At COP29 in Baku, Carbon Brief spoke with Prof Wang Can, director of the department of environmental planning and management at Tsinghua University, to discuss its new study on global carbon neutrality progress.
Tsinghua University is located in Beijing and publishes some of the country’s most prominent climate research, which is often used to inform related policymaking.
The study, published by the university’s Institute for Carbon Neutrality and School of Environment, evaluates different countries’ progress on “[climate and carbon] targets, technology, finance and international cooperation”.
It also identifies “implementation gaps between carbon neutrality targets and emission reduction outcomes”.
In this wide-ranging interview, Wang introduces the institute’s findings and identifies key barriers for the world to reach net-zero emissions.
He also shares reflections on the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), China’s upcoming 2035 climate pledge (NDC), its carbon market, “dual control of carbon” policy, the 14th “five-year plan”, carbon “peaking” timeline, electrification, energy storage and hydrogen.
The interview is transcribed in full below, following a summary of key quotes. The transcript has been edited for length and clarity.
- On the need to implement climate pledges: “We follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations.”
- On developing countries’ commitment to climate action: “The determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active.”
- On China’s 2035 climate pledge (NDC): “The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035.”
- On global renewable deployment: “[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripling target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster.”
- On barriers to tripling renewables: “[Renewable energy] could have been deployed faster…but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers…[We found that countries] including the US have such policies.”
- On the EU’s CBAM: “We think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy.”
- On different pathways to net-zero: “[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature and it is representative for developing countries.”
- On China’s carbon market: “I think progress in this area will become faster…A total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.”
- On missing China’s 2025 energy intensity goal: “The individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not.”
- On China’s emissions peaking early: “I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025…Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends…we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.”
- On China’s electrification: “Electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other…In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful.”
- On the need for energy-storage systems: “Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy.”
- On hydrogen: “There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail.”
Carbon Brief: What’s the most important finding of your research?
Wang Can: We tracked the progress [of countries’ carbon neutrality efforts] from the perspective of implementation. We paid more attention to actions and used scientific methods to evaluate them. Carbon goals are set for decades in the future – if we simply look at the goals, it is difficult to evaluate whether our current actions are sufficient, so a scientific and systematic method is needed to evaluate them. We think actions are important, and the method of evaluating action is also important.
CB: Your report found developing countries have a higher “ambition index” while developed countries have a lower ambition index. What does “ambition index” mean here?
WC: When we talk about ambition index or use index to express what I said earlier, we follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations. Hence we revise countries’ ambition indexes. For example, a country might advertise that it wants to achieve carbon neutrality as soon as possible, but take the action of setting up various barriers to hinder the flow of technology and hinder global cooperation. [Therefore,] it may be very ambitious in terms of goals, but its actions have negative effects. Our index will take these into account and, after considering these factors, assign a score. As of last year, some developing countries have scored higher, while some developed countries have relatively lower ambition indexes.
CB: So you mean you check goals of countries announced in their NDCs and give positive or negative points for their climate actions, and then calculate a score for their ambition index?
WC: Yes.
CB: Were you surprised by the results?
WC: I am not surprised, because I have been involved in the negotiation of the [UN] climate convention for more than ten years. From the negotiation process, we can feel that the determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active. Although developed countries have the ability and technology, and their scientists have more systematic and scientific knowledge in this regard, they are not as persistent as developing countries like China. Once [China] announced [its climate] goal, it systematically and continuously progresses. [Developed countries did not do the same] due to considerations for economy and international trade competition.
CB: The west is particularly interested in China’s 2035 NDC. What new climate goal do you think China would propose or what should be written in the next NDC?
WC: I think the next NDC will still be in line with our “dual carbon” policy [of peaking emissions before 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality before 2060]. The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035. We already have a target for what we should achieve by 2030, and [the next NDC instead prompts] a new round of what we should achieve by 2035. Different stages have different tasks, but they both are under the same overall framework. China has already [announced] its “dual carbon’” goals, [set] two time points [of 2030 and 2060], and [established] the “1+N” policy system. I think [the NDC] is nothing more than specifying tasks for from 2030 to 2035 under such a system. This is my personal understanding and expectation.
CB: Your report said that the current speed of renewable energy development globally is insufficient to meet COP28’s tripling target for 2030 and there is a “large gap” in the deployment scale required to meet climate targets. What are the main factors holding back faster growth?
