The highest court of the UN has issued a landmark “advisory opinion” stating that nations can be held legally accountable for their greenhouse-gas emissions.
Recognising the “urgent and existential threat” facing the world, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded that those harmed by human-caused climate change are entitled to “reparations”.
Their opinion largely rests on the application of existing international law, clarifying that climate “harms” can be clearly linked to major emitters and fossil-fuel producers.
The case, which was triggered by a group of Pacific island students and championed by the government of Vanuatu, saw unprecedented levels of input from nations.
In a unanimous decision issued on 23 July, the 15 judges on the ICJ concluded that the production and consumption of fossil fuels “may constitute an internationally wrongful act attributable to that state”.
The opinion also says that limiting global warming to 1.5C should be considered the “primary temperature goal” for nations and, to achieve it, they are obliged to make “adequate contributions”.
While the ICJ opinion is not binding for governments, it is expected to have a significant impact as vulnerable groups and nations fight for climate compensation in court.
Below, Carbon Brief explains the most important aspects of the ICJ’s 133-page advisory opinion and speaks to legal experts about its implications.
- How did this case come about?
- How has the case been decided?
- What does the ICJ say about climate science?
- What does the ICJ say about countries’ climate obligations?
- What does it say about the legal consequences of breaches?
- What does it say about historical responsibility and reparations?
- What does it say about the Paris Agreement and 1.5C?
- What does it say about fossil fuels?
How did this case come about?
The case stems from a campaign led by 27 students from the University of the South Pacific in Fiji.
In 2019, they established a youth-led grassroots organisation – dubbed the Pacific Island Students Fighting Climate Change (PISFCC) – and began efforts to persuade the leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum to take the issue of climate change to the world’s top court.
PISFCC joined forces with other youth organisations from around the world in 2020, lobbying state representatives to take action.
In 2021, the government of Vanuatu announced that it would lead efforts to gain an “advisory opinion” from the ICJ. It worked to engage with the Pacific island community first, to build a “coalition of like-minded vulnerable countries”, reported Climate Home News.
Following on from this work, Vanuatu received a unanimous endorsement for its efforts from the 18 members of the Pacific Island Forum. It continued to work diplomatically, engaging in discussions across Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America to encourage other countries to join the effort.
After three rounds of consultations with other states, the resolution was put before the UN general assembly with the backing of 105 sponsor countries.
Finally, on 29 March 2023, the assembly unanimously adopted the resolution formally requesting an “advisory opinion” from the ICJ.
The resolution posed two questions for the ICJ. In answering these questions, it asked the court to have “particular regard” to a range of laws and principles, including the UN climate regime and the universal declaration on human rights.
First, the resolution asked what are the legal obligations of states under international law to “ensure the protection of the climate system”.
Second, it asked what are the legal consequences flowing from these obligations if states, by their “acts or omissions”, have caused “significant harm to the climate”.
The resolution asked for the court to consider, in particular, states that are “specially affected” or are “particularly vulnerable” to the impacts of climate change.
It also pointed to “peoples and individuals of the present and future generations affected by the adverse effects of climate change”.
Therefore, the advisory opinion issued this week by the ICJ, in response to these questions, is the culmination of a years-long process.
Although the opinion is not binding on states, it is binding on UN bodies and is likely to have far-reaching legal and political consequences at a national level.
How has the case been decided?
The ICJ was tasked with interpreting international law and arriving at an advisory opinion. While its legal advice will, therefore, not be binding for nations, it will be binding for other UN bodies.
This two-year process involved the judges defining the scope and meaning of the broad questions put to them by the UN general assembly. (See: How did the case come about?)
They then considered which international laws and principles were relevant for these questions.
Among the relevant laws identified were the three UN climate change treaties – the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
They also considered various other treaties covering biodiversity, ozone depletion, desertification and the oceans, as well as legal principles such as the principle of “prevention of significant harm to the environment”.
The ICJ’s process has also seen nations and international groups, such as the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), offer their views on the case.
These groups had the opportunity to feed into the judges’ deliberations over several stages, including two sets of written submissions, followed by oral statements to the court.
In total, the court received 91 written statements, a further 107 oral statements – delivered at the Hague in December 2024 – and 65 responses to follow-up questions by the judges.
This is the “highest level of participation in a proceeding” in the court’s history, according to the ICJ. Some nations, including island states such as Barbados and Micronesia, appeared before the court for the first time ever.
These contributions demonstrated broad agreement among nations that climate change is a threat and that emissions should be cut in order to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
But there were major divergences on the breadth and nature of obligations under international law to act to limit global warming, as well as on the consequences of any breaches, as specifically being addressed by the ICJ.
Overall, the main divisions were between high-emitting nations trying to limit their climate obligations and low-emitting, climate-vulnerable nations, who were pushing for broader legal obligations and stricter accountability for any breaches.
Specifically, “emerging” economies such as China and Saudi Arabia, along with historical high-emitters such as the UK and EU, argued that climate obligations under international law should be defined solely by reference to the UN climate regime.
In contrast, vulnerable nations said that wider international law should also apply, bringing additional obligations to act – and the potential for legal consequences, including reparations.
This is a departure from UN climate talks, where the main divide tends to be between “developed” and “developing” countries – with the latter encompassing both high- and low-emitting nations.
In an unusual move, the ICJ judges also organised a private meeting in November 2024 with scientists representing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
Among those present were IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea and eight other climate scientists from various countries and with different areas of expertise.
A statement issued by the ICJ said this was an effort to “enhance the court’s understanding of the key scientific findings which the IPCC has delivered”.
On 23 July 2025, after some seven months of deliberation, the ICJ issued a unanimous opinion in response to the UN general assembly’s request.
This is only the fifth time the court has delivered a unanimous result, according to the ICJ, after nearly 88 years in operation and 29 opinions.
(In addition to the unanimous opinion of the full court, several of the ICJ judges also issued their own declarations and opinions, individually or in small groups.)
What does the ICJ say about climate science?
When considering the “context” for the issuing of the advisory opinion on climate change, the court provides information on the “relevant scientific background”.
This was drawn from reports by the IPCC, which the court says “constitute the best available science on the causes, nature and consequences of climate change”.
It comes after ICJ judges held a private meeting with IPCC scientists in 2024. (See: How has the case been decided?)
The advisory opinion states that it is “scientifically established that the climate system has undergone widespread and rapid changes”, continuing:
“While certain greenhouse gases [GHGs] occur naturally, it is scientifically established that the increase in concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere is primarily due to human activities, whether as a result of GHG emissions, including by the burning of fossil fuels, or as a result of the weakening or destruction of carbon reservoirs and sinks, such as forests and the ocean, which store or remove GHGs from the atmosphere.”
It continues that the “consequences of climate change are severe and far-reaching”, listing impacts including the “melting of ice sheets and glaciers, leading to sea level rise”, “more frequent and intense” extreme weather events and the “irreversible loss of biodiversity”. The document adds:
“These consequences underscore the urgent and existential threat posed by climate change.”
