’s quarterly CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2.

Year-on-year change in China’s quarterly CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Steel output picked up after stimulus announcements in late September, increasing 2% in October-November and 12% in December after a 4% reduction in the year to September.

The December increase, however, came from the reversal of a sharp 15% drop in production in December 2023, which was a last-minute measure to adhere to a cap set by the government for steel production during the year. As a result, steel production in December 2024 saw a dramatic increase year-on-year, but remained below 2022 levels.

Gas consumption has been rebounding from a drop caused by spiking prices in 2022, but demand growth is expected to moderate this year.

Cement production fell 6% year-on-year in the last quarter, extending a decline that started in 2020 and that has seen China’s cement output fall by almost a quarter from its peak level, as construction volumes have fallen.

Clash between coal and clean energy

As shown in the chart above, emissions from the power sector remained flat during the fourth quarter of 2024, with a small fall from coal and a small rise from gas. However, as electricity demand growth slowed down to 3.5%, emissions would have been expected to fall.

Even as electricity demand growth slowed down in October and November, fossil-fuel generation continued to increase. This was due to a sharp drop in the utilisation of solar and wind capacity, as shown by China Electricity Council data accessed through Wind Financial Terminal.

It is normal for utilisation to vary month-to-month, especially in the case of wind power, as wind conditions vary. The fall in utilisation of solar power was, however, the largest on record and, in the case of both solar and wind, this specific drop is not readily explained by weather conditions.

Lauri Myllyvirta on Bluesky: The weather conditions for solar and wind were a bit worse than last year

If the fall in utilisation was not caused by weather, the other possible cause is an increase in curtailment, or the amount of solar and wind power supply not fed into the power grid.

However, officially reported curtailment rates only increased marginally.

The apparent increase in unreported solar and wind curtailment in November is indicative of issues likely to arise in China’s electricity market as demand for coal-fired power begins to fall.

The government has pushed electricity buyers to enter into long-term contracts with coal-power companies, which involve guaranteed sales volumes. This has been a way to shore up profitability and enable investments in new coal-power capacity.

This now appears to be coming into conflict with clean-power growth and efforts to limit emissions.

When power generation from clean sources grows faster or total power demand grows slower than expected, electricity buyers with these long-term contracts can face penalties, unless they refuse power supply from clean sources and purchase from coal-power generators instead.

This conflict is accentuated when a lot of new coal-power capacity enters into the market. The new units have internal production targets and, at least in some cases, power purchase agreements signed in advance, making them unwilling to reduce output, even if there is no space in the grid.

It is notable that the first time that renewable energy curtailment became a major issue in China was around 2015, when demand for power generation from coal was falling.

Statistical analysis also reveals that solar and wind capacity utilisation tends to fall when coal-power capacity utilisation falls as well – the opposite of what should be expected. In a well-functioning market, coal-power utilisation should fall when more clean power is available.

A statistical model predicting solar and wind power utilisation by province, using daily meteorological data, failed to predict the drop in utilisation in October and November, indicating that weather conditions were not the main reason for the reduction.

If power demand growth slows down in 2025 and the expected record clean-energy additions are realised (see below), the conflict between coal and clean power could worsen. Demand for coal-fired power would be likely to fall, even as the coal industry expects rapid growth.

It would only be possible to ease this conflict by relaxing the government’s targets for long-term power contracts and accepting a fall in the utilisation of coal-power capacity.

Did emissions peak in 2024?

A year ago, an earlier iteration of this analysis predicted that China’s emissions would begin to fall in March 2024 and then continue to decline, leading to a 2% reduction in the full year of 2024.

This was based on three assumptions:

  • Clean-energy additions would continue;
  • Hydropower generation would recover to historical average levels;
  • Energy consumption growth would slow down, after abnormally rapid growth in 2020-2023, during and after zero-Covid.

Taking each of those assumptions in turn, clean-energy additions not just continued but accelerated further, with 2024 poised to see a new record for the amount of solar and wind capacity added. Hydropower also recovered, although not all the way to historical averages.

The clean-energy additions, shown by the columns in the figure below, reached a scale where they would be sufficient to cover all energy demand growth at historical pre-Covid levels (grey line).

