A record surge of clean energy kept China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions below the previous year’s levels in the last 10 months of 2024.
However, the new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and commercial data, shows the tail end of China’s rebound from zero-Covid in January and February, combined with abnormally high growth in energy demand, stopped CO2 emissions falling in 2024 overall.
While China’s CO2 output in 2024 grew by an estimated 0.8% year-on-year, emissions were lower than in the 12 months to February 2024.
Other key findings of the analysis include:
- China’s CO2 emissions grew 0.6% year-on-year in the fourth quarter, as hopes of stimulus measures pushed up industrial coal use and oil demand.
- In addition, wind and solar fell short of expected levels in the final quarter of 2024, likely as a result of being denied grid access in favour of coal power, which was flat year-on-year.
- Clean-energy capacity growth will accelerate in 2025 as largescale wind, solar and nuclear projects race to finish before the 14th five-year plan period comes to an end.
- Industrial electricity demand growth has slowed since summer 2024 and total energy demand growth eased in the fourth quarter of the year.
- These factors would be expected to push China’s coal-power output into decline in 2025, which would have international significance for energy markets and emissions.
- However, another period of industrial demand growth driven by government stimulus efforts could change this picture, particularly if the real-estate slump turns around.
As ever, the latest analysis shows that policy decisions made in 2025 will strongly affect China’s emissions trajectory in the coming years. In particular, both China’s new commitments under the Paris Agreement and the country’s next five-year plan are being prepared in 2025.In particular, both China’s new commitments under the Paris Agreement and the country’s next five-year plan are being prepared in 2025.
Emissions have plateaued since February 2024
China’s re-opening from zero-Covid began in earnest in March 2023, leading to rapid energy demand growth year-on-year until February 2024.
This resulted in a 3.8% rise in China’s CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2024.
Emissions stabilised in March-December 2024 as clean electricity supply growth covered all of the growth in electricity demand, while emissions from cement and steel production fell due to contracting demand for construction materials. This is shown in the figure below.

China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.
After February 2024, oil consumption growth also stabilised. Coal use in the chemical industry and coal and gas use in other industrial sectors continued to grow, offsetting the fall in emissions from the construction materials industry.
Contributions to the emissions plateau during the final 10 months of 2024 are shown in the figure below, broken down by fuel and by sector, where data is available.

Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period March-December 2024 when emissions have remained stable, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.
The growth in power generation from non-fossil sources set a new record, growing more than 500 terawatt hours (TWh) compared with 2023, which had already been a record year.
This is more than the total power generation of Germany in 2023. Solar power generation was responsible for half of the increase in clean power supply.
Emissions inched up in the fourth quarter
After rising in the first quarter of 2024, China’s CO2 emissions started to decline in March, falling 1% in the second quarter of the year and levelling off in the third quarter.
While power-sector emissions remained stable in the fourth quarter, industrial emissions outside the power sector swung into an increase. There was no reduction in power-sector emissions to offset that growth, resulting in an estimated 0.6% increase in overall emissions.
The largest factor was a rebound in oil and gas demand outside the power sector, indicated by the large bars under “All Sectors” and “Other Sectors” in the figure below.
Preliminary numbers from the National Bureau of Statistics indicate gas and oil demand rose 10% and 3% year-on-year, respectively, in the fourth quarter of 2024.
The supply of refined oil products fell 1.5%, so the increase in oil demand apparently came entirely from crude oil consumption in the chemical industry.

