A victory for Donald Trump in November’s presidential election could lead to an additional 4bn tonnes of US emissions by 2030 compared with Joe Biden’s plans, Carbon Brief analysis reveals.
This extra 4bn tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) by 2030 would cause global climate damages worth more than $900bn, based on the latest US government valuations.
For context, 4GtCO2e is equivalent to the combined annual emissions of the EU and Japan, or the combined annual total of the world’s 140 lowest-emitting countries.
Put another way, the extra 4GtCO2e from a second Trump term would negate – twice over – all of the savings from deploying wind, solar and other clean technologies around the world over the past five years.
If Trump secures a second term, the US would also very likely miss its global climate pledge by a wide margin, with emissions only falling to 28% below 2005 levels by 2030. The US’s current target under the Paris Agreement is to achieve a 50-52% reduction by 2030.
Carbon Brief’s analysis is based on an aggregation of modelling by various US research groups. It highlights the significant impact of the Biden administration’s climate policies. This includes the Inflation Reduction Act – which Trump has pledged to reverse – along with several other policies.
The findings are subject to uncertainty around economic growth, fuel and technology prices, the market response to incentives and the extent to which Trump is able to roll back Biden’s policies.
The analysis might overstate the impact Trump could have on US emissions, if some of Biden’s policies prove hard to unpick – or if subnational climate action accelerates.
Equally, it might understate Trump’s impact. For example, his pledge to “drill, baby, drill” is not included within the analysis and would likely raise US and global emissions further through the increased extraction and burning of oil, gas and coal.
Also not included are the potential for Biden to add new climate policies if he wins a second term, nor the risk that some of his policies will be weakened, delayed or hit by legal challenges.
Regardless of the precise impact, a second Trump term that successfully dismantles Biden’s climate legacy would likely end any global hopes of keeping global warming below 1.5C.
- The ‘Trump effect’ on US emissions
- How the Biden administration is tackling warming
- What a second-term Trump might do
- The global climate implications of the US election
- How the analysis was carried out
The ‘Trump effect’ on US emissions
US greenhouse gas emissions have been falling steadily since 2005, due to a combination of economic shifts, greater efficiency, the growth of renewables and a shift from coal to gas power.
Since taking office in early 2021, Biden has pledged under the Paris Agreement to accelerate that trend by cutting US emissions to 50-52% below 2005 levels in 2030 and to net-zero in 2050.
He has implemented a long list of policies – most notably the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act – to keep those targets within reach. (See: How the Biden administration is tackling warming.)
In the “Biden” scenario in the figure below (blue line), all federal climate policies currently in place or in the process of being finalised are assumed to continue. The scenario does not include any new climate policies that might be adopted after November’s election.
The administration’s current climate policies are expected to cut US emissions significantly, bringing the country close to meeting its 2030 target range. Nevertheless, a gap remains between projected emissions and those needed to meet the 2030 and 2050 targets (green).
The “Trump” scenario (red line) assumes the IRA and other key Biden administration climate policies are rolled back. It does not include further measures that Trump could take to boost fossil fuels or undermine the progress of clean energy. (See: What a second-term Trump might do.)
For both projections, the shaded area shows the range of results from six different models, with varying assumptions on economic growth, fuel costs and the price of low-carbon technologies.
In total, the analysis suggests that US greenhouse gas emissions would fall to 28% below 2005 levels by 2030 if Trump secures a second term and rolls back Biden’s policies – far short of the 50-52% target. If Biden is reelected, emissions would fall to around 43% below 2005 levels.
In the Trump scenario, annual US greenhouse gas emissions would be around 1GtCO2e higher in 2030 than under Biden, resulting in a cumulative addition of around 4GtCO2e by that year.
Based on the recently updated central estimate of the social cost of carbon from the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) – which stands at some $230 per tonne of CO2 in 2030 – those 4GtCO2e of extra emissions would cause global climate damages worth more $900bn.
To put the additional emissions in context, EU greenhouse gas emissions currently stand at around 3GtCO2e per year, while Japan’s are another 1GtCO2e. If the EU meets its climate goals, then its emissions would fall to 2GtCO2e in 2030 and to below 1GtCO2e in 2040.
Only eight of the world’s nearly 200 countries have emissions that exceed 1GtCO2e per year – and 4GtCO2e is more than the combined yearly total from the 140 lowest-emitting nations.
Expressed another way, the extra 4GtCO2e would be equivalent to double all of the emissions savings secured globally, over the past five years, by deploying wind, solar, electric vehicles, nuclear and heat pumps.
Carbon Brief’s analysis highlights several key points.
First, that Biden’s climate goals for the US in 2030 and 2050 will not be met, without further policy measures after the next election.
This could include additional state-level action, which could yield an additional 4 percentage points of emissions savings by 2030. Added to the “Biden” pathway, this would take US emissions to 47% below 2005 levels – closer to, but still not in line with the 2030 pledge.
Second, despite this policy gap, Biden’s current climate policies go a significant way towards meeting the 2030 target and could be added to in the future.
Third, if Trump is able to remove all of Biden’s key climate policies, then the US is all but guaranteed to miss its targets by a wide margin.
Given the scale of US emissions and its influence on the world, this makes the election crucial to hopes of limiting warming to 1.5C. (See: The global climate implications of the US election.)
Finally, there is policy uncertainty around which policies will be finalised, how strong any final rules will be, what legal challenges they may face and how easy they prove to roll back.
There is also uncertainty – illustrated by the ranges in the chart – around the impact of Biden’s policies, the response of households, business and industry to those measures, and the rate of economic growth, as well as over future prices for fossil fuels and low-carbon technologies.
These uncertainties are partly – but not entirely – captured by the six models underlying the analysis, which have different model structures and input assumptions.
How the Biden administration is tackling warming
In 2015, the then-president Barack Obama pledged a 26-28% reduction in US emissions below 2005 levels by 2025 as an intended “nationally determined contribution” (iNDC) to the Paris Agreement.