Indeed, the growth in clean-energy supply in 2024 far exceeded the growth in total energy demand recorded in any year from 2015 to 2020. However, energy demand growth in 2023-2024 was above historical norms, increasing significantly faster than in the years before Covid, even as GDP growth rates slowed down, due to high reliance on energy intensive industries to drive growth.

Annual increase in total energy consumption and clean electricity supply.

Annual increase in total energy consumption and clean electricity supply. Source: Total energy consumption growth from NBS annual data and recent economic and energy data releases. Non-fossil electricity supply from Ember yearly electricity data, except 2024 data from CREA monthly China snapshot. Electricity generation is converted into primary energy following the “coal power equivalent” methodology used in China.

Specifically, China’s power demand grew at 6.8% in 2024 while GDP expanded 5%. In contrast, last year’s analysis had assumed that power demand and GDP growth rates would converge after the zero-Covid period and its immediate aftermath were over.

This discrepancy was enough to throw off the projection for 2024. With energy demand growth far in excess of what had been assumed, even the massive clean-energy additions seen in 2024 were only enough to stabilise emissions, rather than to reduce them.

This means that while China’s CO2 emissions have been stable since March, it is still likely that they will post a small increase of around 0.8% for the full year, as January-February had rapid growth due to the rebound from zero-Covid.

As a result, the calendar year of 2023 did not become the peak year for China’s CO2 output, because emissions still inched up, according to current estimates.

From one perspective, stabilising emissions despite the rapid growth in energy demand is a major achievement. From another perspective, it is important for China’s emissions to begin to fall in absolute terms, if global climate goals are to remain within reach.

Even larger clean energy additions likely in 2025

After the enormous jump in China’s clean-energy installations in 2023 – particularly solar – even the most optimistic predictions did not expect a further increase in 2024.

Yet solar and wind capacity additions in China increased by 28% and 5% year-on-year in 2024, respectively, with 277GW of solar and 79GW of wind connected to the grid.

This year is likely to set another record, as key largescale solar, wind and nuclear projects race to complete during the 14th five-year plan period ending in 2025. State-owned enterprises, local governments and other actors have set targets that they will be striving to achieve.

Solar-power capacity additions are expected to stay at the record levels seen in 2024, with approximately 265GW added to the grid, according to forecasts from TrendForce New Energy Research Center.

Wind power is poised for a new record of 110-120GW of capacity added in 2025, according to China International Capital Corporation. Of this, 14-17GW is expected to be offshore wind power, up from 7GW in 2024.

After two slow years, China’s nuclear power capacity is expected to see a significant increase, rising to 65GW by the end of 2025, from 61GW today.

Some 3GW was added right at the end of 2024, starting to contribute to non-fossil power supply in 2025. In total, after a record number of new reactor projects was permitted in 2023 and 2024, China currently has 55GW approved or under construction, suggesting an average of more than 10GW of reactor start-ups per year over the next five years.

In addition, China had at least 14GW of conventional hydropower under construction at the end of 2024, based on Global Energy Monitor data on capacity under construction in April 2024 and subtracting capacity that was already commissioned last year.

Taken together, the new solar, wind, hydro and nuclear capacity that is likely to be connected to China’s grid in 2025 can be expected to generate more than 600TWh per year of electricity, up from the 500TWh of new clean electricity generation added in 2024, as shown in the figure below.

Expected average annual power generation from non-fossil power generation added each year, terawatt-hours per year 2015-2025.

Expected average annual power generation from non-fossil power generation added each year, terawatt-hours per year 2015-2025. Source: Calculated based on changes in year-end capacity and average capacity utilisation for each technology from China Electricity Council data accessed through the Wind Financial Terminal.

However, as noted above, new clean-power capacity will only result in lower coal-fired generation and CO2 emissions if its output is integrated into the electricity system without a major increase in curtailment.

Aiming to avoid that outcome, in early January 2025, China’s top economic planner, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), published a new power system action plan that aims to integrate more than 200GW of new wind and solar onto the grid per year in 2025-27.

While this target is below the record-breaking clean-energy additions seen in recent years, it still indicates that there is central government support for similarly rapid growth in the next few years.

In December 2024, top economic policymakers called for accelerating the construction of very largescale clean-energy “bases” in western China and introduced a new theme of creating zero-carbon industrial parks. As industrial parks are responsible for 30% of China’s CO2 emissions, this policy could also drive significant investment in clean energy.