Year-on-year change in China’s quarterly CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.
Steel output picked up after stimulus announcements in late September, increasing 2% in October-November and 12% in December after a 4% reduction in the year to September.
The December increase, however, came from the reversal of a sharp 15% drop in production in December 2023, which was a last-minute measure to adhere to a cap set by the government for steel production during the year. As a result, steel production in December 2024 saw a dramatic increase year-on-year, but remained below 2022 levels.
Gas consumption has been rebounding from a drop caused by spiking prices in 2022, but demand growth is expected to moderate this year.
Cement production fell 6% year-on-year in the last quarter, extending a decline that started in 2020 and that has seen China’s cement output fall by almost a quarter from its peak level, as construction volumes have fallen.
Clash between coal and clean energy
As shown in the chart above, emissions from the power sector remained flat during the fourth quarter of 2024, with a small fall from coal and a small rise from gas. However, as electricity demand growth slowed down to 3.5%, emissions would have been expected to fall.
Even as electricity demand growth slowed down in October and November, fossil-fuel generation continued to increase. This was due to a sharp drop in the utilisation of solar and wind capacity, as shown by China Electricity Council data accessed through Wind Financial Terminal.
It is normal for utilisation to vary month-to-month, especially in the case of wind power, as wind conditions vary. The fall in utilisation of solar power was, however, the largest on record and, in the case of both solar and wind, this specific drop is not readily explained by weather conditions.
If the fall in utilisation was not caused by weather, the other possible cause is an increase in curtailment, or the amount of solar and wind power supply not fed into the power grid.
However, officially reported curtailment rates only increased marginally.
The apparent increase in unreported solar and wind curtailment in November is indicative of issues likely to arise in China’s electricity market as demand for coal-fired power begins to fall.
The government has pushed electricity buyers to enter into long-term contracts with coal-power companies, which involve guaranteed sales volumes. This has been a way to shore up profitability and enable investments in new coal-power capacity.
This now appears to be coming into conflict with clean-power growth and efforts to limit emissions.
When power generation from clean sources grows faster or total power demand grows slower than expected, electricity buyers with these long-term contracts can face penalties, unless they refuse power supply from clean sources and purchase from coal-power generators instead.
This conflict is accentuated when a lot of new coal-power capacity enters into the market. The new units have internal production targets and, at least in some cases, power purchase agreements signed in advance, making them unwilling to reduce output, even if there is no space in the grid.
It is notable that the first time that renewable energy curtailment became a major issue in China was around 2015, when demand for power generation from coal was falling.
Statistical analysis also reveals that solar and wind capacity utilisation tends to fall when coal-power capacity utilisation falls as well – the opposite of what should be expected. In a well-functioning market, coal-power utilisation should fall when more clean power is available.
A statistical model predicting solar and wind power utilisation by province, using daily meteorological data, failed to predict the drop in utilisation in October and November, indicating that weather conditions were not the main reason for the reduction.
If power demand growth slows down in 2025 and the expected record clean-energy additions are realised (see below), the conflict between coal and clean power could worsen. Demand for coal-fired power would be likely to fall, even as the coal industry expects rapid growth.
It would only be possible to ease this conflict by relaxing the government’s targets for long-term power contracts and accepting a fall in the utilisation of coal-power capacity.
Did emissions peak in 2024?
A year ago, an earlier iteration of this analysis predicted that China’s emissions would begin to fall in March 2024 and then continue to decline, leading to a 2% reduction in the full year of 2024.
This was based on three assumptions:
- Clean-energy additions would continue;
- Hydropower generation would recover to historical average levels;
- Energy consumption growth would slow down, after abnormally rapid growth in 2020-2023, during and after zero-Covid.
Taking each of those assumptions in turn, clean-energy additions not just continued but accelerated further, with 2024 poised to see a new record for the amount of solar and wind capacity added. Hydropower also recovered, although not all the way to historical averages.
The clean-energy additions, shown by the columns in the figure below, reached a scale where they would be sufficient to cover all energy demand growth at historical pre-Covid levels (grey line).
Indeed, the growth in clean-energy supply in 2024 far exceeded the growth in total energy demand recorded in any year from 2015 to 2020. However, energy demand growth in 2023-2024 was above historical norms, increasing significantly faster than in the years before Covid, even as GDP growth rates slowed down, due to high reliance on energy intensive industries to drive growth.

Annual increase in total energy consumption and clean electricity supply. Source: Total energy consumption growth from NBS annual data and recent economic and energy data releases. Non-fossil electricity supply from Ember yearly electricity data, except 2024 data from CREA monthly China snapshot. Electricity generation is converted into primary energy following the “coal power equivalent” methodology used in China.
Specifically, China’s power demand grew at 6.8% in 2024 while GDP expanded 5%. In contrast, last year’s analysis had assumed that power demand and GDP growth rates would converge after the zero-Covid period and its immediate aftermath were over.
This discrepancy was enough to throw off the projection for 2024. With energy demand growth far in excess of what had been assumed, even the massive clean-energy additions seen in 2024 were only enough to stabilise emissions, rather than to reduce them.
This means that while China’s CO2 emissions have been stable since March, it is still likely that they will post a small increase of around 0.8% for the full year, as January-February had rapid growth due to the rebound from zero-Covid.
As a result, the calendar year of 2023 did not become the peak year for China’s CO2 output, because emissions still inched up, according to current estimates.
From one perspective, stabilising emissions despite the rapid growth in energy demand is a major achievement. From another perspective, it is important for China’s emissions to begin to fall in absolute terms, if global climate goals are to remain within reach.
Even larger clean energy additions likely in 2025
After the enormous jump in China’s clean-energy installations in 2023 – particularly solar – even the most optimistic predictions did not expect a further increase in 2024.
Yet solar and wind capacity additions in China increased by 28% and 5% year-on-year in 2024, respectively, with 277GW of solar and 79GW of wind connected to the grid.
This year is likely to set another record, as key largescale solar, wind and nuclear projects race to complete during the 14th five-year plan period ending in 2025. State-owned enterprises, local governments and other actors have set targets that they will be striving to achieve.
Solar-power capacity additions are expected to stay at the record levels seen in 2024, with approximately 265GW added to the grid, according to forecasts from TrendForce New Energy Research Center.
Wind power is poised for a new record of 110-120GW of capacity added in 2025, according to China International Capital Corporation. Of this, 14-17GW is expected to be offshore wind power, up from 7GW in 2024.
After two slow years, China’s nuclear power capacity is expected to see a significant increase, rising to 65GW by the end of 2025, from 61GW today.
Some 3GW was added right at the end of 2024, starting to contribute to non-fossil power supply in 2025. In total, after a record number of new reactor projects was permitted in 2023 and 2024, China currently has 55GW approved or under construction, suggesting an average of more than 10GW of reactor start-ups per year over the next five years.
In addition, China had at least 14GW of conventional hydropower under construction at the end of 2024, based on Global Energy Monitor data on capacity under construction in April 2024 and subtracting capacity that was already commissioned last year.
Taken together, the new solar, wind, hydro and nuclear capacity that is likely to be connected to China’s grid in 2025 can be expected to generate more than 600TWh per year of electricity, up from the 500TWh of new clean electricity generation added in 2024, as shown in the figure below.