On taking office in 2017, the climate-sceptic president Trump then pulled the US out of the Paris Agreement, attracting global opprobrium. He then rolled back or replaced Obama-era climate policies, including the Clean Power Plan, while attempting – unsuccessfully – to prop up coal.
Trump’s successor as president, Joe Biden, campaigned in 2020 on a platform of a “clean energy revolution”. On gaining office in 2021, he immediately rejoined the Paris Agreement and then issued a more ambitious pledge to cut US emissions to 50-52% below 2005 levels by 2030.
Biden also pledged to decarbonise the electricity grid by 2035 and joined roughly 150 other countries in committing the US to reaching net-zero emissions by 2050 – the global benchmark, if the world is to keep warming below 1.5C.
In order to keep these targets within reach, the Biden administration has ushered in a series of climate policies. Most notable is the 2022 IRA, unexpectedly passed by Congress after a 51-50 Senate vote, with the tie broken by the vice president Kamala Harris.
This has been called the largest package of domestic climate measures in US history. It offers incentives covering a broad swathe of the economy from low-carbon manufacturing to clean energy, electric vehicles, “climate-smart” agriculture and low-carbon hydrogen.
The IRA accounts for the most significant part of the emissions reductions expected as a result of Biden’s climate policies to date and shown by the blue line in the figure above.
It includes grants, loans and tax credits initially estimated to be worth $369bn. However, most of the tax credits are not capped, meaning the overall cost and impact on emissions is uncertain.
In general, cost estimates have risen since its passing, as investments triggered by the bill’s incentives have rolled in, with some now putting its ultimate cost above $1tn.
However, a recent analysis of progress since the bill passed in 2021 shows that while electric vehicle sales are running at the top end of what was expected in earlier modelling of the IRA’s impact, the deployment of clean electricity – in particular, wind power – is falling slightly behind.
(Another recent study looks at the behavioural challenges that could affect the success or failure of the IRA, including as a result of political polarisation. Separately, gas power expansion plans from several major US utilities also pose a challenge to the IRA.)
Other Biden administration initiatives with important implications for US emissions include the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, loans for nuclear power plants and new standards on appliance efficiency issued by the Department of Energy.
Meanwhile, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) has finalised rules on methane emissions from oil and gas facilities. It has also proposed – but not yet finalised – rules on vehicle fuel standards, power plant greenhouse gas standards and power plant air pollution.
The administration is now rushing to finalise these rules within the next couple of months, so that they could not be overturned easily after the election using the Congressional Review Act.
The administration is reportedly planning to weaken its proposed vehicle fuel standards. The final version would retain the original aim of having two-thirds of new sales be all-electric by 2032, but would ease the trajectory to reaching that target, according to the New York Times. This would reduce the emissions-cutting impact, relative to what is assumed in the “Biden” scenario.
Separately, the administration is reported to be exempting existing gas-fired units from its proposed power plant emissions rules, focusing for now on existing coal and future gas-fired units. The New York Times quotes EPA administrator Michael Regan saying this will “achieve greater emissions reductions”, but the timescales could also affect the scenario projection.
Meanwhile, Biden has also overseen a rare Senate approval of an international climate treaty, when it ratified the Kigali Amendment on tackling climate-warming hydrofluorocarbons in 2022, with the US EPA issuing related rules the following year.
In addition, Biden’s time in office has seen further state-level action on emissions. This includes California’s clean car standards, as strengthened in 2022 and adopted by six other states.
What a second-term Trump might do
For his part, former president and Republican front-runner Donald Trump has made no secret of his desire to roll back his predecessor’s climate policies, just as he did during his first term.
For example, in 2018, the Trump administration lifted Obama-era rules on toxic air pollution from electricity generating and industrial sites – with Biden now moving to reverse the reversal.
Similarly, in 2020, his administration rolled back an Obama-era EPA rule on methane emissions from the oil and gas industry. The Biden administration’s methane rule could face a similar fate under a second Trump term.
Trump also has form when it comes to energy efficiency regulations, which he rolled back in 2020.
In November 2023, the Financial Times reported that Trump was “planning to gut” the IRA, increase investment in fossil fuels and roll back regulations to encourage electric vehicles. The newspaper added that Trump had called the IRA the “biggest tax hike in history”.
It quoted Carla Sands, an adviser to Trump, as saying:
“On the first day of a second Trump administration, the president has committed to rolling back every single one of Joe Biden’s job-killing, industry-killing regulations.”
Indeed, Republicans in the US House of Representatives have already made multiple attempts to repeal parts of the IRA. While some analysts think a full repeal of the act is unlikely, it is clear that a second-term Trump could – as Politico put it – ”hobble the climate law”.
A February 2024 commentary from investment firm Trium Capital argues that the impact on IRA will depend not only on whether Trump wins victory in November, but also on whether the Republicans retain control of the House and gain a Senate majority.
Even if the Republicans win all three races, the commentary suggests that some parts of IRA might survive beyond the election. It says that consumer incentives for electric vehicles and home heating are “most at risk”, whereas tax credits for clean energy might only be modified.
Equally, MIT Technology Review says that clean energy and EV tax credits both “appear especially vulnerable, climate policy experts say”. The publication adds:
“Moreover, Trump’s wide-ranging pledges to weaken international institutions, inflame global trade wars, and throw open the nation’s resources to fossil-fuel extraction could have compounding effects on any changes to the IRA, potentially undermining economic growth, the broader investment climate, and prospects for emerging green industries.”
Meanwhile, Trump has also criticised Biden’s infrastructure act and previously revoked California’s ability to set tougher car emissions standards, which are also adopted by other states.
In 2022, the California “waiver” was reinstated by Biden, who also opposed a 2023 Republican bill designed to remove California’s right to regulate. Yet the waiver is now embroiled in legal action brought by Republican states, expected to end up in the Supreme Court.
If he emerges victorious in November, Trump would also “plan to destroy the EPA”, according to a Guardian article published earlier this month. It reported:
“Donald Trump and his advisers have made campaign promises to toss crucial environmental regulations and boost the planet-heating fossil fuel sector. Those plans include systematically dismantling the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the federal body with the most power to take on the climate emergency and environmental justice, an array of Trump advisers and allies said.”