WC: I’m not sure if your question is completely consistent with the point we want to express in the report. My understanding of what we said in the report is that although we have seen rapid development of renewable energy, and it is very optimistic in recent years, there is still a gap compared to the requirements of tripling global renewable power capacity by 2030 and the global net-zero target by 2050.
[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripping target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster, especially from a global perspective. Now there are a few countries, such as China and Indonesia in south-east Asia, that have deployed [renewable energy] very quickly in the past one or two years, but globally we have not seen the speed we expected. This is what we want to convey at the core, or what we especially want to convey.
The reason behind this is that we believe that [renewable energy] technology has developed to a stage, from our research, that it could have been deployed faster. After it is deployed faster and more widely [in the future], the speed of progress of this technology will accelerate, and it will enter a positive cycle. This could have happened, but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers, and the extension of trade barriers from [targeting] originally high-tech and communications products to [also targeting] renewable energy that addresses climate change.
This type of trade barrier is a typical practice, based on traditional and very narrow economic interests. It may have ignored the fact, which actually comes from western international trade theory, that free international trade can promote economic development, technological progress, and thus bring a new round of win-win situation. Short-sighted behavior ignores [this]. In the field of renewable energy, the medium- and long-term economic benefits, as well as a firm commitment to climate change, have both been given up [by western countries]. So this, in our view, is a problem facing the development of renewable energy that needs to be solved.
CB: Can you please give an example of the trade barrier you mentioned?
WC: Increased tariffs, for instance – imposing [high] tariffs on renewable energy equipment imports, and the intentional imposition of such tariffs. This example is what we referenced in our country analysis. [We found that countries] including the US have such policies. Our report set a framework in which we checked whether there are trade barrier policies in place, whether [such policies] are enforced, and then, if they are, we look at whether they targeted green and low-carbon technology that we need for cutting emissions. If so, we then gave different weights and negative scores.
CB: What is the trade barrier or barriers that bring the worst impacts currently?
WC: The import controls on wind and solar, adding tariffs on them, or commerce control lists of this kind.
CB: Mainly in the US?
WC: Mainly in the US.
CB: What do you think about the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)?
WC: In our evaluation, we think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy, and its impact may hinder the flow of technology mentioned earlier, the rapid diffusion of technology and the rapid deployment of advanced technology around the world.
Of course, we have to look further and look at it in more detail, because the scope of the industry that CBAM covers will change in the years ahead. At present, from the perspective of international cooperation, its negative weight is not high. From the perspective of execution, although it mainly covers electricity and hydrogen energy [as well as other industries], its scope is not very large at present.
CB: Your report says that there is no “single zero-carbon pathway” that would be universally applicable for all. Instead, it says “differentiated measures are needed for different types of countries”. What’s the best pathway for China to reach carbon neutrality and how does that differ to others?
WC: Yes, what we want to say is that there is no single model that is suitable for all countries to achieve net-zero. Different countries are at different stages of development, their economic structures are different, their resources are different, and even their institutional political structure as well as cultural characteristics are different, so the paths to achieve net-zero will definitely be different. Countries do have differences in policies, [climate] targets, technologies, funds, and international cooperation methods – what we just discussed – [so] we think that different countries should have different models.
For China, “dual carbon” is a policy goal with Chinese characteristics. We need to reach carbon peak before 2030 and achieve neutrality before 2060. The carbon peak before 2030 means that we still need time to decouple economic development from carbon emissions. If we don’t reach the peak, it means that we haven’t decoupled these things yet. Economic growth [still leads to] an increase in carbon emissions. Why is that? Because we are still a developing country, and the largest developing country – the developing country with the most industry in the world. Our manufacturing industry is relatively large, our population is large, and we are still in the process of urbanisation and industrialisation. Carbon emissions and economic development have not yet been completely decoupled. Even in such a situation, we have proposed the goal of achieving carbon neutrality, which further reflects our ambition and determination.
[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature, and it is representative for developing countries. Many developing countries are similar to us. They have not achieved decoupling, but want to specify response to climate change and achieve the two goals [of carbon peak and neutrality]. To reach net-zero globally by the middle of this century, developing countries introduced some targets and paths.
So what is the path? Achieve neutrality after peaking. First, there is a stage of rapid peaking, and to peak as low as possible. In this stage, technical support, financial support, and even some capacity buildings are needed. For example, China is building a carbon market as a policy tool. Currently it is still in the stage of capacity building – collecting carbon emission data, [improving] professional trading capabilities of the market, and so on. This stage is very important for China. If the foundation is not laid solid at this stage, then after reaching the peak, the stage of carbon reduction and achieving carbon neutrality may take a relatively long time, making it more difficult for us to achieve carbon neutrality.