Expected average annual power generation from non-fossil power generation added each year, terawatt-hours per year 2015-2025. Source: Calculated based on changes in year-end capacity and average capacity utilisation for each technology from China Electricity Council data accessed through the Wind Financial Terminal.
However, as noted above, new clean-power capacity will only result in lower coal-fired generation and CO2 emissions if its output is integrated into the electricity system without a major increase in curtailment.
Aiming to avoid that outcome, in early January 2025, China’s top economic planner, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), published a new power system action plan that aims to integrate more than 200GW of new wind and solar onto the grid per year in 2025-27.
While this target is below the record-breaking clean-energy additions seen in recent years, it still indicates that there is central government support for similarly rapid growth in the next few years.
In December 2024, top economic policymakers called for accelerating the construction of very largescale clean-energy “bases” in western China and introduced a new theme of creating zero-carbon industrial parks. As industrial parks are responsible for 30% of China’s CO2 emissions, this policy could also drive significant investment in clean energy.
Energy demand outlook
Whether China’s emissions remain stable or begin to fall, cementing an emissions peak, remains a race between clean-energy additions and energy demand growth.
The big question is whether the recent trend of exceptionally rapid energy demand growth will continue, or whether it will unwind, resulting in a period of demand growing slower than GDP.
The previous periods of rapid energy and power demand growth in relation to GDP, around 2004 and 2010, were followed by periods of slower demand growth. In particular, around 2015, energy demand growth slowed down markedly and China’ emissions plateaued for several years.
There are signs of a repeat of this pattern in China’s recent energy demand data.
Specifically, industrial power demand rose sharply in 2023 and 2024, but exhibited a clear slowdown in the second half of 2024, as shown in the figure below (top left).
This was masked by a rebound in service and residential sector electricity consumption. Residential demand merely caught up to the pre-Covid trendline and service sector demand remains below it, reflecting the Covid-era distortion to the structure of the economy.

The recent rapid energy demand growth has been driven by an economic strategy that heavily favours energy-intensive manufacturing.
This approach has likely reached its limits as China’s manufacturing expansion has led to a supply glut, falling prices for industrial products and falling profits.
Now, the government is aiming to speed up economic growth by stimulating household consumption, a much less energy-intensive part of the economy than manufacturing, and by “halting the decline and stabilising” the real-estate sector.
However, delivering this outcome is far from trivial. The 2022 economic work conference – where annual departmental priorities are set – had also said that the recovery from zero-Covid should be consumption-led, but this vision failed to materialise.
The 2024 conference reduced the emphasis on “high-quality growth”, a concept that discourages growth driven by “low-quality” construction projects. In Communist party jargon, it said that “the relationship between improving the quality and growing the total output must be well coordinated”. This was a downgrade from 2023 when “high-quality growth” was described as a “hard truth”.
What next for energy and emissions in China?
Clean-energy additions will accelerate even further this year, from the record levels of 2024. At the same time, industrial power demand growth has slowed significantly since the summer.
These two trends suggest there is likely to be a fall in power-sector emissions this year. However, this drop in CO2 could still be outweighed by government stimulus efforts leading to another period of rapid growth in heavy industry, especially if construction volumes rebound.
If construction activity makes a strong comeback, this could drive further increases in emissions. The coal industry is bullish, with the China Coal Transportation and Distribution Association projecting a 1% increase in coal consumption in 2025.
The China Coal Industry Association projects a 4.5% increase in power generation from coal and gas. It believes that the stimulus policies to expand investment and stabilise the real-estate market will lead to increases in output in steel, cement and other major coal-consuming industries.
However, even if policymakers did pursue construction stimulus, a key question is how much of an effect it will have – and how fast.
Regardless of industry association hopes, the government’s stimulus announcements, so far, have not reversed market expectations of falling steel demand.
The local governments that are expected to deliver the stimulus are likely to struggle to fund a major increase in spending – and there is much less need for new infrastructure than during previous stimulus cycles.
If the government is successful in reviving household consumption as a source of growth – which is far less energy intensive – then energy demand growth could normalise to levels where clean energy can easily meet all of the growth. If so, emissions would begin to fall in a sustained way.
Beyond 2025, China’s energy and emissions trends are harder to pin down. For example, the rate of clean-energy additions after this year is more uncertain, despite recent positive signals.
China’s new Paris commitments are due to be published this year, containing targets for 2030 and 2035. In addition, the 15th five-year plan, covering 2026-2030, will be prepared this year and released in early 2026. As such, policy decisions made in 2025 will strongly affect China’s emissions trajectory not only this year, but for many years into the future.
About the data
Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.
Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.
Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.
Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.
When data was available from multiple sources, different sources were cross-referenced and official sources used when possible, adjusting total consumption to match the consumption growth and changes in the energy mix reported by the National Bureau of Statistics for the first quarter, the first half and the first three quarters of the year, as well as for the full year. The effect of the adjustments is less than 0.4% for total annual emissions, with unadjusted numbers showing smaller in emissions in the third quarter.
CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2023.
For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.
The post Analysis: Record surge of clean energy in 2024 halts China’s CO2 rise appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Record surge of clean energy in 2024 halts China’s CO2 rise
Climate Change
Factcheck: No, Europe’s heatwaves are not being ‘caused’ by declining air pollution
This summer has seen Europe suffer through a series of record-breaking heatwaves.
Amid widespread media coverage of the number of deaths and the influence of climate change, the UK’s Daily Telegraph reported on new research with the incorrect headline: “Heatwaves caused by fall in pollution.”
The article was shared on social media by Richard Tice – deputy leader of the hard-right, climate-sceptic Reform UK party – along with a number of prominent rightwing commentators.
Tice claimed that “net stupid zero is contributing to rising temperatures, not helping”, adding that “we have been gaslit and lied to”.
GB News followed up with its own article, incorrectly headlined: “Britain’s scorching heatwaves caused by falling pollution levels, researchers find.”
Scientists tell Carbon Brief that the framing of heatwaves being “caused” by declining air pollution is “wrong”.
While a drop in pollution has reduced the cooling impact it has had in the past, the scientists say, Europe’s summer heatwaves are primarily becoming more extreme “as a result of greenhouse-gas-induced warming”.
Another scientist adds that “any attempt” to link this research to net-zero policies is “simply wrong”.
Fast warming
The extensive reporting around Europe’s heatwaves in recent months has often mentioned that Europe is the world’s fastest-warming continent.