The advisory opinion further adds that the “IPCC notes that adaptation measures are still insufficient” and that “limits to adaptation have been reached in some ecosystems and regions”.
On the need to address rising emissions, the document quotes the IPCC directly, saying:
“According to the panel, climate change is a threat to ‘human well-being and planetary health’ and there is a ‘rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all’ (very high confidence). It adds that the choices and actions implemented between 2020 and 2030 ‘will have impacts now and for thousands of years’.”
It adds that the “IPCC has also concluded with ‘very high confidence’ that risks and projected adverse impacts and related loss and damage from climate change will escalate with every increment of global warming”.
In regards to how states should consider climate science when implementing climate policies and measures, the court says that countries should exercise the “precautionary principle”, adding:
“The court observes that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
What does the ICJ say about countries’ climate obligations?
In response to the first question on legal obligations, the ICJ says that countries have “binding obligations to ensure protection of the climate system” under the UN climate treaties.
However, the court’s unanimous opinion flatly rejects the argument, put forward by high emitters, such as the US, UK and China, that these treaties are the end of the matter.
These nations had argued that the climate treaties formed a “lex specialis”, a specific area of law that precludes the application of broader general international law principles.
On the contrary, the ICJ says countries do have legal obligations under general international law, including a duty to prevent “significant harm to the environment”, with further obligations arising under human rights law and from other treaties.
As such, the court, “essentially sided with the global south and small island developing states”, says Prof Jorge Viñuales, Harold Samuel professor of law and environmental policy at the University of Cambridge.
Moreover, the court finds that countries’ obligations extend not only to greenhouse gas emissions, but also to fossil-fuel production and subsidies, says Viñuales, who acted for Vanuatu in the case.
Speaking to Carbon Brief in a personal capacity, he says: “That is important because major producers are not necessarily major emitters and vice-versa.”
In terms of the UN climate treaties, such as the Paris Agreement, the court affirms that these give countries binding obligations including adopting measures to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change.
Developed countries – parties listed under Annex I of the UNFCCC – have “additional obligations to take the lead in combating climate change”, the ICJ notes.
States also have a “duty” to cooperate with each other in order to achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC, acting in “good faith” to prevent harm, it adds.
Beyond the climate treaties, it says that “states have a duty to prevent significant harm to the environment”. Therefore, they must act with “due diligence” and use “all means at their disposal” to prevent activities carried out within their jurisdiction or control from causing “significant harm” to the climate system.
The court sets out the “appropriate measures” that would demonstrate due diligence, including “regulatory mechanisms…designed to achieve deep, rapid and sustained reductions” in emissions. This repeats language from the IPCC, but attaches it to countries’ legal obligations.
As with action under the climate treaties, countries’ obligations under broader international law should be taken in accordance with the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” it adds, a point reaffirmed throughout the advisory opinion.
Furthermore, countries have obligations to act on climate under a raft of other international agreements, covering the ozone layer, biological diversity, desertification and the UN convention on the law of the sea, the ICJ notes.
The court affirms that states that are not party to UN climate treaties must still meet their equivalent obligations under customary international law. This “addresses the unique situation of the US, but without naming it”, notes Sébastien Duyck, a senior attorney at the Center for International Environmental Law, on Bluesky.
Following his re-election last year, US president Donald Trump signed an order to pull the country out of the Paris Agreement again. As such, there is a question around how the ICJ’s opinion might apply to the US – the country that has contributed more to human-caused climate change than any other nation.
Additionally, states have obligations under international human rights law to “respect and ensure the effective enjoyment of human rights by taking necessary measures to protect the climate system and other parts of the environment”, according to the ICJ.
This follows a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2024 that found that the Swiss government’s climate policies violated human rights, as governments are obliged to protect citizens from the “serious adverse effects” of climate change.
Announcing the opinion to the Hague, judge Iwasawa Yuji, president of the court, said:
“The human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is essential for the enjoyment of other human rights.”
What does it say about the legal consequences of breaches?
The second part of the advisory opinion deals with the “legal consequences” of countries causing “significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment”.
This refers to nations breaching their “obligations”, as defined in the first part of the opinion. (See: What does the ICJ say about countries’ climate obligations?)
Crucially, the court says that countries can, in principle, face liability for climate harms, opening the door to potential “reparations” for loss and damage. Prof Viñuales tells Carbon Brief:
“Perhaps the main take away from the opinion is that the court recognised the principle of liability for climate harm, as actionable under the existing rules.”
Prof Viñuales notes that the court says “climate justice is governed by the general international law of state responsibility, which provides solutions for the recurrent arguments levelled to escape liability for climate harm”.
Essentially, the ICJ rejects the notion that it is too difficult to hold countries accountable for climate damages.
Examples of breached obligations given by the court include failing to set out or implement climate pledges – known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs) – under the Paris Agreement, or to sufficiently “regulate emissions of greenhouse gases”.
The ICJ stresses that it is not responsible for pointing fingers at particular countries, only for issuing a “general legal framework” that countries can follow.
As part of this process, it lays out a justification for why states can be held responsible for climate change.
During the ICJ process, some countries argued that greenhouse gas emissions are not like other environmental damage, such as localised chemical pollution. They said that emissions arise from all sorts of regular activities and it is difficult to tie climate damage to specific sources.
Others argued that it is perfectly possible to attribute such damage to states that, for example, have laws to “promote fossil-fuel production and consumption”.
This is important, as the ICJ points out that attribution is necessary if an activity is to be defined as an “internationally wrongful act”. Ultimately, the court agrees that it is feasible to attribute climate damage to specific states, on a “case-by-case” basis.
The court also finds that it is possible, at least in principle, to link climate disasters to countries’ emissions, though it notes that the causal links may be “more tenuous” than for localised pollution. It cites IPCC findings that climate change has amplified heatwaves, flooding and drought, stating:
“While the causal link between the wrongful actions or omissions of a state and the harm arising from climate change is more tenuous than in the case of local sources of pollution, this does not mean that the identification of a causal link is impossible.”
With this established, the court sets out what the consequences could be for countries that are deemed to have carried out “wrongful acts”.
First, the ICJ stresses that nations must meet their existing climate obligations. This means that if, for example, a government publishes an “inadequate” NDC, a “competent court or tribunal” could order it to supply one that is consistent with its obligations under the Paris Agreement.
Second, it also says that if a state is found responsible for climate damage, it must stop and ensure that it does not happen again.
States may be required to “employ all means at their disposal” to carry out this duty, according to the ICJ. In practice, the court says that this could mean governments revoking administrative or legislative acts in order to cut emissions.
In theory, this could lead to more stringent climate policies. For example, Dr Maria Antonia Tigre, director of global climate change litigation at the Sabin Centre for Climate Change Law, tells Carbon Brief:
“The ICJ made clear that the standard of due diligence is stringent and that each state must do its utmost to submit NDCs reflecting its highest possible ambition. That may strengthen pressure – political, legal and public – on states to raise their climate targets, especially before the next global stocktake.”