The paper cites Project 2025, described as “a presidential agenda put forth by the Heritage Foundation and other conservative organisations”. It also quotes Mandy Gunasekara, Trump’s EPA chief of staff and a contributor to the Project 2025 agenda.
After Trump was elected for the first time, many scientists, politicians and campaigners argued that his presidency would only have a relatively short-term effect on emissions and climate goals.
Many of his first-term efforts to rollback climate rules and boost fossil fuels ended in failure.
While some modelling suggested that his first presidency would delay hitting global emissions targets by a decade, Carbon Brief analysis found that US states and cities might be able to take sufficient steps to meet the country’s then-current climate goal without federal action.
However, another recent Guardian article says that a second-term Trump would be “even more extreme for the environment than his first, according to interviews with multiple Trump allies and advisers”. It adds:
“In contrast to a sometimes chaotic first White House term, they outlined a far more methodical second presidency: driving forward fossil fuel production, sidelining mainstream climate scientists and overturning rules that curb planet-heating emissions.”
Carbon Brief’s “Trump” scenario does not include additional fossil fuel emissions as a result of policies supporting coal, oil and gas production or use, as the success or otherwise of any such efforts are highly uncertain.
In addition, higher US fossil fuel production would not all be consumed domestically and would not increase global demand on a one-for-one basis.
While it would be likely to raise demand and emissions, both domestically and internationally, the precise impact would depend on the response of markets and overseas policymakers.
The global climate implications of the US election
If Biden – or another Democrat – wins the election in November and if his party regains control over the House and Senate, then they could push to implement new climate policies in 2025.
There is a clear need for further policy, if US climate goals are to be met. Moreover, the expiration of a large number of tax cuts at the end of 2025 could present an opportunity to deploy carbon pricing in support of raising revenues – and cutting emissions – according to a recent study.
It suggests that a price on emissions, described as a “carbon fee”, could significantly boost US chances of hitting its 2030 target, even if paired with a partial repeal of the IRA.
(Note that the “Repeal IRA; no new emissions rules” scenario in this study is similar to the “Trump” scenario in Carbon Brief’s analysis. However, the model used in the study finds a relatively weak 2030 emissions impact of the IRA compared with most of the five others, with which it is aggregated by Carbon Brief.)
An additional point of leverage is the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which will put a carbon price on US exports unless they face an equivalent price domestically, according to Democratic senator Sheldon Whitehouse, speaking at a launch event for the study:
“The 2025 opportunity when the Trump tax cuts collapse [creates] huge room for negotiation. Then you’ve got the CBAM happening in Europe that puts enormous pressure to get a price of carbon, if you want to avoid being tariffed at the EU and UK level.”
Whether a second-term Biden administration would attempt to put a price on carbon or not, it would be likely to push forward new policies in pursuit of US climate targets.
In contrast, a victory for Donald Trump could be expected, at a minimum, to result in full or partial repeal of the IRA and rollbacks of Biden’s climate rules, including power plants, cars and methane.
This is reflected in Carbon Brief’s “Trump” scenario, which would add a cumulative 4GtCO2e to US emissions by 2030, as shown in the figure below.
Moreover, assuming no further policy changes, this cumulative total would continue to climb beyond 2030, reaching 15GtCO2e by 2040 and a huge 27GtCO2e by 2050.
The increases in cumulative emissions under the “Trump” scenario are so large that they would imperil not only the US climate targets, but also global climate goals. (Under the 22nd amendment of the US constitution, Trump would not be allowed to run for a third term.)
In 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sixth assessment report (AR6) said that it would be “impossible” to stay below 1.5C without strengthening current pledges:
“[F]ollowing current NDCs until 2030…[would make] it impossible to limit warming to 1.5C with no or limited overshoot and strongly increas[e] the challenge to likely limit warming to 2C.”
The corollary of this is that if the US – the world’s second-largest emitter – misses its 2030 target by a wide margin, then it would be likely to end any hope of keeping global warming below 1.5C.
How the analysis was carried out
The two scenarios set out in this analysis are based on an aggregation of modelling published by Bistline et al. (2023) and the Rhodium Group (2023).
The first study was explained by the authors in a Carbon Brief guest post. It compares the impact of the IRA using results from 11 separate models, some of which only cover the power sector. Carbon Brief’s analysis uses results from the six models that cover the entire US economy.
The “Trump” scenario is based on the “reference” pathway in this study, corresponding to the average of the six models. The only modification is that the Trump scenario is set to match the Biden scenario below until 2024.
The “Biden” scenario is based on the average IRA pathway from this study, extended using modelling from the Rhodium Group to include the impact of further Biden administration policies.
Carbon Brief’s analysis uses the “mid-emissions” pathway from the Rhodium study’s “federal-only” scenario, which includes the impact of vehicle fuel standards, power plant greenhouse gas and pollutant emissions rules, and energy efficiency regulations.
This additional Rhodium Group modelling is based on draft rules which have not yet been finalised and are subject to change, as well as to potential legal challenge, as discussed above.
The uncertainty shown for the “Trump” and “Biden” scenarios corresponds to the range in the six economy-wide models from Bistline et al. (2023).
Carbon Brief’s analysis does not include any additional post-2025 climate policies that could be adopted by a second Biden administration. Nor does it include the potential impact of pro-fossil fuel policies that could be introduced by a second Trump administration.
Finally, it also does not include additional subnational climate policies that could be introduced, nor does it consider the risk that current or future state action could be hit by federal or legal challenge.
Historical US greenhouse gas emissions are taken from the US EPA inventory through to 2021. Figures for 2022 and 2023 are based on estimated annual changes from the Rhodium Group.
The post Analysis: Trump election win could add 4bn tonnes to US emissions by 2030 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Trump election win could add 4bn tonnes to US emissions by 2030
An uptick in heat extremes, driven by human-caused climate change, has caused tropical bird populations to decline by up to 38% since the 1950s, according to a first-of-its-kind analysis.