The new study in question aims to unpack why Europe’s summer temperatures are rising more quickly than other regions of the northern hemisphere’s mid and high latitudes.
The research – published in Geophysical Research Letters – explores the role of air pollution and, specifically, how it affects circulation patterns in the atmosphere.
(The study focuses on long-term trends in European summers and does not include the very recent heatwaves.)
Human-caused emissions of aerosols – tiny, light‑scattering particles produced mainly by burning fossil fuels – have long acted to “mask” global warming. This is largely because they absorb or reflect incoming sunlight and influence the formation and brightness of clouds.
To understand how the climate of Europe – or any region – is changing, scientists need to take into account a whole range of factors, says Prof Bjørn Samset, a research professor at Norway’s Center for International Climate Research (CICERO), who was not involved in the work.
This includes “greenhouse gases, aerosols, land-use change, natural variability and how they all interact”, he says, adding:
“The effects of air pollution on circulation, which is the topic here, has long been difficult to pin down.”
As European countries improved their air quality through the second half of the 20th century, the cooling effect of aerosols has gradually been removed.
This can boost heatwaves in two ways – directly, by letting more sunlight reach the land surface and, indirectly, by influencing the jet stream.
Using hundreds of simulations from nine climate models, the new study finds that a decline in aerosols is resulting in more frequent “quasi-stationary Rossby waves”.
Rossby waves are huge meanders in the jet stream. Occasionally, they become slow-moving – or “quasi-stationary” – which allows weather systems to get stuck over one region, leading to prolonged heatwaves.
These circulation changes have contributed to Europe’s rapidly warming summers.
However, while Europe’s heatwaves are being influenced by declining aerosols, it is “wrong” to say they are being “caused” by them, says Prof Erich Fischer, a climate scientist at ETH Zurich.

Fischer, who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief:
“Heatwaves are caused by high-pressure systems and are now much more frequent and intense because they are happening in a climate that is much warmer than 100 years ago as a result of greenhouse-gas-induced warming.
“The paper shows that the greenhouse-gas-induced summer warming had been temporarily masked by air-polluting aerosols. The full extent for European summers only becomes visible now as the air-polluting aerosols have declined.”
Samset adds:
“Air pollution never causes or removes global warming, it only temporarily moderates it.”
Study lead author Dr Pedro Roldán‐Gómez, an associate researcher at the Barcelona Supercomputer Centre, is quoted in the Daily Telegraph saying that “most” of the “excess warming” in Europe, beyond that of comparable regions in the northern hemisphere, can be linked to declining aerosols.
But, earlier in the article, the newspaper interprets this as, simply, “most of the extra heat experienced in Britain and Europe” is down to air pollution.
GB News uses a similar phrasing, reporting that “much of the additional warming across Britain and western Europe since the 1980s is linked to the sharp decline in airborne particles known as aerosols”.
This is “misleading”, says Fischer, while Roldan-Gomez tells Carbon Brief that this is a “tricky point”, which “could lead to wrong interpretations if not properly explained”. He adds:
“The contribution of greenhouse gases is, in any case, the most important factor.”

Cleaner air
The Daily Telegraph’s article was seized upon by Reform’s Richard Tice to claim that “cleaner air” was causing higher temperatures, rather than CO2.
This continued his position – refuted by long-established climate science – that CO2 does not drive global warming.