Energy demand outlook

Whether China’s emissions remain stable or begin to fall, cementing an emissions peak, remains a race between clean-energy additions and energy demand growth.

The big question is whether the recent trend of exceptionally rapid energy demand growth will continue, or whether it will unwind, resulting in a period of demand growing slower than GDP.

The previous periods of rapid energy and power demand growth in relation to GDP, around 2004 and 2010, were followed by periods of slower demand growth. In particular, around 2015, energy demand growth slowed down markedly and China’ emissions plateaued for several years.

There are signs of a repeat of this pattern in China’s recent energy demand data.

Specifically, industrial power demand rose sharply in 2023 and 2024, but exhibited a clear slowdown in the second half of 2024, as shown in the figure below (top left).

This was masked by a rebound in service and residential sector electricity consumption. Residential demand merely caught up to the pre-Covid trendline and service sector demand remains below it, reflecting the Covid-era distortion to the structure of the economy.

China’s electricity consumption growth by sector, terawatt-hours per month.
China’s electricity consumption growth by sector, terawatt-hours per month. Source: National Energy Administration monthly data releases.

The recent rapid energy demand growth has been driven by an economic strategy that heavily favours energy-intensive manufacturing.

This approach has likely reached its limits as China’s manufacturing expansion has led to a supply glut, falling prices for industrial products and falling profits.

Now, the government is aiming to speed up economic growth by stimulating household consumption, a much less energy-intensive part of the economy than manufacturing, and by “halting the decline and stabilising” the real-estate sector.

However, delivering this outcome is far from trivial. The 2022 economic work conference – where annual departmental priorities are set – had also said that the recovery from zero-Covid should be consumption-led, but this vision failed to materialise.

The 2024 conference reduced the emphasis on “high-quality growth”, a concept that discourages growth driven by “low-quality” construction projects. In Communist party jargon, it said that “the relationship between improving the quality and growing the total output must be well coordinated”. This was a downgrade from 2023 when “high-quality growth” was described as a “hard truth”.

What next for energy and emissions in China?

Clean-energy additions will accelerate even further this year, from the record levels of 2024. At the same time, industrial power demand growth has slowed significantly since the summer.

These two trends suggest there is likely to be a fall in power-sector emissions this year. However, this drop in CO2 could still be outweighed by government stimulus efforts leading to another period of rapid growth in heavy industry, especially if construction volumes rebound.

If construction activity makes a strong comeback, this could drive further increases in emissions. The coal industry is bullish, with the China Coal Transportation and Distribution Association projecting a 1% increase in coal consumption in 2025.

The China Coal Industry Association projects a 4.5% increase in power generation from coal and gas. It believes that the stimulus policies to expand investment and stabilise the real-estate market will lead to increases in output in steel, cement and other major coal-consuming industries.

However, even if policymakers did pursue construction stimulus, a key question is how much of an effect it will have – and how fast.

Regardless of industry association hopes, the government’s stimulus announcements, so far, have not reversed market expectations of falling steel demand.

The local governments that are expected to deliver the stimulus are likely to struggle to fund a major increase in spending – and there is much less need for new infrastructure than during previous stimulus cycles.

If the government is successful in reviving household consumption as a source of growth – which is far less energy intensive – then energy demand growth could normalise to levels where clean energy can easily meet all of the growth. If so, emissions would begin to fall in a sustained way.

Beyond 2025, China’s energy and emissions trends are harder to pin down. For example, the rate of clean-energy additions after this year is more uncertain, despite recent positive signals.

China’s new Paris commitments are due to be published this year, containing targets for 2030 and 2035. In addition, the 15th five-year plan, covering 2026-2030, will be prepared this year and released in early 2026. As such, policy decisions made in 2025 will strongly affect China’s emissions trajectory not only this year, but for many years into the future.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.

Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

When data was available from multiple sources, different sources were cross-referenced and official sources used when possible, adjusting total consumption to match the consumption growth and changes in the energy mix reported by the National Bureau of Statistics for the first quarter, the first half and the first three quarters of the year, as well as for the full year. The effect of the adjustments is less than 0.4% for total annual emissions, with unadjusted numbers showing smaller in emissions in the third quarter.