Finally, the ICJ opens the door for countries to seek “reparations” for climate harms from other countries.
It says these reparations could be expressed in different ways – including paying compensation or issuing formal apologies for wrongdoing.
This outcome was widely celebrated by climate justice activists and vulnerable nations, who see it as ushering in a “new era” in the fight to obtain financial compensation for climate disasters.
Harj Narulla, a barrister at Doughty Street Chambers and legal counsel for the Solomon Islands, tells Carbon Brief:
“The ICJ’s ruling has provided a legal pathway for developing states to seek climate reparations from developed States…States can bring claims for compensation or restitution for all climate-related damage. This includes claims for loss and damage, but importantly extends to any harm suffered as a result of climate change.”
What does it say about historical responsibility and reparations?
One of the most significant parts of the ICJ opinion is the assertion that nations and “injured individuals” can seek “reparations” for climate damage.
This ties in with a long and contentious history of climate-vulnerable nations in the global south seeking compensation from high-emitting nations.
The notion of “climate reparations” has often been linked to developing countries pushing for so-called “loss and damage” finance in UN climate negotiations, including the – ultimately successful – fight for a “loss-and-damage fund”.
However, the US and other big historical emitters have ensured that any progress on loss-and-damage funding has not left them legally accountable for their past emissions.
The Paris Agreement states explicitly that its inclusion of loss and damage “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”.
Crucially, the ICJ opinion makes it clear that such language does not override international law and states’ responsibilities to provide “restitution”, “compensation” and “satisfaction” to those harmed by climate change.
Danilo Garrido Alves, a legal counsel for Greenpeace International, tells Carbon Brief that this means loss-and-damage finance is not a replacement for reparations:
“If a state contributes to the loss and damage fund and at the same time breaches obligations…that does not mean they are off the hook.”
Legal experts, including Prof Viñuales, tell Carbon Brief that this outcome is not surprising, given its grounding in international law. He says:
“It is the correct understanding of international law, but, in law, progress often takes the form of moving from the implicit to the explicit and that’s what the court did.”
Nevertheless, the outcome could have major implications for climate politics and lead to a wave of new climate litigation. Dr Tigre, at the Sabin Centre for Climate Change Law, tells Carbon Brief:
“[It] could shift the conversation from voluntary climate finance to legal obligations to repair harm, particularly for vulnerable communities and states already suffering loss and damage.”
Notably, the court says that while some states are “particularly vulnerable” to climate change, international law “does not differ” depending on such status. This means that, in principle, all nations are “entitled to the same remedies”.
As for individuals or groups taking legal action for both “present and future generations”, the ICJ notes that their ability to do so does not depend on rules around “state responsibility”. Instead, they would depend on obligations being breached under “specific treaties and other legal instruments”.
The ICJ says that reparations would be determined on a case-by-case basis, noting that the “appropriate nature and quantum of reparations…depends on the circumstances”. It also notes that:
“In the climate change context, reparations in the form of compensation may be difficult to calculate, as there is usually a degree of uncertainty.”
The question of precisely which nations will be liable for paying climate reparations is also predictably complex. Much of this discussion centres around responsibility for emissions, both currently and in the past.
Under the Paris Agreement, “developed” countries – a handful of nations in the global north – are obliged to provide climate finance to “developing” countries, which includes major emitters such as China.
In ICJ submissions, major emitters and fossil-fuel producers categorised as “developing” under the UN system stressed their low historical emissions. Some developing countries blamed climate change on a small group of “developed states of the global north”.
For their part, some countries with high historical emissions argued that it is difficult to assign responsibility for climate change.
However, the ICJ concludes that this is not the case. It says it is “scientifically possible” to determine each state’s contribution, accounting for “both historical and current emissions”.
Therefore, while the court explicitly avoids identifying the countries responsible for paying reparations, it makes clear that historical responsibility should be accounted for when considering whether states have met their climate obligations.
Finally, the court also says that “the status of a state as developed or developing is not static” and that it depends on the “current circumstances of the state concerned”.
This is notable, given that the current definitions of these terms – which determine who gives and receives climate finance – are based on definitions from the early 1990s.
What does it say about the Paris Agreement and 1.5C?
The advisory opinion offers clear guidance on the Paris Agreement and its aim to limit global temperature rise to “well-below” 2C by 2100, with an aspiration to keep warming below 1.5C.
It says that limiting temperature increase to 1.5C should be considered countries’ “primary temperature goal”, based on the court’s interpretation of the Paris Agreement.
The court adds that this interpretation is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s stipulation that efforts to tackle climate change should be based on the “best available science”.
(In 2018, four years after the Paris Agreement, a special report from the IPCC spelled out how limiting global warming to 1.5C rather than 2C could, among other things, save coral reefs from total devastation, stem rapid glacier loss and keep an extra 420 million people from being exposed to extreme heatwaves.)
Following this, the advisory opinion also makes it clear that countries are not just encouraged – but “obliged” – to put forward climate plans that “reflect the[ir] highest possible ambition” to make an “adequate contribution” to limiting global warming to 1.5C.
(The climate plans that countries submit to the UN under the Paris Agreement are known as “nationally determined contributions” or “NDCs”.)
Moreover, contrary to the arguments of some countries, the advisory opinion states:
“The court considers that the discretion of parties in the preparation of their NDCs is limited.
“As such, in the exercise of their discretion, parties are obliged to exercise due diligence and ensure that their NDCs fulfil their obligations under the Paris Agreement and, thus, when taken together, are capable of achieving the temperature goal of limiting global warming to 1.5C.”
Dr Bill Hare, a veteran climate scientist and CEO of research group Climate Analytics, noted that the court’s stipulations on the 1.5C and NDCs represent a “fundamental set of findings”. In a statement, he said:
“The ICJ finds that the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit is the primary goal because of the urgent and existential threat of climate change and that this requires all countries to work together towards the highest possible ambition to limit warming to this level.
“All countries have an obligation to put forward the highest possible ambition in their NDCs that represent a progression over previous NDCs; it is not acceptable to put forward a weak NDC that does not align with 1.5C.
“The ICJ points to potential for serious legal consequences under customary international law if countries do not put forward targets aligned to 1.5C.”
The court also notes that the concept of equity is essential to the Paris Agreement and other climate legal frameworks, commonly referred to by text noting that countries have “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.
Significantly, it adds that the Paris Agreement differs from other climate frameworks by also stating that these responsibilities and capabilities should be considered “in the light of different national circumstances”.
The advisory opinion continues:
“In the view of the court, the additional phrase does not change the core of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities; rather, it adds nuance to the principle by recognising that the status of a state as developed or developing is not static. It depends on an assessment of the current circumstances of the state concerned.”
The verdict comes after debate – considered highly controversial by many – about whether “emerging” economies, such as China and India, should be considered “developing countries” at climate summits.