CB: Speaking of China’s carbon market, in our previous Carbon Brief reports, some analysts said that it is not fully active yet, and that trade may have not achieved its maximum potential. How can we maximise the potential of the carbon market?
WC: I think progress in this area will become faster. Because this year [2024], the State Council issued a work plan for the transition from “dual control of energy” consumption to “dual control of carbon”, and clarified a timetable [for this]. From now to 2030, the main mechanism is controlling carbon intensity [the emissions per unit of GDP], with total control [in tonnes of carbon emissions] as a secondary mechanism. But at the same time, [developing] some total control mechanisms should be explored. After China’s carbon emissions peak in 2030, total control [in tonnes of CO2] will be the main mechanism [of controlling carbon emissions], supplemented by [carbon] intensity control.
As long as there is a total control target, the carbon trading and carbon market system can play a role in lowering emissions. Because a policy tool such as carbon trading essentially aims to achieve a certain set target for total emissions at a low cost. A target for total emissions control only gives an amount [to reach], but whether this target is allocated to emitting entities efficiently or not isn’t something the government has enough information to determine. Through carbon trading and carbon markets, emission reductions can be achieved at the lowest cost. So to answer your question directly, when a total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.
CB: You mentioned the transfer from “dual control of energy” to “dual control of carbon emissions”. There are suggestions that China’s total emission intensity target could be missed because this year’s GDP growth is slower than emissions rates. Do you think this has a big impact?
WC: What impact are you referring to?
CB: The 14th “five-year plan”. The 14th five-year plan has set a total energy intensity reduction goal but it could be missed because economic growth is slower than energy consumption.
WC: The energy intensity goal, yes.
CB: Do you think this will slow down the entire emission reduction process [planned in the 14th “five-year plan”]?
WC: I think this [energy intensity] goal is to serve the broader goal of emissions reduction, so whether it was achievable or not may have been a factor that was considered when the goal was originally set. For example, when the goal was set around 2020, it did not take into account the economic form and technological changes of recent years. In fact, there is another goal corresponding to this goal, which is the total amount of renewable energy [for 1,200GW of wind and solar capacity by 2030]…[which was] achieved very quickly. So we set some goals that are easy to achieve and some goals that may be more difficult to achieve than expected. I think I should go back to my previous point that the individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not.
From the perspective of promoting “dual carbon” work in recent years, China has made great progress in the construction of its [climate] policies, reducing the cost of developing renewable energy technologies, and [increasing] the pace of deploying [them]. From the central government to the provincial government and then to the city-level government, there is a top-down push for capacity building and promotion of [the government’s] ecological work around raising public awareness and collecting data, such as the building blocks for baseline data, including exploring the integration of carbon assessments into environmental impact assessments. These are also the views expressed in our report on global progress on carbon neutrality. From this perspective, we think that China’s work over the past three years – since general secretary Xi Jinping announced the “dual-carbon” goals – has been on the right track, helping us achieve carbon peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060.
We are doing solid ground work. It’s not a slogan or “campaign-style” work that could lead to [short-term] reductions that later rebound. If we want to reduce them sustainably, a systematic change in the economy and society is needed. This systematic change must come from the perspectives just mentioned, and we must do some ground work. [The changes brought about by] some work may not be fast in the short term, as [emissions] are still in a climbing stage, and the total amount [of emissions] has not been completely reduced. But this is what we are doing in the short term to prepare for the long term, and the short term is a stage that we can’t avoid.
CB: We previously published an analysis that China may have already achieved carbon peak in 2023, based on data. What do you think about this research finding?
WC: I think predicting a peak is not a scientific approach. So far, I have not seen any indicators or studies that can predict a country has reached a peak. It is something that must be judged by time, and it may take several years [after a peak appears to occur] because emissions may rebound. Of course, there are many factors to consider in analysis and research, such as the growth of the population, the growth of the economy, industrial structure, and energy demand and the energy technology behind it.
There are many indicators that could help us do this analysis. Based on analysis of the existing indicators, I think it is not wrong to [say China has] reached its peak in 2023, and this is definitely credible. But I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025. Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends, including the systematic preparations we have made and the determination of the central government work towards the “dual carbon” goals, we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.
[Carbon Brief analysis published since this interview took place shows that China’s CO2 emissions stopped rising for the last 10 months of 2024, but still grew slightly overall.]