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2023.

For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.

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Analysis: Record surge of clean energy in 2024 halts China’s CO2 rise

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‘Concerning’ low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak

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Antarctic sea ice has recorded its third-smallest winter peak extent since satellite records began 48 years ago, new data reveals.

Provisional data from the US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) shows that Antarctic sea ice hit its annual winter peak on 14 September, with an extent of 17.59m square kilometres (km2).

The organisation notes that the data is still preliminary, adding that “large fluctuations in extent are typical of Antarctic sea ice near the seasonal maximum”.

One expert tells Carbon Brief that it is “concerning to see these low values persisting”, but says that scientists need more time to determine whether this represents a “structural shift” in Antarctic sea ice extent.

Meanwhile, at the Earth’s other pole, Arctic sea ice reached its annual minimum on 12 September, ranking as the joint-10th lowest in the satellite record.

The NSIDC notes that the last 20 years have seen the lowest 20 Arctic sea ice extents in the satellite record.

Antarctic peak

Dr Lettie Roach, a polar climate scientist at the Alfred Wegener Institute in Germany, tells Carbon Brief that this year’s Antarctic sea ice maximum was “well below average for the season”. She warns that, “after several decades of stable or increasing winter Antarctic sea ice conditions, it is concerning to see these low values persisting”.

She adds:

“Compared with the Arctic, it’s less clear how recent changes in Antarctic sea ice are attributable to human-caused warming vs natural variability. We need more years of observations to better understand whether this is truly a structural shift.”

Dr Clare Eayrs, a postdoctoral researcher at the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), tells Carbon Brief that, since recording a “near-average February minimum” extent, Antarctic sea ice has “returned to unusually low winter coverage”.

She notes that Antarctic sea ice extent in July and August this year were the fifth and fourth lowest on record, respectively, adding that “all five of the lowest July extents have occurred since 2022 and all four of the lowest August extents since 2023”.

The chart below shows Antarctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2023 (mid blue), the year of the smallest winter sea-ice maximum on record.

Antarctic sea ice peak in 2026 is third smallest on record. Daily Antarctic sea ice extent for 2026, 2025, and 2023, as well as decadal averages, million km2. Source: NSIDC. Line chart showing 2026 peak in September remaining below 1980s-2010s averages but above Sep 2023's lowest record. - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)
Daily Arctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Eayrs tells Carbon Brief that the regional pattern of Antarctic sea ice cover “changed substantially during the growth season”.

For example, she says that “in April, the Bellingshausen Sea remained almost entirely ice-free, while the neighbouring Amundsen Sea had more ice than usual”.

However, by late August, changes in atmospheric pressure and wind meant that “the Bellingshausen deficit had largely recovered, while ice was unusually scarce in the Amundsen Sea and across much of East Antarctica”.

Map showing the main regions of the Antarctic.
Map showing the main regions of the Antarctic. Credit: Carbon Brief

Arctic minimum

Meanwhile, the Arctic recorded its minimum summer sea ice extent on 12 September. At 4.60m km2, this year ties with 2025, 2010 and 2008 as the 10th-lowest sea ice extent on record.

The chart below shows Arctic sea ice extent in 2025 (dark blue) and 2026 (red) so far. For comparison, the chart shows decadal averages (dotted lines) as well as 2012 (mid blue), the year of the smallest summer sea-ice minimum on record.

Arctic sea ice minimum in 2026 is tied for 10th smallest on record. Daily Arctic sea ice extent for 2026, 2025 and 2012, as well as decadal averages, million km2. Source: NSIDC. The line graph shows annual ice extent reaching September lows, with 2026 far below 1980s-2000s averages. - (alt text generated by Google Gemini)
Daily Antarctic sea ice extent for 2026 and 2025, with decadal averages for comparison, based on data from the NSIDC. Chart by Carbon Brief.

Roach tells Carbon Brief that although this minimum is not “record setting”, it is still “lower than any sea ice minimum before 2007”. She adds:

“Human-caused climate change has reduced Arctic sea ice cover and thickness, so the region is fundamentally different compared to a few decades ago.”

Scientists have been tracking Arctic sea ice thickness using a reanalysis produced called the Pan-Arctic Ice Ocean Modeling and Assimilation System (PIOMAS) since 1979.