What does it say about fossil fuels?
One of the most eye-catching paragraphs of the advisory opinion relates to its verdict on fossil fuels.
In a section labelled “determination of state responsibility in the climate change context”, the court specifically addresses countries’ obligations when it comes to producing, using and economically supporting fossil fuels. (See below).
The court says that fossil-fuel production, consumption, the granting of exploration licences or the provision of subsidies “may constitute an internationally wrongful act” attributable to the state or states involved.
It comes after multiple analyses have concluded that any new oil and gas projects globally would be “incompatible” with limiting global warming to 1.5C.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, climate law expert Prof Jorge Viñuales notes that the clear mention of fossil fuels comes despite not being featured in the questions posed to the court:
“The request characterised the conduct to be assessed by reference to emissions, so the court could have stayed there. Yet, the relevant conduct was expanded to production and consumption of fossil fuels, including subsidies.”
Though the advisory opinion is not legally binding on countries, it could influence domestic decision-making around granting permissions to new fossil fuel projects going forward, adds Joy Reyes, a policy officer at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics. She tells Carbon Brief:
“Litigants can cite the advisory opinion in future climate litigation, which includes the language around fossil fuels. While not legally binding, the advisory opinion carries moral weight and authority, and can influence domestic decision-making around new fossil-fuel projects. If states and corporations fail to transition away from fossil fuels, their risk for liability increases.”
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ICJ: What the world court’s landmark opinion means for climate change
When carbon dioxide (CO2) is released from a factory or power plant, the gas can be captured and permanently stored underground, preventing it from driving climate change.
This is the idea underpinning carbon capture and storage (CCS), a technology that is at the heart of many nations’ net-zero plans.
Influential organisations, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), describe CCS as “critical” for cutting emissions from key sectors – and for helping to avoid dangerous global warming.
In particular, capturing CO2 is seen as one of the only viable options for decarbonising some of the world’s highest-emitting industries, such as cement production.
The UK, for example, has committed to investing as much as £21.7bn over the coming decades in its nascent CCS industry, as part of the nation’s net-zero strategy.
Yet, in the UK and elsewhere, there has been a backlash against plans for CCS.
Citing high costs, ties to the fossil-fuel industry and a “history of poor performance”, critics describe CCS as a “dangerous distraction” or a “false climate solution”.
Time and again, the outlook for the roll-out of CCS has been scaled back, as the technology has failed to deliver as quickly as expected – and as policy support has wavered.
Furthermore, critics state that the technology remains “unproven” on the scale required to make a meaningful impact on global emissions.
In this Q&A, Carbon Brief explores the role CCS is expected to play in achieving net-zero, its record to date and the reasons it has been criticised, using the UK as an example.
What is CCS?
CCS involves capturing CO2 emissions released from a large source, such as a gas power plant or a cement factory.
The CO2 is separated from the facility’s exhaust stream, generally using a chemical solvent, before being compressed into a liquid and transported via pipeline or vehicle. The CO2 is then stored by injecting it into underground reservoirs, such as depleted oil fields or saline aquifers.
The term “CCUS” is sometimes also used, referring to the “utilisation” of CO2 to make products, including fertilisers, fuels or building materials. Such uses do not necessarily lead to permanent emissions cuts, as the CO2 can end up later being released back into the atmosphere.
(“CCS” is used in this Q&A, unless quoting another organisation that specifically refers to “CCUS”.)
The infographic below shows the stages of capturing CO2 and transporting it to be either stored or used in other applications.
Carbon capture technology was originally rolled out at US and Canadian oil wells in the early 1970s as a way to achieve “enhanced oil recovery”. This involves injecting captured CO2 into depleted wells – a process that stores CO2, but also helps to extract more oil.
This remains, by far, the most significant end use for captured CO2 worldwide, with around three-quarters of it used for this purpose.
Moreover, most of the CO2 currently captured is a by-product of gas purification – the process by which fossil fuels such as methane are separated from other, unwanted substances. Selling this CO2 can make such gas projects more economically viable.
Therefore, as shown in the chart below, which is based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data, the majority of CO2 that is both captured and used today helps the fossil-fuel industry to extract and sell more oil and gas.
CCS was first proposed as a way to deal with CO2 emissions in a 1976 academic article, which imagined injecting the captured gas into the ocean.
It is only since the early 2000s that CCS has gained traction as a proposed climate solution, with a 2005 “special report” by the IPCC exploring the topic. At that time, the authors note there were just three small-scale projects trying to capture and permanently store CO2.
Installing CCS at factories or power plants and permanently storing the CO2 would mean that, in theory, such facilities could continue using fossil fuels without contributing to climate change.
Such applications are often mentioned alongside two related technologies, both of which could be used to “suck” CO2 out of the atmosphere and, thus, deliver “negative emissions”.
One is bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). Crops absorb CO2 as they grow and BECCS involves a power plant burning these crops, then storing the resulting CO2.
The other technology is direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS).
These technologies are classed as “CO2 removal”, as they involve absorbing CO2 from the atmosphere using plants or machines and then storing it permanently.
By contrast, CCS installed at a factory is considered a way to avoid CO2 emitted by that specific facility from entering the atmosphere. This Q&A focuses on such applications, which account for the vast majority of existing and planned CCS.
How much CCS capacity has been built so far?
As of February 2026, there were a total of 75 operational CCS projects around the world. As noted above, almost all of them are at fossil-fuel extraction and processing sites, according to the IEA’s database.
Together, these projects capture 62.5m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) each year. This is equivalent to the annual greenhouse gas emissions of Ecuador.
(This compares with the 22 CCS projects, promising to capture 40MtCO2 annually, that were operational or under construction as of 2014.)
As the chart below shows, the amount of CO2 currently being captured and stored is a tiny fraction of the total emissions from fossil-fuel use.
In a 2020 report, the IEA explained that the “story of CCUS has largely been one of unmet expectations: its potential to mitigate climate change has been recognised for decades, but deployment has been slow”.
A wave of interest in CCS in the 2000s, largely from countries in Europe and North America, focused on enabling coal power plants to continue operating with lower emissions.
This interest largely petered out, as plummeting renewable energy costs weakened the case for coal plants with CCS. Today, there are only seven operating CCS-coal plants worldwide – five in China, one in the US and one in Canada.
Yet the Paris Agreement in 2015 – and the national net-zero targets that followed – highlighted the need for deep emissions cuts in sectors that previously expected to continue emitting for decades. This, once again, has fuelled interest in the use of CCS.
In recent years, there has also been growing interest in producing low-carbon “blue” hydrogen from gas with CCS.
Hydrogen is widely seen as key for decarbonising certain sectors – particularly in industry – but analyses suggest that it may be difficult to make sufficient “green” hydrogen using renewable power on the timescales required.
As the map below shows, most CCS capacity is based in the US and Canada, with other major fossil-fuel producers such as Norway, Brazil and the Gulf states also contributing.