Tice also claimed in his post that net-zero policies are “contributing to rising temperatures”. Tice appears to be linking declining air pollution to a shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy.
Samset points out that net-zero became a goal “decades later” than the cumulative efforts to reduce air pollution since the 1980s and that it is “simply wrong” to link it to the study.
“The scientific community will keep working to understand how greenhouse gas warming and air pollution interact,” he says, but “nothing we do will change the fact that the consequences of global warming are due to human-induced CO2 emissions”.
Fischer adds:
“Let us not forget that cleaning up air-polluting aerosols is highly desirable. According to the World Health Organisation, 7 million people still die prematurely every year due to air pollution.”
Clean air legislation
Finally, the Daily Telegraph article and the study itself both attribute Europe’s declining air pollution from the 1980s onwards to the Montreal Protocol.
This is a “glaring error”, Samset says, and it is “surprising that it wasn’t picked up” in the peer-review process for the study. He explains:
“The Montreal Protocol did not deal with air pollution. It dealt with ozone-depleting gases and has been an extremely successful multi-national effort against environmental damage. “
Clean air legislation was already in place in many European countries by the time the Montreal Protocol was signed in 1987, says Samset.
In response, Roldán‐Gómez says that while the protocol did not target aerosols specifically, it “boosted the clean air policies”.
The post Factcheck: No, Europe’s heatwaves are not being ‘caused’ by declining air pollution appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Factcheck: No, Europe’s heatwaves are not being ‘caused’ by declining air pollution
Climate Change
Access to finance ‘strengthens climate resilience’ among sub-Saharan women
Empowering women through greater access to finance could “strengthen” households’ resilience to “climate shocks”, according to a new study.
Published in Climate Risk Management, it analyses the impact of financial access on “women-headed households” in sub-Saharan Africa.
The study finds that where women had formal financial access – such as through owning a bank account – households were more able to withstand short-term shocks.
It adds that “climate shocks”, such as extreme weather events and the impacts of climate change, can cause economic crises, which destabilise communities and households.
However, the authors say that in order to protect households from long-term climate vulnerabilities – including “droughts, floods and sea-level rise” – financial access would need to be paired with wider efforts to tackle gender inequality.
They add that the findings could have important implications for policy in sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries and households are vulnerable to climate disasters.
Financial inclusion
The study highlights that entrenched gender disparities mean many women still have unequal access to financial services in sub-Saharan Africa
For example, women are still less likely to have their own bank accounts and instead are often dependent on male relatives for access to finance.
The number of women with access to an account in the region had risen to 52% as of 2024, according to data from World Bank Group.
However, as shown in the chart below, the gap between men and women has also increased, rising from just under 5 percentage points in 2011 to 12 in 2024.

Using survey data from Afrobarometer, the new study analyses 25,511 women-headed households across 37 sub-Saharan countries.
The authors use the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) framework to measure “financial inclusion”. This looks at factors such as having a bank account, owning a mobile phone and having internet access.
Francis Anaisie, a co-author on the study, tells Carbon Brief the researchers were motivated by the UN’s sustainable development goals (SDGs). Anaisie, an economist at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, says the study specifically looked at SDGs five and 13, on gender equality and addressing climate issues. He adds:
“Financial inclusion is one of the key policy tools for empowering women or for empowerment. But as to whether this actually translates into better climate outcomes for women is not known or is limited; this study seeks to address that gap.”
The study finds households with higher levels of financial access for women had higher levels of women’s empowerment, when this is defined as the ability to make choices and have control over economic and social outcomes.
This was checked by cross-comparing financial access against different measures of women’s empowerment, such as financial security, voting rights and connection to communities.
In particular, the study found that “financially included” women had greater political and economic empowerment, such as financial security and voting rights. On some measures of social empowerment, however, the link was weaker – financial access alone was not enough to erase cultural and social barriers to gender equality.
Women and climate change
It has been well documented that women are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change than men.
Environmental shocks affect women disproportionately due to a range of factors. These include income disparities, higher rates of displacement and unequal access to land.
Financial inequality and barriers to economic resources, such as needing internet access to make digital payments, play a key role in climate vulnerability, says Tracy Kajumba. She is director for the Least Developed Countries initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) interim secretariat at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
Kajumba, who was not involved in the study, explains to Carbon Brief:
“Women are on the front line doing farming, planting, harvesting and these things that are all impacted [by climate change]. If they don’t have the income to invest either in drought-resistant crops or water-saving technologies, it becomes difficult for households to adapt.”
Calculating climate resilience
The new study measures the impact of financial inclusion on women’s empowerment and, in turn, on climate resilience.
It evaluates a household’s ability to withstand and recover from “shocks and stressors” by using a UN Food and Agriculture Organization metric for “resilience index measurement and analysis” (RIMA).
For example, questionnaires are used to gather information about households in certain areas. The data is then used, together with key indicators, to quantify a household’s resilience to food insecurity, climate variability and economic crisis, amongst other risks.
The 25,511 households surveyed across sub-Saharan Africa were found to be relatively resilient overall and had a high capacity to bounce back from climate shocks. However, they had much lower ability to adapt, in order to build protective capacity in advance of extreme events.
In addition, the study finds that women’s financial empowerment had a positive impact on a household’s ability to “absorb” a climate shock, suggesting that financial access is critical for responding to climate change.