In March 2026, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) terminated a global dataset of air pressure that scientists relied upon to produce PIOMAS, forcing both datasets to stop publishing updates.

The PIOMAS website says it will take “considerable effort and time” to find alternative data to use in their reanalysis. It adds that “we don’t yet have a good sense if that’s possible with available funds and if so, when we will be able to resume production of a new PIOMAS timeseries”.

Roach also notes that August saw record-breaking heat sweep across much of the world, explaining that high temperatures “extended into Arctic coastal regions, close to regions with substantial sea ice loss – particularly the Barents-Kara and East Siberian seas”.

Dr Zack Labe, a scientist at Climate Central, tells Carbon Brief that the absence of a new record does not mean that ice cover is becoming more “resilient”. He says:

“Local weather patterns across the Arctic play a really important role in year-to-year sea-ice extent, even as the long-term trend is clearly downward.”

Labe tells Carbon Brief that weather in the Arctic this summer was “influenced mainly by lower pressure toward the central Arctic, which brought cloudier and cooler conditions that limited surface melt and delayed the start of the melt season”.

He explains that this “was most obvious across parts of the Beaufort and Chukchi seas, where the melt season didn’t really kick off until after early July, which was more than two weeks later than normal”.

In contrast, he says, the Atlantic side of the Arctic “had a much more extreme summer”, with sea ice in the Barents Sea recording its “earliest melt-out on record”.

This was partly due to “unusually warm air and ocean temperatures”, Labe says. He notes, for example, that parts of western Siberia saw unusually persistent temperatures more than 5C above the 1981-2010 average for much of the summer, which extended out over the Kara Sea and contributed to substantial ice melt in this area”.

Map showing main regions of the Arctic.
Map showing main regions of the Arctic. Credit: Carbon Brief

Labe tells Carbon Brief that, going forward, scientists need “more data and observations of other sea-ice metrics, like ice thickness, which may give us better insight into the overall condition of the ice pack, especially during years like 2026 when it is very fragmented”.

(In March 2026, Arctic sea ice reached its peak extent for this winter, clocking in as the joint-smallest in a satellite record going back almost half a century.)

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COP31 attendees told not to interfere in Türkiye’s “internal affairs”

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Participants at COP31 in Antalya will have a “duty” not to interfere in Türkiye’s internal affairs under the country’s hosting deal with the UN, reviving a clause dropped for last year’s climate summit in Brazil that human rights groups warn could put activists at risk.

Türkiye has faced growing criticism from human rights groups over the jailing of opposition figures, journalists and activists and imposed a blanket protest ban around July’s summit of the NATO military alliance in Ankara.

The contested provision is included in the binding agreement between the UN climate secretariat and the Turkish government that sets out responsibilities over logistical arrangements and details participants’ rights and obligations.

The document, signed in June but only made public on Wednesday, gives accredited COP31 attendees immunity from legal action over what they say, write or do in connection with the conference. Climate Home News understands that this safeguard can be applied to what takes place both inside and, in certain circumstances, outside of the UN-controlled COP “Blue Zone”. For the first time, this protection explicitly continues after the summit ends.

Turkish riot police arrested protesters during the anti NATO protest on July 7, 2026 in Ankara, Turkey. (Photo by Sedat Suna/Getty Images)

But participants enjoying these “privileges and immunities” also have a duty to respect Türkiye’s laws and regulations and not to interfere in its internal affairs, the agreement states. Rights groups fear its wide-ranging formulation could be used to discourage criticism of the host government.

Climate Home News understands that whether an action is covered by the immunity or infringes on the host’s internal affairs would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with close coordination between the country’s authorities and the UN climate change body.

A separate provision states that immunity shall be waived where the UN believes it would “impede the course of justice”.

‘Chilling effect’

Those same provisions featured in the host country agreements for COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and COP29 in Azerbaijan, both regarded as authoritarian regimes, before being dropped for COP30 in Brazil.

Ann Harrison, climate justice policy advisor at Amnesty International, said it is “extremely disappointing” that the COP31 agreement re-introduced clauses that could “hinder the ability of human rights defenders and civil society organisations to conduct their work safely”.