A surge of projects have entered the global CCS pipeline in recent years. According to the IEA, 93.7MtCO2 of capture or storage capacity is under construction as of February 2026 and another 1,279.6MtCO2 is in the “planning” stages.
“Planned” projects include any initiative at early concept, feasibility or engineering study stages and the industry has a long history of projects being cancelled or delayed.
Nevertheless, this pipeline of projects could lead to a large expansion of facilities dedicated to permanent CO2 storage that does not involve extracting more oil.
The planned projects – if they are realised – would also include significant growth in sectors where CCS is virtually non-existent, such as steel, hydrogen and cement production, as shown in the chart below.
What role is CCS expected to play in reaching net-zero?
It will be impossible to stop dangerous climate change unless the world reaches net-zero emissions, according to the IPCC. The amount of global warming – and whether the Paris Agreement temperature target can be met – depends on when net-zero is reached.
Many global pathways that have been set out for achieving net-zero, including a majority of the IPCC-assessed pathways where global warming is limited to 1.5C, rely on the use of CCS at fossil-fuel plants and industrial sites.
“These models have been quite instrumental in bringing CCS back onto the agenda,” Lina Lefstad, an ecological economist at Lund University, tells Carbon Brief.
Influential organisations relying on CCS in their net-zero scenarios range from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) through to the oil company Shell. The IEA has stated that net-zero would be “virtually impossible” without CCS.
These scenarios often include 10s to 100s of times more CCS capacity being built in the coming decades. The IEA includes 1.7GtCO2 being captured by 2035 in its net-zero scenario – nearly 30 times more than is captured today.
(Some of the much higher numbers in scenarios assessed by the IPCC have been dismissed by experts as implausible, especially given the slow rollout of CCS to date.)
When considering CCS for both emissions cuts and removals, Dr Jennifer Roberts, a researcher at the University of Strathclyde and deputy director at the UK Carbon Capture and Storage Research Centre (UKCCSRC), tells Carbon Brief the situation is clear:
“From an IPCC climate modelling perspective…reaching net-zero without CCS is far more expensive, disruptive and potentially out of reach.”
This does not mean that it would be impossible to reach net-zero without using CCS. However, net-zero scenarios that use little or no CCS rely on dramatic changes elsewhere, such as much lower global energy demand.
Net-zero scenarios often include a crucial role for CCS in “hard-to-abate” sectors, referring to activities that lack available, low-cost options to fully decarbonise. In particular, CCS is widely seen as vital for decarbonising parts of heavy industry.
The IPCC sixth assessment report (AR6) summary for policymakers calls CCS a “critical mitigation option” for some sectors, including cement and chemicals. The technical summary of the AR6 Working Group III report says that “CCS will be required to mitigate remaining CO2” in industrial sectors.
The IEA describes CCS as “virtually the only technology” that can significantly cut cement emissions, which account for around 7% of the global total. (Much of this CO2 comes from chemical processes, meaning it would still be released if the industry was electrified.)
Yet, the understanding of “hard-to-abate” emissions is changing, as alternatives to CCS become cheaper and increasingly available. As a result, CCS has become a less attractive option in some sectors, as well as being seen as less vital in some others.
Carbon Brief analysis shows that the IEA has reduced its outlook for CCS in the power sector by a third, compared to its expectations in 2021, as the chart below shows.
This reflects both slow progress in deploying CCS and rapid cost reductions in renewables, which make running gas or coal power plants less attractive.
(Even prior to this adjustment, the IEA’s net-zero scenario was already at the lower end of CCS use, compared to those assessed by the IPCC.)
This declining role for CCS in the power sector would mean its use is more concentrated in industry.
Industrial sectors – particularly cement, steel and chemicals – account for 60% of the CO2 captured in 2050 under the IEA’s net-zero scenario, as shown in the figure below. The remaining 40% is roughly split between electricity generation and blue hydrogen production.
Climate NGOs Bellona and E3G have stressed that with “limited public funding, infrastructure constraints and political attention, prioritisation is essential” for CCS. Their “CCS ladder” places CCS in cement and lime production at the top – with the highest “climate value” – while power CCS has “low and decreasing value”.
Despite this, the focus of the CCS sector so far has not been in heavy industry, which represents less than 10% of announced capacity.
Another key consideration is the role governments are assigning to CCS in their national net-zero strategies.
One study found that 33 of the 67 long-term net-zero strategies submitted to the UN by governments, with a further 10 indicating some potential use.
It concluded that high-income countries that produce a lot of oil and gas, such as Canada and Norway, showed the “firmest commitment” to capturing and storing CO2.
Nations have agreed at UN climate talks to “phase down” coal power that is “unabated”. This is generally understood to mean coal power without CCS – leaving space to develop “abated” coal plants. This could allow China, for example, to continue using its sizable coal fleet with CCS to reduce emissions.
Why is CCS controversial?
Despite its role in many net-zero scenarios, CCS remains a highly contested technology.
It has long been framed in some circles as a “false solution” to climate change, that is backed and lobbied for by fossil-fuel companies to “delay” the clean-energy transition.
Critics argue that CCS is expensive – especially compared to increasingly cheap wind and solar power – in part because it significantly increases the energy requirements of a facility.
A University of Oxford working paper published in 2023 concluded that a “low-CCS” pathway to net-zero emissions would cost around $1tn less a year compared to a “high-CCS” pathway. The researchers stated that “no evidence is found for technological learning or associated cost reductions” in the development of CCS to date.
(They added that CCS is “still likely necessary” for cement and chemical production.)
Pointing to the limited progress in scaling up the technology so far, some question whether CCS can play the role envisaged in many net-zero scenarios.
Responding to the IPCC’s most recent report, for example, the Centre for International Environmental Law stated that “abated fossil fuels only exist in models”.
Proponents of CCS contest the notion that CCS is “untested” or “unreliable”, pointing to some projects that have been operating for many years. Moreover, most of the component parts that make up a working CCS project are in wide use for other purposes.
Yet, another key criticism levelled at CCS projects is that they simply do not capture enough CO2, diminishing their role as a climate solution.
There is a widespread view that CCS projects should aim to capture at least 90% of the CO2 being emitted. UK guidelines are among those targeting a higher capture rate of 95%.
The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) has assessed the performance of existing projects. Its 2023 analysis is shown in the chart below.
The thinktank concluded that, in reality, most existing CCS projects are far below such capture rates, meaning they continue to emit significant amounts of CO2. (Capture is the most expensive part of the CCS process.)
Once the CO2 is captured, it must be stored. The IPCC says there is ample global geological storage available for CO2. It also says that, as long as sites are “appropriately selected and managed”, CO2 “can be permanently isolated from the atmosphere”.
Nevertheless, critics have noted that even relatively low rates of leakage along the transportation and storage chain could have a big climate impact when deployed at scale.
The continued use of gas in gas-CCS or blue hydrogen projects also brings risks of upstream emissions more broadly, such as methane leaks. (See: What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?)