The study combines ecological and climate attribution techniques to trace the fingerprint of fossil-fuelled climate change on declining wildlife populations.
It shows that an increase in heat extremes driven by climate change has caused tropical bird populations to decline by 25-38% in the period 1950-2020, when compared to a world without warming.
The findings could help to explain why tropical bird numbers have declined even in pristine rainforests, a phenomenon that previously mystified biologists, the scientists say.
‘Chance encounter’
Over the past few decades, an emerging field of science known as “climate attribution” has used a standardised set of techniques to trace the fingerprint of human-caused warming on different elements of the climate system, ranging from worsening extreme weather events to episodes of glacier melt.
The new research, published in Nature Ecology and Evolution, is the first to use climate attribution techniques to detect the fingerprint of climate change on declining wildlife populations.
The study came about following a “chance encounter” between lead author Dr Maximilian Kotz, a climate scientist at the Barcelona Supercomputing Center in Spain, and his co-authors, who are biodiversity experts at the University of Queensland in Australia, while Kotz was completing a research stay in Australia.
Kotz says to Carbon Brief:
“As far as we are aware, this is the first animal climate attribution study.”
The researchers decided to focus on birds, rather than other animal species, as they have the “best available data, covering a good range of different species and geographies”, he adds.
Heat extremes
The authors examine how an intensification of heat extremes could have impacted bird populations, while controlling for other factors known to affect wildlife, including average temperature increase and human pressures, such as land-use change.
Episodes of extreme heat are known to have an immediate and long-lasting impact on birds, Kotz says:
“High temperature extremes can induce direct mortality in bird populations due to hyperthermia and dehydration. Even when they don’t [kill birds immediately], there’s evidence that this can then affect body condition which, in turn, affects breeding behaviour and success.”
Using statistical techniques, the scientists first analyse historical records to identify how bird populations have responded to fluctuations in climate, including heat extremes, over 1950-2020.
The team sourced global data on bird populations from the database that underlies the Living Planet Index, put together by the environmental charity WWF. They note it is the most comprehensive database available, but still has “clear geographic biases”, with global north regions better represented than those in the global south.
They use an attribution framework to estimate the extent to which human-caused warming influenced the changes in heat extremes observed in that time period, then calculate the impact of these climate-change-driven heat extremes on bird population changes from 1950-2020.
(The authors defined “heat extremes” as temperatures within the top 1% of daily temperatures over 1940-70, with data taken from ERA5, a global reanalysis dataset, which combines data from weather stations, satellites and model output.)
To understand how this would compare to a world without climate change, the researchers subtract this impact from the historical records.
Comparing their results to the counterfactual world without climate change allowed them to quantify how bird populations have changed as a result of human-driven increases in heat extremes.
Mapped
The research finds that human-driven heat extremes have had “strong negative impacts” on bird population numbers, with those residing at lower latitudes being the most affected.
The map below shows the percentage change in bird population abundance attributed to heat extremes over 1950-2018, when compared to a world without climate change.
On the map, dark red shows large decreases in population abundance, while light blue indicates small increases. (Abundance refers to the number of individual animals in a given population.)
The research finds that birds in the tropics have experienced the largest declines attributable to heat extremes.
It concludes that an uptick in heat extremes has caused tropical bird abundance levels to decline by 25-38% in the period 1950-2020, when compared to a world without warming.
The range in the size of that impact reflects the results of different models, which each use slightly different techniques to simulate changes to bird populations, Kotz says.
Tropical turmoil
In their paper, the authors note that their finding that tropical birds have experienced the most substantial declines are “consistent” with other studies indicating that “birds in these regions may be closer to the thermal limits at which impacts start to occur”.
They add that the findings are “particularly pertinent, given recent documentation of declining tropical bird populations, even in undisturbed habitats”.
One previous study found that in a “relatively undisturbed” part of the Amazon rainforest, bird abundance declined by more than 50% from 2003 to 2022. Similar results were found in a forest in Panama.
The authors of the new study say:
“The source of such declines have been noted as unknown, yet they are of a similar order of magnitude to our estimates of the impacts of intensified heat extremes.”
Their results suggest that “in tropical realms, climate change impacts on bird populations may already be comparable to land pressures that lead to habitat destruction and degradation”, the authors say.
This has “potential ramifications” for commonly proposed conservation strategies, such as increasing the amount of land in the the tropics that is protected for nature, they continue:
“While we do not disagree that these strategies are necessary for abating tropical habitat loss…our research shows there is now an additional urgent need to investigate strategies that can allow for the persistence of tropical species that are vulnerable to heat extremes.”
In some parts of the world, scientists and conservationists are looking into how to protect wildlife from more intense and frequent climate extremes, Kotz tells Carbon Brief.
He references one project in Australia which is working to protect threatened wildlife following periods of extreme heat, drought and bushfires.
Informing forecasts
As well as shedding light on what could be behind the rapid decline of birds in the tropics, the findings also underscore the importance of examining changes in climate extremes, rather than just annual global temperature rise, says Prof Alex Pigot, a biodiversity scientist at University College London (UCL), who was not involved in the research. He tells Carbon Brief:
“Most of the models that have been used to make projections of risk to biodiversity under future climate change use long-term climate averages and so the results of this study suggest that our existing risk assessments could be missing these critical impacts of climate change.
“We urgently need to address this and develop early warning systems to be able to anticipate in advance where and when extreme heatwaves and droughts are likely to impact populations – and also rapidly scale up our monitoring of species and ecosystems so that we can reliably detect these effects and feed this information back into our models to refine our future projections for biodiversity.”
Dr Peter Soroye, a biodiversity scientist at the Wildlife Conservation Society Canada, who was also not involved in the research, agrees:
“It’s not just that the climate is getting gradually warmer every year with climate change, it’s that climate change is also driving increasingly frequent and severe extreme temperature events that are putting wildlife at risk.
“As we more fully understand the importance of extremes, it seems increasingly important to consider them when we model or project changes in biodiversity over time.”
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Fossil-fuelled heat has caused tropical birds to decline by ‘up to 38%’ since 1950s
This year marks a decade since nations successfully negotiated the Paris Agreement, a landmark treaty that has been the guiding force for international climate politics ever since.