Increased empowerment through financial access enables women to make decisions about planting crops, to access credit in emergencies and to buy or sell food at a better price, the study notes.
For example, it says increased financial access and women’s empowerment help households to deal with the immediate consequences of an extreme weather event, such as a drought. This could be through building community mutual-support networks and by enabling access to savings, to keep the household running.
Anaisie says the study shows women’s empowerment has a significant impact on climate resilience. He tells Carbon Brief:
“If we include women in the financial system, in the case of any climate issue they can save, they can be independent, they can rely on investment to absorb these shocks. This empowerment will help them to be more resilient to climate shocks…We can make progress because SDG goals are all about inclusiveness. It’s all about inclusive growth.”
However, the study notes that financial access does not necessarily create long-term change, which would make the household less vulnerable to extreme weather in the first place.
The authors suggest that lasting structural and cultural change is important for bringing about long-term resilience. They say that policies to address gender inequalities would help bring this about.
They say such policies could include gender-sensitive agricultural credit schemes, subsidised climate insurance for women farmers in drought-prone regions, joint land-titling programmes and quotas for women in local climate-adaptation committees.
Such policies would have helped women impacted by recent severe floods in Ghana to protect their savings, Anaisie explains. He tells Carbon Brief:
“Women are engaged in economic activities, especially informal activities. They have resources and money, but when the flood came in, many women lost that. If they had access to insurance, this flood wouldn’t have cost them that much.
“So, if the government comes out with financial initiatives, training, civic education and gender-focused initiatives, leadership training, women will be empowered and this will translate into their resilience with regards to climate change.”
Addressing climate vulnerability in sub-Saharan Africa
The study could have policy implications for sub-Saharan Africa, a region particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The region faces increasingly extreme weather, heatwaves, droughts, wildfires and floods, as well as food scarcity and threats to crops.
The study suggests that policies to address structural and cultural barriers to women’s financial autonomy could be a key way to build climate resilience across the region.
However, it recognises that even where financial access is expanded, gender norms and cultural constraints continue to shape women’s social empowerment. This, in turn, affects their ability to adapt to climate change in the long term.
Ultimately, addressing structural inequalities is needed to minimise climate vulnerability, says Kajumba. She adds that supporting adaptation with financial access can allow households to absorb shocks without falling into poverty – and to rebuild after climate impacts.
Kajumba says that supporting adaptation with women’s financial access can allow households to absorb shocks without falling into poverty – and to rebuild after climate impacts. She adds:
“When they are supported [with] microloans, savings and all that, you will see change in income, change in households, change in health and education for the children as well.”
However, Kajumba notes that structural inequalities still “amplify” women’s vulnerability to climate impacts and make it harder for them to exercise agency and leadership. She adds:
“The tools that are being used are not always favourable for women…When we look at women in leadership and participation, you cannot lead or you cannot participate unless you have some level of income.”
The post Access to finance ‘strengthens climate resilience’ among sub-Saharan women appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Access to finance ‘strengthens climate resilience’ among sub-Saharan women
Climate Change
State of the climate: Rapidly developing El Niño raises chance of record-warm 2026
As 2026 passes its halfway point, the world is watching one of the most rapidly intensifying El Niño events in the modern record take shape in the tropical Pacific.
The developing El Niño is boosting expectations for global temperatures, both this year and next.
El Niño is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific that releases heat from the ocean into the atmosphere, temporarily raising global temperatures and reshaping rainfall and extreme weather around the world.
Carbon Brief’s “state of the climate” report in April gave 2026 a 19% chance of setting a new global temperature record.
That chance now stands at 35% – a near-doubling in four months – with virtually all of the change driven by ever-stronger El Niño forecasts.
The key findings from the first half of 2026 include:
- The first six months of 2026 were the third-warmest start to a year on record – around 1.4C above pre-industrial levels – behind only 2024 and 2025.
- While the first few months of the year came in as the fourth or fifth warmest, both May and June were the second-warmest ever recorded as El Niño conditions took hold.
- El Niño conditions arrived in April and reached the threshold for a “strong” event by June, when the Niño3.4 index reached 1.6C. Of the 667 model runs Carbon Brief examined, 91% project a peak later this year that is above the strongest El Niño in history.
- The chance that 2026 beats 2024 as the warmest year on record has risen to 35%. Carbon Brief’s central estimate remains that 2026 will be the second-warmest year, at around 1.51C above pre-industrial levels.
- Whether 2026 sets a record will depend on the dataset: the odds range from around two-in-three in NASA and Berkeley Earth data to around two-in-10 in ERA5 and one-in-10 in the JRA-3Q reanalyses.
- June 2026 was western Europe’s hottest June on record, amid a heatwave that set hundreds of individual records. Nearly 9% of the world’s surface saw record June warmth.
- The developing El Niño will have its largest impact on 2027, which Carbon Brief projects to be around 1.7C above pre-industrial levels – this would comfortably set a new record for the warmest year.
- Arctic sea ice has spent 39 days of 2026 so far at, or below, record daily lows following its joint-lowest winter maximum in the satellite era.
Third-warmest start to a year
Carbon Brief analyses records from six different groups that report global surface temperatures: NASA GISTEMP, NOAA GlobalTemp, Hadley/UEA HadCRUT5, Berkeley Earth, Copernicus/ECMWF ERA5 and the JMA JRA-3Q reanalysis.
The first half of 2026 was the third warmest on record in every one of the six datasets, behind only 2024 and 2025. The figure below shows annual temperatures since 1970, along with the 2026 year-to-date average (January-June) for each group.

January 2026 was only the fourth- or fifth-warmest January on record, as lingering weak La Niña conditions suppressed temperatures. Since then, each month has climbed the rankings.
La Niña is the cool phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). It typically brings wetter conditions to Australia, Indonesia and equatorial South America and drier conditions to the southern US.
March was second-to-fourth warmest across datasets, April the third and both May and June were the second warmest ever recorded, behind only the corresponding months of 2024.
The chart below shows how June 2026 (thick red line) came in around 0.08C below the June record set in 2024 in the average of the six datasets.
Meanwhile, Copernicus reported that global sea surface temperatures over the ice-free oceans set a new June record.