Considering these factors, in 2023 Climate Analytics assessed a “high CCS pathway” from the IPCC database. It concluded that if CO2 was captured at rates seen in existing facilities – around 50% – and upstream emissions remain high, CCS use could see an extra 86GtCO2e emitted by 2050.
The report found that even the IEA’s net-zero scenario, which relies on “more limited fossil CCS use”, could result in an additional 16GtCO2e due to “underperforming fossil CCS”.
All of this calls into question many uses of CCS, according to Andrew Reid, energy finance analyst at IEEFA: “Is there really any point in trying to decarbonise fossil fuels, which comes with significant technical, timing and additional cost risk?” Reid tells Carbon Brief:
“As for cement and chemicals, again, there are alternatives, but these are nascent and expensive. CCS may be a solution here and if investment is going to be made in any area, it most likely should be these.”
On the other hand, CCS advocates argue that gas, for example, is likely to be an important, “dispatchable” part of many electricity systems as nations transition to clean energy.
Prof Stuart Haszeldine, a CCS researcher at the University of Edinburgh, explains this position to Carbon Brief:
“If we’re going to burn gas, then we should be fitting CCS on that…Otherwise we’re just going to say it’s OK for us to burn lots of gas and carry on emitting.”
There is also a line of argument referred to – sometimes pejoratively – as “techno-optimism”, which often stresses CCS as a core climate solution. This was exemplified by a controversial report on climate action in 2025 by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI), in which the former UK prime minister wrote that CCS should be “at the centre of the battle”.
This diverges from the IPCC’s conclusion that, while CCS will likely have a role in achieving net-zero emissions, its contribution will be dwarfed by that of renewables.
CCS also attracts criticism due to its connection to the fossil-fuel industry. Dr Jen Roberts at the UKCCSRC tells Carbon Brief that she agrees these links make for complicated messaging:
“CCS is critical for net-zero, but is intrinsically tied with an industry sector that is climate polluting and historically anti-climate lobbying.”
Roberts says careful policymaking, including the development of business models and standards, can support CCS in hard-to-abate sectors where it is most needed.
Some experts suggest that governments should require companies to capture and store their emissions under the “polluter pays” principle.
Roberts also notes that fossil-fuel companies have the experience and the workforce needed to scale up CCS. “Oil and gas companies can evidence a track record in multi-million or billion-dollar subsurface engineering projects,” Roberts adds.
Despite the fossil-fuel industry’s apparent support for CCS, one 2021 study co-authored by Haszeldine noted that they had, in fact, invested relatively small amounts in the technology, compared to renewables and nature-based solutions.
Lina Lefstad at Lund University questions whether the fossil-fuel industry stands to benefit financially through the deployment of CCS as much as some critics imply:
“People seem really worried that the fossil-fuel industry is going to come out the winner again, but if that was the case I think we would have large-scale CCS by now.”
What are the UK’s plans for scaling up CCS?
The UK government has committed “up to” £21.7bn of funding over 25 years to support the nation’s first five CCS projects and to make the nation an “early leader” in the sector.
This package, supported by both the former Conservative and current Labour governments, is intended to help create “clusters” of connected facilities across industrial areas of the UK.
Some have suggested that this represents a large pot of government spending, which could be raided to support more pressing priorities. Indeed, media coverage often points to CCS funding as a potential target for government cuts, or as a way to boost, say, military spending.
This is in spite of the fact that three quarters of the funding is expected to come from levies on consumers, rather than government budgets.
The first two CCS clusters, which are currently set to be deployed in the late-2020s, are the East Coast Cluster in north-east England and HyNet in north-west England and north Wales. The second two, scheduled for around 2030, are Acorn in north-east Scotland and Viking in the Humber.
The projects are expected to include blue-hydrogen production, gas power with CCS and industrial uses. The CO2 captured would be pumped into offshore saline aquifers and depleted gas fields.
Former UK energy secretary Ed Miliband has stated that CCS will “unlock” hard-to-abate sectors and play an “important role” in achieving clean power by 2030.
This position is supported by the UK government’s climate advisors at the Climate Change Committee (CCC), who have consistently stressed that CCS is “essential” for net-zero.
In the CCC’s most recent net-zero pathway, released as part of its seventh carbon budget advice, CCS contributes 2% of emissions cuts in 2030 and 8% in 2050, as shown in the chart below. (If CO2 removals using BECCS are included, this increases to 15% in 2050.)
The CCC maintains that it “cannot see a route to net-zero that does not include CCS”. Nevertheless, the committee has downgraded its expectations for CCS in recent years.
Between the CCC’s sixth and seventh carbon budget advice, its recommendations for power and industry CCS capacity dropped from 46MtCO2 to 41MtCO2.
Dr Jamie Tarlton, the committee’s CCS lead, addressed this at a conference in March 2025, stating that it was “partly because we see more opportunities for decarbonising the other sectors and reducing those residual emissions than we saw five years ago”.
More recently, the UK government also scaled back its expectations for industrial CCS in its latest carbon budget delivery plan for 2035, bringing it more in line with the CCC’s net-zero pathway. It still describes CCS as “part of the most cost-effective route to net-zero”.
The UK’s CCS plans have drawn criticism. A September 2024 letter to Miliband signed by 22 scientists and activists expressed concern about “locking the UK into a fossil-fuel based pathway”.
They note that the gas-CCS power plants and blue hydrogen facilities initially backed by the government would leave the UK reliant on gas imports, as North Sea production declines. This could be expensive and result in “upstream” emissions due to methane leaks.
(At the end of 2025, BP withdrew its involvement in one of the blue hydrogen facilities at the Teesside site. A data centre is planned for the site instead.)
Net Zero Teesside, a gas-CCS power plant in the East Coast Cluster run by BP and Equinor, has been unsuccessfully challenged in court over its emissions savings. The challenge was based on the idea that potential upstream emissions could significantly exceed any emissions cuts from CCS use.
According to a report by Carbon Tracker, the lifecycle emissions of Net Zero Teesside gas-CCS power plant would depend heavily on where it sources its fuel.
The project could cut emissions by around three-quarters, relative to an unabated gas plant, says the report. But it adds that if the plant relies on imported gas with high upstream emissions, then it might only cut emissions by a quarter.
(Most of the upstream emissions from imported gas would be released overseas, meaning they would not be counted in the UK’s official emissions inventory.)
Besides driving “gas dependence” in the UK, the government’s approach has drawn criticism for failing to ensure that CCS is prioritised in the industries that are hardest to decarbonise.
A report by the Public Accounts Committee in early 2025 took aim at the government’s cluster-based approach. It said this “does not ensure that financial support for CCUS is directed at the sectors which will need it most” – highlighting cement production.
(Of the CO2 captured in the CCC’s net-zero pathway in 2050, around 40% is in the industrial and waste sectors, while the remaining 60% is from gas power plants and the production of fuels such as hydrogen.)
