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Conflict in the Middle East Threatens Carbon Capture Buildout: What It Means for the Global CCUS Market?

The conflict in the Middle East is raising doubts about major carbon capture projects in the Gulf region. Carbon capture, utilization, and storage, known as CCUS, is a technology that prevents carbon dioxide (CO₂) from entering the atmosphere. It captures CO₂ from industrial sources and stores it underground or uses it in industrial processes. CCUS is seen as crucial for cutting hard‑to‑abate emissions from oil, gas, cement, and steel.

Gulf Ambitions Hit the Pause Button

Before the conflict, Gulf plans aimed for about 20 million tonnes per year (Mtpa) of CCUS capacity by 2030. This would have positioned the region as a key global hub. But Rystad Energy says this is now unlikely. The pipeline may shrink closer to the lower case of around 12 Mtpa by 2035 due to delays and repriced risk. 

impact of middle east conflict to CCUS in gulf
Source: Rystad Energy

The Gulf’s CCUS buildout has strong logical drivers. The region has abundant oil and gas operations, and projects often connect to those facilities. However, when the upstream energy system is disrupted, CCUS plans can be delayed, pushed back, or re‑evaluated. This change affects investors’ view of CCUS as a near‑term investment in the region.

Rising Costs and Risk Reprice Carbon Capture

One major risk from prolonged conflict is rising energy costs. If energy prices jump — which often happens during regional conflict — the cost to capture and transport CO₂ also rises.

Rystad’s analysis shows that a 50 % rise in energy prices could increase capture and transport costs by about 30 %. That could push the cost of capturing a tonne of CO₂ well above the price range expected by 2030 in the European Union’s emissions trading system. 

  • The analysis suggests an increase from $95 per tonne to $124 per tonne using a ‘middle impact’ case, where energy prices rise about 50%.
ccus cost impact of energy price increase
Source: Rystad Energy

Higher costs come from more expensive power, higher equipment prices, and slower supply chains. All these pressures hit CCUS projects hard because they are already more costly than conventional infrastructure.

Energy‑intensive capture systems need cheap, reliable supplies of power and materials. Rising inflation and disrupted supply chains could reduce availability and slow project build‑outs. 

Longer project timelines may also raise the cost of capital. Investors typically demand higher returns when projects take longer or face greater uncertainty. In some cases, projects may only move forward if they are supported by governments or strategic partners, especially when the cost per tonne of CO₂ captured rises above key benchmarks. 

Global CCUS Market Still Expanding

While the Gulf faces near‑term risks, the global CCUS market has continued to grow. A large number of projects are being developed worldwide.

As of 2025, ~628 CCUS projects are tracked globally across all stages, with potential capture capacity exceeding 416 Mtpa if completed. Operational capacity reached 64 Mtpa from 77 facilities. The breakdown by number of facilities and total capture capacity is as follows:

commercial CCS facilities capacity and projects 2025 H1
Source: Global CCS Institute

The market is growing because many governments and companies have adopted emission‑reduction mandates. About 63 % of industries say these mandates accelerate CCUS deployment.

  • Nearly 55 % of new CCUS projects are integrated with other low‑carbon technologies like hydrogen or renewable energy.
CO₂ capture capacity of commercial CCS facility
Source: Global CCS Institute

North America leads global capacity, accounting for about 46 % of total CCUS project capacity. Europe holds around 26 %, Asia‑Pacific about 21 %, and the Middle East & Africa roughly 7 % of the total project pipeline.

The oil and gas sector remains the largest user of CCUS, making up about 53 % of the global captured CO₂. Industrial decarbonization in sectors like cement and steel now represents around 25 % of the planned capacity worldwide. 

operational CCS capacity per region
Source: IEA estimations

Market research also shows that the CCS market size was estimated at about USD 3.9 billion in 2025, growing at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7 % to reach USD 6.7 billion by 2033. This growth reflects rising investments in decarbonization technologies across industrial and power sectors.

Long-Term Outlook: The Gigaton Challenge

CCUS projects are growing, but still fall far short of what climate models recommend. A recent Rystad Energy forecast suggests that global CCUS capacity could expand to more than 550 million tonnes per year by 2030. That’s more than a tenfold increase over today’s roughly 45 million tonnes per year of captured CO₂.

However, this projected expansion is still far below what many climate scenarios require. Limiting global warming to under 2 °C often needs CCUS to capture nearly 8 gigatonnes of CO₂ each year by 2050 in many energy transition models. That means growth must accelerate sharply after 2030 to meet climate goals.

The IDTechEx forecast shows a strong long‑term outlook for CCUS. It estimates global capture capacity will hit around 0.7 gigatonnes per year by 2036. This indicates rapid growth, with a CAGR over 20% from 2026 to 2036. This would place CCUS as a major technology in global decarbonization, if investment and deployment scale up quickly.

What This Means for the Gulf and the World

For the Gulf region, rising geopolitical risk is changing how CCUS projects are evaluated. Many planned build‑outs linked to oil and gas value chains may be slowed or repriced as risk premiums rise.

Some analysts now expect that Gulf CCUS capacity may align with a more cautious trajectory through the mid‑2030s rather than a rapid 2030 build‑out. Moreover, the 8 Mtpa shortfall equals 1.5% of the projected 550 Mtpa global capacity, placing intense pressure on North America and Europe to accelerate.

Rising costs from energy price shocks further complicate the equation. With Middle East & Africa capacity shrinking from 7% to ~4% of the total pipeline, US 45Q projects and EU ETS industrial clusters must find enough replacement capacity.

Still, global drivers for CCUS remain strong. Governments and companies worldwide continue to plan and build projects. New technologies and integrations with hydrogen, renewable energy, and industrial clusters could help spread costs and scale the technology.

As many countries expand their net‑zero plans, CCUS will play a key role in managing emissions that are difficult to eliminate through electrification or fuel switching alone.

In this evolving landscape, the CCUS market is poised for significant long‑term growth, but near‑term geopolitical disruptions and cost pressures will require careful planning, strong policy support, and sustained investment. Strategic partnerships and global cooperation will be key to ensuring that CCUS can meet both economic and climate goals.

The post Conflict in the Middle East Threatens Carbon Capture Buildout: What It Means for the Global CCUS Market? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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