Yet, with another round of negotiations looming at COP30 in November, there has been growing discontent with the UN climate process.
Critics say the talks are not doing enough to accelerate emissions cuts, tackle fossil fuels or raise climate funds for developing countries, among other concerns.
Influential figures in climate politics and civil society groups say COPs are in need of an “urgent overhaul” and have launched various manifestos for change.
This has been recognised by the Brazilian COP30 presidency, which has acknowledged the “growing calls for change” and asked parties to “reflect on the future of the process itself”.
All of this comes amid concerns about a “crisis” of multilateralism, widespread conflict and escalating climate hazards.
Carbon Brief asked 16 leading experts about how they think the UN climate talks could be reformed, including Christiana Figueres, Todd Stern, Prof Navroz K Dubash, Bernice Lee, Paul Watkinson, Dr Joanna Depledge, Dr Jennifer Allan, Sandrine Dixson-Declève and Li Shuo.
The contributors’ answers are presented via the thematic sections below.
- Has the Paris Agreement been a success?
- How could the negotiations themselves be improved?
- Can UN climate talks drive faster emissions cuts?
- How could COPs ensure broader accountability?
- Do UN climate talks need majority voting?
- What should the role of the COP presidency be?
- Do fossil-fuel companies have too much influence?
- Are COPs too big?
- How could COP participation be improved?
- How can COPs drive change outside the UN process?
Has the Paris Agreement been a success?
Todd Stern, former US special envoy for climate change: Paris has performed well in some respects, including strengthening both its temperature and emission goals in light of evolving science. It also led to a first global stocktake that called for tripling renewable energy and doubling energy efficiency by 2030 – and transitioning away from fossil fuels – in order to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.
Bernice Lee, distinguished fellow and senior advisor at Chatham House: It can be hard to remember that the process remains one of the most successful multilateral endeavours in recent history. It has delivered what few thought possible: agreement among nearly 200 countries on a global issue that cuts to the core of national sovereignty, economic models and domestic politics. That the COP process delivered the Paris Agreement – and more recently, an agreement to transition away from fossil fuels – is no small feat. It is also easy to forget that, prior to Paris, the world was on track for a catastrophic 4-5C of warming. Today’s pledges, while still inadequate, have bent that curve closer to 2.5-3C – still unsafe, but a meaningful shift…Rather than dwelling on the system’s imperfections, the question is whether it can evolve, realistically and politically. Dismantling the current system is unlikely to yield a stronger or more equitable one with the authority to override national decisions. The current process, after all, emerged from the ruins of earlier failures.
Kaveh Guilanpour, vice president for international strategies at the Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions: In the aftermath of every COP, there are calls to reform the UNFCCC. But we should be aiming for an evolution, not a revolution, for three reasons. Firstly, a revolution would almost certainly not result in something stronger than we already have. It is hard to imagine that it would be possible to adopt the Paris Agreement in the current geopolitical and economic context. Secondly, the Paris Agreement is working, albeit not fast enough. Thirdly, and most importantly, the biggest barriers to the effective functioning of the UNFCCC and delivering on the Paris Agreement are deficiencies in the underlying politics. No amount of tweaking of the UNFCCC process can make up for that.
How could the negotiations themselves be improved?
Dr Monserrat Madariaga Gomez de Cuenca, environmental lawyer at Legal Response International: It is time to fully acknowledge that there is a crisis of trust in the UN climate process and take appropriate measures to limit it. Parties mistrust each other and stakeholders mistrust the limited results emerging from 30 years of climate talks.
Paul Watkinson, former EU climate negotiator: Whilst the negotiating process can be frustrating, it remains essential. I would focus on making the workload more manageable, for example by grouping items on agendas and organising work on a multiannual basis. The aim should be to give enough time to every item – rather than addressing everything together each time – and develop the understanding that not every item needs a negotiated outcome at each meeting.
Kaveh Guilanpour: [We should] embrace the role of multilateral negotiations at the core – and recognise that this is what attracts world leaders and non-parties to COPs – but work towards contextualising the negotiations in a wider ecosystem of climate action, to which they are clearly linked. Do not place all expectations only on the negotiated outcomes.
Christiana Figueres, former executive secretary of the UNFCCC: We could…streamline repetitive and overloaded agendas – and elevate the accountability of COP presidents through a public oath of office, potentially administered by the UNFCCC bureau, that reminds the COP presidency of its role.
Dr Joanna Depledge, research fellow at the University of Cambridge and former UNFCCC secretariat staff member: Overall, the negotiations have proved resistant to anything but very limited reform. Why so? The fact is that many of the perceived inefficiencies are not flaws as such, but inherent to a global process where all nations are sovereign and equal – and all want a say. They are also inherent to the very issue of climate change, which, because it is so multifaceted…inevitably spawns an ever-expanding agenda, while attracting ever more government and civil society participants. And process is politics: moves to restructure the negotiations inevitably come up against powerful forces who know how to maximise their influence in the existing system and far prefer the status quo.
Dr Monserrat Madariaga Gomez de Cuenca: [COPs should] avoid rushed, closed-door negotiations without party consultations, which make implementation impossible. When draft text appears in the eleventh hour and is forwarded to the closing plenary without proper discussion, the possibilities of parties gaslighting each other on the actual “meaning” and “intention” of the text multiply. Language such as “transitioning away from fossil fuels” or the path towards the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to $1.3tn” – where the wording is not clear – allows parties to cherry-pick the most favourable interpretation, undermining the implementation of decisions that were already difficult to achieve.
Dr Joanna Depledge: Streamlining agendas and limiting government delegation size are worth fighting for, but imposing criteria for selecting COP hosts and excluding private companies involved in high-carbon activities are non-starters. If the real problem is that the COP is not taking decisions in line with the science, then the answer is not tinkering around the edges of procedure and process. What is needed is a major strategic rethink and more fundamental reforms – notably to decision-making practices and voting – as I argue elsewhere.