Dr Andrew Boswell, the energy analyst who challenged Net Zero Teesside in court, says he is “more nuanced” when it comes to applications of CCS that do not involve gas. “There may be a case for cement, lime and waste…However, the case is unproven,” he tells Carbon Brief.
The Public Accounts Committee report also criticised the “high-risk” approach of using public funds for CCS projects, as well as slow progress in developing the technology.
Enrique Cornejo, head of energy policy at fossil-fuel trade body Offshore Energies UK, tells Carbon Brief that the UK needs to maintain momentum and deploy CCS in order to “achieve economies of scale” and to reduce the cost of the technology more broadly:
“It is indeed necessary to streamline the cluster sequencing process to ensure that emitters in sectors such as cement have a clear route to the CCS market.”
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After the US-Iran war caused energy prices to soar, ballooning Egypt’s energy import bill, the government has doubled down on plans to boost renewable energy in the country’s power mix – part of its broader plan to become a clean energy export hub for the region.
With abundant sunshine, swathes of unused desert land and plenty of wind, Egypt is seen as having the potential to become a major force in renewable power generation, helping to cut the planet-heating carbon emissions of Africa’s second-largest economy and beyond.
The conflict in the Middle East has given the government’s clean energy plans more salience, making the case for renewable power to bolster the country’s energy security and help it meet its economic development goals by exporting clean power.
The government recently announced an accelerated timeline for renewables to reach 45% of the electricity mix within two years – up from a previous target of 42% by 2030 and a huge jump from around 13% in 2025, according to think-tank Ember.
In June, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with government ministers to discuss the faster delivery of solar and energy storage projects as well as upgrades to the electricity grid to deliver on the new goal, including 105 renewable energy projects intended to bolster grid stability.
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Big challenges lie ahead, among them a parallel bet on continued fossil fuel exploration and the need to upgrade electricity infrastructure, a task that could require multibillion-dollar investments, experts say.
“The technical and financial plumbing – the grid, foreign-currency financing and the supply chain – are the real gatekeepers,” Nadia Elmasry, an expert at the Regional Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, told Climate Home News.
In a speech to the nation in March, President Sisi said $50 billion worth of investment were needed to overhaul the electricity grid and transmission infrastructure.
During the COP29 climate talks in 2024, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly warned that Egypt’s targets for renewable power expansion could be missed without more international support for critical infrastructure.
Multimillion-euro investment
Modernising and expanding power grids has emerged as a central pillar of an intensifying global push for electrification – a key priority of the COP31 UN climate talks taking place in Türkiye in November.
As dozens of governments led by the European Union and the UK throw their political weight behind a rapid electrification of the global economy, Egypt’s hunt for foreign investment in power infrastructure has found sympathetic ears.
In June, the EU and its European Investment Bank lending arm announced a financing package of up to €690 million ($795 million) to modernise Egypt’s transmission network – widely seen as a weak point in the nation’s clean energy ambitions.
The project aims to help the grid absorb 22 GW of renewable capacity by 2030, reduce electricity losses and move power from wind and solar zones to consumers and, eventually, foreign markets, including the EU.
New substations and transmission lines will connect wind and solar zones around the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, reducing losses and preparing the network for future cross-Mediterranean trade.
Under the country’s ambitious regional plans, Egypt would supply clean power via existing interconnections with Jordan, Libya and Sudan, as well as a 3 GW link under construction with Saudi Arabia.
Further ahead, proposals envision the export of renewable electricity to southern Europe via a subsea cable, and Egypt also aims to be a primary source of green hydrogen and ammonia for European markets.
Conflicts, cash among the challenges
Planned investment in electricity and renewables reached 136.3 billion Egyptian pounds ($2.7 billion) for the 2025/26 financial year, up from 72.6 billion pounds ($1.4 million) the year before, with public investment expected to account for about three-quarters of that.
Grid investment is “the cornerstone” of Egypt’s hub strategy, said energy and environmental economy expert Mohammed Abdel Raouf, allowing it to integrate renewables without destabilising the power system and create the smart-grid infrastructure needed to trade electricity with other countries.
But Egypt’s plans face several major challenges, besides the necessary grid upgrades, which are estimated to cost billions of dollars alone, according to a December 2025 study by the Amsterdam-based think-tank Transnational Institute.
Regional conflicts are disrupting supply chains and discouraging investment, particularly in renewable energy, Abdel Raouf warned. High borrowing costs, financing rules, limited EU-compliant capacity and uncertain long-term buyers of Egypt’s clean power could also slow progress, according to the Transnational Institute study.
The Arab world’s most populous country has been grappling with the aftermath of a steep currency devaluation and economic fallout from the Gaza and Iran wars.
Elmasry pointed to pressures from Egypt’s shortage of foreign currency and the need for concessional finance or guarantees to make long-term projects bankable. Egypt says it has mobilised $4 billion in concessional finance for 4.2 GW of renewable energy projects.
Regulatory coordination and workforce development will be essential, particularly as Egypt seeks to trade across grids governed by different technical and commercial rules, Elmasry added.
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In order to generate an exportable surplus of clean electricity at a time of rising domestic power needs, Egypt also needs to give a bigger role to decentralised minigrid systems such as rooftop solar projects, said Cairo-based solar entrepreneur Hatem Tawfik.
“We will [only] be a hub in 2040 after we produce more than we need,” said Tawfik, co-founder and managing director of Cairo Solar, a solar engineering, procurement and construction company, calling for cheaper loans and simpler permitting and grid-connection rules.
For Tawfik, such small-scale projects are also fundamental to the government’s goal of shoring up energy security to avert crises like that of 2023/2024, when Egypt’s falling gas output contributed to rolling blackouts during sweltering heatwaves.
At a time of heightened geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East, this is even more urgent.
“In the event of war, or if a country such as Israel, which supplies 40-60% of Egypt’s [imported] gas, suddenly cut off supplies [again], Egypt would be less vulnerable,” he told Climate Home News.
Home-grown batteries
Storage could determine whether Egypt’s renewable power is merely abundant at midday or commercially valuable around the clock.
“Storage is what turns intermittent renewables into firm, exportable power,” said Elmasry.
In January, Norwegian developer Scatec signed a 25-year power purchase agreement with the Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company for 1.95 GW of solar and 3.9 GWh of battery storage.
Demand for more storage has also raised the prospect of Egypt developing a domestic battery industry.
Chinese company Sungrow plans to build a battery-storage-system factory in Ain Sokhna, its first in the Middle East, with annual production capacity of 10 GWh and operations scheduled to begin in April 2027. It will provide the batteries for Scatec’s energy storage project.
Egypt has also granted licences for two battery-storage projects in Aswan and Suez worth a combined $800 million. Huawei and Egyptian company AIS have meanwhile signed an agreement to explore local production of grid-forming battery systems.
At the same time, Egypt is conducting an aerial geophysical survey in search of critical minerals across six regions, a first in about half a century.