CB: Your previous work has pointed towards the economic benefits of electrification as an approach to cutting emissions. The IEA [International Energy Agency] has also recently highlighted China’s rapid progress on this front. Can you talk about China’s strategy here, the current situation with electrification and what China can do to move forward?
WC: In my articles, electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other. Renewable energy replaces fossil energy and builds a new power system – a goal we hope to achieve for net-zero [efforts]. In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful. Why is that? Because electrification at the end-use has implications for energy saving and can also adjust the unstable supply of renewable energy. At the same time, electrification can better absorb some energy storage facilities [integrate energy storage into the energy system] and accelerate energy storage’s technological progress. In addition, electrification reduces dependence on fossil energy. It is not in an “either/or” [zero-sum game] with renewable energy. The more renewable energy develops, the more confident we are that it should be used for end-use consumption.
CB: Can you please explain a bit more? How can electrification ‘absorb energy storage’?
WC: Electrification is the direct consumption of energy at the end-use, such as boilers. So when we talk about electrification, we need to look at what is being electrified. Electrification is [using electric boilers] to replace the use of coal-fired and natural gas-fired boilers for heating in industries, or using electric vehicles (EVs) to replace gasoline cars, or using induction cookers to replace natural gas for cooking. All these directly reduce [the consumption of] fossil energy.
[If] all the traditional fossil energy uses are replaced by electricity, our demand for energy storage will not grow. EVs are applications of lithium batteries being used in the automotive field. Heat pumps and electronic heat pumps for industr[ial production] can also be equipped with energy storage. This opens up a new demand for energy storage at the end-use. Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy. As we mentioned above, energy storage is a link in this system.
CB: Electric heat pumps are generally used in the south while central heating with coal is more common in the north. Are there methods, such as policy support, that can help the north to quickly transfer to heat pumps?
WC: I am not particularly clear about this issue, but I believe that it is centred on technical difficulties. Because the demand for heat in the north is more fundamental and urgent than that in the south. For example, heating under low temperature conditions is a livelihood issue [in the north]. In the south, the demand for heat pumps may be met by low-temperature boilers for production, which can be produced today, tonight, or tomorrow, with certain production flexibility. Therefore, the supply of heat pumps in the south is not so urgent. In the north, [central heating with coal] can be more secure. So there may be different [requirements] in security, technology and applicability of heat pumps. I think it is not just a policy issue, it needs further developments in technology.
CB: What do you think about hydrogen?
WC: I would think that, just like electrification, it may be a very important technical field for the construction of a carbon-neutral technology system in the future. One of the characteristics of renewable energy, once the supply becomes high, is that it is intermittent, so it requires energy storage. Energy storage means that it can store energy when there is no demand, and provide some when supply cannot meet demand. [Hydrogen] is both a better energy storage and a way to develop chemical reserves, because its production method, electrolysis, can use surplus renewable energy. This surplus renewable energy comes from solar and wind energy.
Such an energy storage method is [different from] traditional hydrogen production, where hydrogen is a by-product of the chemical industry or even converted directly from oil and fossil fuels. This is a [current] trend and form of energy conversion, not a form of energy storage. [But] in the carbon-neutral technical system, hydrogen is a form of energy storage.
The core difference is a power system featured with renewable energy, whose marginal cost is very low – almost zero marginal running costs. So after wind and solar are deployed – after the costs of infrastructure and fixed asset investment – the cost for electricity generation via wind and solar is almost zero. The zero marginal running cost can be used for electrolysis. You can understand it as using zero cost for hydrogen production. At that time, the cost of hydrogen will be very low.
CB: But I heard the cost for hydrogen production is quite high currently?
WC: Yes, that’s because enough progress hasn’t been made yet. When we are still using water electrolysis to make hydrogen, the cost of wind and solar power is spread over the electricity used to electrolyse water. It is not using surplus [renewable] electricity for electrolysis, because there is not that much surplus electricity. When the proportion of wind and solar power in our power system reaches a certain level, there will be more surplus electricity. In order to store the surplus electricity, we currently use lithium batteries and other [technologies] to store this electricity, instead of using electrolysis to make hydrogen. So I think hydrogen is a new form of energy storage.
At the same time, hydrogen is also a clean new energy form for end-use. It can replace natural gas and gasoline. After it is converted into ammonia, it can also replace oil used in heavy trucks and even cruise ships. It is a foreseeable clean energy form and an end-use energy. So I think it is very critical. There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail. So it is a key and indispensable technology.
The interview was conducted by Wanyuan Song at COP29 in Baku on 16 November 2024.
The post The Carbon Brief interview: Prof Wang Can appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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