COP31 electrification pledge leaves out clean power commitment

She added the provisions could have a “wider chilling effect” on rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, given concerns over the human rights situation in Türkiye, including laws that “have shrunk civic space” and their “abusive” implementation by authorities.

The UN climate change body declined to comment.

Rights groups have documented blanket protest bans, unlawful use of force by the police and prosecutions of journalists, human rights defenders and lawyers across Türkiye in the last year.

Arrests and protest bans

Last July, environmental activist Esra Işık was sentenced to more than two years for “resisting” a public official over what Amnesty International described as a peaceful protest against an urgent expropriation order linked to the expansion of coal mining in south-western Türkiye. She is appealing the conviction.

Ahead of a summit of the NATO alliance in the capital Ankara in July, authorities put in place a 13-day blanket ban on demonstrations, citing “national security”, and arrested over 200 people. Human Rights Watch said the crackdown showed Türkiye’s “ruthless intolerance of freedom of speech and assembly”.

Earlier this month, Turkish police detained dozens of people as part of what rights groups described as the government’s widening crackdown on LGBTQ+ activists and venues.

Questioned by media as to how he would guarantee the right to protest at COP31, Kurum said earlier in September that his team would “try to meet” any request they receive from civil society and give them “a free space to express themselves”.

“Don’t worry, thinking you will not be able to voice your opinions or really share your thoughts,” he said in an attempt to reassure campaigners, adding that he had put former deputy environment minister Mehmet Birpinar in charge of liaising with civil society.

Civic space needed

Camilla Pollera, human rights and climate change campaigner at the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), said meaningful participation at COP31 is fundamental to the legitimacy of climate action.

“At a climate summit, civil society participation necessarily includes being present, speaking out, scrutinising governments’ decisions and climate policies, and advocating for communities most vulnerable to climate change,” she added.

Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025.
Thousands march in a COP30 protest calling for climate justice and protection of the Amazon among other things in Belem, Brazil on November 15, 2025. (Photo: Mariel Lozada/Climate Home News)

At last year’s COP30 summit, thousands of Indigenous people and climate activists peacefully marched through the Amazonian city of Belém in the first major demonstration outside the UN venue in four years. Smaller-scale demonstrations were largely confined to the “Blue Zone” at COP27 in Egypt, COP28 in the UAE and COP29 in Azerbaijan.

In two other separate incidents in Belém, members of the Munduruku tribe blocked access to the conference centre for hours, demanding an end to development projects in their ancestral land, and protesters stormed through the venue clashing with UN security officials.

The COP31 hosting agreement keeps some of the safeguards previously hailed by civil society groups. The government and the UN secretariat commit to upholding “the fundamental human rights” of all participants in the agreement’s preamble.

Under the deal, Türkiye also needs to ensure that security personnel follow “the highest ethical and professional standards and are expected to behave with integrity and respect”.

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Threatened by rising seas, small islands secure right to keep their statehood

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As rising seas submerge growing swathes of land, countries that lose territory should still keep their national boundaries, sovereign rights and UN membership, according to a political declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly in New York on Thursday.

The declaration, which was championed by climate-vulnerable small island states, affirms “the presumption in favour of continued statehood” in the face of sea level rise fuelled by climate change, and urges countries to work together to assist communities affected by encroaching oceans.

Speaking at a high-level UN meeting to address the existential threats posed by sea level rise, Cabo Verde’s Prime Minister Francisco Carvalho, one of the initiative’s co-facilitators along with Australia, said the adoption of the text by consensus sends “a message of hope”.

“This declaration has a very special meaning. For us, sea level rise is neither a distant threat nor a theoretical concern,” he said, adding that rising seas put at risk key infrastructure, water resources and economic growth in small island states.

In the Pacific, sea levels have risen at twice the global rate, dramatically increasing coastal flooding events from two to 20 a year in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and from zero to 102 events per year in American Samoa, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

Surangel Whipps Jr., president of the Pacific island of Palau, said the summit in New York represents a “moment of international solidarity”, and highlighted that small island states will remain permanent members of the UN.

    Declaration recognises statehood

    An advisory opinion by the world’s top maritime court, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), first upheld in 2024 that countries do not have to shrink their maritime borders even if they lose land territory due to sea level rise. This was reiterated by the International Court of Justice in last year’s landmark ruling on the climate obligations of states.