Still, Mohamed Gamal Kafafy, president of the World Green Economy Council, said competing directly with China would be unrealistic, suggesting Egypt should instead manufacture under Chinese licences or through joint ventures, reducing imports while building local skills.
The Ministry of Electricity did not respond to Climate Home News’ request for comment.
Mixed messages?
The government’s climate investment programme aims to add 10 GW of renewable capacity and retire 5 GW of inefficient fossil-fuel generation by 2028, but Egypt is not turning its back on oil and gas.
President Sisi told energy companies attending the Egypt Energy Show in March to pursue a double strategy – intensifying efforts to explore and increase oil and gas production while also accelerating investment in renewable energy. The Petroleum Ministry plans to drill about 480 exploratory oil wells over five years.
The risk, Tawfik said, is that a large oil or gas discovery reduces the incentive to focus on investment in renewables.
“When a major oil or gas discovery, such as the Zohr gas field, leads to overconfidence, it reduces the focus on renewable energy,” he said, noting that renewable project rollouts largely stagnated after the completion of the giant Benban solar park in 2019.
But major developments such as the El Dabaa nuclear plant and the Abydos solar and energy-storage project demonstrate that significant work is already under way to meet Egypt’s clean energy hub ambitions, Tawfik said.
“Simply implementing the existing plans would be an excellent outcome,” he added.
Main image: The Sharm El Sheikh solar power plant in Egypt (Photo:
Hassan Allam Utilities)
The post Egypt seeks to unlock renewable potential to power regional clean energy hub appeared first on Climate Home News.
Egypt seeks to unlock renewable potential to power regional clean energy hub
The United Nations Secretary-General and foreign ministers from the UK, France and Spain have blamed the deadly wildfires engulfing Europe on climate change, using the disaster to renew calls for faster cuts to greenhouse gas emissions.
António Guterres told journalists on Friday that the “climate crisis is in overdrive”, adding that global heat seen so far is just a “warm up act” as a phenomenon known as El Niño intensifies “adding fuel to a planet already on fire”.
A new World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) report published on Friday predicts that the weather pattern will grow into a “strong event” between now and October, increasing the risk of higher than normal temperatures across much of the world and disrupted rainfalls.
“That risks shattering every seasonal record – and driving even more severe effects worldwide,” Guterres said.
El Niño builds on top of an already warming world, driven primarily by the burning of fossil fuels. A WMO scientist, who did not want to be named, told journalists that all the heatwaves and other climate impacts seen so far this year are “before the effects of El Niño are really kicking in at a global scale”.
Fossil fuellling the fires
Fires have broken out across much of Europe but are threatening the most people in the south-west of France near Bordeaux and in Central Spain near Madrid. Nearly a quarter of a million people have been evacuated in France with hundreds of homes destroyed while in Spain 80,000 people have had to leave their homes and at least 13 died in one village.
A scientific study published on Friday by the World Weather Attribution group found that man-made climate change made deadly fires in France twice as likely and those in Spain twenty times more likely. Smaller fires in the UK were not analysed by the study.
UN Climate Change leader Simon Stiell blamed fossil fuels for the fires, as well as storms in Chile and heatwaves in North America and Japan in recent weeks. “The climate alarm is blaring”, he said on Wednesday.
Guterres criticised new fossil fuel production projects and fossil fuel subsidies for causing hardship across the world. Discussing his speech, a senior UN official – who did not want to be named – said the subsidies amounted to trillions of US dollars a year and criticised pension funds and institutional investors, including insurance companies, for continuing to invest in fossil fuel projects.
Asked why world leaders and the public are not prioritising climate action, Guterres said they are distracted by wars in Ukraine, the Middle East, Sudan and elsewhere and sometimes forget “other aspects that are a sometimes even more dangerous threat”.
Also the fossil fuel industry and “some countries” are campaigning to pretend that climate change does not exist, he said, adding that the UN should be more active in “naming the situations as they are and the responsibilties as they are and mobilising the public opinion”.
After meetings in Paris and Madrid earlier in the week, the UK’s new foreign minister Ed Miliband issued joint statements with his French and Spanish counterparts – Jean-Noël Barrot and José Manuel Albares Bueno – calling on the world to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels.
They promised to do more to reduce emissions and protect their people and encouraged other governments to do the same.
The UK-French statement called on governments to publish UN climate plans, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which are aligned with the Paris Agreement’s goal to limit global average temperatures to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.
According to Climate Action Tracker, only three countries – the UK, Nigeria and Norway – have submitted NDCs with 2035 emissions reduction targets which are compatible with 1.5C. Fifty-two countries – including Egypt, Vietnam and Argentina – have yet to submit an NDC at all.
Defending science
Beyond action on emissions, the ministers also intervened in an ongoing dispute over the timing of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC)’s next flagship assessment.
Miliband and Barrot’s statement said they “underline the importance” of scientific report feeding into governments’ next global stocktake of progress on climate action in two years’ time, calling it a “critical input” to that process.
The timing of this report has been a contentious issue in government negotiations at the IPCC and at June’s climate talks in Bonn. While a group of nations calling themselves the “friends of science” want the report before the stocktake, others like Saudi Arabia and India have argued that this would make the report of a worse quality and less inclusive of developing countries’ scientists.
Science ‘under attack’ from fossil fuel interests at UN climate talks
The UK-Spanish statement weighed in less explicitly on this issue but said that they “recall the importance of scientific evidence and acknowledge the work of the IPCC in this respect.”
The British and French ministers said they would seek to accelerate reductions of emissions in methane, a particularly potent greenhouse gas, at COP31 in November. They encouraged governments “to work jointly to develop a marketplace for fossil fuels with near-zero methane intensity.”
Methane leaks from oil, gas and coal production are a major contributor to global warming. Over a 20-year period, methane traps around 80 times more heat than carbon dioxide.
The UK and Spanish statement emphasised the importance of supporting the Global South and underlined the need to mobilise sustainable financing “at scale with the challenge we face”. The previous UK government, in which Miliband was energy minister, cut climate finance to developing countries to pay for increases in military spending.
The UK government led by new Prime Minister Andy Burnham has yet to outline any major changes to climate finance in its two weeks in power but has announced it will convert some finance from grants to loans in order to free up money to subsidise bus travel in England.
More adaptation needed
Guterres said that “it is time to stop treating each disaster as an isolated tragedy and recognise the systemic risk that is unfolding before our eyes.” A recent study found that three-quarters of UK media reports about the British June heatwave did not mention climate change.
As well as reducing emissions, the UN Secretary-General called for measures to adapt vulnerable people to extreme heat. Specifically, he said that buildings should be built and retrofitted for extreme heat and that every city and country should have heat-health action plans and early warning systems. Over 250 cities have joined the UN’s ‘beat the heat’ initiative, he said.
The Portuguese diplomat called for governments and employers to do more to protect their workers from heat, criticising global fashion brands for not setting heat standards for the factories that supply them. “No one should have to risk their life to earn a living,” he said.
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