A record-breaking El Niño
ENSO is the largest source of year-to-year variability in global temperatures.
The most common way to assess the strength of an El Niño or La Niña event is by looking at the sea surface temperature anomaly in the “Niño3.4” region of the tropical Pacific.
El Niño and its sister La Niña occur when temperatures in the tropical Pacific are more than 0.5C (El Niño) or less than 0.5C (La Niña) below normal, where normal is defined by removing the effects of long-term climate change.
The thresholds for defining the strength of an El Niño or La Niña are above/below 1C for “moderate” events, 1.5C for “strong” events and 2C for “very strong” (or “super”) events.
After two years dominated by La Niña conditions, the tropical Pacific flipped decisively in April when the Niño3.4 index crossed the 0.5C El Niño threshold. It subsequently reached 1C in May and hit 1.6C in June, marking one of the fastest onsets in the observational record.
In the first few weeks of July, the index shot above 2C, significantly outpacing the speed at which any prior El Niño events developed.
Forecast models expect even more to come.
An analysis by Carbon Brief of the median of 667 model runs from 14 different modelling groups suggests that sea surface temperatures in theNiño3.4 region could peak at 3.59C between July and December.
More than 91% of runs predict the strongest El Niño event in the modern record. The previous record was set during the event of 2015-16, when temperatures peaked around 2.75C.
This is shown in the chart below, which features a histogram of the likelihood of different possible 2026 El Niño peaks across all the models on the top. The forest plot beneath shows the best estimate and range of outcomes predicted by each individual model.

The median forecast in every one of the 14 models suggests a peak that exceeds the 2C “super” El Niño threshold, with most models peaking in November or December.
Some caution here is warranted, however. Raw model Niño3.4 anomalies are measured against a fixed climatology. Because the entire tropical ocean has warmed due to human-caused greenhouse gas emissions, the models tend to overstate event strength relative to the historical record.
A cleaner comparison uses the relative Niño3.4 index (RONI), which subtracts the average tropical ocean warming.
This relative measure suggests the median forecast peak for El Niño in the latter half of 2026 is 3.1C. The prior record stands at a lower 2.69C, set in 1982-83.
Nevertheless, 77% of model runs still show a new record event occurring. This is shown in the chart below.

In summary, on both indexes, the central expectation is now for the strongest El Niño in the observational record.
Model forecasts made in the spring and early summer have historically shown some bias toward overpredicting event strength. However, forecasts made after the spring are considerably more reliable.
Widespread record warmth and a massive European heatwave
The map below shows the temperature anomaly for the first half of 2026 in the ERA5 dataset, relative to a 1981-2010 baseline period.

It shows how the largest warm anomalies were found across the Arctic – particularly north of Scandinavia and Svalbard – as well as western Europe, the western US, northern Mexico, central Asia, western China, eastern Russia and the Antarctic Peninsula region.
The developing El Niño is clearly visible as a tongue of warm anomalies stretching along the equatorial eastern Pacific. Only a few regions – central Canada, Alaska and parts of the Southern Ocean – saw temperatures below the 1981-2010 average.
Where 2026 ranks against history is even more striking. The map below shows where the period of January-June 2026 ranked among all 87 years in the ERA5 record, which stretches from 1940 to 2026. Grid cells marked in red saw temperatures in the first half of the year that were in the top-five warmest years.

More than 30% of the global surface had a top-five warmest start to the year and 7.1% saw its warmest on record, including much of western Europe, the eastern equatorial Pacific and the seas around Japan.
Not a single grid cell had a top-five coolest start to the year. In June alone, 8.9% of the world’s surface saw record warmth for the month. This is illustrated in the map below, where grid cells marked in red saw temperatures that were in the top-five warmest years and grid cells in blue in the top-five coolest.

The standout regional temperature event was a heatwave that struck Europe in late June.
Western Europe had its hottest June on record, recording an average temperature of 3.05C above the 1991-2020 average and beating the record set only a year earlier, according to Copernicus. A heat dome over 22-30 June broke 10 all-time national heat records and around 400 long-record station records.
France set a new June national record of 44.3C, while the UK broke its June record on three consecutive days, reaching 37.3C. The humid heat drove a death toll estimated in the thousands.
A separate heat dome also brought record June temperatures to parts of North America in late June.
On track to be second warmest, but a real chance at first
Carbon Brief’s updated projection for 2026 as a whole combines the observed January-June temperatures with the latest El Niño forecast. It uses a statistical model trained on the historical relationship between the first half of the year, ENSO conditions and annual temperatures observed over 1950-2025, excluding major volcanic eruption years.
Carbon Brief estimates that 2026 will be around 1.51C above pre-industrial levels, with a 90% range of 1.45C to 1.57C, shown by the yellow dot in the chart below.
This is up from 1.47C in the projection set out in April – and is notably more certain now that half the year has passed.
This central estimate would make 2026 the second-warmest year on record, just below 2024 (1.52C) and ahead of 2023 (1.43C) and 2025 (1.41C).