    The new declaration endorsed by all governments at the UN General Assembly stresses that sea level rise “is not a distant scenario but a real and lived experience for many”, and notes that international law must be implemented in global responses to rising seas.

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the “milestone must now be translated into action”, adding that the declaration should encourage an “ongoing dialogue” at the “highest possible level” leading to practical outcomes. Pacific islands have proposed an international treaty on sea level rise that would provide more legal certainty.

    “Those on the frontlines must be front and centre on every decision. We cannot allow countries and cultures to vanish beneath the waves,” he said. “The SOS has gone out. The world must answer.”

    At regional summit, Pacific islands ask for COP31 support for clean energy and finance

    Goodwin Friday, prime minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, said measures to protect vulnerable states will require adequate finance. “Investing in resilience now is more cost-effective than paying the far greater price for loss and damage later,” he added.

    Championed by Australia’s COP31 co-presidency, Pacific islands have sought to put adaptation to sea level rise and ocean conservation at the top of the political agenda by inviting world leaders to attend the pre-COP31 summit co-hosted by Fiji and Tuvalu in October.

    Tuvalu will also host the second global fossil fuel phase-out summit in April 2027, after around 60 governments met this year in Santa Marta, Colombia, to discuss ending their dependence on coal, oil and gas.

    “Our coastlines, our reefs and our communities are living with the consequences of fossil fuel dependence every day, and our people have earned the right to help shape the way forward,” Lynda Tabuya, Fiji’s climate minister, said in a statement announcing details of the conference.

    Secretary-General António Guterres attending the meeting on addressing the existential threats posed by sea level rise at UN headquarters in New York.
    Secretary-General António Guterres attending the meeting on addressing the existential threats posed by sea level rise. (Photo: UN Photo/Manuel Elías)

    Ocean monitoring gets a boost in New York

    Amid record-breaking marine heat and seas rising at unprecedented speed, governments in New York announced new commitments to protect the world’s ocean, as efforts to bolster marine ecosystems and coastal communities rise up the political agenda.

    On Wednesday, the EU and Canada announced more funding for a new Europe-led ocean monitoring system called OceanEye, launched in the aftermath of a failed attempt by the Trump administration to dismantle the largest existing network of deep-sea observatories.

    During an event at UN headquarters in New York, EU President Ursula von der Leyen and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced around $163 million in new funding for the initiative, with the EU pledging €92 million ($105m) on top of existing seed funding and Canada pledging C$82 million (US$58m) over five years.

    According to an EU statement, while OceanEye will collaborate with the Global Ocean Observing System, that network “remains vulnerable to financial shortfalls and geopolitical disruptions”. A group of 30 countries from Europe, Africa and the Americas joined an international initiative in support of OceanEye, including large coastal nations like Brazil, Namibia and Mexico.

    Von der Leyen said OceanEye “can make us the leading ocean data provider in a matter of years”, including by launching new satellites and installing new observatories in the deep ocean. “From outer space to the deepest ocean, our funding helps us keep watch beneath the waves,” she added.

    Carney said the initiative would help protect Canada’s Arctic region with real-time monitoring operating year-round. “We can’t protect what we can’t see,” he said, also highlighting that Canada had expanded conservation of its ocean territory from 1% a decade ago to 15% now.

    In New York, a group of 19 countries said they are either developing or implementing plans to sustainably manage all of their ocean territory, with 12 new nations joining the initiative. In a joint communiqué, they called on more countries to sign up ahead of COP31.

    Warnings of El Niño-fuelled extreme heat

    Scientists and world leaders have raised the alarm over this year’s record-breaking marine temperatures, which have persisted above historical peaks for more than 100 days as the naturally occurring El Niño phenomenon intensifies in the Pacific.

    Extreme ocean heat could become a threat to coastal ecosystems and communities, experts fear. Water temperatures 1.5C above normal levels have also rapidly fuelled a strong hurricane in the Pacific in recent days.

    Despite scientific calls for additional ocean conservation efforts, a report launched this week in New York warned that efforts to protect ocean ecosystems are lagging behind, with only 10% of the global ocean covered by conservation areas and just 3.5% designated as “effectively protected”.

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