Harjeet Singh, founding director at the Satat Sampada Climate Foundation: The process must change: streamline negotiations, review consensus rules and ban fossil-fuel lobbyists from influencing texts. Centre the voices of Indigenous peoples, frontline communities and civil society. And scale up public climate finance to enable a just transition and real support for adaptation and addressing loss and damage – by making polluters pay. The recent International Court of Justice advisory opinion has reinforced the demand for climate reparations. COP30 must open a new era of accountability and justice.
Can UN climate talks drive faster emissions cuts?
Dr Jennifer Allan, senior lecturer in international relations, Cardiff University: The UNFCCC is only as effective as parties allow it to be. The Paris Agreement is working precisely how some feared and how some major emitting countries hoped. It is premised on the promise of transparency: that national reports and the global stocktake, coupled with principles of progression, will – somehow – inspire climate ambition. But transparency is not the same as accountability.
Todd Stern: The Paris regime itself has an important role to play. For starters, the regime needs to develop much more of a broad partnership in the spirit of the 2015 High Ambition Coalition. Part of such a shift will depend on considering whether country emission targets are adequate. Of course, Paris was built on the principle of “nationally determined contributions” and that principle cannot be thrown overboard. But Paris was also built on the promise that it would strive to prevent dangerous climate change, that new emission targets every five years would reflect countries’ highest possible ambition and that global stocktakes would, in fact, take stock.
Claudio Angelo, head of international policy at the Climate Observatory: The “nationally determined” nature of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), and the fact that no assessment of progress is formally done outside the five-year period of the global stocktake, mean that the ambition gap will become more difficult to close the more urgent it becomes to close it. The irony of it is that the Paris architecture was tailor-made to accommodate the idiosyncrasies of the US, which has pulled out of the agreement anyway.
Prof Navroz K Dubash, professor of public and international affairs at Princeton School of Public and International Affairs: A bumper sticker for reform of the UN climate talks might read: “Less talk of ambition; more action on implementation”. An “ambition-first” approach rests on extracting national statements of emissions reduction intent, leveraging these up through country “naming and shaming” and strengthening compliance through enhanced accountability. But the conditions are not favourable for this approach. National politics rarely privilege emissions reductions over other objectives and global politics is increasingly non-responsive to climate shame. By contrast, the conditions for a “learning-by-doing” approach based on on-the-ground implementation appear brighter. Many countries are experimenting with pragmatic efforts to turn their economies in low-carbon directions.
Todd Stern: There is nothing about the nationally determined character of country pledges that says countries cannot be questioned, prodded and critiqued. Protecting thin skin is not as important as protecting a liveable world.
Prof Navroz K Dubash: How might global talks enable learning by doing, rather than doubling down on ambition-first approaches? NDCs could be liberated to be templates for experimentation rather than rigid bases for accountability alone. Detailed sectoral low-carbon development pathways would highlight country commonalities, reveal productive scope for international cooperation and incentivise finance…A renewed international process should be focused on the hard, detailed work of enabling low-carbon, resilient development transitions and less on extracting statements of intent.
Kaveh Guilanpour: [We should] move to an approach where progress is measured predominantly by the impact of implemented national level policies, not NDCs on paper. Focus as much on enhancing international cooperation to deliver implementation as on increasing formal ambition on paper through NDC target-setting.
How could COPs ensure broader accountability?
Paul Watkinson: The biggest opportunity to support implementation is outside the formal process, putting order and structure into the “action agenda”. It has grown enormously in recent years and there have been many valuable initiatives…But there has been insufficient continuity and not enough follow-up and tracking to ensure that what is announced and promised is delivered. That is why I welcome the proposal of the incoming Brazilian COP30 presidency to structure the action agenda around six broad themes, drawn from the outcomes of the global stocktake, including a cross-cutting theme around enablers including the vital role of finance. They have the power, in close coordination with the high-level champions, to relaunch the action agenda on stronger foundations that could serve for years to come.
Dr Jennifer Allan: Within the negotiations, there is a glaring need to track the many commitments made outside of the regular negotiation process, either in presidency-led declarations or cover decisions. A central, publicly available hub needs to collate these promises and track progress. Presidencies may broker these commitments, but have few incentives to follow up on them.
Bernice Lee: What can – and must – change is how the system functions. Every decade or so, the climate regime has adapted – from Kyoto’s top-down legalism to Paris’s nationally determined flexibility. These shifts were not just philosophical, they also enabled new capacities. The collapse in Copenhagen helped catalyse renewable energy investment plans, while Paris introduced NDCs. The next phase must embed delivery and equity more deeply into the process including, for example, mechanisms aligning corporate transition plans with country transition, national policies and sectoral pathways. The outcomes of any reform process should mean fewer theatrics, earlier decisions and sharper accountability. All of this would enhance not only country but also public engagement, as well as the credibility of the global climate process.
Harjeet Singh: Rather than catalysing ambition, the Paris Agreement has been used by developed countries to shirk their historical responsibilities…It is not the Paris Agreement or the UNFCCC that failed – it is rich countries that undermined the system to protect polluters and preserve an unsustainable growth model. True reform begins with accountability. Wealthy nations must be held responsible for their historical emissions and must pay for the loss and damage they have caused.
Sandrine Dixson-Declève, honorary president at the Club of Rome and executive chair of Earth4All: Strengthen climate target enforcement through scientific oversight, peer review and robust reporting – ensuring governments, COP presidencies and corporations are held accountable. [There should be] a permanent scientific advisory body within the COP. Science must be central to negotiations, with all delegations regularly briefed on the latest data around risks, equity, solutions and scenarios.
Prof Navroz K Dubash: Ambition and implementation can be complementary, but they are not necessarily so. The former is driven by a relentless focus on emissions, comparability in emission pledges and building accountability. The latter is enabled by linking climate to other objectives, seeking country-specific formulations that buy political support and flexible experimentation that allows for learning from failure. Being more, not less, in the sectoral weeds might reveal opportunities not apparent from the stratospheric heights of climate negotiations. Well-developed, home-grown visions of sustainable futures are the most robust basis for developing countries’ legitimate claims for finance and other support.