Carbon Brief’s modelling puts the chance that 2026 beats 2024 as the warmest year on record at 35%, using the average of the six different surface temperature records assessed. It puts the chance that 2026 comes in above 1.5C at around 63%.
If it does, 2026 would be the second calendar year – after 2024 – where warming averaged above 1.5C, in a further sign that the world is rapidly approaching the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit.
A single year above 1.5C does not by itself constitute a breach of the goal, which refers to the longer term average temperature of the planet. This is defined as the midpoint of a 20-year period by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
These likelihood of a record have been climbing rapidly throughout 2026.
Global temperatures so far throughout the year have run well below the record-setting levels of 2024 – around 0.13C cooler over the first six months.
On their own, temperatures observed so far in 2026 would make a new annual record unlikely.
However, rerunning the projection using only the data available at the end of each month since March – including both the year-to-date observations and the El Niño forecast issued that month – shows a shifting picture.
Using March data, 2026 had just a 7% chance of setting a new record. That rose to 16% in April, 24% in May, 27% in June and 35% using the latest data in mid-July.
This is shown in the chart below.

Notably, this rise has little to do with observed temperatures. The year-to-date anomaly has actually drifted slightly down, from 1.41C after March to 1.39C after June.
Observed temperatures and fewer remaining months of the year contributed only around four percentage points of the 28-point rise in the likelihood; the remaining ~84% of the change comes from successive upward revisions to the El Niño forecast for late 2026.
However, whether 2026 ends up becoming the warmest year on record may end up depending on which dataset is used.
Running the same projection gives odds of a 2026 record of around two-in-three for Berkeley Earth (66%) and NASA GISTEMP (65%), but only 35% for HadCRUT5, 24% for NOAA and just 13% and 9% for the ERA5 and JRA-3Q reanalyses, respectively.
This is shown below.

The divergence between projections mostly reflects how exceptional each dataset’s 2024 was.
The reanalysis approaches recorded a particularly warm 2024, leaving 2026 more ground to make up. GISTEMP and Berkeley, on the other hand, project 2026 modestly above their 2024 values.
A repeat of the situation in 2015 where different groups disagreed on record rankings is a real possibility. Headlines in January 2027 may hinge on choices of dataset.
2027 likely to be the warmest year in human history
The biggest climate story of the developing super El Niño may not be 2026 at all.
Global temperatures typically lag in the tropical Pacific by around three months. So, an El Niño event peaking in November and December 2026 will have its largest warming influence on 2027.
We saw this same pattern occur in 1997-98, 2015-16 and 2023-24 – where the year in which the El Niño developed was warm, but the following year was record-smashing.
Carbon Brief has extended its projection into 2027 by using the historical relationship between year-over-year temperature changes and ENSO conditions in the preceding autumn.
This yields a best estimate for 2027 of around 1.71C above pre-industrial levels, with a 90% range of 1.49C to 1.93C. This is shown by a yellow square on the chart below.

That would give 2027 a 92% chance of setting a new global temperature record and a 94% chance of exceeding 1.5C.
Taking 2026 and 2027 together, there is a 93% chance that at least one of the two years sets a new record.
The 2027 estimate is more uncertain than the 2026 one. As with 2026, there are uncertainties in the projection due to unknowns around exactly how strong the El Niño peak proves to be and how quickly it decays.
However, even the low end of the 2027 range would put it among the warmest years on record and the central estimate of 1.71C would exceed 2024 by nearly 0.2C.
If these projections bear out, the 2020s will have delivered new global temperature records in 2023, 2024 and 2027 – and potentially 2026 too – with a number of individual years well above the 1.5C threshold.
The long-term warming trend, driven by human emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, has increased from around 0.18C per decade in the early 2000s to around 0.27C per decade today. El Niño and La Niña play a big role in determining which years along that rising path stand out as records.
Arctic sea ice at record lows
Arctic sea ice has spent much of 2026 in record-low territory.
Following the joint-lowest winter maximum in the satellite record in mid-March, daily extent has set or tied record lows for the date on 39 days so far this year, including extended spells in mid-to-late March and in early-to-mid June.
The most recent record-low days were in early July.
The chart below shows how Arctic sea ice in 2026 (dark red line) has been below the historical range (shaded red).
It also shows how Antarctic sea ice (dark blue), meanwhile, has remained below the 1979-2010 range for almost all of 2026 to date.

As of mid-July, Arctic extent is a bit below the 1979-2010 historical range for the date, though it remains around 0.6m square kilometres (km2) larger than the record low for the date set during 2020’s exceptional summer melt season.
The trajectory over the coming two months will determine whether 2026 challenges 2012’s record September minimum. Early-summer conditions are a poor predictor of the September minimum, which depends heavily on summer weather.
Antarctic sea ice, meanwhile, is currently around 300,000km2 below the historical envelope, but has stayed well clear of the record lows set in 2023 and has not set any new daily records yet this year.
Q&A: Europe’s May and June heatwave deaths – and how they were counted
Guest post: France’s June heatwave caused more than 2,700 heat-related deaths
Guest post: Climate change has caused one-fifth of Pine Island glacier retreat
Media reaction: How climate change intensified Europe’s record-breaking June heat
The post State of the climate: Rapidly developing El Niño raises chance of record-warm 2026 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
State of the climate: Rapidly developing El Niño raises chance of record-warm 2026
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