Do UN climate talks need majority voting?
Erika Lennon, senior climate attorney at the Centre for International Environmental Law: Voting is the elephant in the room. The parties to the UNFCCC have never been able to adopt the “rules of procedure” because they cannot agree on the provision related to voting in the absence of consensus. Instead, they proceed meeting after meeting using them as “draft rules of procedure”. This has created a race to the bottom whereby countries that want to stall progress can do so. For 29 years, other parties have had to agree to the lowest common denominator in the name of consensus.
Claudio Angelo: The decision made in 2023 to “transition away from fossil fuels” needs both fleshing out and monitoring, but it is nowhere to be seen in the formal negotiations towards Belém. Such omissions reflect one fundamental problem of the UNFCCC and one fundamental flaw of the Paris Agreement: the consensus rule. Some countries are now shamelessly backtracking on their previous commitment and saying that any mention of cutting back on fossil fuels anywhere is a red line for them…A handful of countries are holding the future of humanity hostage because they can block whatever they want [due to the consensus rule]. Even COP presidencies that do want to move the agenda forward are afraid to be bold, lest “the process should collapse”. But a process that is unfit for purpose might as well collapse.
Christiana Figueres: In the context of the formal negotiations, we could reconsider our tradition of having to adopt all decisions unanimously. UNFCCC procedures require consensus for the adoption of decisions, not necessarily unanimity. The difference is important and admittedly challenging to manage, but worth examining.
Erika Lennon: The fix would be to adopt the rules of procedure, including the paragraphs on voting. The UNFCCC would then join many other multilateral environmental agreements – and its own financial instruments – that sometimes use majority voting.
Bernice Lee: In recent months, many well-meaning critics have called the UN multilateral climate process broken, arguing it should be dismantled and replaced, but with no viable alternatives waiting in the wings. Reforming core procedures – such as introducing majority voting or amending the convention – would require agreement from three-quarters of countries, followed by domestic ratification. Even without today’s fractured geopolitics, this would be a tall order.
What should the role of the COP presidency be?
Dr Monserrat Madariaga Gomez de Cuenca: [COPs should] avoid adding more pressure by clarifying duties and processes for the COP president. Rules of procedure simply give the COP president the power to formally conduct the negotiations, which should be done in a neutral manner. Increasingly, we see COP presidents setting exceedingly ambitious plans for their respective COPs. Ideas of “success” and “legacy” permeate what should be a facilitative role towards the collective progress of UN climate talks. COPs finish with statements and reports of achievements that do not reflect the actual progress. Reviewing the conduct of negotiations and the role and expectations of COP presidencies could help in restoring some of the damaged trust in the process.
Prof Thomas Hale, professor in public policy at the University of Oxford: The “action agenda” needs to escape the “boom-bust” cycle that shifting presidencies and high-level champions have imposed on it, in which new announcements trump delivery. The COP30 presidency has laid out a positive approach here, but the acid test lies in making it real.
Sandrine Dixson-Declève: Only countries with high climate ambition should be eligible to host COPs.
Li Shuo, director of the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute: Instead of – or alongside – three more paragraphs specifying how the world will “transition away from fossil fuels” or “triple renewable energy”, how about three renewable projects in the COP host country, to be announced in conjunction with the climate summit?…Efforts to advance the implementation agenda through additional multilateral rulemaking and COP decisions risk missing the point. The COP presidency…could showcase a handful of large‑scale renewable energy projects in their own countries, backed by concrete financing. Such a “trade fair” function of the COP would help bridge the widening gap between what is agreed at COPs and what is happening on the ground.
Do fossil-fuel companies have too much influence?
Erika Lennon: The fossil fuel industry’s survival depends on the UNFCCC’s failure, as meeting the goals of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement undeniably means phasing out fossil fuels. It is therefore no wonder that, since the beginning, fossil-fuel industry lobbyists have been present at COPs and working to undermine ambition.
Dr Jennifer Allan: Presidencies have much to answer for and can be key to raising accountability. COP is becoming the new Davos: a place for billionaires to meet, without scrutiny of their activities or announcements. This must end. Presidencies should revoke invitations to [Amazon chief executive] Jeff Bezos and others who have been offered high-level platforms.
Erika Lennon: Parties could adopt a conflict-of-interest policy to, at the very least, make [fossil-fuel lobbyists’] influence transparent and subsequently exclude those who aim to unduly influence the process. Parties, including the presidency team, could refuse to give them badges…In addition, they could end greenwashing at COPs in the form of corporate sponsorships and pavilions.
Are COPs too big?
Prof Thomas Hale: COP is both too big and too small for an era of implementation. Its cost and complexity eat up scarce resources. Meanwhile, it creates a gravity well that warps the climate community’s work into an annual rush to the end of the year…At the same time, even the biggest COPs are puny compared to the problem. Climate change demands action from all of society…In this complex system, the UNFCCC process plays the critical function of setting agendas and goals. No other body has the multilateral legitimacy to serve as a lighthouse.
Dr Jennifer Allan: Climate summits could shift from a talkshop to a demonstration of leadership if invitations are only extended to countries that have submitted and maintained more progressive NDCs and are implementing them.
Prof Thomas Hale: We need COPs to be everything, everywhere, all at once. Alongside a single, two-week meeting in one place, we need lots of smaller, focused meetings in many places. Instead of an intergovernmental process that talks about action, we need to fully shift the “action agenda” into the heart of the UNFCCC. The good news is that the elements of this shift are already well in motion, with more and more cities hosting “climate weeks”…Regional meetings with more flexible formats reach more people, in a more targeted way, much more cheaply and efficiently than a COP.
Dr Jennifer Allan: I’ve been researching the role of side events, pavilion activities and Global Climate Action Hub panels in the “expo” that now dominates COP space and participation opportunities. There has been a decided shift, from a smaller number of events focused on negotiation and implementation to a huge array of panels showcasing new initiatives or national actions. It is about what is new, not following up on what has been agreed. Side events and Global Climate Action Hub events could shift focus under the secretariat and the high-level champions. Pavilion spaces could be reserved for those who can demonstrate that their presence will advance climate action.
Sandrine Dixson-Declève: COPs must evolve from negotiation-heavy forums to more frequent, smaller, solution-focused meetings centred on progress and implementation, with broad stakeholder participation.
How could COP participation be improved?
Erika Lennon: Civil society, youth, Indigenous peoples, women, local communities and people with disabilities, among others, have increasingly faced shrinking civic space in the UNFCCC process. They have to fight to have their voices heard, to be present in the rooms where decisions happen, for access to information and open decision-making, and to assemble peacefully.
Shreeshan Venkatesh, global policy lead at Climate Action Network International: Structural barriers…undermine inclusivity and equitable participation in UNFCCC meetings, from the high cost of accommodation at COPs to discriminatory visa practices and shrinking civil society quotas. These barriers must be dismantled to ensure all parties and stakeholders can participate fully and on equal terms.
Erika Lennon: Parties should incorporate and support participation not only at COPs, but also in climate action and decisions on the ground. They can do this by creating space across all agenda items to hear from rightsholders and ensuring human rights and civic space are guaranteed during all negotiations.
Shreeshan Venkatesh: Civic space and freedoms are under threat, even at COPs. Host agreements must guarantee freedom of speech, assembly and accessibility, backed by an independent body to address violations.
How can COPs drive change outside the UN process?
Sandrine Dixson-Declève: COP must transform from a forum of negotiation to a platform of delivery, inclusion and accountability, anchoring climate action in the lived realities of people and the demands of science.
Kaveh Guilanpour: There should be a thorough and honest analysis of the value add of the UNFCCC process and what is best left to other fora.
Christiana Figueres: While some negotiations remain necessary, the most urgent action has shifted to implementation in the context of market forces and climate economics. There is no doubt that civil society, businesses, cities and communities are moving faster than governments. These actors, traditionally considered and labelled as mere “observers” in the formal UNFCCC space, have become the true engines of transformation. One could consider the pros and cons of creating a semi-detached “real world” space alongside COP – one that amplifies their progress, showcases innovation and feeds actionable insights back into the formal process.
Todd Stern: The Paris regime has a role to play in encouraging and tracking strong action outside its purview. This includes the public and private sectors working together on rapid decarbonisation and on unlocking the kind of large-scale investment needed for countries in the global south to build sustainable and resilient economies.
Shreeshan Venkatesh: The UNFCCC, and other multilateral fora that have become central to the formulation and implementation of climate policy and international cooperation, must align with international law. This includes the recent advisory opinions from the ICJ and the Inter-American Court of Justice, and the obligations they clearly lay out.
Claudio Angelo: [There is] a final, bigger problem, which no UNFCCC reform can solve: the climate regime is a child of the democratic world order and the lynchpin of that world order has become a rogue state. The rise of the far-right and the erosion of democracy are rendering multilateralism itself useless – a world that is unable to stop genocides in Gaza and Sudan can’t solve the climate crisis.
The post COP experts: How could the UN climate talks be reformed? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Wildfires have scorched more than 40,000 hectares of land so far this year across the UK – an area more than twice the size of the Scottish city of Glasgow.
This is already a record amount of land burned in a single year, far exceeding the previous high, Global Wildfire Information System (GWIS) data shows.
It is also almost four times the average area burned in wildfires by this stage of the year over 2012-24 – and 50% higher than the previous record amount burned by this time in 2019.
The burned area overtook the previous annual record in April, BBC News reported at the time, and has continued to soar in the months since.
Major wildfires
The chart below shows that UK wildfires in 2025 so far have already burned by far the largest area of land over any calendar year since GWIS records began in 2012. The previous record year was 2019, followed by 2022, while 2024 saw the lowest area size burned.
Annual land area burned by wildfires across the UK from 2012 to 2025 (red), alongside the average area burned each year over 2012-24. Source: Global Wildfire Information System.
Climate change can increase the risk and impact of wildfires. Warmer temperatures and drought can leave land parched and dry out vegetation, which helps fires spread more rapidly. Climate change is making these types of extreme conditions more likely to occur, as well as more severe.
Fire services in England and Wales responded to 564 wildfires from January to June 2025 – an increase from 69 fires in the same period last year, the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) said in a statement in June.
Most wildfires in the UK are caused by human activity, whether accidental or deliberate, according to the NFCC. Some common ignition sources are disposable barbecues, lit cigarettes and campfires.
Jessica Richter, a research analyst at Global Forest Watch, says that, while fires are also a key part of some ecosystems, climate change is the “major driver behind the increasing fire activity around the globe”. She tells Carbon Brief:
“As we see more fires, we’re going to see more carbon being emitted and that’s just going to be, for lack of a better phrasing, adding fuel to the fire.”
Examples of 2025 wildfires around Galloway (1) and Inverness (2) in Scotland, and a wildfire in Powys (3) in Wales. Source: FIRMS, MapTiler, OpenStreetMap contributors.
The UK has also recorded its highest-ever wildfire emissions this year, according to Copernicus, which was “primarily driven” by major wildfires in Scotland from late June to early July.
These were the largest wildfires ever recorded in the country, reported the Scotsman. They “ravaged” land in Moray and the Highlands in the north of the country, the newspaper added.
Scotland experienced an extreme wildfire in Galloway Forest Park in April, which was “so intense it could be seen from space”, the Financial Times said.
Elsewhere, in April, the Belfast News Letter reported that firefighters tackled almost 150 fires on the Mourne Mountains in Northern Ireland.
More recently, BBC News reported that firefighters in Dorset, England received “non-stop” wildfire calls in the first weekend of August, with one blaze “engulf[ing] an area the size of 30 football pitches”.
Wildfires have also caused devastation across many parts of Europe in recent weeks – including Albania, Cyprus, France, Greece, Spain and Turkey – as well as in the US and Canada.
The post Analysis: Record UK wildfires have burned an area twice the size of Glasgow in 2025 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Record UK wildfires have burned an area twice the size of Glasgow in 2025
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